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I  appeal to you, therefore, brothers and sisters, by the mercies o f God, 
to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, 
holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship.
Do not be conformed to this world, 
but be transformed by the renewing o f your minds, 
so that you may discern what is the will o f God -  
what is good and acceptable and perfect. (Romans 12:1-2)
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Introduction
1. Background to the Thesis and a Discussion of its General Outlook
The topic of conscience has fascinated me for a number of years. In the course of my 
pastoral work in different parishes, and chaplaincy work with young people and those 
in hospital, whether for mental or physical reasons, I have encountered countless 
people who struggled with moral dilemmas or who felt crushed by guilt owing to the 
gap between their practice and their knowledge of what they were called to do. I have 
also met individuals who seemed to be unaware that, despite the gravity of the action, 
what they were doing was in any way wrong. Whether mentioned or left implicit, the 
conscience of each of these individuals played a vital role in the decision to choose 
one course of action over another, in judging a completed action to have been right or 
wrong, or even in exhibiting a state of perplexed uncertainty as to what should be 
done next. Thinking over these different problems led me to reflect further on the 
question of erroneous conscience. Could an action that was considered to be wrong by 
others (particularly by the Magisterium of the Church) be good, virtuous or 
meritorious if the individual believed it to be so? Do we live in parallel moral 
universes, where the person ultimately defines what is moral solely by belief or 
conviction, or do we have access to a ground of universal truth, rooted in our created 
nature, as gifted by God? Therefore, should the pastor leave the individual in blissful 
ignorance, or should he try to deepen moral understanding or help develop the moral 
capacities of the people he encounters?
Consideration of questions such as these led me to investigate the possibility 
of making conscience the subject of doctoral research. However, the resultant thesis is 
not a study of pastoral problems, in the style of a manualistic analysis of cases of 
conscience. Rather the study is at the level of fundamental moral theology, presented
in the hope that a deepened awareness of the nature and function of conscience will 
shape my future pastoral activity, and in the hope that it might help others, too, in 
their understanding of this core notion of morality. As a result, I have attempted to 
present a detailed study of the notion of conscience with the purpose of highlighting 
that it cannot operate, or be understood as operating, in isolation, but rather is 
dependant upon the context of virtue and grace (and a community of people living in 
grace and virtue) for its flourishing. Such a context is ultimately an expression of the 
universal call to holiness: a call to seek union with God that shapes our judgements of 
conscience, our choices and actions, including those which have an impact on others. 
This conclusion may seem to be either obvious, unreal or facile to different readers, 
but a brief response to these objections may offer some justification for the content of 
this thesis.
The idea that conscience needs virtue and grace may be considered obvious by 
some people. What is perhaps not obvious, however, is how these concepts fit 
together and support each other. A key concept concerning how conscience develops 
or relates to other human capacities and gifts is the notion of ‘formation of 
conscience’. Yet, it appears to me that the idea is often presented with insufficient 
detail, such that the blueprint offered for that formation often lacks the necessary, 
positive anthropological underpinning. In this situation, formation of conscience 
could be misread in two radically different ways. Firstly, conscience formation could 
be viewed through the lens of a morality of obligation as simply doing what the 
Church tells you to do; tantamout to what appears to be a restriction of the freedom of 
conscience in this moral mindset. Alternatively, other writers present formation of 
conscience as engaging oneself in sufficient moral education so as to free oneself 
from the psychological burden of a super-ego, or a childish conscience based on
obligation, so that one arrives at an adult conscience which is able to think fully for 
itself. Each of these understandings of formation involves a negative tension between 
conscience and external authority, where conscience is either the slave or the master, 
and gives insufficient attention to formation as a process of growth in moral 
disposition, in tune with reality on all levels: personal, interpersonal, relating to the 
world around us, and to God himself. This leads us to the question of the place of 
prayer in the moral life. As Christians, this may also seem to be so obvious as not to 
require any further reflection. Yet, again, this is not the case, since prayer can also be 
misconstrued as some kind of irrational bypass, or an excuse for justifying selfish 
motivation or actions that would go against the moral teaching of the Church. I would 
suggest that these possible uses of prayer give further evidence that research is needed 
into the relationship between conscience, grace and reason.
To others this thesis may seem unreal or facile. Clearly, a study discussing the 
nature of conscience and its relationship to virtue and grace may appear to be merely 
an academic exercise, with little potential for application, especially if the concept of 
virtue is met with scant regard and the idea of grace is faced with unbelief. Virtue is a 
little-used word in everyday speech, and it, as well as its particular forms, suffers 
from misconceptions, which often reduces it to being synonymous with a lack of 
dynamism or being a killjoy. Yet, this could hardly be further from its real meaning. 
Even in academic circles, virtue ethics is still only slowly recovering some of its 
former strength, as its language is still considered by many to be out of date or 
superseded by other approaches to morality, in such a way that it no longer has much 
to contribute to moral theory. However, it is hoped that this thesis will contain 
sufficient coherence so as to uphold virtue’s role in conscience, particularly through 
the notion of habitus in offering a way of acknowledging conscience’s capacity for
development, as well as through the virtue of prudence, in recognising and applying 
the moral law. As to the role of grace in conscience, this will only make sense within 
the framework of belief. Indeed, as such this thesis is written as a work of theology, 
believing in the reality of God’s presence and action in our lives, from within the 
understanding of the Catholic faith. Here the capacity of conscience for growth and 
development also encompasses the capacity to be forgiven, healed and helped by the 
Spirit of the living God. Our conscience, understood as the moral sense of seeing the 
truth, needs to develop, and the two main aspects of that development are our efforts 
in virtue, and our openness to God’s efforts in gracing our lives in holiness.
Lastly, while acknowledging the legitimacy of virtue and grace, other readers 
may still consider my conclusion of the need for virtue and grace in conscience to be a 
facile or neat and tidy conclusion which fails to acknowledge the complexities and 
limitations of human existence. Yet, thinking back to pastoral experience, it is 
precisely the acknowledgement of these limitations that prompted this conclusion in 
the first place. At certain points I will draw the reader’s attention to the limitations or 
flaws in the operation of conscience. This at first might seem to be evidence against 
the possibility of virtuous life, as if it were an unobtainable goal, but this would be 
looking at virtue from the wrong end. Rather than seeing the definition of virtue as a 
cause of defeatism or resignation in the face of one’s limitations, one should consider 
the virtuous life as the model for the possibility of moral improvement or persistent 
striving, so long as it is placed in the context of hope in God’s love, mercy and 
providence. Thus, ultimately we depend upon God’s grace for spiritual-moral growth, 
as our own efforts are never sufficient.
In effect, this thesis consists of three parts: a premise of moral fragmentation, an 
analysis of the nature of conscience in order to reveal the inadequacies of subjectivist 
notions (whose absolutism eschews the need for constant growth or assistance), and a 
study of virtue, grace and holiness as the necessary context for the growth and 
assistance that conscience requires.
Relying upon the evidence presented by a variety of authors that contemporary 
morality and moral theory is suffering from fragmentation, I will propose that this 
fragmentation has affected the common understanding of conscience, and is therefore 
in need of renewal, particularly in terms of reintegration with its proper setting. In 
order to verify that proposal, it is necessary to study how conscience has been 
understood over the centuries, particularly in the context of Christian faith, as well as 
focus upon particular issues concerning its nature and function. This investigation, 
contained in chapters two, three and four, will necessarily be lengthy, as it is my hope 
that, rather than paint a caricature of conscience, whose omissions would betray the 
reality, the conducting of a detailed study will both recover an awareness of the 
richness of this human capacity, as well as duly acknowledge its limitations. 
Conscience is neither a redundant, empty term, nor an excuse for subjective 
absolutism, where it knows no limits. Its nature lies in its relationship to our created 
being, created in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:27), who calls us to a life of 
true freedom and authenticity through our capacity to see the truth and to act upon it 
in goodness.
With regard to method, to the best of my ability, and within the constraints of 
availability of texts and the time alotted to me, I will endeavour to return to source 
material in its original language, with an eye also to the context in which the passage
2. Form and Method of the Thesis
was written. (Accordingly, all translations are my own, unless specified otherwise.) 
This, at times, will lead to chains of research which, hopefully, will reveal the original 
understanding of the author, be he or she from the classical, biblical, medieval, 
modem or contemporary period. The thesis is synthetic in approach, in that, given my 
concerns regarding fragmented understandings of conscience, I have drawn from a 
variety of authors from different periods in an attempt to bring together something of 
the wealth of thought on conscience presented down through the ages. This synthesis 
will also attempt an interdisciplinary link with psychology, particularly cognitive 
psychology, to give further support to the medieval view that conscience was both 
capable of moral reasoning and yet limited in its success.
In this way, much of the purpose of the thesis is summed up by the word 
“context.” The context of the historical review will serve to provide us with much 
material to reflect upon the nature of conscience, and the consideration of the 
existential context or environment of conscience will assist us in drawing conclusions 
about the circumstances and goal of its development. Therefore, we begin our 
exploration of conscience with a study of its history, starting with a presentation of 
current moral fragmentation and its impact on the contemporary understanding of 
conscience. This question of fragmentation will then prompt us to review the major 
stages of the history of its development, relating to its interpretation as a notion.
xiv
The term ‘conscience’ holds many connotations, from the momentous decisions and 
actions of Saint Thomas More and Martin Luther,1 to the cartoon character Jiminy 
Cricket sitting on your shoulder, counselling the right course of action. Someone may 
make an appeal to conscience for different reasons. It may be an expression of serious 
deliberation or simply a means of excusing oneself from having to follow a less 
selfish or more demanding path. Indeed, after many centuries of using the term, we 
have reached a point in history, and also more particularly in moral theology, where 
the term conscience is suffering from such contradictory or unclear usage that the 
concept has lost much of its moral impact. Popular usage of the concept would 
probably only resemble a fraction of its rich and complex history. As a result, even 
the basic question of what conscience is leads modem writers of different fields to 
produce a series of possibilities. Some would hold that it is an intellectual faculty 
closely related to the process of moral reasoning. Others would consider it to be an 
affective faculty, or the unpleasant emotional response to wrong action, whose role is 
to curb or modify such behaviour. Another school would reduce it to a connatural 
disposition to carry out what is thought to be right. Others would identify it with the 
voice of God whispering in the depths of our being. And yet, still others would argue 
that it does not exist at all, attributing all of its functions purely to the sphere of moral 
reasoning, or to the workings of a superego that judges our actions and threatens
Chapter One
Setting the Scene: Fragmentation
1. Introduction
1 D . V incent Tw om ey, “ A  Discourse on Thomas M ore’ s Great Matter: Conscience,”  in 
Contemporary Irish Moral Discourse: Essays in Honour o f  Patrick Hannon, ed. A m elia  Flem ing 
(Dublin: Colum ba Press, 2007), 156-80.
1
punishment on the basis of contravening the dictates of parental authority in its 
varying forms.2
This list is by no means exhaustive, but at least gives some idea of the 
challenge that one faces in trying to understand the meaning and function of 
conscience. Is it really the case that conscience does little more than “make cowards
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of us all,” or does it occupy a broader, more positive role in our lives? Is it related to 
other human capacities, or is it completely self-contained in its function and in the 
formation or provision of its content? Some would even question whether conscience 
has any content at all.4 I will explore these questions in this thesis, but I will do so in 
the light of a fundamental premise, namely, fragmentation. It is my concern that 
conscience is itself a victim of the fragmentation of moral theory, which has affected 
moral theology for some time, though particularly over the past four decades. This 
fragmentation has left conscience in danger of being isolated, weakened in its 
function or seen largely as simply the locus of personal opposition to external 
authority.
According to Jean Porter’s analysis, contemporary moral theology is afflicted 
with a markedly fragmented and divided set of approaches.5 For the past forty years 
“Catholic moral theology has been dominated by an intense and sometimes 
acrimonious debate between those who follow [Germain] Grisez and John Finnis in 
asserting that there are some determinate kinds of actions that are never morally
2 See Douglas C. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 99-100, 82, 1 11 ,  89-90.
3 W illiam  Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. T.J.B. Spencer (London: Penguin, 1980; 1996), act 3, 
scene 1, line 83.
4 For tw o types o f  this view , see Peter Fuss, “ Conscience,”  and Bernard W and, “ The Content 
and Function o f  C onscience” both contained in Conscience, ed. John D onnelly and Leonard Lyons 
(Staten Island, N Y : A lba House, 1973), 34-50 and 133-143 respectively. A t 47: “ The role o f  
conscience is purely and sim ply to ‘ enforce’ our moral knowledge or b e lie f w ith a tendency to act in 
accordance with what w e know  or believe.”
5 Jean Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue: The Relevance o f  Aquinas fo r  Christian Ethics 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John K n ox Press, 1990), 14-15; idem, Moral Action and Christian 
Ethics (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1995), 11.
2
justified, and those, sometimes called proportionalists, who disagree.” 6 Initially the 
divisions may seem even more surprising, given the fact that, on an even broader 
spectrum, so many leading Protestant and Catholic ethicists are “significantly 
indebted to one figure,” namely Saint Thomas Aquinas.7 However, Porter concludes 
that such divided opinion over moral matters among Christian ethicists should come 
as no surprise, since “the roots of the fragmentation of Christian ethics are similar to 
those that Alasdair MacIntyre has identified for secular moral discourse.” 8 As a result, 
it may be useful to review MacIntyre’s analysis in order to set the scene for Porter’s 
assessment of contemporary moral theology.
2. MacIntyre’s Analysis of Moral Fragmentation
In his seminal work After Virtue, MacIntyre states that modem moral discourse is 
radically flawed and that a pluralism of traditions has created a situation of an 
incommensurability of rival premises and argumentation in moral problems.9 His 
claim of a morally deficient modernity is based upon a review of the current context 
of moral disagreement and of the view that a masked emotivism has become widely 
accepted as the form of moral reasoning that best directs our actions and best sums up 
the sociological reality of humanity.10 MacIntyre believes that a moral “catastrophe” 
has occurred,11 without the majority being aware of the fact, and so his book charts
6 Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 14.
7 Ibid., 15. For a summary o f  contrasting approaches, see ibid., 16-31.
8 Ibid., 15.
9 Alasdair M acIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (London: D uckworth, 
1985), 8-10.
10 Ibid., 11-35.
11 Ibid., 3. M ore recently, D avid W alsh has written about what he calls the “ schizophrenia o f  
modern w orld,”  w hich is the “ irrational rationality o f  a technological w orld bereft o f  any ultimate 
order.”  L ike M acIntyre, he believes that society has lost its w ay and meaning, and that m uch o f  the 
foundations o f  m odernity are illusory. The difference in approach is that, w hile M acIntyre looks to 
redress the balance b y  returning to some form o f  teleological virtue-based m orality, W alsh ’ s te leology 
is overtly Christological. See David W alsh, The Third Millennium: Reflections on Faith and Reason 
(W ashington, D C : Georgetow n University Press, 1999), 67-110; 193-232, at 77  and 98.
3
the loss of the purpose of morality, and then attempts a reconstruction of our 
fragmented ethical discourse on Aristotelian lines. Indeed, it is the central thesis of 
After Virtue that it is in the Aristotelian moral tradition that we are to find the surest 
“epistemological and moral resources” for the grounding of moral discourse.12
MacIntyre says that modem moral disagreement has three fundamental
• • 13 « • •characteristics. Firstly, public disagreement is interminable, because of the 
incommensurability of rival arguments. Secondly, although this interminability has at 
its heart a private arbitrary basis for the choice of a position, the discourse is still 
couched in terms of objective standards and rational argument. Lastly, this paradox is 
further complicated by the fact that the premises of the rival arguments have very 
different historical origins, and that in turn the meaning of moral terms of the 
arguments has changed over time. He considers this change of meaning to be the root 
cause of our current disorder in discourse, and also of the flourishing of emotivism as 
the end product of this moral decay. MacIntyre sees this change in moral meaning as 
the result of the failure of the Enlightenment Project to give an isolated rational 
justification for morality. This failure was cumulative and so is examined by the 
author in the form of historical narrative.14
The Enlightenment was a period of secularisation and change, which led to the 
questioning of belief in general and of moral belief in particular. Authors such as 
Diderot, Hume and Kant began the process of unwittingly weaving together old and 
new styles of philosophy, leading to inherent contradictions in their philosophical 
systems. Largely, this old background would be supplied by the residue of the 
Enlightenment philosophers’ religious and social upbringing: Diderot in French 
Jansenist Catholicism, Hume in Scottish Presbyterianism, Kant in Prussian




Lutheranism, and Kierkegaard in Danish Lutheranism. Although there are clear 
differences in the style and philosophical approaches of these men, MacIntyre argues 
that they are remarkably similar in their ethical content. This implies that, although 
there are some radical gestures, such as Hume’s denial of the Christian objection to 
suicide,15 overall they remain quite conservative in their moral content. This, in turn, 
implies that on their part there is a presupposition of the general content or normative 
standard of morality, for which they then strive to find a new foundation. While 
inadvertently keeping much of the inherited moral content intact, paradoxically they 
sought to reject the classical-theistic Aristotelian tradition that helped to make the 
content intelligible. Their rejection of the metaphysics and teleology of this tradition 
pulled the rug from under their feet. The Enlightenment’s rejection of both an 
essential human nature and of any notion of telos or goal to human existence, leaves 
morality without its necessary framework, which leads to a fundamental breakdown in 
the purpose of ethics.16 As a result, morality came to require redefinition. Attempts 
were supplied by utilitarianism and analytical philosophy.
In the utilitarianism of writers such as Bentham and J.S. Mill, the benchmark 
for morality became the greatest pleasure or happiness to the greatest number.17 
Despite the positive social reforms that stem from this philosophical period, in the 
end, pleasure is an unquantifiable concept and so is useless in providing an ultimate 
criterion for solving moral problems. Utilitarianism gave way to intuitionism in 
Britain and pragmatism in North America, both being the immediate preparation for a
15 David Hume, Essays on Suicide & the Immortality o f  the Soul, reprints o f  the 1757 and 
1783 eds., (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’ s Press: 1992, 1995), 1-107.
16 Kant is forced to admit the necessity o f  a form o f  teleology for the intelligibility o f  ethics, 
but his teleology is radically different from the classical form, given that “ the order o f  nature form ing 
the context for the moral Idea is not itself teleological.”  See M acIntyre, After Virtue, 56; Thomas 
Auxter, Kant’s Moral Teleology (M acon, G A : M ercer University Press, 1982), 74.
17 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f  Morals and Legislation (N ew  York: 
Hafher, 1948). See pages 1-4 for a definition o f  utility and its role as the measure o f  right and wrong.
C f. John Stuart M ill, Utilitarianism (London and N ew  York: Longmans, Green and C o., 1895), 8-38.
5
decline into emotivism. Intuitionism stripped the truth-value from judgements and 
actions by separating the ‘is’ of fact from the ‘ought’ of moral obligation. The ‘ought’ 
can no longer be deduced by moral judgement since it is claimed that there is no such 
thing as moral reasoning, and so the person arrives at the dutiful action through 
simple intuition. This individualistic morality resulted in the view that moral conflict 
is resolved not by the inherent quality of the argument, but by the opponents’ capacity 
to convince or subdue. Thus, in this view, the winning or deciding criterion for moral 
problems is reduced to a matter of being able to shout the loudest or being the most 
eloquent in one’s conviction.18
Analytical philosophy quickly dismissed intuitionism, because it is clear that 
in reality moral reasoning does in fact take place. Thus, analytical philosophy sought 
to revive the Kantian attempts at a rationalist explanation for moral objectivity and 
authority. However, given the fact that the moral agent is now seen as unencumbered 
by the heteronomies of divine law, natural teleology or hierarchical authority, the 
project fails to reach its goal, since ultimately objective moral authority cannot be 
found in the individual moral agent.
MacIntyre argues that the current moral crisis is caused by a difference 
between the meaning and use of moral terms. Secular modem moral discourse draws 
its meaning from utilitarian or neo-Kantian thought, but the apparent success of such 
thought is betrayed by the emotivist use for which it is employed. Emotivism is the 
doctrine which holds that all moral and evaluative judgements are without objectivity, 
and are nothing but expressions of preference and feeling towards something.19 
Society has absorbed this historical process of philosophical deterioration, and so the 
emotive aftermath of the Enlightenment is the creation of an illusory social theory of
18 See Cahal B. Daly, Moral Philosophy in Britain: From Bradley to Wittgenstein (Dublin: 
Four Courts Press, 1996), 26-94, at 72.
19 On the em otivist theories o f  A yer and Stevenson, see ibid., 137-199.
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value-neutrality and desire-fuelled manipulative power, where preference is justified 
by bureaucrats and so-called experts.
What can we draw from this description of the moral breakdown of society? It 
leads us to face up to the stark choice of full acceptance or radical reform of the
current situation. For MacIntyre this choice is symbolised by the adoption of either
9 n • •Nietzschean or Aristotelian styles of thought, and his writing clearly advocates the 
choice for Aristotelian reform with a revival of attention to virtue.
3. Porter's Analysis of Fragmentation in Moral Theology
It is MacIntyre’s description of moral crisis21 that leads Jean Porter to see 
fundamental similarities between the fragmentation of Christian ethics and the decline 
of secular moral discourse:
20 N ietzsche, as the nihilist logical conclusion to this process, continues the rejection o f  past 
foundations, but also has the honesty to encourage the elimination o f  vestigial references to pre-m odem  
m orality. C f. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Judith Norman, ed. Rolf-Peter 
Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13 (emphasis in text): 
“ L ife  is itse lf w ill to power. [ ...]  In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous teleological 
principles!” ; idem, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. H ollingdale, ed. W alter 
Kaufinann (N ew  York: V intage Books, 1967), 404: “Profoundest gratitude for that w hich m orality has 
achieved hitherto: but now it is only a burden which may becom e a fatality! M orality itself, in the form 
o f  honesty, com pels us to deny m orality.”  Elsewhere, MacIntyre offers further reflections on the effects 
o f  a N ietzschean philosophy on society, commenting that it contains the m aterial for the collapse o f  
friendship, pity and the acknowledgem ent o f  our mutual dependence, w hich is basic to the notion o f  the 
common good and to the care and protection o f  vulnerable members o f  society. See Dependent 
Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: D uckworth, 1999), 155-166.
21 M acIntyre’ s analysis is not without its critics, both at the broad level and at the level o f  
detail. A lthough I would support his view s on fragmentation, I would jo in  those who consider the 
conclusion o f  his presentation o f  human teleology in After Virtue to be incomplete. His use o f ‘ quest’ 
as the narrative k ey  to human existence leads him to suggest that the definition o f  a good life for man is 
a life spent seeking for the good life, and that virtues assist him in his search. T o  m y mind, this 
incomplete form o f  teleology leaves itse lf open somewhat to the relativism  M acIntyre seeks to redress. 
He says that what is better or worse for a person depends upon the character o f  the intelligible narrative 
o f  that individual, in that the narrative not only bestows intelligibility on the person’ s actions, but also 
presumes a certain objectivity. I f  this is the case, then the narrative should prescribe more clearly the 
good that man is to seek in his quest. Linked to this comment would be M acIntyre’ s lack o f  attention to 
divine law, both natural and revealed, as part o f  the Aristotelian tradition, w hich is a significant 
omission to an examination o f  the content o f  the concept o f  the m edieval teleological quest.
Jean Porter describes M acIntyre’ s substitution o f  A ristotle’ s m etaphysical b io logy with 
narrative unity o f  human existence as “ inadequate as the basis for a reconstruction o f  an Aristotelian 
account o f  the virtues,”  because it is “ too imprecise” and “ says too little about what a good human life
7
Like their secular counterparts, today’s Christian ethicists have seized on 
fragments of what was once a unified moral tradition as the basis for their 
interpretations of Christian ethics. The Catholic moral theologians mentioned 
above [Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and proportionalists, such as Richard 
McCormick] have attempted to construct a moral theory on the basis of 
accounts of human goods and their relation to human action, and Protestant 
thinkers have attempted to develop theories of Christian ethics out of some 
account of Christian love, an appeal to the goodness of nature, or a reflection 
on the virtues. But unfortunately, while those fragments once fitted together 
and made sense as a part of a unified theory of morality, none of them on its 
own seems to be adequate as a basis for a convincing, contemporary theory of 
morality. If this line of analysis is correct, then no one of these theories will 
have the cogency to be fully adequate on its own terms, much less to convince 
those who adopt different starting points in their interpretations of the 
Christian moral tradition. Hence, we would expect to see what we do see in 
the field of Christian ethics, namely, either interminable debate or a frustrated
• 99suspension of all attempts at conversation.
Like MacIntyre, Porter also turns to the past for a way out of the problem, but 
neither of them is merely turning the clock back with the intention of proposing that 
an ancient or medieval approach should simply be re-employed without the slightest
should be,” particularly in that, unlike Aquinas, it lacks reference to supernatural happiness (beatitude) 
as the point o f reference also for achieving natural happiness. Thus, one can say that MacIntyre’ s 
reasoning in After Virtue stands, but, as he admits himself, requires further elaboration, which is 
something he seeks to address in his later works and in his replies to objections. I would suggest that in 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry he breaks the cyclical paradox o f seeking the good life by 
introducing the notion o f teaching authority as presented through hypothesis by Plato in the Meno. The 
authoritative teacher is thus able to lead the way and draw the good potential from the apprentice in the 
moral life. It is here that the notion o f  institution comes to the fore, with its roles o f  providing laws and 
exemplars for the exercise and development o f particular practices. To this we should add that the 
Church as institution also has a maieutic purpose in drawing forth the inherent narrative and moral 
keys, which would shape and direct an individual’ s life. We shall return to the role o f others in moral 
growth later on in this thesis. Cf. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 275-278, 219, 225; idem, Three Rival 
Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1990), 61- 
63; Plato, Meno, trans. G.M .A. Grube, in The Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 99a: “And that only these two things, true belief and knowledge, guide 
correctly, and that i f  a man possesses these he gives correct guidance” ; D. Vincent Twomey, Pope 
Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age: A Theological Portrait (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2007), 137. For critical points o f  view, see Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 82-83, at 82; John Horton 
and Susan Mendus, eds., After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Notre Dame, IN: University o f  Notre Dame Press, 1994).
22 Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 15-16. For a brief summary o f Hauerwas’s views on the 
shortcomings o f proportionalism, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Virtue, Description and Friendship,”  Irish 
Theological Quarterly 62 (1996-97): 170-184, at 173-75: (at 174) “ What has bothered me about the 
proportionalists is not their attempt to provide an alternative to the ‘old legalistic moral theology’ , but 
that even in their attempt to provide an alternative to the legalist framework they continued to 
presuppose a law-like framework. Actions continued to be treated in abstraction from virtues, but now 
in the name o f pastoral sensitivities such actions are assumed to be infinitely redescribable.”
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alteration. Rather, in the broadest of terms, both see the re-establishment of a 
coherent moral model as the way out of the present impasse and likewise both turn to 
the past for clues to the nature of such a cohesive structure.
4. Pinckaers and the Fragmentation of Freedom
Servais Pinckaers, another major figure on the moral stage, has also presented an 
analysis of the past to understand the present and to propose renewal and growth in 
moral theology. A primary focus for him has been not only the role of freedom in 
moral choice, but also how the notion of freedom has changed through history, and 
consequently resulted in changing our understanding of morality.
Although the history of the concept of free will is turbulent and complex, 
present-day society would be largely unaware of the radical transformation that has 
befallen this idea over the centuries. Indeed, Servais Pinckaers observes that “we are 
so accustomed to thinking of freedom as the power to choose between contraries that 
we can hardly imagine any other concept of it.” 24 This notion of freedom is what he 
classes as “freedom of indifference,”25 which is the prevailing concept in today’s 
society, thereby affecting the cultural air we breathe, and leading to attitudes such as 
the consumerist ‘use and abuse’, or to a diminished regard for the needs of others, 
particularly the most vulnerable of society, through a growth of utilitarianism and the 
atomisation of morality. At times, especially in dogmatic theology, much attention has
23 Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 174: “ I do not intend to argue that Aquinas’s theory o f 
morality could be accepted as it stands today. However, I do believe that some version o f  that theory, 
reformulated in the light o f  contemporary problematics, would offer the best prospect for recovering a 
cogent account o f human goodness and human virtue from the chaos o f contemporary moral 
discourse.” MacIntyre’ s Aristotelian analysis o f virtue also contains alteration through his notion o f 
‘practice’ . See After Virtue, 181-203.
24 Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. from the 3rd ed. by Sr. Mary 
Thomas Noble (Edinburgh: T & T  Clark, 1995), 354.
25 Ibid., 328-53.
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been given to the battles of Luther and Erasmus on the subject of liberum arbitrium,26 
but their own struggles over the relationship between freedom and God, and their 
concepts of human nature reflect a much earlier rupture in the fundamental 
understanding of freedom, stemming from nominalism and its initiator, William of 
Ockham, who died in 1349.27
Pinckaers describes the impact of Ockham’s thought as “the first atomic 
explosion of the modem era.”28 Our fundamental understanding of the human soul 
with all its faculties was blown apart by a new concept of freedom, and “successive 
after-shocks [...] destroyed the unity of theology and Western thought.”29 Thus, it is 
quite ironic that someone who achieved such a devastating effect should have been
TOnicknamed “Venerable Inceptor.” Ockham’s thought was like an atomic bomb, in 
that it was both fundamentally divisive and disruptive. Ockham’s universe was 
“essentially discontinuous, the universe of division and not the universe of order and 
harmony.” 31 Thus, the age-old notions of order and harmony, brought to their zenith 
in the thought of St Thomas Aquinas, were turned on their head in favour of absolute
26 For example, Luther concludes “ if  we believe it to be true, that God fore-knows and fore­
ordains all things; that He can neither be decieved or hindered in His Prescience and Predestination; 
and that nothing can take place but according to His Will, (which reason herself is compelled to 
confess;) then, even according to the testimony o f reason herself, there can be no ‘Free-will’ - in man,
- in angel, - or in any creature.” See Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. Henry Cole (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976), 390. Cf. Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther: An Introduction to 
His Life and Work, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Edinburgh: T & T  Clark, 1986), 68.
27 In his analysis o f  Luther’s theology, Albrecht Ritschl “ freely admitted that Luther 
occasionally demonstrated that he had been influenced by Nominalism.” See Lohse, Martin Luther, 
220. On Ockham and nominalism, see also Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 241-53.
28 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 242.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 241. Vereecke concurs with this assessment o f Ockham. He says that “his influence 
on the evolution o f  the Western world has been enormous. For more than a century and a half his 
doctrine has created the background upon which modem thought has been developing.”  Louis 
Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham a Sant'Alfonso de Liguori: Saggi di Storia della Teologia Morale 
Moderna, 1300-1787, trans. Giancarlo Vendrame (Cinisello Balsamo, Milan: Edizioni Pauline, 1989), 
215-16: “ l ’ influsso di Guglielmo d’Ockham nell’evoluzione del mondo occidentale è stato enorme. Per 
più d’un secolo e mezzo la sua dottrina ha creato lo sfondo sul quale è venuto elaborandosi il pensiero 
moderno.”
31 Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 174: “Pertanto quello che Ockham ci presenta è un 
universo essenzialmente discontinuo, l ’universo della divisione e non l ’universo della ordine e 
dell’armonia” (emphasis in text).
10
separation, through Ockham’s concept of singularity.32 Hence in Ockham’s revolution 
we find the root of our modem problems with individualism. His far-reaching revision 
brought this divisive outlook to bear upon a whole raft of key issues: “freedom was 
separated from nature, law and grace; moral doctrine from mysticism; reason from
« » » » • TTfaith; the individual from society.” Equation of reality solely with the individual 
meant that in the moral sphere reality was now to be found in the individual decision 
of free will, which, according to Ockham, is something indifferent and contingent.34
William of Ockham’s primacy of an indifferent, independent will is a rejection 
of the position taken by St Thomas, who saw free will as a faculty of reason and will, 
thereby identifying freedom, in Pinckaers’s summation, as “the outcome of the mind’s
or
inclination to truth and the will’s inclination to goodness.” In other words, the free 
choice of the individual is an extension of the reason and will and an expression of the 
individual’s natural inclination towards the good.36
This shift in understanding had a serious impact upon the importance of the 
final end in morality. St Thomas’s study of moral theology in the Summa starts with 
the end in order to show the unity of all actions in our last end, namely final and
32 Ibid., 171-73; Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 242.
33 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 242.
34 Ibid., 242-43; cf. William o f  Ockham [Guillelmus de Ockham], Quodlibeta Septem, in 
Opera Philosophica et Theologica, vol. 9 (St. Bonaventure, New York: Editiones Instituti Franciscani, 
1980), I, q. 16, a. 1: “Circa primum sciendum quod voco libertatem potestatem qua possum 
indifferenter et contingenter diversa ponere, ita quod possum eumdem effectum causare et non causare, 
nulla diversitate existente alibi extra illam potentiam.”
35 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 381.
36 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Leonine ed. (Rome: Forzani, 1894), la  Ilae q .l, 
a. 1: “ liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis, et rationis” (emphasis in text). An assessment 
o f the views o f  the different thinkers is often made harder to understand simply by the way terms are 
commonly translated. See Brian Davies, Aquinas (London and New York: Continuum, 2002.), 105: 
“And, though translators o f  Aquinas often render this phrase [liberum arbitrium] by the English 
expression ‘ free w ill’ , its significance is different. For the thesis that people have free will is commonly 
taken to mean that freedom belongs only to the will, that is, i f  you like, the prerogative o f the will or a 
peculiar property o f  it. And Aquinas does not share this assumption.” Herbert M cCabe is equally keen 
to clear up the confusion, preferring to translate liberum arbitrium as “ free choice.”  Quoted in Martin 
M cKeever, “Ethics as Language in Herbert McCabe, O.P.,” Studia Moralia 41 (2003): 137-152, at 149.
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perfect happiness, or beatitude, in the vision of God.37 Ockham did not accept this 
universal description of finality, and downplayed the importance of an ultimate end 
by emphasising the immediate end contained in the individual act. This had the effect 
of separating acts from one another, and led to the casuist analysis of individual cases
T O  _
of conscience in later centuries. The Venerable Inceptor’s rejection of natural 
inclinations and his downplaying of virtues also served his absolutist liberation of 
human freedom. Thus, natural inclinations, including happiness, were no longer seen 
as helping man achieve a freely-chosen, morally good act and good end, but were now 
considered a threat to freedom and morality. Thus, we can see the root cause of the 
ousting of the treatise on happiness from the modem moral manuals.39 Previously the 
virtues had been seen as dispositions that developed and perfected the natural 
inclinations, thereby leading man to happiness by following his God-given nature.40 
The manuals also gave less emphasis to the virtues, as a result of the nominalist 
revision of the nature of virtue. “For ethicists, virtue became simply a traditional, 
convenient category for listing moral obligations.”41 For Ockham obligation became 
the central focus because he understood the nature of both God and man to be
"7 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, qq.1-5, at q.3, a.8, resp.: “Respondeo dicendum, quod 
ultima, et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae.” Cf. Fergus Kerr, After 
Aquinas: Versions ofThomism (Malden, M A, Oxford, Melbourne, and Berlin: Blackwell, 2002), 133: 
“The best way o f  describing the moral considerations in the Summa Theologiae is not as virtue ethics, 
let alone as divine command ethics, but as an ethics o f divine beatitude.”
38 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 243-44, 336: “Free actions followed one upon 
another in a person’s life without any bond o f unity to weld them together into a basic whole, as the 
vision o f a last end or even personal sentiment might have done.”
39 Ibid., 332; 244-45.
40 Ibid., 336; Davies, Aquinas, 114. St Thomas identifies five natural inclinations: inclination 
to the good; to self-preservation; to sexual union and the rearing o f offspring; to the knowledge o f the 
truth; and to live in society. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.94, a.2, Pinckaers’s analysis in 
Sources of Christian Ethics, 400-56.
41 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 336. Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 181: “ In 
the moral life, therefore, there remains only one specific virtue, obedience, to which all other virtues 
are referred. Moral virtue is the response o f  man to an exterior obligation” [“Nella vita morale resta 
quindi una sola virtù specifica, Vobbedienza, alla quale si riconducono tutte le altre virtù. La virtù 
morale è la risposta dell’uomo ad un’obbligazione esteriore” ] (emphasis in text).
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absolute, isolated in their singularity.42 Obligation and the law became the only 
principle that could link God and his creature, but the link was one of opposition.43 
God is therefore not bound by any obligation and his supreme freedom is only limited 
by the principle of non-contradiction.44 However, man is subject to obligation and to 
following the divine will because of his created status.45 This was the only limitation 
to man’s freedom: God’s freedom. Thus moral theology came to be reduced to a 
battle of liberties, where there could only be one outcome, man’s compliance with 
God’s will, known through Revelation and reason.46
From this overview of Ockham’s position, we can see that freedom of 
indifference creates a reductivist morality of obligation, severed from teleology and 
natural order. Indeed, Ockham’s morality became so detached that, without the 
existence of a specific obligation in the form of a precept or commandment, or a 
personal awareness of the commandment, the act remains morally indifferent, since
42 Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 174, 178.
43 Ibid., 178.
44 Indeed Ockham upheld the thesis that, provided he did not contradict himself, God could 
change his will arbitrarily, even to the point o f commanding that man should hate him, and i f  man 
obeyed, then he would not be committing a sin, but acting morally. Moreover, in Ockham’ s 
understanding, “natural law is therefore not the human translation o f  the eternal demands o f  being, nor 
the expression o f  our natural inclinations and o f our virtues: it is the simple echo, the simple blind 
transmission o f  the orders o f  the arbitrary divine will.” See Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 344; 
Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 183: “La legge naturale non è quindi la traduzione umana delle 
esigenze eterne dell’essere, né l’espressione delle nostre inclinazioni naturali e delle nostre virtù: è la 
semplice eco, la semplice trasmissione cieca degli ordini dell’arbitraria volontà divina.”  Richard Cross 
comments on the writings o f  Blessed John Duns Scotus, who seems to follow Ockham’s voluntarism. 
“ Scotus holds that God is bound neither by external nor by internal constraints in his actions towards 
creatures. [...] For this reason, we should reject Scotus’s account o f  God’ s contingent action and the 
ethical theory which it grounds.” Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus on Goodness, Justice and What God 
Can Do,”  Journal of Theological Studies 48 (1997): 48-76, at 76.
45 Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 179.
46 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 345-49. Despite Ockham’s morals being typically 
described as ‘voluntarist’ , there is still a significant, though diminished, role for reason in his system. 
Moral reason now had the task o f revealing and proclaiming divine commands, instead o f  weighing up 
the content o f  precepts to understand them and justify action. Hence we can see Ockham as a 
forerunner to Kant’s rationalist philosophy, with its application o f imperatives.
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the goodness of the act is purely determined by whether the individual has conformed 
to an obligation or not.47
Without a reconciliation of morality with the teleology of happiness in terms 
of joy in Christ, as opposed to simply passing pleasure, there remains a tug of war 
between the universal and the particular, between God and the individual, between 
authority and conscience. This is because we are relying upon a disjunctive freedom 
of indifference, which both begets and rebels against a morality of obligation. It had 
been the aim of St Thomas to “deconstruct the sin-dominated moral theology in the 
pastors’ handbooks of his day, by dispersing the standard list of vices and virtues 
throughout a systematic consideration of the human being as moral agent, with goals, 
capacities, emotions, dispositions, and so on, which have to be integrated, with the
4.8help of law and grace, for them to attain the beatitude which is their ultimate end.” 
Clearly, St Thomas sought to present an “organic” moral theology and analysis of the 
human act.49 However, Kerr points out that, even early on, Thomas’s plans ran into 
difficulty, primarily because of the size of the secunda pars of the Summa. Thus, the 
secunda secundae's analysis of vices and virtues was being read independently of the 
prima secundae, despite its essential role in contextualising the moral analysis. Yet, 
even this reduction of reading was insufficient, and so “by 1290, at the behest of the 
Master of the Order, even Dominican friars were provided with a slimmed-down 
version of the secunda secundae.”50 Thus, the clergy of St Thomas’s time turned the 
Summa into what he had intended it to eradicate, namely a morality dominated by lists
47 Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 184, at 181: “ That the act is good, therefore, it is not 
enough to carry out materially what is commanded, because every action is in itself indifferent; but it is 
necessary to carry it out because it is obligatory” [“Perché l’atto sia buono, quindi, non basta compiere 
materialmente quanto è comandato, perché ogni azione è in se stessa indifferente; ma occorre 
compierla perché è obbligatoria"] (emphasis in text).
18 Kerr, Ajier Acjuinas, 118.
49 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 337.
5tl Kerr, After Aquinas, 119.
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of sins. We must therefore be wary in apportioning all blame to William of Ockham 
for the deconstruction of St Thomas’s vision and for the reduction of the ambit of 
moral theology. Nevertheless, Ockham remains pivotal in the creation of a freedom of 
indifference and of the development of a morality of obligation. Thus, through his 
analysis of Ockham and St Thomas, Pinckaers hopes to encourage a revival of the 
Thomistic organic model, which is firmly rooted in a freedom for excellence.
As its name suggests, freedom for excellence differs radically from its 
indifferent counterpart, in that the use of man’s freedom is channelled towards 
striving for and achieving the good. The word ‘for’ implies that the freedom that man 
enjoys has a purpose, and so immediately we can see that this way of looking at 
freedom is teleological in approach. ‘Excellence’ should also indicate to us that there 
is a greater role in this model for virtue.
Servais Pinckaers offers the examples of learning to play the piano and 
learning a language to highlight the contrast between the two notions of freedom. In 
both examples, long-term effort is required to achieve good results, be it beautiful 
playing or fluency. Likewise, “a minimum of predisposition is needed in the 
beginning” to permit musical or linguistic development, built up “by means of 
regular, progressive exercises.” 51 What seems to be a constraint upon the freedom and 
pleasures of the moment turns out to be a gateway to greater opportunity. Where 
previously the individual could only make poor choices (to play or speak badly or not 
at all), now the person has the capacity to do things well, and so has greater freedom 
in the realms of language and music, through a fuller freedom of expression and 
performance. The key distinction between freedom of indifference and freedom for 
excellence as understood through these examples is that in the former one is free to
51 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 355.
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make mistakes, whereas in the latter one has freely cultivated the ability to avoid 
mistakes. Thus, rather than consider freedom as simply a careless choice between 
contraries, there is a positive quality to the notion. Hence, we can apply this to the 
moral sphere to observe that the virtue of courage or fortitude develops progressively 
through trials and pressures to enable the individual to achieve worthwhile actions, 
which he would have otherwise avoided.
While freedom of indifference precedes and dominates all natural inclinations, 
freedom understood as for excellence is rooted in the natural inclinations, particularly 
the natural longing for truth, goodness, a sense of uprightness and love, and a desire 
for knowledge and happiness. The ancients described these roots of freedom as the 
semina virtutum, or the seeds of virtue. Thus, these natural dispositions are developed, 
giving a direction to our desires by influencing our moral judgements.54 While the 
freedom of indifference saw natural inclinations as an obstacle to freedom, freedom 
for excellence sees them as the source of our freedom, and the opportunity to grow in 
freedom by following our God-given nature (sequi naturam).55 Thus, freedom is no 
longer characterised by moral indifference, but by the spontaneous attraction to what 
is good and true. We can also see here that while Ockham’s freedom was considered 
to be fully present from the beginning of a person’s existence, freedom for excellence 
is “bestowed in embryo” and grows to maturity through education.56 Pinckaers 
outlines the process of development of personal morals and freedom as described by 
St Thomas in the secunda secundae, which is divided into three stages: beginners, 
progressives and the perfect. Beginners in the order of charity (incipientes) are
52 Ibid., 356. Pinckaers calls freedom for excellence the “ ability to act with excellence and 
perfection whenever one wishes.”  See Servais Pinckaers, Morality: The Catholic View, trans. Michael 
Sherwin (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 74.





schooled by the law of the Decalogue in avoiding sins and in fighting against 
inclinations opposed to charity.57 “Progressives” or proficients {proficientes) at the 
second level aim to strengthen their active charity through developing the qualities of 
the heart, namely the virtues. Thus a limited moral theory of avoiding evil is expanded 
to progress in seeking the good.58 Pinckaers points out that the Sermon on the Mount 
is most suited to this stage, taking the person to a different level of law now “based on 
a generosity that always exceeds the demand with the spontaneity of true love.” 59 
This law, which penetrates to the heart, is the New or Evangelical Law, which 
develops the practice of the virtues through the illumination and attraction of the Holy 
Spirit.60
Far from a juridical concept of law, the New Law is the motion of the Spirit in 
us leading us to wisdom, right living and love.61 Therefore, the New Law is “the rule 
of love infused by the Spirit.” 62 As an infused interior law,63 its primary element is the 
grace of the Holy Spirit, with the written law of the New Testament, particularly the 
Sermon on the Mount, being its secondary element.64 Pinckaers identifies the root of
57 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae q.24, a.9; Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 362- 
63. Here in a morality o f  happiness and virtue the law has an educational role in the growth o f  freedom, 
rather than simply being a limit to freedom through obligation, as it is viewed in a morality o f 
obligation. Both moralities use the rules o f the Decalogue, but the morality o f  obligation fails to see it 
as a first step in moral development, by reducing morals to mere compliance with commands. See 
Pinckaers, Morality, 74; idem, Sources of Christian Ethics, 362.
58 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae q.24, a.9.
59 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 365.
60 Ibid., 365, 369; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae qq. 106-108. A s such, St Thomas called 
the N ew Law the “ law o f  freedom” since it enables us to reach our potential through the grace o f  the 
Holy Spirit. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae q.108, a .l. See also Servais Pinckaers, “ The 
Recovery o f  the New Law  in Moral Theology,” trans. Hugh Connolly, Irish Theological Quarterly 64 
(1999): 3-15.
61 Pinckaers, Morality, 85.
62 Ibid.; Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 161: “The law o f  the Gospel is not an imperative 
imposed on man from outside; it is the Holy Spirit who lives in him, who enlightens him on what he 
must do and who gives him the strength to progress ever more on the path o f  grace” [“La legge del 
Vangelo non è un imperativo imposto all’uomo dall’ esterno; è lo Spirito Santo che vive in lui, lo 
illumina su quanto deve fare e gli dà la forza di progredire sempre di più sulla via della grazia” ].
63 While the interior natural law is instilled in man by being part o f  his very nature, in addition 
to this, man is endowed with the New Law by a gift o f grace. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae 
q.106, a .l.
64 Vereecke, Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 160-61.
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this Evangelical Law as faith in Christ.65 This act of faith and our relationship with 
Christ radically transforms the nature of morals. If the root is faith, then Pinckaers 
observes that the sap of the Law nourishing the tree of our lives is charity, working 
through us to produce the fruit of good works.66 Therefore, given the potentially 
powerful influence of the Spirit of love in developing the believer’s moral growth, the 
fact that little is written about the New Law should be a matter of concern to those 
wishing a spiritual renewal of morals.
Pinckaers states that “our freedom reaches maturity precisely with our 
capacity to balance the twofold dimension of personality and openness to others, 
interiority and outreach, living ‘for self and ‘for others’.” He proposes that, while 
freedom for excellence enables the individual to balance moral responsibility towards 
self and others, freedom of indifference destroys the relationship by “breaking it down 
into contraries,” thereby stunting moral growth.69 This balance is perfected through 
reaching the third level of moral development, namely, spiritual maturity. St Thomas
70calls those who have become moral and spiritual adults “the perfect” (perfecti), who 
are such because of the perfection of their love of God and of their attainment of
• 71union with and enjoyment of God in contemplation.
65 Pinckaers, Morality, 85-87.
66 Ibid., 87.
67 Vereecke is o f  the opinion that the lack o f attention by modem moralists to the N ew  Law in 
St Thomas’s thought seriously threatens the success o f a revival o f Thomistic morals. See Da 
Guglielmo d'Ockham, 431.
68 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 367.
69 Ibid.
70 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae q.24, a.9; Pinckaers draws our attention to the fact that 
this should be understood in a human sense, relative to our created condition. Pinckaers, Sources of 
Christian Ethics, 368.
71 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae q.24, a.9; la Ilae q.106, a .l; Pinckaers, Sources of 
Christian Ethics, 368.
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The inclusion of spiritual joy as goal and prize in this vision of morality allows 
us to break away from the stale morality of obligation.72 In the light of Christ’s 
teaching in John 15:8-11, Pinckaers shows that freedom for excellence succeeds in 
marrying God’s commandments with joy in Christ, in that only through bearing much 
fruit in love will our joy be complete.73 Thus, above all else, the excellence we are to 
strive for through the exercise of our freedom is that of an imitation of the love of 
Christ, achieved by life in the Spirit.74
72 Such a morality o f obligation is not only stale according to Pope John Paul II, but also 
ultimately, “ dehumanising” through the constraints o f his “ voluntaristic and arbitrary” nature. See John 
Paul II, Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1993), 76. O fficial text 
in Acta Apostolicae Sedis (hereafter A AS) 85 (1993), 1194-95.
73 Pinckaers, Morality, 80. Vereecke points out “ the most serious limitation to Ockham’ s 
system is in not seeing that, beyond being a morality o f obedience to God, Christian morality is a 
morality o f  charity.” See Da Guglielmo d’Ockham, 188: “Il limite più grave del sistema di Ockham sta 
nel non aver visto che la morale cristiana, oltre che una morale dell’obbedienza a Dio, è una morale 
della carità.” Pinckers also uses the philosophy o f Henri Bergson to support his argument concerning 
his views on freedom and happiness in relation to the moralities o f obligation and o f happiness and 
virtue. Clearly, they would differ over the role o f reason in morality, given the “diminished idea which 
Bergson had o f intelligence in general and o f its role in the moral life in particular,”  as Maritain notes. 
Nevertheless, it appears that Pinckaers has found resonances in Bergson’s philosophy to complement 
his Thomistic analysis o f  moral theology. For example, there is clearly a theological teleology in 
Bergson’s analysis, albeit limited in its development. Bergson states that everyone is to aspire to 
mysticism, which has the purpose o f  transforming humanity so that all may share in being open to all 
people, and open to the creative impulse o f God. Joy is another significant goal in both writers’ 
thought, with both identifying the Beatitudes as the model for a rounded morality, instead o f  a 
restricted morality o f  obligation. See Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy: An Historical and Critical 
Survey of the Great Systems (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1964), 431; Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Bereton (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1974), 225, 243: “Creation [is] ...G od undertaking to create creators, that He may 
have, besides Himself, beings worthy o f  His love.” On the importance o f joy, cf. Bergson, Two 
Sources, 50, 306; Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 131-2; idem, Morality, 78-81, at 80-81: “ The 
reconciliation o f morality and happiness by means o f  joy  is, in my view, an essential condition for the 
renewal o f  moral theology. To establish this reconciliation firmly, we must even revise our 
understanding o f freedom by rediscovering our spiritual nature.” On the Beatitudes, cf. Bergson, Two 
Sources, 50-51; Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, 145-55, 369; idem, Morality, 78-81.
74 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Leonine ed. (Rome: Foranzi, 1894) IV, 22: 
“Filii igitur Dei libere a Spiritu Sancto aguntur ex amore, non serviliter ex timore.” See also Maritain 
on freedom for love. Thus Maritain considers Christian morals to be a morality o f  inspiration (from the 
Holy Spirit) rather than a Bergsonian morality o f aspiration. See Maritain, Moral Philosophy, 436-37.
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Even in the wake of writers such as Pinckaers and despite the shift in methodology 
found in the moral section of the Catechism o f  the Catholic Church and the call for 
renewal made by Pope John Paul in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor, the loss of
* • 7c ,cohesion and dynamism in moral theology seems to have persisted. Indeed, Vincent 
Twomey observes that “the recovery of the original, Aristotelian/Thomistic notion of 
virtue as the context for moral reflection has yet to make any significant impact on the 
mainstream of the academic discipline of moral theology,” as it is “still dominated by 
the rival schools of a ideological approach (proportionalism) or the deontological 
approach (principles).” 76 Therefore, given the body of material presenting arguments 
to show a situation of moral decay, it is my contention that if moral theory in general 
is struggling to emerge from a fragmented state, this fragmentation will also affect our 
understanding and use of conscience. This would appear to be so, as different authors 
will testify.
5. Summing up the Evidence
15 The approach to morality presented in the first section o f  Chapter 3 o f the Catechism closely 
resembles Pinckaers’s approach, namely, action understood in the context o f  life in the Spirit, seeking 
to live positively and generously in keeping with the Beatitudes through the exercise o f our conscience, 
assisted by the virtues, both human and theological. See Catechism of the Catholic Church (Vatican 
City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), nos. 1700-1877. This model is maintained in the revised 
edition. See Catechism of the Catholic Church (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999). Hereafter, all 
references to the Catechism will refer to the revised edition, using the abbreviation CCC. Veritatis 
Splendor was presented in the light o f  the Catechism to address “ certain tendencies” which were seen 
to be undermining the foundations o f moral theology, particularly the relationship between freedom 
and truth, faith and morality, objectivity and universal moral norms. See Veritatis Splendor, 5, 32, 78, 
84, 88, 90; AAS 85 (1993), 1137-38,1159-1160, 1196-97, 1200-01, 1203-04, 1205. Livio Melina, 
responding directly to Pope John Paul’ s call to renewal in moral theology in Veritatis Splendor, also 
points to a present-day moral crisis rooted in subjectivisation, pluralism and fragmentation, where the 
individual and his/her freedom have been made absolute. See Sharing in Christ’s Virtues: For a 
Renewal of Moral Theology in the Light of “Veritatis Splendor, ” trans. William E. M ay (Washington 
DC: Catholic University o f America Press, 2001), 13-33.
76 D. Vincent Twomey, “Moral Renewal Through Renewed Moral Reasoning,” Josephinum 
Journal of Theology 10 (2003): 210-229, at 211. Twomey also considers the diminished impact o f  
virtue ethics on moral theology to be the result o f  little reflection upon related issues, particularly the 
passions, thus perpetuating the “blandness” o f contemporary moral discourse. It may also be caused by 
looking at ethics based on virtue as simply one school among many (hence the danger o f  the term 
‘virtue ethics’) rather than as a wholesale shift in attitude. See ibid., 2 11, including n.6, and idem, 
“ Recovery o f  the Passions in Moral Theology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 67 (2002): 224, 240.
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It may be useful for us to summarise the elements of fragmentation identified 
by the authors and magisterial documents mentioned above, in order to see whether 
the same elements are present in studies on conscience. The collective concerns are as 
follows:
1 . a pluralism of traditions establishing a situation of an 
incommensurability of rival premises and argumentation in moral 
problems.
2 . a moral deficiency owing to emotivism in various guises undermining 
moral reasoning, by eschewing objectivity or detaching it from its end.
3. changes to the meaning of moral terms, especially the transformation 
of freedom into a disjunctive notion, thus creating opposition between 
those involved in forming a moral decision (the individual and external 
authorities, both human and divine).77
It should be the case that these main issues are also to be found in current 
writing on conscience, if my observation on fragmentation is to have plausibility. I 
also acknowledge that such an assessment will not be shared by all, given that a 
variety of moral theologians would consider the changes to the notion of conscience 
as necessary for the development of a mature, responsible and flexible morality.78
77 One could give other examples o f moral terms that are subject to significant difference in 
understanding, such as natural law, which has a whole variety o f qualifying terms attached to it: fixed 
or dynamic, transcendental or categorical, physicalist or personalist. Gustafson presents a summary o f 
contrasting views o f  moral terms, as well as the bases for different moral traditions. He concludes that 
persistent polarities in moral views are based upon differences o f  outlook on “being and becoming, 
structure and process, order and dynamics, continuity and change, determination and freedom, nature 
and history, nature and grace, law and gospel.” However, a more fundamental problem is the notion o f 
polarity in the first place, since this pulls elements apart. Jean Porter argues that a unified moral theory 
has become fragmented, with the individual pieces being taken as separate starting points for different 
moral traditions. I would therefore propose that Gustafson gives a summary o f moral traditions that 
affirms Porter’ s thesis, in that his analysis does not attempt to approach the above notions in a 
complementary manner. See James Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for 
Rapprochement (London: SCM  Press, 1979), 144-156, at 144.
78 For example, Timothy E. O ’ Connell, “An Understanding o f Conscience,”  in Readings in 
Moral Theology No. 14:Conscience, ed. Charles E. Curran, (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
2004), 25-38; Ewert H. Cousins, “ The Mature Christian Conscience,” in Conscience: Its Freedom and 
Limitations, ed. William C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971), 369-378; Paul Tillich, 
“A  Conscience Above Moralism,”  in Conscience: Theological and Psychological Perspectives, ed. C. 
Ellis Nelson (New York, Paramus, and Toronto: Newman Press, 1973), 46-61. Here Tillich proposes 
the notion o f  a transmoral conscience to overcome the internal conflict between its guilty and good 
dimensions.
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With regard to incommensurability of premises and equivocal terminology, Josef 
Romelt says that when recourse is made to the notion of conscience in discussing 
everyday moral problems “often a lot of confusion is created,” because of the 
contradictory meanings applied to conscience. This in turn is due to a complex and 
contradictory hidden background of philosophical and cultural influences, both 
theistic and atheistic. In short, Romelt concludes that “conscience can mean 
everything or nothing.” He considers careful and accurate analysis of the different 
layers of meaning in the term to be the only starting point available to the move away
on
from the impasse of conflict in understanding.
On the basis of a historical study exploring the effects of different
philosophies and schools of psychology on the notion of conscience, Terence
Kennedy comes to the conclusion that “we should not be surprised that so often
conscience becomes the shield for arbitrary opinions and even for outright
subjectivism and emotivism. ‘What I do has nothing to do with other people. It’s a
matter for my conscience alone.’ This is the ultimate devaluation o f  conscience in an 
81unauthentic ethic.” Carlo Caffarra goes further by concluding that we are witnessing 
a “gradual emptying of conscience.” The first stage of this is an “increasingly radical 
subjectivism.” However, he also notes that the institutional use of utilitarianism and 
proportionality, such as found in civil law, results not in the strengthening of the 
autonomy of conscience won by subjectivism, but rather its loss, through the
79 Josef Romelt, La Coscienza: Un Conflitto delle Interpretazioni, Quaestiones Morales, no. 13 
(Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 2001), 12: “ Quando nella discussione etica dei problemi 
morali della vita quotidiana si ricorre al concetto di coscienza si crea perciò spesso molta confusione. 
Spesso si confondono fra di loro i diversi significati filosofici e culturali che si nascondono dietro di 
esso, nonché i diversi piani a tali significati collegati. Non si riconosce la loro contradittorietà. E infine 
il termine coscienza può dire tutto o nulla.”
80 Ibid., 13.
81 Terence Kennedy, Doers of the Word: Moral Theology for Humanity in the Third 
Millennium, vol. 1, Tracing Humanity's Ascent to the Living God (Middlcgreen, Slough: St Pauls,
1996), 168-175, at 175 (emphasis mine).
6. Corresponding Fragmentation in the Notion of Conscience
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complexity of weighing up each good in new and technical contexts forcing complete 
reliance on the judgement of “so-called experts.” 82 Finally, taken to its logical 
conclusion, Pope John Paul writes that a completely individualistic ethic not only 
empties conscience of its meaning, but also “leads to a denial of the very idea of
DO
human nature.”
Taking the opportunity to apply his general theory to conscience, Pinckaers 
observes that the reinforcement of the notion of freedom of indifference by the 
manualist tradition left freedom and law as opposites, where “freedom and law can be 
compared to two landlords who are contesting the field of human behaviour.” 84 In this 
context of moral voluntarism the conscience of the subject fluctuates between 
rigorism and laxism. As a result, the role of conscience also swings between forcing 
the individual to obey the law through obligation, to submitting the law always to 
personal freedom. Pinckaers considers this “pendulum of conscience” to be caused by
o r
a separation of freedom and law from truth.
Other theologians also focus their attention on the issues of freedom and 
opposition. Alojzy Drozdz considers contemporary culture to contain a radical shift in 
the notion of man and conscience, caused by the opposition of humanity and God, 
which forces us to make a choice between us and God. He sums up this attitude with 
the term “modem prometheanism,” 86 which he says is either an open or hidden
82 Carlo Caffara, “ The Autonomy o f Conscience and Subjection to Truth,”  in Crisis of 
Conscience, ed. John M. Haas (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 149-168, at 152. This comment on 
experts shows close similarity to the conclusions o f MacIntyre, and may be dependent upon them.
83 Veritatis Splendor, 32, AAS 85 (1993), 1159-60, at 1160: “Extrema si attingit, 
individualismus ad ipsam notitiam naturae humanae negandam perducit.”
84 Servais Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,” in Crisis of Conscience, ed. John M. 
Haas (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 79-92, at 81.
85 Ibid., 79-81, at 79: “Our freedom is not an absolute; it is a freedom for truth. [...] The love 
o f truth, at the core o f  freedom and conscience, is certainly the most profound, the most decisive point 
o f the present moral debate.”
86 A lojzy Drozdz, “II Problema della Coscienza Morale nel Prometeismo di O ggi,”  in La 
Coscienza Morale Oggi: Omaggio al Prof. Domenico Capone, ed. Marian Nalepa and Terence
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reference to the spectral vision of nihilism, “which casts onto man and onto moral 
‘conscience’ a type of ‘atheistic and radical shadow’, since in it man and conscience 
are considered as self-sufficient realities in themselves.” 87 Drozdz points out that 
starting from the nineteenth century, through authors such as Shelley (1792-1822), the 
myth of Prometheus (who was punished for stealing fire from the gods to give it to 
mankind, which he had created from clay) became a symbol of modem self-liberation
n o  '  t  m
and autonomy. Other figures who take on this symbolic role in literature are Job and 
Zarathustra.89 Thus, through this lens, man is no longer defined in terms of homo 
sapiens, but rather homo ribelans.90 For Drozdz, this idea of rebellion is highly 
significant in that it creates an attitude of opposition towards every ‘other’, including 
God. This has an effect on the notion of conscience by shifting its foundation to that 
of “hubris,”91 which establishes the relationship between human conscience and God
Kennedy, Quaestiones Morales, no. 3 (Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1987), 505-25. 
Grisez and Shaw also allude in passing to this notion when giving examples o f  mistaken ideas about 
the nature o f conscience: “ There is conscience on a Promethean model, where one’s solitary conscience 
is the only gauge o f  right and wrong that matters. And, perhaps especially for some Catholics, there is 
conscience as rebel: ‘The Church can’t tell me what to do’ .” Drózdz would consider the latter to be an 
expression o f  the Promethean model. See Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ: A 
Summary of Christian Moral Principles (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1991), 26 
(emphasis in text).
87 Drózdz, “ Il Problema della Coscienza Morale, 505: “Il prometeismo moderno fa 
riferimento, palese o nascosto che sia, a questa visione spettralizzante, che proietta sull’uomo e sulla 
‘coscienza’ morale una sorta di ‘ombra atea e radicale’perché in esso l ’uomo e la coscienza sono 
considerate come realtà a sé stesso l’autosufficente.”
88 Unlike Aeschylus’ poem, where Prometheus’ defiant unrepentance results in him eventually 
being cast down to eternal punishment in Tartarus, in Shelley’s version, Prometheus’ pain comes to an 
end when Demogorgon dethrones Jupiter (in act 3, scene 1) and they both sink down to the abyss 
instead, proving Prometheus, “monarch o f the world” , victorious, rather than defeated, through his 
defiant endurance. Cf. Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound, in Plays, Translations and Longer 
Poems, Everyman’ s Library, vol. 258 (London: J.M. Dent; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1907), 144-219; 
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, in Aeschylus, vo l.l, Suppliant Maidens, Persians, Prometheus, Seven 
Against Thebes, with English trans, by Herbert Weir Smyth, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press; London: Heinemann, 1922, 1988 ed. consulted), 209-315.
89 Drózdz, “ Il Problema della Coscienza Morale, 507; Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Viking Penguin,
1954), 103-439; C.G. Jung, Answer to Job, trans, from German by R.F.C. Hull (London and Princeton: 
Routledge and Paul, 1954; Ark Paperbacks, 1984), 23. Jung claims that in Job standing his ground to 
argue against the injustice he has experienced, he reveals the antinomy in G od’ s nature.
90 Drózdz, “ Il Problema della Coscienza Morale, 507.
91 Ibid., 515-16.
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• 92 •as aut...aut instead of et...et, with the consequence that morals are reduced to taste
or whim.93 The solution for this Polish author is to interpret human conscience with a
“christological key,” along with the call to conversion.94 Drozdz sees metanoia as the
route to putting things back in order. Thus, “conversion touches human ‘conscience’
in its essential relationship with God: it is not simply a conversion to a doctrine to be
believed in or to a norm to be observed, but rather the ‘return’ to God the Father, a
return from the eccentric orbit. This return to God involves, as a consequence, the
openness (disponibilita) of conscience to renew its full normative authority which
exhorts [one] to produce ‘fruits in keeping with conversion’ (Mt 3:2).” 95
We can observe a similar analysis in the writings of Pope Benedict XVI, at
that time Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger. He also identifies the issue of the relationship
between self and other as central to the contemporary discussion of morality in
general and of conscience in particular. He says that the question of conscience:
centers on the concepts of freedom and norm, autonomy and heteronomy, self- 
determination and determination by an external authority. Conscience appears 
here as the bulwark of freedom against those who seek to narrow our lives 
through the use of authority. Two antithetical conceptions of Catholicism are 
proposed. On the one hand, we find a renewed understanding of Catholicism 
that understands Christian faith on the basis of freedom and sees this faith as a 
principle that sets people free. On the other hand, we find a superseded, ‘pre- 
conciliar’ model that subjects Christian existence to authority that issues 
norms to regulate people’s lives even in the most intimate spheres and 
attempts in this way to maintain its power over them. It seems therefore that
92 Ibid., 519.
93 Ibid., 523-24.
94 This follows Pope John Paul’ s understanding o f  humanity in Christ, as presented in his 
Encyclical letter Redemptor Hominis, particularly at numbers 18 and 20. Cf. AAS 71 (1979), 257-327, 
at 301-305, 309-16. For an English translation see Redemptor Hominis (Milan: Editrice Àncora, 1979).
95 Ibid., 524: “ La conversione tocca la ‘coscienza’ umana nel suo essenziale rapporto con Dio: 
non è semplicemente una conversione a una dottrina da credere o a una norma da osservare, bensì il 
‘ritorno’ al Dio-Padre, un ritorno dall’orbita eccentrica. Questo ritorno a Dio comporta, di 
conseguenza, la disponibilità della coscienza a rinnovare la sua piena autorità normativa la quale esorta 
a produrre ‘ frutti conformi alla conversione’ (Mt 3,2).” Although the call to repentance is announced in 
Mt 3:2, John the Baptist’ s challenge to produce fruit worthy o f repentance or conversion is actually 
found at Mt 3:8.
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we have a conflict between two antithetical models, morality o f  conscience 
and morality o f  authority,96
Like Drozdz, Ratzinger says that this attitude of conflict colours the notion of 
conscience. Thus, being considered as uthe highest norm and that one must follow it 
even against authority,” 97 conscience is employed to protect an individual’s freedom. 
According to this understanding, the Magisterium would have the opportunity to 
speak on morality, but conscience would have the final say on matters. Indeed, some 
authors take this to its extreme by declaring conscience as infallible.98 Ratzinger’s 
concern is that this exaltation of conscience leads to a loss of a sense of objective 
truth, a weakening of the meaning of human existence and a deterioration of 
solidarity.99 However, Ratzinger also considers this absolute “subjective obstinacy” to 
be only one possible type of misdirected or underdeveloped conscience,100 pointing to 
situations where people under the control of a totalitarian regime come to misinterpret 
the memory of repeated propaganda as the ‘“voice of God’ from inside
96 Joseph Ratzinger, “ If Y ou Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” in Values in a Time of 
Upheaval, trans. Brian M cNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press; New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2006) 
75-99, at 75 (emphasis in text).
97 Ibid. (emphasis in text).
98 Ratzinger points to Fichte as the first to declare this view. However, other authors point to 
Butler as arriving at this unerring, supreme moral authority first (Butler died in 1752, ten years before 
Fichte’s birth). Cf. ibid., 76, n. 1; Joseph Butler, Five Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, in Five 
Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel and A Dissertation upon the Nature of Virtue, ed. with 
introduction and notes by Stephen L. Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), Preface, no. 24 (page 17): 
“neither can any human creature be said to act comformably to his constitution o f  nature unless he 
allows to that superior principle [conscience] the absolute authority which is due to it.”  See also 
Edward G. Andrew, Conscience and its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason and 
Modern Subjectivity (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 2001), 107-11, and Langston, Conscience 
and Other Virtues, 80-82.
99 Ratzinger, “ Conscience and Truth,” 76. Edward Andrew charts a history o f  the development 
o f  an individualist conscience, which lacks “ love, compassion or benevolence” . Indeed, the thesis o f 
his book is that a subjective, “ inner-directedness o f  conscience may be in inverse relationship to 
responsiveness to others” and their needs. In other words, the more concerned with self-justification or 
self-preservation, the less interest an individual’s conscience will have in the common good. See 
Andrew, Conscience and its Critics, 12-13, 187.
100 Joseph Ratzinger, “ Conscience in its Age,” in Church, Ecumenism and Politics: New 
Essays in Ecclesiology, trans. Robert Nowell (Middlegreen, Slough: St Paul Publications, 1988), 165- 
179, at 168-69.
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themselves,” 101 or where an individual’s human development is stunted through fear 
by misconstruing the content of their superego as true conscience. Thus, the future 
Pope underlines the fact that “the concept of conscience needs continual refining, and 
laying claim or appealing to conscience stands in need of a cautious honesty that is 
aware that one abuses something that is great when one rashly calls it into play.” 102
7. Conclusion
In the light of these comments by different authors, I would propose that the current 
state of the understanding of conscience is often confused, 103 distorted or fragmented, 
and the result of this is that its present-day application is open to isolation, misuse or 
even redundancy in different moral approaches.104 With this in mind, it is the aim of 
this thesis to analyse the nature of conscience,105 and with the help of things both new 
and old to offer a description of conscience that is, hopefully, more integrated with 
other parts of moral theory, and that emphasises a more positive and dynamic outlook, 
rooted in human growth, in virtue and grace.
I would suggest that a presentation on Christian conscience needs to be located 
in a fuller context, and that concentrating on only one of its foundations or points of
10IIn contrast, as an example o f someone with a great strength o f conscience who did not fold 
under external pressure, Ratzinger tells o f the nuclear scientist Andrey Sakharov and his challenge to 
the morality o f nuclear weapons in the face o f the Communist regime. See “ Freedom, Law  and the 
Good: Moral Principles in Democratic Societies,”  in Values in a Time of Upheaval, trans. Brian 
M cNeil (San Francisco: New York; Ignatius Press: Crossroad Publishing, 2006), 45-52.
102 Idem, “ Conscience in its Age,”  169.
103 James Gaffney also considers the understanding o f conscience to be “remarkably 
ambiguous, and that its ambiguity has increased over the course o f its history.”  See Matters of Faith 
and Morals (Kansas City, MO: Sheed &  Ward, 1987), 87-88.
104 Indeed it is Edward Andrew’ s view that over the centuries since the Enlightenment, “the 
liberal tradition o f  the English-speaking world has simultaneously attempted to deconstruct conscience 
and to champion its rights.” With such a state o f affairs, no wonder it is difficult to define what 
conscience is and how it is used. See Andrew, Conscience and its Critics, 177.
105 Gaffney sees neither sense nor value in trying to establish what conscience “really” means, 
and instead prefers a Socratic style o f  definition o f  terms to offer a starting point to reflection on the 
matter. It is my hope that an exploration o f  sources and an analysis o f  problems regarding content will 
provide adequate reasons to avoid my conclusions on conscience being completely arbitrary. Cf. 
Matters of Faith and Morals, 88.
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reference will result in a restricted vision of its role. Therefore, just as criticism by 
various authors has been made of looking at conscience in relation to freedom (and 
therefore law) without sufficient reference to objective truth, likewise, an analysis of 
conscience in terms of virtue without combining it with grace and holiness will also 
be in danger of fragmentation.106 Having one without the other is like having the cart 
without the horse. Thus, although Jean Porter aims at avoiding fragmentation in The 
Recovery o f  Virtue, as she deliberately separates the philosophical from the 
theological in Aquinas’s writing, I would suggest that this pulls apart what Aquinas 
would have considered as an integrated whole.107 Therefore, it is with this intention 
of integration that I set out on the first aim of this thesis, namely to offer some 
background to the notion of conscience.
106 Twomey, “Moral Renewal,” 212: “Grace, it might be said, is a subject in need o f 
immediate attention by moral theologians, i f  moral theology is to recover its authentic theological 
dimension.” See also Kennedy on his exhortation to a “ unified and comprehensive vision o f  morality,” 
since the isolation o f  virtue from other moral elements is just as fragmented as moral theories based on 
deontology or teleology. In Terence Kennedy, Doers of the Word: Moral Theology for Humanity in the 
Third Millennium, vol. 2, Light to the Nations: Making the Life of Humanity Worthy of the Gospel 
(Middlegreen, Slough: St Pauls, 2002), 138-39.
107 Porter, Recovery o/Virtue, 32: “Moreover, I have not attempted a complete account o f  the 
moral theory even o f  the ST [the Summa Theologica o f St Thomas Aquinas]. Rather, what I offer in 
this book is a reconstruction o f the more strictly philosophical components o f  that theory, and I have 
generally bracketed its more properly theological components.” Pinckaers also cautions against a 
reading o f  the Summa which is either myopic (looking no further than subject o f  interest) or suffering 
from double vision (where we separate the content into different preconceived categories, such as 
philosophy and theology). See Sources of Christian Ethics, 169-71.
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Chapter Two
Conscience in Classical Culture and Sacred Scripture
1. Introduction
C. S. Lewis once wrote that the analysis of the term ‘conscience’ was far from easy. 
Indeed, not content with describing conscience as a “maze,” where there is at least a 
discernible start and finish, he preferred to liken the concept to “a simmering pot of 
meanings,” 1 where the whole idea seems to be in constant, bubbling turmoil. 
Certainly, there are many contradictions and inconsistencies in the history and 
interpretation of conscience. However, we should not think that the use of the term is 
so variable that it defies all definition, like some kind of boiling alphabet soup. 
Instead, while giving due acknowledgment to the complexity of the word’s early use, 
it is possible to discern trends and stages in its development, which will lead us to 
draw some conclusions about how the concept was understood and employed. These, 
in turn, will give us some points of reference in our search for an integrated notion of 
conscience. I will therefore begin this exploration into the background of the concept 
by examining the early use of conscience (syneidesis) in classical culture and Sacred 
Scripture, particularly in the New Testament, since this will allow us to recognise the 
characteristics of early Christian usage, before turning our attention to Scholastic 
analysis in the next chapter.
1 C. S. Lewis, “ Conscience and Conscious,” in Studies in Words (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960), 181-213, at 196.
2 The purpose o f  the historical chapters is to provide sufficient background to allow us to 
proceed to an exploration o f  an integrated notion o f conscience. Therefore, in no way is it intended that 
the presentation will be an exhaustive history. A s a result, although other periods, such as the patristic 
era, are also rich in material, in order not to lose sight o f  the main object o f  the thesis, reference to the 
patristic period and other points in history will be made only when relevant to the issue in hand. For 
useful notes on the style and understanding o f  conscience in the Church Fathers, see Philippe Delhaye, 
The Christian Conscience, trans. Charles Underhill Quinn (New York: Desclde, 1968), 69-99.
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2. Semantic Background to the Use of Conscience in the New Testament
The word syneidesis is to be found only thirty times in the New Testament as a whole,
•5
with St Paul laying claim to the greatest use of the word. Although Paul did not coin 
the term himself,4 it can be safely said that he was the first to introduce it into 
Christian literature, since fourteen of the occurrences are found in the Pauline corpus, 
with all remaining usage coming after him.5 With this in mind, it follows that we 
should begin our exploration of New Testament usage of conscience with St Paul.
3 Gerd Lüdemann, “Syneidësis,” in Exegeiical Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 3, ed. 
Horst B alz and Gerhard Schneider, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), 301- 
303, at 301 (hereafter cited as EDNT). St Paul’s use o f the term is to be found in Rom 2:15, 9:1, 13:5;
1 Cor 8:7.10.12, 10: 25.27.28.29 (twice); 2 Cor 1:12,4:2, 5:11.
4 St Paul showed a certain flair for creating “words compounded with the preposition syn,” 
meaning ‘with’ , in his efforts to describe the reality o f the Christian life. However, as we shall see, 
syneidesis is not one o f  his inventions. See Brendan McGrath, Syn' Words in Saint Paul,”  Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 14 (1952): 219-26, at 219.
The word also occurs in Acts 23:1, 24:16, in the pastoral letters ITim  1:5. 19, 3:9,4:2; 2 Tim 
1:3; Titus 1:15, in Heb 9:9.14, 10:2. 22, 13:18 and lPet2:19, 3:16. 21, which leads Coune to observe 
that the word is absent from the more Jewish styled parts o f  the New Testament. A t first, one might be 
surprised at this conclusion, given that the term occurs five times in Hebrews. However, their 
appearance seems to be less o f an inconsistency than initially imagined. Firstly, chapter 13, which is 
the most “Pauline” in style o f  the whole letter, is possibly a later addition to the text, perhaps for the 
purpose o f  giving the homily “the appearance o f a letter to allow its admission into the canon.” O f  the 
other four instances, their appearance is explained by the background o f  the author o f  Hebrews. 
Raymond Brown notes that “the quality o f  his Greek and his control o f the Scriptures in Greek suggest 
that he was a Jewish Christian with a good Hellenistic education and some knowledge o f  Greek 
philosophical categories.” It is this Hellenistic background which contributes significantly to the style, 
in contrast to the content, o f Hebrews and hence allows Coune to draw his conclusion on the uses o f  
syneidesis. Cf. Michel Coune, “Le problème des idolothytes et l ’ éducation de la syneidêsis,” 
Recherches de Science Religieuse 51 (1963): 497-534, at 497, n. 2; George W esley Buchanan, To the 
Hebrews, The Anchor Bible, vol. 36, 2nd ed. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 1981), 267-68, at 
268; Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament, (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 693- 
95, at 695.
Although further nuancing o f  the concept is found in these letters, it is clear that the previous 
Pauline usage would have had some influence on these later occurrences. This is true also o f  “ a late 
Greek gloss” added to John 8:9 in a few manuscripts, concerning the woman caught in the act o f 
adultery. The additional clause describes the departing scribes and Pharisees as “being convicted by 
their conscience.”  Although a late interpolation, Pierce considers its guilt-based understanding similar 
to the early Pauline uses o f syneidêsis. A s a result, he feels justified in concluding that St Paul’s use “ is 
normative for the N.T. and has at least a strong claim to be normative for Christianity as a whole.”  I 
think Pierce overreaches himself in this conclusion, since the significance o f  the Johannine gloss 
“ written later than any o f  the other occurrences,” would only prove the complete normativity o f  Paul if  
all other intervening uses o f syneidêsis in other texts, including some Pauline texts, were o f  the same 
type and content, namely, a negative guilty conscience. This, however, is not the case, and so all we 
can say is that St Paul’ s early usage forms a major part o f  the norm for the N ew  Testament 
understanding o f  the term. Cf. C. A. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (London: SCM  Press,
1955), 104, 117, 68; Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel According to John (i-xii), The Anchor Bible, vol. 
29 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 1966), 332-338.
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However, before attending to Paul’s use of the word, we should ask where he 
drew the word from in the first place. Syneidesis is the noun drawn from the verb 
synoida. The prefix syn when combined with a verb can retain its ‘with’ meaning, or 
can be reduced to having “a vaguely intensive force.” 6 Thus synoida refers to 
someone who ‘has knowledge of something with’ another person or oneself, or knows 
something well.7 This double meaning of syn also applies to all the cognates of 
synoida. The origins of syneidesis date back to about 500 B.C., with Democritus of
o
Abdera being the first reliably recorded philosopher to have used the term. Its usage 
was rare at first,9 but became very frequent and more stable in meaning in both 
secular Greek writings and Hellenistic Jewish works by the time of the first century 
A.D., as attested to by writers such as Plutarch, Philo and Josephus. This frequency of 
usage continued in Roman authors, such as Cicero and Seneca, through the Latin 
translation conscientia, which is a contraction of cum-scientia.10 Although in time the 
moral significance of syneidesis (and conscientia) came to hold sway, from early on 
the word was used to describe two different, though at times related, acts: physical 
awareness and moral awareness. Depending upon the translation, Democritus’ use is 
possibly moral: “Many people, who, not knowing of the dissolution of mortal nature, 
however, being conscious of their life of evil doing, [syneidesei de tes en toi bioi
6 Lewis, “ Conscience and Conscious,” 181; Christian Maurer, “Synoida, Syneidesis,”  in 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 7, ed. Gerhard Friedrich, trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), 898-919, at 899-902 (hereafter cited as TDNT).
7 Lewis, “ Conscience and Conscious,” 181; Maurer, TDNT, 899-900. The verb came to be 
used reflexively in the expression synoida emautö, where the person who knows and the person who 
shares the knowledge are one and the same. Maurer describes this as an interaction between two egos 
in the same subject. This verbal description o f an internal point o f reference in personal awareness is 
significant in the development o f the noun. See Maurer, TDNT, 900.
8 Cf. C. Spicq, “ La conscience dans le nouveau testament,”  Revue Biblique 47 (1938): 50-80, 
at 51-52; Linda Hogan, Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition (New York and 
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2000), 38.
9 Spicq comments that after its debut in the writing o f Democritus and Chryssipus, apart from 
some rare texts, the word “practically disappears from the literature”  until the first century after Christ. 
Ceslas Spicq, “Syneidesis,” in Theological Lexicon of the New Testament, vol. 3, trans. and ed. James 
D. Ernest (Peabody, M A: Hendrickson, 1994), 332-336, at 332.
10 Lüdemann, EDNT, 301.
31
kakopragmosun.es] are troubled with a lifetime of disquiet and fears, by inventing 
untrue fables about the time after the end.” 11 In contrast, Chrysippus does not use 
syneidesis in a moral sense. He “predicates syneidesis of every living creature -  not 
exclusively of man -  and means by it [...] simply the awareness or consciousness 
which a creature has of its own composition.” Thus we can see that syneidesis has 
two related, though distinct meanings, which C.S. Lewis describes as “two branches 
of meaning; that which uses the full sense (‘together’) of the prefix and that in which 
the prefix is [...] almost inoperative,” with only the former containing a moral 
overtone.13 This means that syneidesis expresses moral knowledge of an action, 
shared either with another external witness, or reflexively with one’s innermost self, 
only when the prefix maintains its original force.14 It is this background of a double 
meaning to syneidesis that makes interpretation of Pauline and other New Testament 
texts complex and liable to disagreement among scholars. However, as some 
arguments are more plausible than others, it is possible to arrive at a reasonably 
reliable understanding of New Testament use.
11 Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 1, Greek with German trans., 2nd 
ed. (Berlin: Wiedmannsche, 1906), 55, B, 297: “Manche Leute, die von der Auflösung der 
menschlichen Natur nichts wissen, sich dagegen des menschlichen Elends wohl bewußt sind, mühen 
sich ihre Lebenszeit in Unruhen und Ängsten ab, indem sie über die Zeit nach dem Ende erlogene 
Fabeln erdichten.”  (Own translation, with reference to the Greek.) Spicq is certain that the text refers to 
moral consciousness. See, Syneidesis," 332, n. 1. Cf. also Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 39. Some 
would argue, however, that kakopragmosynen can also be taken in a non-moral sense to mean “ the 
distressing situation o f  life,”  instead o f “ evil conduct.” A s a result, this alters the translation to mean, 
“ Some people who are not aware o f the dissolution o f mortal nature but know the misery o f life, and 
pass their time wretchedly in unrest and anxiety, inventing lying myths about the hereafter.” Therefore, 
the text ultimately remains ambiguous about the content o f moral responsibility implied by syneidesis. 
If this text is not evidence o f  a moral use o f the term, it is clear that syneidenai, synesis and syneidesis 
are used to refer to moral conscience (mostly bad), at least by the second century B.C. in writers such 
as Demosthenes. See Maurer, TDNT, 902-903.
12 Cf. Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 14; Lewis, “ Conscience and Conscious,” 181- 
82, at 182: “ We read in Diogenes Laertius (VII, 85) ‘Chrysippus says that the first property o f  every 
animal is its structure and the suneidesis o f this’ . Suneidesis here can hardly mean anything more than 
‘awareness’ .” For original Greek text, see C.J. De Vogel, Greek Philosophy, vol. 3, The Hellenistic- 
Roman Period (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959), 127-28.
13 Lewis, “ Conscience and Conscious,” 181-82.
14 Ibid., 182; 184-91.
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Given that syneidesis has an independent secular Greek history pre-dating 
Jewish usage, and that there is no direct Hebrew equivalent to the Greek word 
syneidesis,15 it is clear that St Paul did not make or employ a direct translation of a 
Hebrew concept. Rather he adopted the term from Greek culture for his own use in 
response to the difficulties and challenges facing the new Christian communities in 
Greece and Rome. Therefore, having established that Paul drew the term from Greek 
culture, now we must narrow the search for the origins of his usage, in order to gain a 
better idea of the connotations of the concept at the time of its Christian acceptance, 
and also to spot whether or not the concept was significantly altered by Paul and other 
Christian writers.
It had been long held that Pauline moral usage had its origins directly in Stoic 
philosophy.16 Indeed this “seductive, but simplistic hypothesis,” 17 is still accepted by 
some modem writers, despite major authorities’ rejection of this theory from the early 
1900s.18 A major difficulty in Paul drawing the term from Stoicism is the lack of
15 Xavier Leon-Dufour, “ Conscience” , in Dictionary of the New Testament, trans. from 2nd 
rev. French ed. by Terrence Prendergast (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1980), 145. The fact that there is 
no direct translation in Hebrew for a word meaning conscience has led some scholars to dismiss the 
Old Testament as having virtually no influence upon the shaping o f the Christian usage o f the term. 
Pierce says that the term “ is one o f the few important Greek words o f  the N.T. that have not had 
imported into them, through use by the LXX [Septuagint], a colouring from the Hebrew experience and 
outlook o f  the O .T.” See Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 6 0 .1 would hold this to be an 
oversimplification, as there are related biblical Hebrew concepts, which other writers have shown to 
have a bearing upon the Christian notion. We shall return to these later.
16 Delhaye points out that early Twentieth Century rationalistic science was keen to prove that 
St Paul was purely Stoic in his use o f conscience, but that “they had to make a singularly hasty retreat,” 
since “numerous works showed that the notion o f  syneidesis is in no way specifically Stoic.”  See 
Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 49.
17 Spicq, “ La conscience dans le nouveau testament,”  51.
18 For example, Terence Kennedy, Doers of the Word, I, 168: “ The phenomenon o f  
conscience was first elaborated by the Stoics as right decision in harmony with the logos which was the 
world-plan o f  human destiny.” Cf. Jayne Hoose “ Conscience in the Roman Catholic Tradition,” in 
Conscience in World Religions, ed. Jayne Hoose (Leominster: Gracewing; Notre Dame, IN: University 
o f  Notre Dame Press, 1999), 62-98, at 63: “ [Paul] uses the key concept o f  Stoicism, syneidesis.” 
Although Häring comments on the uncertainty o f how much influence Stoicism had on Paul, 
nevertheless he says Paul “takes up the key concept o f  the Stoic ethics, syneidesis.”  See Bernard 
Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, vol. 1, General Moral 
Theology (Slough: St Paul Publications, 1978), 227. As Hoose refers to Häring in the medieval 
background to conscience, although not cited, it is possible that she also drew her comments on 
Stoicism from him, given similarity o f  content.
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occurrence in Greek Stoic texts.19 The Melissa fragment previously ascribed to 
Epictetus is now largely accepted as belonging to another author, possibly with
Of)Christian connections. This leaves the Greek Stoic corpus with no text referring to 
syneidesis in a moral sense. As a result, the only Stoic text to use the term is that of 
Chryssipus (ca 281-208 B.C.), which, as we have already seen, employs the word to 
mean simply ‘awareness’. Modem scholarship has thus concluded that moral use of 
the term is not particularly Stoic. Moreover, the second reason for severing a direct 
link between Paul and the Stoics is that by the time of Paul, the term is not even the 
preserve of the philosophical elite. Indeed Pierce notes that St Paul “wrote for 
professional philosophers [...] no more than other N.T. writers.” As a result, since 
he wrote for ordinary people, his usage of syneidesis must be taken from ordinary
usage. Thus the understanding of the term will reflect not technical philosophy but
00“popular philosophy” or “folk wisdom.” It is in this popular context that syneidesis
19 This does not preclude the cross-over o f Latin Stoicism, particularly that o f  Seneca through 
Philo. Indeed, Schrage considers it probable that Paul has “borrowed the concept from Hellenistic 
Judaism, where we find (especially in Philo) ideas similar to those o f Seneca,”  who clearly commented 
on conscientia. However, as we shall see, Philo does not use the word syneidesis. Therefore, all we can 
say is that, at most, Paul may have borrowed the notion from Stoic influences on the culture o f  the 
time, but it is very unlikely that he derived the specific term from this particular school o f  philosophy. I 
would also side with Delhaye in the view that it is more likely that Hellenistic moral philosophy 
influenced the Latin writers, rather than the other way around. See Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the 
New Testament, trans. David E. Green (Edinburgh: T & T  Clark, 1988), 195; Delhaye, The Christian 
Conscience, 50, n.12. On Seneca and conscientia, see De Vogel, Greek Philosophy, III, 292-294.
20 Ibid., Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 14-15, 51. The fragment ascribed to 
Epictetus uses syneidesis and syneidos to describe the adult equivalent o f a nursemaid, namely, an 
internal guardian and protector given to us by God. Hogan cites this passage as an example o f  the Stoic 
understanding o f conscience as the “ divinely appointed overseer” . Maurer considers the use o f  syneidos 
in the passage to be an exception, given that the term used for the overseer is normally epitropos. Yet, 
Maurer does say that the latter term contributes to the Christian development o f  the positive, directive 
notion o f conscience. Hogan also acknowledges that the fragment may not be by Epictetus but sides 
with those who think it to be by another Stoic author. Cf. Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 41 and 193, n. 
11; Maurer, TDNT, 904-905. Marietta agrees that the fragment has been incorrectly attributed to 
Epictetus. See Don E. Marietta, “ Conscience in Greek Stoicism,”  Numen 17 (1970): 176-187, at 179.
21 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 16.
22 Ibid., 16-17; at 16: “ There is thus always an element o f ‘popular philosophy’ in popular 
speech: and this is no less true o f  Hellenistic koiné at the beginning o f the Christian era.” For 
corroboration o f  this “Popularphilosophie” conclusion, see Piero Rossano, “Morale Ellenistica e 
Morale Paolina,” in Fondamenti Biblici della Teologia Morale: Atti Della XXII Settimana Biblica, ed. 
Associazione Biblica Italiana (Brescia: Paideia, 1973), 173-85, at 179. Alvarez points out that there is 
no lack o f authors who claim to have found a direct relation between Pauline usage and some school or 
movement o f the time, be it Stoicism, Neo-Pythagorism, or Hellenistic Judaism o f  the style o f  Philo.
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had been more widely used for centuries.23 Indeed, so commonplace an idea was 
syneidesis that Pierce takes the view that, although Democritus is the first to use it in 
Greek literature, the term is not of his own making. Rather syneidesis belongs to a 
category of ethical concepts that were absorbed into the formal Ethics of the 
philosophers.24 Other scholars would not go so far as this, concluding that the 
widespread use of the word in society was the after-effect of professional 
philosophical use. Nevertheless, whatever the order of application, the fact that it 
was employed regularly in the public sphere poses its own problems, since its broad 
usage lacked strict definition. As a result, it would be impossible to achieve complete
9 f tprecision in its meaning. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of reaching 
sufficient common detail to outline the contemporary Greek background to Paul’s use.
In his influential monograph, C. A. Pierce presents a detailed analysis of the 
moral branch of syneidesis in Greek popular usage up to the time of St Paul. His 
general conclusion is that the Greeks of the time considered syneidesis to be “an 
element of human nature as such; but at the same time of human nature as integrally
However, Alvarez says that, “the channel from which Paul drew his approach to Hellenistic thought 
was probably popular philosophy through which passed into the public domain a series o f  concepts 
elaborated with characteristics specific to different philosophical schools.”  Lorenzo Alvarez Verdes, 
Caminar en el Espíritu: El Pensamiento Etico de S. Pablo, Quaestiones Morales, no. 12 (Rome: 
Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 2000), 194-195, at 194: “El cauce de que se sirvió Pablo su 
aproximación al pensamiento helenista fue probablemente la filosofía popular, a través de la cual había 
pasado al dominio público una serie de conceptos elaborados con características específicas por las 
diversas escuelas filosóficas.”  Cf. Marietta, “ Conscience in Greek Stoicism,” 186-7.
23 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 17: “ It is used by every possible sort o f  writer: by 
philosophers and poets; by tragic and comic playwrights -  and who more in touch with popular usage 
than the comedian; by historians and novelists; by engineers and physicians; by orators and 
rhetoricians; by learned critics and simple commissioners o f domestic inscriptions: by writers o f  private 
correspondence.”
24 Ibid-
25 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 194, n. 20.
26 Schnackenburg observes that “as it was used chiefly in popular ethics and not defined, we 
cannot expect absolute clarity in its use.” See Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New 
Testament, trans. J. Holland-Smith and W.J. O ’ Hara (Freiburg: Herder; London: Bums &  Oates, 1965), 
288. It could be said that an absolute definition o f conscience in present-day popular usage is equally 
impossible, as its content continues to vary.
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involved in an ordered universe.”27 Pierce identifies three factors that produce this 
conclusion. Firstly, syneidesis is linked to Ananke -  “the fixed determinate order of 
things-as-they are,” and therefore writers, such as Socrates, saw that those who broke 
this order would suffer greatly from knowing they had done so. Secondly, by 
extension, it was widely held that an element of Ananke was an integral part of human 
nature, with syneidesis or synesis acting as the means for communicating a break with 
that order.29 Finally, in a theological context, conscience, order and God or gods were
OA
easily linked together since God was recognised as the “orderer of the universe.”
Thus, in this context, a break in the order of things recognised by conscience is an
offence to God (the gods) since he is (they are) the source of the order of things.
Pierce goes on to show that statistically there is an overwhelming case for
identifying one point of reference for nearly all relevant Greek texts, so much so that
any text referring to syneidesis or a related word, must be understood as such unless
specified otherwise. There are four aspects to this point of reference. Firstly,
syneidesis reflexively refers to the quality of a person’s own acts and character, not
anyone else’s. “No external authority need be consulted: he knows, and is his own
•  ^1witness to himself; and this knowledge and witness are private to him alone.” 
Secondly, syneidesis refers to specific acts of that person, and only to his/her
27 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 40. Reference to an ordered universe could easily 
elicit thoughts o f  Stoic philosophy, and so it is understandable that some authors might see this as 
evidence o f  Stoic influence upon the formation o f the concept. However, the notion o f  a “ world-order” 
is far from exclusively Stoic, as can be evidenced by earlier texts. See Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. 
Zeyl, in The Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 508a. 
Thus, the idea o f  an order in nature in relation to an order in human nature would have also belonged to 
the language o f  popular philosophy by the time o f the first century A.D. This double focus o f  internal 
and external order will prove to be a source o f tension that is explored in modem writings on 
conscience.
28 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 40. Cf. also Römelt, La Coscienza, 35.
29 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 40. As a result, “Polybius asserts that there is no 
witness so fearful, nor accuser so terrible as that sünesis which dwells in the soul o f  every man.” See 
ibid., 40-41 (emphasis in text). With this understanding o f the order o f things being built into human 




» • • • • I”)character insofar as it is “determined by and expressed in specific acts.” Thirdly,
IT
“the reference is always to past acts.” Lastly, it is the norm that “the act, acts, 
condition or character” referred to “are bad.”34
Thus it can be summarised that for the Greeks the popular notion of syneidësis 
signified an aspect of human nature that responded to the order of nature as a whole 
by reflexively identifying past bad actions. This leads Pierce to conclude that “for the 
N.T. period, therefore, it is safe to say that in popular usage -  in default of 
unequivocal indication to the contrary -  syneidësis is concerned only with bad acts, 
conditions and character,” and not with the assessment of the goodness of a future
i f
action or of the good character of a person.
But how did syneidësis function in order to register that a bad action had been
committed against the order of things? Greek writings describe the function of
syneidësis in terms of pain. It is portrayed either as a pain in itself, as the inflictor of
pain upon the guilty individual or as the seat of feeling pain. Plutarch likens the
gnawing, persistent pain of conscience to the suffering endured from an ulcer
(helkos).31 Philo presents conscience as the agent of pain. I will quote his description
here in full, as it contains significant points to which we shall return later:
For every soul has for its birth-fellow and house-mate a monitor [elenchos] 
whose way it is to admit nothing that calls for censure, whose nature is ever 
to hate evil and love virtue, who is its accuser and its judge in one. If he be
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 43 (emphasis in text); Maurer, TDNT, 904: “Moral conscience [in secular Greek 
writing] is not primarily concerned with preparation for approaching decisions (conscientia 
antecedens) but with assessing and condemning acts already committed (conscientia consequens). 
Hence the normal case is the bad conscience; the good conscience is an exception.”
34 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 45 (emphasis in text); Maurer, TDNT, 904: “B y 
way o f  summary it may be said that from the 5th to the 3rd century B.C. there is varied use which is only 
feeling its w ay towards a noun to express the moral conscience in a bad sense. Only from the 1st 
century B.C. do the two nouns syneidos and syneidesis outstrip synesis and come into common use.”
35 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 45.
36 Ibid., 46.
37 Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, in Plutarch ’s Moralia, vol. 6, with English trans. by 
W .C. Helmbold, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, M A: Harvard University 
Press, 1970), 476F.
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once roused as accuser he censures, accuses and puts the soul to shame, and 
again as judge, he instructs, admonishes and exhorts it to change its ways. 
And if he has the strength to persuade it, he rejoices and makes peace. But if 
he cannot, he makes war to the bitter end, never leaving it alone by day or 
night, but plying it with stabs and deadly wounds until he breaks the thread 
of its miserable and ill-starred life.38
Other texts, such as the Orphic Hymn are worded in such a way as to present 
conscience “as the ‘organ’ or ‘faculty’ in which pain is felt.” The concept of 
conscience as faculty is an important issue in the history of the word’s development, 
and we shall examine this more fully later. However, it is important to note that the 
description of conscience as a separate faculty or an aspect of one’s personality to 
which one can be true or break away from to one’s shame, is present in some early 
texts, and so Langston’s curious notion that conscience as a faculty is only accepted 
after the Protestant Reformation is well off the mark.40 Having said that, Pierce is 
convinced that both agent and faculty descriptions of conscience are purely 
metaphorical and so in content are not so far removed from the simple description of
38 Philo, De Decalogo, in Philo in Ten Volumes, vol. 7, with English trans. by F.H. Colson, 
Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 87. 
For the purposes o f  comparison, here is Pierce’s translation in Conscience in the New Testament, 46: 
“It is bom  with every soul and makes its abode with it, nor is it wont to admit therein anything that 
offends. Its property is ever to hate the evil and love the good. The same thing is at once both accuser 
and judge. When once stirred up, as accuser it lays charge, it makes accusation, it puts to shame: then 
again as judge it teaches, warns and counsels the soul to repent. I f  its suasions but prevail, joyfully is it 
reconciled. But if  it cannot prevail, it gives not peace but makes war. Never does it depart by day nor 
by night, but stabs as with a goad, and inflicts wounds that know no healing, until it snap the thread o f  
that soul’ s pitiful and accursed life.”
Although Philo uses words related to syneidesis, such as syneidos, in this highly descriptive 
passage he is, in fact, referring to elenchos instead o f syneidos. However, Pierce presents a language 
study to show that the two words are synonymous in Philo’s writing, and so the passage conserves its 
relevance for a study on syneidesis and conscience in general. See ibid., 46, n. 2. Spicq would concur 
with the link between the two words. See Spicq, “Syneidesis,” 334. In Philo’s description o f  elenchos 
as that which naturally loves virtue and hates evil, we may, perhaps, also fmd a precursor o f the 
medieval descriptions o f synderesis: that faculty or habitus which naturally seeks the good and shuns 
evil. W e shall delve deeper into synderesis in the next chapter.
39 See Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 49.
40 See Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, 8, 71 -77. Langston misrepresents history by 
claiming that the idea o f conscience as faculty only develops much later, starting with the writings o f 
Luther. However, one must acknowledge the presence o f the idea o f  faculty among some Greek 
writers, as well as certainly among the early Scholastics through the widespread influence o f  Philip the 
Chancellor. See M.B. Crowe, “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics, I: Synderesis and the Early 
Scholastics,”  Irish Theological Quarterly 23 (1956): 151-164.
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conscience as pain.41 The difficulty here is that pain itself is a metaphor, and so if he 
wishes to disregard metaphors as offering little insight into the real nature or function 
of conscience, then he is left without any descriptive terms at all.
In reading Pierce’s text it becomes apparent that his approach is reductivist, in 
that if something does not quite fit his tight conclusions, he will swiftly explain it 
away as irrelevant to his investigation. At this point, his interim conclusion is this: 
“The fundamental connotation of the syneidesis group of words is that man is by 
nature so constituted that, if he overstep the moral limits of his nature he will 
normally feel pain -  the pain called syneidesis.”42 This is an important conclusion, 
later cited by others,43 which we must bear in mind as we step into the New 
Testament world and into Paul’s use of the word. However, from Pierce’s initial 
conclusion, which he later applies to Paul and the New Testament in general, it is 
clear that he wants to show that conscience is “the painful reaction of man’s nature, as 
morally responsible, against infringements of its created limits,” and nothing more.44
41 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 49-50.
42 Ibid., 50.
43 For example, Terence Kennedy quotes this conclusion with no further comment, while 
Alvarez quotes it in full to show where he thinks Pierce has gone wrong. Cf. Kennedy, Doers of the 
Word, I, 168; Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 222-23.
44 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 108. Alvarez has problems with Pierce’s 
reductivist approach, too, and Maurer concludes that he is “ going too far”  to presume a developed and 
largely uniform concept o f conscience in the pre-Christian Greek world. Cf. Alvarez, Caminar en el 
Espíritu, 222-23, Maurer, TDNT, 907. I have focused my attention on Pierce’ s work for a number o f 
reasons. Firstly, though dated, Pierce remains a major point o f reference for scripture scholars and 
moral theologians writing on the topic o f conscience in the ancient Greek and N ew  Testament periods. 
Nevertheless, scholars now recognise that his major conclusion is reductivist, and therefore does not do 
justice to the rich nature o f Pauline and later New Testament descriptions o f conscience. His desire for 
a neat conclusion leads Pierce to sideline passages which do not fit his thesis, despite acknowledging 
their existence. For example, Alvarez states that Pierce’s hypothesis o f Pauline conscience as solely 
painful reaction runs into difficulty when a Pauline text does not refer to transgression, but rather to the 
issue o f one’s rectitude or truthfulness being subject to the judgement o f others (2 Cor 4:2, 5 :11; Rom 
9:1) or refers to the question o f proving the existence o f God’s law written in our hearts (Rom 2:12-16). 
Therefore, one must not rely wholly upon Pierce’s presentation. Most moral theology books quote him 
without comment, which could give him greater credence than due, and thus undermines the fuller 
notion o f conscience present in Scripture. The implication o f this is that i f  Scripture is to be a major 
source for moral theology, then an inaccurate presentation o f conscience would lead to a reductivist 
notion being applied to moral theology. See Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 222-23.One o f  the few 
that does make a comment is Charles Curran, who points out that the analysis o f  Pierce and others may 
be influenced by denominational bias. See Charles E. Curran, “ Conscience in the Light o f the Catholic
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A n y  o th e r d e s c rip tio n  o f  conscience is  declared to  be “ a near-pe rsona l m e taphor”  o f  
m an ’ s “ ca p a c ity  to  react”  to  w rongdo in g , add ing n o th in g  to  the  con ten t o f  the  
n o tio n .45
I  have the  im press ion  tha t P ierce sees conscience in  the  G reek and N e w  
Testam ent env ironm en ts as opera ting  s im p ly  lik e  an a la rm  b e ll o r w a rn in g  lig h t 
in d ic a tin g  m a lfu n c tio n , o r lik e  a stab o f  pa in  in  reaction  to  a h a ir b e in g  p u lle d . I  w o u ld  
cons ide r th a t there  is  a serious p rob lem  w ith  th is  co n c lu s io n , in  th a t i t  is  o v e rly  
m echan is tic . E ven  i f  w e w ere to  exclude the p o s s ib ility  o f  a d e lib e ra tiv e  c o n s c ie n tia  
an teced ens , such a m echan is tic  approach does no t do ju s tic e  to  the  ju d g e m e n t o r 
m en ta l process in v o lv e d  in  fe e lin g  a g u ilty  pang o f  conscience , h o w eve r sh o rt a 
process th a t m ay be, g ive n  the in flu e n ce  o f  d iffe re n t facto rs  such as re p e titio n  o r the  
in flu e n ce  o f  ex te rna l a u th o rity . T here fo re  1 am  o f the o p in io n  th a t the  o th e r m etaphors 
em p loyed  b y  w rite rs  such as P h ilo  a re  s ig n ific a n t, in  th a t th e y  describe  the  fu n c tio n s  
o f  conscience to  be m ore than  s im p ly  a p a in fu l reaction , regard less o f  w he the r th a t act 
o f  conscience g ives evidence to  conscience be ing  a fa c u lty  o r s im p ly  a p a rt o f  
p ra c tic a l reason. P ierce says th a t the “ m etaphors b o th  o f  ju d g e  and o f  p ro s e c u to r  are 
fre q u e n t,”  in  G reek te x ts .46 I f  th is  is  the case, then  I  w o u ld  be w a ry  o f  s im p ly  
d ism iss in g  them  as near-personal concré tisa tions o f  the  p a in fu l w itness  ca lle d  
syneidës is , because the  w o rd  “ ju d g e ”  in  its e lf h ig h lig h ts  a fu n c tio n  th a t is  m ore  than  
au tom a tic  re a c tio n , w h ic h  re lates to  some k in d  o f  co n c lu s io n  o r v e rd ic t based upon 
re fle c tin g  upon  the s itu a tio n .
Moral Tradition,” in Readings in M oral Theology No. ¡4: Conscience, ed. Charles E. Curran, (New 
York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 3-24, at 6.
45 Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, 108.
46 Ibid., 48-49 (emphasis in text). Although Philo’s emphasis on the juridical aspect of 
conscience is a result of his drawing from both Hellenistic and Jewish traditions, nevertheless, 
according to Pierce, the words judge and prosecutor do appear frequently in secular Greek texts which 
have not been influenced by Jewish thought. Cf. Maurer, TDNT913.
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C. S. L e w is ’ s ana lys is  o f  p re -C h ris tia n  usage o f  syneides is  is  a lso  m echan is tic . 
H e concludes th a t a t th is  stage o f  sem antic deve lopm ent o f  syn e id es is  (and 
c o n s c ie n tia ), conscience is n o t considered to  be “ a separate fa c u lty  o f  the  sou l. [ . . . ]  
S uneides is  o r c o n s c ie n tia  is  ra the r ‘ a state o f  a ffa irs ’ ; k n o w in g  abou t y o u r o w n  past 
actions w h a t o thers, o r m ost o thers do no t kn o w .” 47 T he re fo re , he says th a t “ i t  w o u ld  
m ake no  sense to  say ‘ M y  co nsc ien tia  te lls  m e th is  is w ro n g ’ ; i t  te lls  m e s im p ly  th a t I  
have done th is  -  fo r  o f  course w ha t w e conscire  is  a lw ays in  the  past.” 48 A c c o rd in g  to  
th is  unde rstand ing  o f  conscience, there is no sense in  re la tin g  the  n o tio n  o f  obedience 
to  it ,  s ince here i t  is  n o t seen as la w g iv e r o r ju d g e , b u t as m ere w itness. T hus, as w ith  
P ierce, the  co n c lu s io n  is  th a t conscience at th is  p o in t in  h is to ry  is  concerned w ith  past 
actions. B u t a lth o u g h  the  process o f  analysis is  qu ite  d iffe re n t, ye t aga in  here w e  fin d  
a m echan is tic  d e sc rip tio n  o f  e a rly  conscience. D esp ite  the  fa c t th a t L e w is  says 
co n s c irin g  o r syneidesis  is  an awareness o f  g u ilt,49 he says th a t th is  state o f  awareness 
is  n o t one th a t is  capable o f  ju d g in g  the act. Thus, “ i t  bears w itness  to  the  fa c t, say th a t 
w e co m m itte d  a m urder. I t  does n o t te ll us tha t m urder is  w ro n g ; w e are supposed to  
kn o w  th a t in  som e o the r w a y .” 50 Y e t again, th is  sounds lik e  the  a la rm  b e ll d e sc rip tio n  
o f  P ierce w h ic h  in v o lv e s  no m ora l judgem en t. Thus, i t  a lm ost appears th a t another 
fo rm  o f  conscience is  ope ra ting  p rio r to  the state o f  co n sc irin g  to  a llo w  the  person to  
have th is  awareness o f  g u ilt. O nce m ore, i f  the ea rly  w rite rs  described  a ju d g in g  ro le  
fo r  syneidesis , a lb e it ty p ic a lly  lo o k in g  to  the past, i t  m akes no  sense to  d ism iss  th is  as 
pure  m e tapho r o r a vo id  i t  com p le te ly . I  w o u ld  the re fo re  propose th a t L e w is ’ s ana lys is  
serves o n ly  to  m uddy fu rth e r an a lready m u rky  p o o l, and tha t, w h ile  m uch o f  P ie rce ’ s
47 Lewis, “Conscience and Conscious,” 191.
48 Ibid., 190. Lewis coined the term ‘conscire’ to describe the notion of syneidesis as moral 
witness, prior to what he calls “the great semantic shift” when syneidesis becomes judge and not 




ana lys is  serves to  g ive  m uch  in s ig h t in to  p re - and e a rly  C h ris tia n  usage, G rise z  h its  
the  n a il on  the  head w hen he says tha t “ some aspects o f  P ie rce ’ s tre a tm e n t need to  be 
am ended.” 51
H a v in g  acknow leged  the need fo r  cau tion  in  fo rm in g  conc lus ion s abou t p re - 
C h ris tia n  G reek usage, w e can at least say tha t up to  th a t p o in t the  w o rd  syn e id es is  is  
a lm o s t a lw ays re la ted  to  bad past actions, and m ost o f  the  a tte n tio n  w as g iv e n  to  its  
ro le  in  d ra w in g  a tte n tio n  to  the w rongdo in g  b y  means o f  e lic itin g  p a in fu l o r g u ilty  
fe e lin g s ,52 though  th is  d id  n o t com p le te ly  exclude som e lim ite d  unde rs tan d ing  o f  
syneidesis  a lso as an act o f  judgem en t concern ing  the w ro n g fu l deed. A lth o u g h  the 
va rie d  use o f  syneidesis  has been noted ea rlie r, there is a danger th a t in  th e  desire  to  
present a c le a r p ic tu re  o f  the  G reek background, w e m ig h t fo rg e t the  g e n tly  e v o lv in g  
state o f  the  w o rd , w h ic h  w as fa r fro m  lin e a r in  its  p rogression . A s  a re su lt, I  am  
som ew hat w a ry  o f  P ie rce ’ s con fidence  tha t syneidesis  w as s im p ly  absorbed in to  the 
C h ris tia n  co n te x t w ith  lit t le  strugg le  o r change,53 and w o u ld  side w ith  M a u re r in  
a ckn o w le d g in g  the  m a jo r c o n trib u tio n  o f  C h ris tia n ity  to  the  deve lop m e n t o f  the 
w o rd .54
51 Germain Grisez, The Way o f  the Lord Jesus, vol. 1, Christian M oral Principles (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 94, n.6.
52 As pain in some form was the experience of people with syneidesis, the general norm for the 
Greeks was to describe pleasure or well-being in terms of an absence of syneidesis. Therefore, once 
again there is an indication that the role of conscience in deliberating future action did not form part of 
the Greek notion up to the time of the New Testament. Divine admonition concerning future action is, 
however, present in the Socratic term daimonion. This may have contributed to the concept of 
antecedent conscience, which was fully developed much later. See Maurer, TDNT, 905.
53 Piero Rossano also thinks that the word was transferred wholly and unchanged (“in blocco”) 
into the realm of New Testament ethics. Rossano, “Morale Ellenistica e Morale Paolina,” 179.
54 Maurer, TDNT, 907.
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W ith  th is  b r ie f h is to ry  o f  the elem ents o f  its  e a rly  use, w e can n o w  in ve s tig a te  the  
understand ing  o f  syneidesis  in  S crip tu re . I f  w e lo o k  at S t P au l firs t, w e can id e n tify  a 
num ber o f  cha rac te ris tics  to  h is  usage w h ich  show  th a t he is  n o t s im p ly  rehea rs ing  the 
com m on p ro fane  understand ing  up to  tha t p o in t. F irs tly , P au line  use canno t be 
reduced m e re ly  to  se lf-aw areness, bu t ra ther p r im a rily  i t  denotes c r itic a l re fle c tio n  
upon onese lf, p a rtic u la rly  o f  a m ora l na tu re .55 F o r exam ple , P au l re fe rs  to  the 
ju d g e m e n t o f  h is  conscience w hen a ffirm in g  h is  eva lua tio n  o f  h o w  d e ce n tly  he has 
trea ted  peop le  (2  C o r 1 :12). P aul describes th is  locus o f  re fle c tio n  and assessm ent 
a lm ost as i f  syneidesis  is  a second ego tha t subm its the f ir s t pe rsona l ego to  c r itic a l 
ju d g e m e n t.56 T h is  ind ica tes  th a t Paul trusts tha t conscience has a ce rta in  o b je c tiv ity  
and n e u tra lity .57 T ha t is  n o t to  say tha t he is  unaw are th a t c o n flic ts  o f  conscience can 
arise, as w e sh a ll see. N everthe less, P au l’ s d e sc rip tio n  o f  syneidesis  presents i t  as a 
benchm ark fo r  re lia b le  judgem en t. I f  th is  w ere n o t the case, the re  w o u ld  be no p o in t 
in  m a k in g  an appeal to  i t  in  h is  defence.
3. Conscience in the Writing of Saint Paul
55 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 196-204. In his assessment of Paul, Maurer would 
downplay the religious or moral nature of syneidesis in Paul, reducing it to a “percipient and active 
self-awareness.” However, such a conclusion is itself contradictory, given that Maurer has already 
concluded, contrary to Pierce, that “at all events [Paul] means something more comprehensive than a 
subsequent bad conscience.” A subsequent bad conscience responds to wrongdoing of the past. If 
Paul’s notion is more comprehensive than this, it must also be on a moral level, for to be defined purely 
as self-awareness would surely be a complete redefinition, in non-moral terms, rather than expansion of 
the notion as presented by Pierce. See Maurer, TDNT, 914. Alvarez sees syneidesis in Paul as 
combining critical awareness on both a noetic and pragmatic level, thus combining the two branches of 
the term’s meaning. Spicq would consider it to be purely moral. Cf. Caminar en el Espíritu, 196-97; 
Spicq, “La conscience,” 76. Horsley follows Maurer in translating syneidesis in Paul as 
‘consciousness’. Yet, he then proceeds to use this word in a moral manner, rather than only as pure 
perception. I would suggest that Horsley’s translation is based upon a fear that ‘conscience’ might 
immediately be misunderstood as exclusively conscientia antecedens. However, if the nature of Paul’s 
moral use of syneidesis were to be fully and clearly explained, I think this fear would be unfounded. 
Horsley also thinks that Paul encounters the word syneidesis in Corinth for the first time. Alvarez states 
that the fact that Paul first uses syneidesis in writing to the Corinthians is insufficient reason to suggest 
that he did not know it beforehand. Cf. Richard A. Horsley, “Consciousness and Freedom among the 
Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10,” Catholic B iblical Quarterly 11 (1978): 574-89; Alvarez, Caminar en 
e l Espíritu, 195.
56 Cf. Ibid., 199; Maurer, TDNT 900.
57 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 197-98. Schrage uses the term “independent” rather than 
neutral. See Schrage, The Ethics o f  the New Testament, 195.
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syneidesis  is  capable o f  ju d g in g  no t o n ly  ou r ow n actions, b u t a lso  those o f  o thers. 
T h ro u g h o u t the Second L e tte r to  the C o rin th ians, Paul is  try in g  to  co n v in ce  the  chu rch  
co m m u n ity , som etim es w ith  great em otion, th a t he is  a c re d ib le  w itness  to  o u r L o rd  
and to  the  message o f  sa lva tio n , and there fore  shou ld  be lis te n e d  to .59 H e hopes th a t 
the co m m u n ity  are able to  recognise h is  s in ce rity , and th a t the re  is  no d ece it in  w ha t 
he says. A w a re  th a t the  L o rd  w ill ju d g e  h im  fo r  the q u a lity  o f  h is  ac tions  (2  C o r 5 :1 0 ), 
Paul ca rries  o u t h is  m iss io n  o f  re co n c ilia tio n  in  “ fea r o f  the L o rd ”  (2  C o r 5 :l l ) . 60 
Lam brech t observes th a t ju s t as Paul understands h im s e lf as an “ open b o o k ”  to  G od, 
so he hopes th a t he and h is  le tte r are equa lly  transparen t to  th e  C o rin th ia n s ,61 and he 
considers the  co m m u n ity  capable o f  ju d g in g  h is  in te g rity  th ro u g h  th e ir consciences. 
T h is  is  th e re fo re  an appeal to  the  perception  and m o ra l ju d g e m e n t o f  a conscience 
o the r than  h is  ow n , show ing  th a t P aul understands syneidesis  as n o t s im p ly  a pe rsona l 
c r itic a l instance, b u t one th a t is  capable o f ju d g in g  the actions o f  others.
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P aul a lso  considers every in d iv id u a l to  be endow ed w ith  syneides is . H e 
re fe rs  h is  p reach ing  o f  the  tru th  o f  the G ospel to  the ju d g e m e n t o f  the  conscience o f  
everyone (2 C o r 4 :2 ).63 H e also uses conscience as a m o tive  to  e xh o rt the  obedience 
o f  eve ry person to  go ve rn in g  au tho ritie s  (R om  13:1.5) H ere the  te x t does n o t ta lk  o f
The second characteristic we can observe in the writings of Paul is that
58 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 204.
59 Cf. Jan Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, Sacra Pagina, vol. 8 (Collegeville, MN: Michael 
Glazier and Liturgical Press, 1999), 1-7, 35, 92.
60 NB: In this dissertation all biblical quotations made in English are taken from the New 
Revised Standard Version, 1989 ed., unless specified otherwise. However, in cases where I have 
translated a passage by a writer which contains a biblical quotation, I have translated the biblical 
citation on the basis of what is contained in the passage, rather than substituting it for an English 
edition.
61 Lambrecht, Second Corinthians, 92.
62 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 204-205; Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, The 
Pastoral Epistles, trans. Philip Buttolph and Adela Yarbro, ed. Helmut Koester (Philadelhia: Fortress 
Press, 1972), 19: “In Paul (Rom 2:15) conscience appears as a general human phenomenon.”
63 Note, however, that here he offers a further qualification to the capacity of an individual’s 
conscience to judge rightly. He says “pros pasan syneidesin anthrdpon endpion tou Theou” — literally 
‘every conscience of men before God, or in the sight of God.’ Clearly, Paul considers the relationship 
of the person to God as having a bearing on right judgement.
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eve ry conscience, as in  the p rev ious passage, bu t attests to  the  u n ive rsa l na tu re  o f  
syneidesis  in  reverse, b y  ta lk in g  o f  every person (p a s a  p s y c h e )  and appea ling  to  th e ir  
conscience fo r  com p liance  (d ia  ten  syneidesin ). H e also a lludes to  u n iv e rs a lity  w hen  
com paring  Jews to  G en tiles  in  th e ir com pliance to  G od ’ s la w , s ta ting  th a t the  G e n tile s  
have th e ir conscience to  bear w itness to  the la w  w ritte n  in  th e ir  hearts (R om  2 :1 4 -1 5 ).
A  fo u rth  e lem ent o f  the P au line  understanding is  h is  d is tin c tio n  be tw een the 
ju d g e m e n t o f  G od and the  judgem en t o f  syneidesis. H e m arks a c le a r d iffe re n ce  
betw een the tw o , a lthoug h , as com m ented on e a rlie r, Paul considers the hum an a c tio n  
to  be rea lised  be fo re  G od (c f. 2 C or 4 :2 ).64 The A p o s tle ’ s e sch a to lo g ica l 
understand ing  o f  G od ’ s judgem en t provides the background  to  the  h is to ric a l fu n c tio n  
o f  conscience .65 Thus, w h ile  m a in ta in in g  a lin k  betw een the tw o , the  non ­
id e n tific a tio n  o f  the  ju d g e m e n t o f  syneidesis  w ith  the ju d g e m e n t o f  G od m eans th a t 
conscience does n o t have the  last w ord . I t  is  the re fo re  a hum an ju d g e m e n t inasm uch  
as i t  can be sub ject to  the  p o s s ib ility  o f  e rro r.66 In  fa c t, u n lik e  the  la te r instances o f  use 
in  the  S crip tu res, w h ic h  are concerned d ire c tly  w ith  the  m o ra l q u a lity  o f  the  
conscience its e lf, S t Paul is  m ore concerned about the capac ity  and m a tu rity  o f  an 
in d iv id u a l’ s conscience. There fo re  St Paul does n o t use the te rm s a g a th e  (g o o d ) and 
p o n e ra  (e v il)  to  syneidesis, b u t fre q u e n tly  app lies the a d je c tive  asthenes  (w e a k) to  
describe  it .  G ive n  its  sub o rd in a tio n  to  G od and its  capac ity  fo r  e rro r, th is  show s th a t 
P aul understands syneidesis  to  be ne ithe r “ autonom ous, abso lu te , [n ]o r d e fin itiv e .” 67
64 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 205-206; Schräge, Ethics o f  the New Testament, 195.
63 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 206. Cf. Rom 2:12-16; 1 Cor 4:4-5: “It is the Lord who 
judges me. Therefore do not pronounce judgment before the time, before the Lord comes, who will 
bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart.”
66 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 206.
67 Schräge, Ethics o f  the New Testament, 195. Schräge highlights 1 Cor 4:4 here as an 
example of the distinction between the judgement of syneidesis and God, since Paul declares here that 
his conscience could have missed something.
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F o llo w in g  on fro m  the  idea tha t hum an conscience has its  lim its  and is  
susceptib le  to  e rro r, P aul concentrates some o f h is  correspondence on  the  m atte rs o f  
the  rig h ts  o f  the  w eak conscience and c o n flic t betw een consciences. These issues are 
e xp lo red  b y  P aul in  the  con tex t o f  the in te rface  betw een C h ris tia n  and pagan custom  
o r in te ra c tio n , p a rtic u la rly  rega rd ing  the m a tte r o f  m eat sa c rific e d  to  id o ls . O ne m ig h t 
im ag ine  th a t P a u l’ s pha risa ic  background w o u ld  lead h im  to  a s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  and 
o u trig h t re fu sa l to  a llo w  any contact w ith  people o r a rtic le s  exposed to  id o l w o rsh ip . 
Indeed , he encourages the  C h ris tians o f  C o rin th  to  fle e  fro m  a n y th in g  re la ted  to  the  
w o rs h ip  o f  id o ls  (1 C o r 10 :14-21) and in  do ing  so is  fo llo w in g  Isa ia h ’ s in ju n c tio n  to  
“ to u ch  n o th in g  unclean”  (2  C o r 6 :16 -17 ; Isa iah  52 :11 ). H ow eve r, P au l is  fo rce d  to  
g ive  a fu lle r  answ er than  th is , since the co m m u n ity  a t C o rin th  was d iv id e d  o ve r the 
m atte r.
Som e C o rin th ia n  C h ris tians reasoned th a t i f  there is  o n ly  one G od and o n ly  
one L o rd  Jesus, then one cannot be harm ed b y  ea ting  a n y th in g  because the  id o ls  are 
unrea l. O thers had n o t fu lly  shaken o f f  the m o ra l im pact o f  th e ir past b e lie fs  ( IC o r  
8 :7 ), and so th o u g h t they  w o u ld  be contam inated by  ea ting  m eat s a c rific e d  to  id o ls . 
A s  a re su lt th e ir  consciences w ere ‘ w eak’ (asthenes ) and w ere  suscep tib le  to  be ing  
“ d e file d ”  b y  those a c tin g  fre e ly  accord ing  to  th e ir fu lle r  kn ow ledg e  o f  the  fac ts  
(g n o s is ).69 H ere , th e re fo re , S t Paul shows us th a t judgem en ts o f  consciences can 
d iffe r, even am ong m em bers o f  the b e lie v in g  com m un ity . T h ro u g h  its  c a re fu l w o rd ­
68 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 207-17.
69 Scholars are divided over the identity of the ‘weak’ Christians in Corinth and Rome. 
Typically the weak are identified as either Christians with either a Jewish or Gentile background (I 
would favour the Jewish Christian explanation). For a description of differing views, see Joseph A. 
Fitzmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible, vol. 33, (New York: Doubleday 1993), 686-88; Raymond F. 
Collins, First Corinthians, Sacra Pagina, vol. 7 (Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier and Liturgical 
Press, 1999), 325. More recently, Mark Nanos has proposed that they are Non-Christian Jews, but this 
has been criticised as implausible by Robert Gagnon. ForNanos’s thesis and its rejection, see Robert 
A. J. Gagnon, “Why the ‘Weak’ at Rome Cannot be Non-Christian Jews,” Catholic B iblical Quarterly 
62 (2000): 64-82. For the purposes of this thesis, it is, however a moot point, with little effect on the 
moral implications or the relationship between the weak and the strong of the community.
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p la y , 1 C o rin th ia n s  8 also c ritic ise s  any fo rm  o f  G nostic  s u p e rio rity , in d ic a tin g  th a t 
ac tin g  w ith o u t ch a rita b le  concern fo r others is  the true  w eakness.70 The issue is  tu rned  
around b y  P au l, so th a t w ha t seems to  be a le g itim a te  a c tio n  becom es a s in  because o f  
its  ha rm  to  o th e r peop le  ( IC o r  8 :12; c f. R om  14: 16-17). Thus, P au l s trike s  o u t aga inst 
the  v io la tio n  o f  ano ther person ’ s conscience, show ing  th a t the  g u id in g  p r in c ip le  to  ou r 
a c tiv ity  is  to  be c h a rity , and n o t co ld  reason.
W h ile  c h a rity  {a g a p e ) is  proposed as the c rite rio n  fo r  re s o lu tio n  o f  c o n flic t, 
neverthe less occasions w ill arise w here i t  is  harder to  fin d  a s o lu tio n . A s  a re s u lt, in  1 
C o rin th ia n s  10, P au l o ffe rs  an analysis o f  p a rtic u la r th o rn y  issues, such as ea tin g  m eat 
fro m  com m on butchers (v . 25 ), accepting  an in v ita tio n  to  eat w ith  a G e n tile  fr ie n d  (v . 
2 7 ), and w h a t to  do i f  at the  m eal one is in fo rm e d  th a t the  m eat has in  fa c t been 
sa c rifice d  to  id o ls  (v . 28 ), so tha t in  a ll instances o the r peop le ’ s conscience sh o u ld  n o t 
be w ounded th ro u g h  p e rp le x ity  o r scandal. Paul uses th is  ch a rita b le  approach fo r  a 
s a lv ific  purpose b y  m a k in g  h im s e lf w eak w ith  the w eak and “ a ll th in g s  to  a ll peop le ”  
(1 C o r 9 :2 2 ). A g a in  the  A p o s tle  presents a c a re fu lly  nuanced e xp la n a tio n  b y  p o in tin g  
o u t th a t a lth o u g h  som eth ing  is la w fu l, i t  m ay s t ill n o t be appropria te  ( IC o r  10 :23 -24 ). 
T he re fo re , o u r freedom  th ro u g h  ou r know ledge fin d s  its  lim it  th ro u g h  o u r re la tio n  
w ith  o thers, and the  lo ve  th a t is  due to  them .71 Thus, in  C hapter 10 w e fin d  b r ie f 
exam ples o f  cases o f  conscience, w here, as w e ll as p o in tin g  to  occasions o f  
consequent m o ra l re fle c tio n , Paul is  in tro d u c in g  the idea th a t syneides is  is  in v o lv e d  in  
the  act o f  m o ra l d e lib e ra tio n  and judgem en t, p rio r to  the m o ra l act its e lf  ( fo r  exam ple ,
79
th in k in g  and ju d g in g  be fo re  bu y in g  the m eat fro m  the lo c a l m a rke t). T he re fo re , 
there m ay be som e signs o f  the deve lopm ent o f  co n sc ien tia  an teced en s , b u t i t  is
70 1 Cor 8:9: “But take care that this liberty of yours does not somehow become a stumbling 
block to the weak.” 1 Cor 8:11: “So by your knowledge those weak believers for whom Christ died are 
destroyed.”
71 Schräge, Ethics o f  the New Testament, 213-14.
72 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 53-54.
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p ro b a b ly  in a p p ro p ria te  to  c la im  tha t th is  is  a fu lly  deve loped concep t in  P a u l’ s 
w ritin g s . Indeed Schräge p o in ts  ou t th a t “ Paul sees the fu n c tio n  o f  conscience  as 
m ore e va lu a tive  than  d ire c tiv e  and norm ative , even though  i t  m ay precede the  a c t.”  
Thus a t th is  p o in t conscience s t ill ho lds m ore the ro le  o f  “ c r itic a l a u th o rity ”  ra th e r 
than “ g u id in g  a u th o rity ” .74
P a u l’ s ana lys is  o f  these cases o f  conscience shou ld  n o t be taken  as an 
exhaustive  thesis o r a com ple te  m odel, bu t i t  is  c lea r tha t, fo r  h im , ch a rita b le  concern  
fo r  o thers and re s p o n s ib ility  fo r one’ s actions are ke y  fundam en ta ls to  re a ch in g  a 
dec is ion . C o n flic t o f  consciences is n o t to  be an occasion fo r  peop le  to  despise one 
another (R om  14 :3 ), and one m ust a lw ays recogn ise th a t u ltim a te ly  the  o n ly  
ju d g e m e n t th a t counts is  G od ’ s (R om  14:4).
F rom  th is  w e can sum m arise tha t in  the w ritin g s  o f  P au l syneides is  has the 
cha rac te ris tics  o f  be ing  an instance o f  c r itic a l re fle c tio n  on o n e se lf and on  th e  actions 
o f  o thers, w h ic h  is  fo u n d  in  a ll people. I t  is  a hum an capac ity  w h ic h , th o u g h  re la te d  to  
G od ’ s presence is  n o t w ith o u t the p o s s ib ility  o f  e rro r o r c o n flic t w ith  ano the r person, 
and so shou ld  n o t be considered as the u ltim a te  ju d g e  o f  o u r actions, s ince th is  is , in  
fa c t, G od. T h e re fo re , i t  is  c lea r fro m  these va rious p o in ts  th a t P au line  usage shou ld  
n o t s im p ly  be equated w ith  the fo rm e r p ro fane n o tio n , w h ic h  focused on  past bad 
actions. E q u a lly , i t  is  e v id e n t fro m  the con ten t o f  the  tex ts  th a t the  c r itic a l re fle c tio n  
and d e lib e ra tio n  o f  syneidesis  fo r Paul cannot be reduced to  an experience  o f  pa in .
nc
Indeed, such a d e sc rip tio n  is  absent fro m  h is  le tte rs. Thus, P a u l’ s w r itin g  presents a
73 Indeed Maurer points to the Latin philosophers as the major cause for the shift to
conscientia antecedens as the norm. See TDNT, 907.
74 Schräge, Ethics o f  the New Testament, 195.
75 The nearest Paul gets to the idea of pain is the description of wounding someone’s 
conscience through scandal in 1 Cor 8:10. This is quite a different notion from that of the pain of a 
guilty conscience.
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d e fin itiv e  step in  the  deve lopm ent o f  the n o tio n  o f  conscience, upon  w h ic h  la te r 
w rite rs  w o u ld  depend.76
4. Jew ish  a n d  H ellen istic  In flu en ces  on  th e N otion  o f  S y n eid esis
B e fo re  b r ie fly  lo o k in g  at la te r N e w  Testam ent usage, one shou ld  stop to  ask w h e th e r
Jew ish a n th ro p o lo g y  had any ro le  in  shaping the use o f  syneides is  b y  P au l and
subsequent C h ris tia n  w rite rs . A s I  com m ented e a rlie r, there is  no d ire c t e q u iv a le n t to
syneidesis  in  H ebrew . T h is  is  p robab ly  due to  the d iffe re n t fra m e w o rk  fo u n d  in  Jew ish
a n th ropo logy. R a ther than  a tten tion  be ing  focused upon the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  genera l
norm s to  concre te  s itu a tio n s  as in  G reek understand ing , a tte n tio n  is  cen tred  upon
c o n fo rm ity  o f  the  in d iv id u a l’ s conduct to  the L a w .77 T h is  a ttitu d e  is  w idespread  in  the
O ld  Testam ent, b u t is  sum m ed up w e ll by Psalm  118 [1 1 9 ]. R a ther than  ta k in g  the
ty p ic a l H e b re w  p o e tic  fo rm , th is  huge psa lm  constitu tes an “ a n th o lo g y ”  o f  aphorism s
conce rn ing  observance o f  the  law . H ere i t  w ill su ffice  to  quote one verse to  g ive  an
idea o f  the  te n o r o f  the  psalm :
G ive  m e understanding,
th a t 1 m ay keep y o u r la w
and observe it  w ith  m y  w h o le  heart.”  (v . 34)
H o w e ve r, despite  the  d iffe rences in  an th ropo logy, i t  co u ld  h a rd ly  be sa id th a t 
Jew ish  observance w as p u re ly  m echanica l, as i f  i t  w ere done w ith o u t re fle c tio n , and 
so w e do fin d  te rm s in  Jew ish an th ropo logy w h ich  re la te  to  persona l aw areness and 
dec is ion . A m o n g  these w ords, w e fin d  the key te rm  ‘hea rt’ ( le b ). The hea rt, acco rd in g
76 Maurer observes that “with few exceptions” there had “never been anything like this before 
in literature,” thus indicating Paul’s significant development. Spicq agrees, commenting that “none of 
these texts, even those of Seneca, approach St. Paul’s in density and precision.” However, others would 
argue that one must not over-exaggerate the import of the texts, given much later developments. I 
would suggest that both sides can be accommodated by acknowledging St Paul’s understanding as a 
major step in an ongoing history of conscience. Thus, just as Paul’s understanding cannot be reduced to 
the pre-Christian notion, neither can later writings be fully defined by Paul’s use. Cf. Maurer, TDNT, 
917; Spicq, “Syneidesis,” 335; Romelt, L a Coscienza, 47-48, including n. 87.
77 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espiritu, 192: “El sujeto, considerado como un todo, debia 
simplemente velar por la conformidad factica conducta-ley.”
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to  the  H eb re w  m in d se t c le a rly  has a broader m etaphorica l re m it than  th e  e m o tio n a l 
concept p re va le n t now adays, and so beyond em otions, the hea rt com es to  represent
TO
“ a ll th a t is  w ith in ”  a person, in c lu d in g  m em ory, m in d  and aw areness, th e re b y  also 
in c o rp o ra tin g  ju d g e m e n t o f  one’ s actions. W h ile  the G reeks saw  syn e id es is  as the 
locus fo r  c r itic a l awareness o r judgem en t, reacting  p a in fu lly  to  the  w ro n g d o in g , in  the
• • • 7Q ,
H ebrew  w o rld  the  heart, as “ the seat o f  in te llig e n ce  and d e c is io n  m a k in g ,”  is  
a ffe c te d  b y  s in  and g u ilt due to  its  personal re la tio n sh ip  w ith  G od  th ro u g h  h is  
covenan t.80 T h is  understand ing  is  c le a rly  sum m ed up  in  P sa lm  50 [5 1 ], as an 
awareness o f  w ro n g d o in g , the burden o f  s in  on  the heart and the  des ire  to  re g a in  
p u rity  and jo y  o f  s p ir it are a ll in  evidence in  its  verses:
H ave  m e rcy  on  m e O G od, 
acco rd in g  to  y o u r steadfast lo ve ; 
acco rd in g  to  y o u r abundant m ercy 
b lo t ou t m y  transgressions.
W ash m e th o ro u g h ly  fro m  m y in iq u ity , 
and cleanse m e fro m  m y sin . (w .1 -2 )
C reate in  m e a clean heart, O  G od, 
and p u t a new  and rig h t s p ir it w ith in  me.
D o  n o t cast m e aw ay fro m  y o u r presence, 
and do n o t take yo u r h o ly  s p ir it fro m  m e. 
R estore to  m e the jo y  o f  y o u r sa lva tion  
and susta in  in  m e a w illin g  s p irit, ( w .  10-12)
78 Jean de Frame and Albert Vanhoye, “Heart,” trans. W. Jared Wicks, in Dictionary o f  
B iblical Theology ed. Xavier Leon-Dufour, trans. under the direction of Joseph Cahill, (London,
Dublin, and Melbourne: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967), 200-202. Deidun describes the Hebrew notion of 
heart as “the core of the moral and religious personality and the locus of God’s interior communication 
with man.” See T.J. Deidun, New Covenant Morality in Paul, Analecta Biblica, no. 89 (Rome: Biblical 
Institute Press, 1981), 53. Delhaye observes five main aspects to the moral understanding of heart in 
Scripture as (1) a witness to the moral value of acts, (2) the place where the divine law is interiorised, 
(3) the source of moral life, (4) being involved in our understanding of moral value and (5) the focus of 
conversion to God. See Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 51-58.
79 Helen Costigane, “A History of the Western Idea of Conscience,” in Conscience in World 
Religions, ed. Jayne Hoose (Leominster: Gracewing; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1999), 3-20, at 6.
80 Unlike in the ancient Greek world, where guilt had a cosmocentric focus, for the Hebrew 
the issue is one of remaining faithful to or falling short of God’s will or command. See Romelt, L a  
Coscienza, 30-31; Kennedy, Doers o f  the Word, I, 176.
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T he re fo re , a lthoug h  the te rm  leb  is  no t id e n tic a l to  syneides is , g iv e n  the 
d iffe re n t a n th ro p o lo g ica l background and its  broader s ig n ifica n ce , neverthe less, one 
can d isce rn  areas o f  convergence w h ich  a llo w e d  som e n o tio n s  re la te d  to  le b  to  be 
trans la ted  in  the  H e lle n is tic  pe rio d  as syneidesis. F o r exam ple, in  Job 2 7 :6  w e fin d  
“ m y hea rt does n o t reproach m e fo r any o f  m y  days,”  and in  the  S ep tuag in t le b a b  is  
trans la ted  as “ s y n o id a  em au to ” . Syneidesis  also appears in  a fe w  te x ts  o f  G reek 
sap ie n tia l lite ra tu re , nam e ly  the Codex S ina iticus  va ria n t o f  S irach  42 :8 , E cclesiastes 
10:20 (a m is tra n s la tio n  o f  the H ebrew ) and W isdom  17:10 (c le a rly  re fe rrin g  to  a 
g u ilty  consc ience ),81 and also in  the Pseudepigrapha o f  the la te  Jew ish  w ritin g s . The 
existence o f  a cross-ove r o f  ideas and tra n s la tio n  is  thus considered b y  A lv a re z  to  be 
evidence o f  a “ p rog ress ive  rapprochem ent”  betw een Jew ish  and G reek th o u g h t.82 The 
m ee ting  o f  m indse ts also a ffected  associated ideas, such as ‘ g o o d ’ , ‘ c le a n ’ and ‘p u re ’ ,
oq 04
w h ic h  are a p p lie d  in  te x ts  to  bo th  leb  (as k a rd ia ) , and syneidesis. M a u re r a lso  sees 
the a p p lic a tio n  o f  p o s itiv e  ad jectives lik e  good, clean, pure  to  le b  as in flu e n c in g  the 
deve lopm ent o f  “ a concept h ith e rto  unknow n  in  the  G reek w o rld , th a t o f  a good
oe
conscience, w h ic h  a lso inc ludes the c o nsc ien tia  p ra e c u rre n s .”
G ive n  St P a u l’ s h is to ry  o f  be ing a C h ris tia n  w ith  a H e lle n is tic , Jew ish  
background, i t  shou ld  com e as no surprise i f  h is  background w o u ld  c o lo u r h is  
language and p resen ta tion  o f  the C h ris tia n  message. T hus, g ive n  the  in te rp la y
81 Cf. Spicq, “Syneidesis,” 332; Maurer, TDNT, 909; Marvin H. Pope, Jo b , The Anchor Bible, 
vol. 15 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 1965), 172.
82 Maurer, TDNT, 910, Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 193: “Esta progresiva aproximación 
entre el pensamiento judaico y el griego se acentuará en los escritos tardíos, como el Testamento de los 
XII Patriarcas, donde se hace mención explícita del dinamismo ‘acusador’ que funciona en el interior 
del hombre, atribuyéndolo sea al corazón (Test G ad  5,3), sea explícitamente a la syneidesis (Test Rub 
4,3).”
83 For example, the Septuagint translates lebab tób in Deut 28:47 as agathe kardia, which 
shifts the Hebrew understanding of a glad heart to that of a morally good heart. Cf. Maurer, TDNT, 
909-10; Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 193, n. 15.
84 Ibid., 193. We shall also see application of these adjectives in post-Pauline texts.
85 Maurer, TDNT, 910.
86 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu, 193-94.
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betw een leb  and syneidésis  a lready present be fo re  P au l’ s tim e  i t  w o u ld  be sensib le  to  
in fe r th a t som e o f  the  m eaning o f  leb  fo rm s p a rt o f  P au l’ s unde rs tan d ing  o r use o f  
syneidésis , and also constitu tes a basis fo r  P au l’ s deve lopm ent o f  the  p re -C h ris tia n  
n o tio n . The a p p lic a tio n  o f  q u a lita tive  w ords to  syneidésis  com es a fte r P au l, b u t i t  m ay 
be th a t the  m in d se t o f  the  hum an heart re la tin g  to  G od ’ s la w  in flu e n ce s  P a u l’ s 
understand ing  o f  conscience. A s noted e a rlie r, the p ro fane  n o tio n  o f  syneidés is  
fre q u e n tly  re la te d  to  the  la w  o f  cosm ic order. H ow ever, S t P a u l’ s n o tio n  o f  an 
u n d e rly in g  la w  to  hum an nature m ay have also in c lu d e d  the idea  o f  “ a la w  kn o w n  to  
a ll m en w h ic h  w as in it ia lly  com m unicated b y  the H ebrew  G od, and w h ic h  e n ta ile d  a 
n o tio n  o f  a n o n -p a rtic u la r covenant betw een H im  and the e n tire  hum an race .” 87 P a u l’ s 
fu lle s t d e sc rip tio n  o f  the  un ive rsa l la w , w h ich  also shows the  c lose p ro x im ity  o f  
syneidésis  and k a rd ia  is  R om ans 2 :15 -16 , w here Paul re fe rs to  the  G e n tile s :
T h e y  show  th a t w ha t the la w  requ ires is  w ritte n  on  th e ir  hearts, to  w h ic h  
th e ir  o w n  conscience also bears w itness; and th e ir c o n flic tin g  though ts  w ill 
accuse o r perhaps excuse them  on the day w hen, a cco rd in g  to  m y  gospe l, 
G od, th ro u g h  Jesus C h ris t, w ill ju d g e  the secret though ts  o f  a ll.
I  have in c lu d e d  verse 16 in  th is  quo ta tio n , as i t  g ives a fu lle r  co n te x t to  the 
understand ing  o f  hea rt and conscience in  Paul. I f  the firs t h a lf o f  verse 15 is  presented 
in  is o la tio n , i t  can m isrepresent P aul as hav ing  a n o tio n  o f  h u m a n ity  w h ic h  shou ld  
have no d if f ic u lty  in  w o rk in g  ou t G od ’ s w ill,  since it  is  w ritte n  on  the  hea rt and 
te s tifie d  to  b y  the  conscience. H ow ever, he continues the  sentence b y  d e s c rib in g  the 
hum an s itu a tio n  o f  c o n flic t, w here hearts hardened b y  s in  w il l  be accused, bu t
87 David Greenwood, “Saint Paul and Natural Law,” Biblical Theology Bulletin 1(1971): 262- 
279, at 266. Greenwood’s argument is that, for Paul, acting morally is not just based on nature, but on 
divine general revelation (as well as particular), and so Paul is not simply replicating the Stoic motto 
sequi naturam. He refers to the Rabbinic literature commenting on the Noachic covenant indicating a 
tradition of a deep and lasting bond between God and all people in existence prior to the more 
exclusive Sinaitic covenant made with Moses and the chosen people. See pages 267-69. For the 
opposite view, see Dibelius and Conzelmann, The Pastoral Epistles, 19.
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confused m in d s  m ay be excused on the day o f  judgem en t. T hus, once aga in , as in  the 
case o f  h is  adv ice  rega rd ing  food  sacrificed  to  id o ls , w e fin d  P aul g iv in g  a c a re fu lly  
constructed  a rgum ent, w h ic h  bo th  exhorts to  ho liness, bu t a lso  adm its  the  p o s s ib ility  
o f  hum an p e rp le x ity  in  m o ra l m atters.
P au l the re fo re  be lieves th a t G od has revealed h is  w ill n o t o n ly  to  th e  Jews bu t 
to  a ll na tio n s , th ro u g h  a la w  w hose requ irem ents are w ritte n  in  the  hea rt (e rg o n  tou  
nom ou  g ra p to n  en ta is  k a rd ia is , R om  2 :1 5 ).88 In  th is  passage w e see syneidesis
SO
ope ra ting  in  re la tio n  to  k a rd ia , and so I  w o u ld  suggest th a t, to  a c e rta in  exten t, 
P a u l’ s unde rstand ing  o f  syneidesis  is  c le a rly  in flu e n ce d  b y  leb .
S ince w o rd s  never stand in  iso la tio n , in  a d d itio n  to  th e  co n n e c tio n  o f  le b  to  
syneidesis , one shou ld  a lso acknow ledge the re la tio n sh ip  o f  syneides is , th ro u g h  le b , to  
concepts such as tru th , ju s tic e  and in te g rity  (e.g. Ps 7 :8 -10 ; 4 3 :3 ; 101; 119 :36 ). The 
p a rtic u la r understand ing  o f  these term s w ill,  in  tu rn , co lo u r the  unde rs tan d ing  o f  
syneidesis. T h is  im p lie s  tha t the n o tio n  o f  syneidesis  w ill a lw ays in co rp o ra te  and 
re fle c t a p a rtic u la r w o rld  v ie w . Thus, as w e ll as o ffe rin g  ideas su rro u n d in g  the  w o rd  
leb , the  b ib lic a l w o rks  o f  S ap ien tia l lite ra tu re  also o ffe r a p a rtic u la r w o rld -v ie w , 
w h ic h  w o u ld  have also le ft its  m ark on C h ris tia n  understand ing  o f  syneides is . T h is
88 Deidun points out that in his writings on God’s influence on the heart, St Paul is following 
the prophetic tradition exemplified by the Jeremiah and Ezekiel texts which refer to God’s people 
following his law from their hearts (Cf. Ezek 36:26-27; Jer 31:31-34). The novelty in these texts is not 
simply the intériorisation of God’s law, but the fact that God himself will intervene. In the same vein, 
Paul talks of the law written on the heart and also God himself teaching the people (1 Thess 4:10). This 
shows that in Paul’s theology the ethical role of the Holy Spirit takes far greater prominence than the 
prophetic and charismatic dimensions of the Spirit associated with Old Testament passages such as Joel 
3:1-5. We shall return to the role of the Holy Spirit in moral action later. Cf. Deidun, New Covenant 
Morality, 54. See Pietro Dacquino, “La Vita Morale e lo Spirito secondo S. Paolo,” in Fondamenti 
Biblici della Teologia M orale: Atti Della XXIISettimana Biblica, ed. Associazione Biblica Italiana 
(Brescia: Paideia, 1973), 357-73 at 365-66.
89 This relationship of conscience and heart remains in the patristic period. For example St 
Augustine talks of conscientia cordis. See In Joannis Evangelium, in Patrologiae Cursus Complétas 
(Series Latina), gen. ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, n.p., 1844-1855) [hereafter cited as PL], 35, 1643, 4: 
(related to drinking the water of life) “Venter interioris hominis conscientia cordis est.” Delhaye points 
out that both physical and ethical awareness continue to be expressed through syneidesis in the 
writings of the Church Fathers. Cf. Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 69.
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W e lta n s h a u u n g  w as deep ly  im bued w ith  an understand ing  o f  the  w o rld  n o t as n e u tra l 
experience , b u t as som eth ing  tha t is  “ ve ry  good”  (c f. G en 1 :31 ), s ince i t  is  created b y  
G od.90 I t  is  th ro u g h  th is  experience o f  c rea tion  th a t G od in  understood as re v e a lin g  h is  
w ill to  the  in d iv id u a l,91 and the e ffo rts  to  attune o n e se lf to  th a t w il l is  conside red  to  be 
true  w isd o m .92 In  th is  con te x t, there fo re , leb  also acts as the  “ lis te n in g  hea rt”  w h ic h  is 
able to  sense the  m ean ing  o f  the w o rld .93 T h is  idea o f  an openness to  m ean ing  and to  
o rde r as designed b y  G od m ay w e ll have con trib u te d  to  the  backg round  to  P a u l’ s use 
o f  syneidesis . The ex te n t to  w h ich  the S ap ien tia l tra d itio n  in flu e n ce d  P a u l’ s n o tio n  o f  
syneidesis  w o u ld  be hard  to  determ ine w ith  any degree o f  ce rta in ty . N one the less, i t  
w o u ld  be d if f ic u lt  to  exclude  a ll in fluence  o f  th is  tra d itio n  fro m  h is  tho u g h t.
5. L a ter  N ew  T estam en t U sage
W e pass n o w  to  the  la te r usage o f  syneidesis  in  the N e w  Testam ent. M y  com m ents 
here w ill be b rie f, s ince the add itions o r a lte ra tions to  the P au line  unde rs tan d ing  are 
fe w , th o u g h  s t ill s ig n ific a n t. The obvious d iffe re n ce  betw een S t P a u l’ s use and the 
la te r appearances o f  syneidesis  is  tha t, by  and la rge , conscience is  n o w  characte rised  
by  its  a ttrib u te s ,94 n e a rly  a ll o f  w h ich  are p o s itive . A  num ber o f  the  passages re fe r to
90 Gerhard von Rad, Wisdom in Israel, trans. James D. Martin (London: SCM Press, 1972),
298-99.
91 Ibid., 175. Von Rad notes a shift in emphasis from Israel to the individual as the addressee 
of revelation.
92 Ibid., 296. Talking of King Solomon’s prayer (1 Kings 3:9), von Rad points out that 
Solomon, as the exemplar of the wise man, sums up the Sapiential attitude in his desire for “an 
‘understanding’ reason, a feeling for the truth which emanates from the world and addresses man.”
With this attitude of a “listening heart”, the wise person was “totally receptive to that truth,” but not in 
passivity, but rather in intense activity, so as to achieve “prudent articulation” of that truth. See ibid., 
296. Note the NRSV translation of Solomon’s request for an “understanding mind” obscures the 
reference to heart.
93 Von Rad indicates that the notion of a listening heart “seems to come originally from 
Egyptian wisdom,” in which the heart was understood as the organ by which man is able to take in the 
meaning and order of the world. See ibid., 297, n. 12
94 The two exceptions are Heb 10:2 and 1 Pet 2:19, where both passages employ the term 
without adjective to refer to a consciousness of sin and to an awareness of God respectively.
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“ a good conscience”  (a g a th e : IT im  1:5; 19; 1 Pet 3 :16. 21, and k a le : H eb 13 :18 ), o r a 
“ c le a r conscience”  (k a th a r a : lite ra lly  clean, 1 T im  3 :9 ; 2 T im  1:3; A c ts  2 3 :1 ), w ith  
o thers us ing  “ b lam eless”  (a p ro skop o s : A c ts  24 :16 ), o r d e scrib in g  the  need to  p u r ify  o r 
p e rfe c t o u r conscience (H eb 9 :9 .14 ). A  sm a lle r p o rtio n  o f  the  te x ts  re fe r to  dam aged 
o r co rrup ted  conscience (1 T im  4 :2 , “ branded”  by dece iv ing  s p irits ; T itu s  1 :15 ) o r an 
e v il conscience (p o n e ra : H eb 10:22). Thus, in  com parison  to  the  p ro fa n e  G reek 
n o tio n , the  focus has sh ifte d  com p le te ly , and the good o r c le a r conscience ( lin k e d  to  
o u r re la tio n s h ip  w ith  G od) is  n o w  the no rm  ra the r than  the e xce p tio n .95 A s  such “ the 
good conscience re fle c ts  an actua l state o f  a ffa irs  w ith  G od, n o t ju s t a la c k  o f  g u ilty  
fe e lin g s .” 96 A  num ber o f  the passages express a m uch stronger co n n e c tio n  to  b e lie f in  
the tenets o f  the  fa ith , and in  some instances con tinue  to  re la te  the  state o f  the 
conscience to  the  state o f  the heart.97 These p o s itiv e  descrip tions  th e re fo re  in d ica te  a 
co ncen tra tio n  on  fid e lity  to  G od and in te g rity  o f  life , ra th e r than  on  g u ilt o r 
p e rp le x ity .98 A s  a re su lt, in  m any o f  the  post-P au line  te x ts  the  n o tio n  “ good 
conscience”  is  an expression w h ic h  relates to  “ C h ris tia n  good c itiz e n s h ip ,” 99 as w e ll 
as accen tua ting  the  ecc les ia l d im ension  o f  an in d iv id u a l’ s conscience . T hus, the 
c o n trib u tio n  o f  these la te r N e w  Testam ent tex ts  is  to  fu rth e r em phasise the  p o s itiv e  
ro le  o f  syneides is  in  the con tex t o f  the C h ris tia n  fa ith .
95 Maurer, TDNT, 919.
96 Dan G. McCartney, “Conscience,” in Dictionary o f  the Later New Testament and its 
Developments, ed. Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids (Downers Grove, IL, and Leicester: 
InterVarsity Press, 1997), 241-43, at 242.
97 For a positive example, oft-quoted by St Augustine, see 1 Tim 1:5: “a pure heart, a good 
conscience and sincere faith” or in 1 Tim 3:9 “hold fast to the mystery of the faith with a clear 
conscience.” A negative example referring to Baptism is found in Hebrews: “our hearts sprinkled 
clean from an evil conscience.”
98 Alvarez, Caminar en el Espiritu, 220-21.
99 Dibelius and Conzelmann, The Pastoral Epistles, 20.
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T h is  o v e rv ie w  o f  c lass ica l and sc rip tu ra l use o f  the te rm  syn e id es is  has revea led  
ce rta in  ke y  elem ents w h ic h  de fine  how  the te rm  was understood. I t  is  c le a r th a t the 
te rm  cam e to  m ean fa r m ore than  at its  o rig in s . E ven in  c lass ica l w r itin g  i t  m oved  
aw ay fro m  b e in g  s im p ly  a te rm  to  describe consciousness o r aw areness o f  o u r 
su rround ings and focused on chosen hum an action . Syneidesis  cam e to  be so le ly  
understood in  m o ra l te rm s, a t firs t a lm ost e xc lu s ive ly  re la tin g  re fle x iv e ly  to  one ’ s past 
actions, w here  one had done w rong . Syneidesis  as a n o tio n  sum m ed up  th e  experience  
o f  the  g n a w in g  p a in  o f  g u ilt. H ow ever, th is  w itness to  w ro n g d o in g  w as also 
understood in  tim e  to  be the ju d g e  and gu ide o f  the  in d iv id u a l, th ro u g h  the  in flu e n c e  
o f  o th e r te rm s such as elenchos  and d a im o n io n , though  a p p lic a tio n  o f  these ideas to  
syneidesis  to o k  m uch  lo n g e r to  deve lop . St Paul fu rth e r adapted the  te rm  b y  p la c in g  i t  
in  re la tio n  to  G od. Thus, syneidesis  came to  be understood as a ca p a c ity  o f  m o ra l 
awareness, th a t operates in  acts o f  c r itic a l judgem en t w ith  a ce rta in  degree o f  
o b je c tiv ity . H ere  syneidesis  is  considered as ju d g in g  n o t o n ly  one ’ s o w n  ac tio n s , b u t 
also those o f  o thers, and is  a capacity  w ith  w h ic h  a ll people are endow ed. T he  acts o f  
ju d g e m e n t described  b y  P aul re la te  m o s tly  to  past actions, b u t a lso  in c lu d e  som e 
m ora l d e lib e ra tio n  o f  fu tu re  action . The o b je c tiv ity  o f  syneidesis  re la tes to  its  ro le  in  
m e d ia tin g  the  n a tu ra l and d iv in e  law . A s  such, syneidesis  does n o t operate  fro m  its  
ow n  a u th o rity , b u t acts in  service  o f  the liv in g  G od. N everthe less, syn e id es is  is  a 
fla w e d , hum an capacity  fo r m o ra l judgem en t, g u ilt and a p p ro b a tio n  w h ic h  is  
im p e rfe c t in  its  opera tion . There fo re , syneidesis  is  no t the la s t w o rd  in  ju d g in g  ou r 
actions; w e are u ltim a te ly  sub ject to  G od ’ s judgem en t in  a ll its  righ teousness and 
m ercy. The la te r N e w  Testam ent w ritin g s  em phasise the p o s tive  ro le  o f  syneidesis , 
p a rtic u la rly  on  the  basis o f  a rig h t re la tio n sh ip  w ith  G od and w ith  the  co m m u n ity  o f
6. Conclusions
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fa ith . H ere  w e can see the ro le  o f  syneidesis  expand ing and d e ve lo p in g  so th a t the 
c lass ica l em phasis on  conscience as the seat o f  rem orse ove r bad a c tions  o f  the  past is  
c le a rly  secondary to  the idea  o f  keep ing  one’ s conscience pu re  in  the  p resent, as a 
m eans o f  s tr iv in g  to  liv e  the C h ris tia n  voca tion .
W e have observed th a t the developm ent o f  syneidesis  in  its  usage re su lte d  
fro m  the  in flu e n ce s  o f  d iffe re n t schools o f  p h ilosop hy  on  the p o p u la r language o f  the 
tim e , as w e ll as d ra w in g  upon elem ents o f  Jew ish and C h ris tia n  a n th ro p o lo g y  and 
th e o lo g y  in  its  C h ris tia n  fo rm . The com m ents made in  th is  o v e rv ie w  have been 
o ffe re d  in  an a ttem p t to  a rrive  at a d e scrip tio n  o f  the  c o n s titu tiv e  e lem ents o f  the  
understand ing  and use o f  syneidesis  in  N e w  Testam ent tim es. T h is  d e s c rip tio n  has, 
understandab ly , focused upon  passages co n ta in in g  the te rm . H o w e ve r, the  fa c t th a t the  
passages co n ta in in g  syneidesis  o n ly  con ta in  references to  a ce rta in  num be r o f  them es 
shou ld  n o t im p ly  th a t no connection  to  any o ther idea was eve r m ade o r presum ed; 
no r, indeed, shou ld  the  la ck  o f  a d ire c t connection  lim it  cu rre n t th e o lo g ic a l re fle c tio n  
on re la tin g  syneides is  to  d iffe re n t b ib lic a l them es. In  o th e r w o rd s , ju s t as the  
S ap ie n tia l lite ra tu re  p rov ides a backdrop fo r the understand ing  o f  le b , so th e  w h o le  o f  
the C h ris tia n  message m ade up o f  the O ld  and N e w  C ovenan ts, p ro v id e s  a 
backg round  to  the  fu lle r  understand ing o f  syneidesis. In  th is  w a y , fo r  exam ple , i t  is  
the re fo re  le g itim a te  and h e lp fu l to  understand conscience in  re la tio n  to  h u m a n ity  
b e ing  m ade in  im age and likeness o f  G od (G en 1:27 ), and to  the  them es o f  the  lig h t o f  
tru th  and the  lig h t o f  C h ris t (Ps 43 :3 ; Is  2 :5 ; E ph 5 :9 ; Jn 1 :9 -13 , 12 :36), seen as 
in te rp re tiv e  keys to  an understand ing  o f  the  be ing  and a c tio n  o f  the  hum an person, as 
w e ll as to  an understand ing  o f  the hum an capacity  fo r g ro w th  in  w isd o m  and grace. 
W e sh a ll re tu rn  to  som e o f these ideas in  la te r chapters, b u t, in  the  m ean tim e , m e n tio n  
o f  such exam ples shou ld  ind ica te  th a t the S crip tu res p ro v id e  a r ic h  source fo r
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co n tin u e d  re fle c tio n  upon  the re a lity  o f  conscience in  the  lig h t o f  th e  C h ris tia n  c a llin g . 
W e can see evidence o f  th is  con tinued  re fle c tio n  s tim u la te d  b y  S c rip tu re  th ro u g h o u t 
the  h is to ry  o f  th e  C hurch . P robab ly  one o f  the  m ost fe r tile  p e rio d s  o f  ana lys is  o f  
conscience , w ith  its  m arriage  o f  S crip tu re  w ith  p h ilo so p h y  and th e  w ritin g s  o f  the  
C hu rch  Fathers, w as th a t o f  the  M id d le  A ges, and so i t  is  app rop ria te  th a t w e  tu rn  o u r 
a tte n tio n  n o w  to  e x p lo rin g  the  de ta iled  ana lysis o f  th a t pe riod .
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Chapter Three 
Medieval Investigations on Conscience
1. P a tristic  S o u rces  an d  M ed iev a l A pp lication
I t  is , w ith o u t doub t, essentia l to  any study o f  the  h is to ry  o f  conscience  th a t 
cons ide rab le  a tte n tio n  be p a id  to  the  co n trib u tio n  o f  the S cho las tic  P e rio d , s ince the 
w rite rs  o f  th is  era w ere b o th  the  firs t to  present a de ta ile d  ana lys is  o f  the  concept 
w ith in  the  C h ris tia n  con tex t, and also to  p ro v id e  the standard p o in t o f  re fe rence  fo r 
cen tu ries a fte rw ards. H ow eve r, the ke y  te x t at the ro o t o f  m e d ie va l advances w as, in  
fa c t, fro m  the  P a tris tic  p e rio d , nam ely, a passage fro m  S t Jerom e’ s C o m m e n ta ry  on  
E z e k ie l ,1 in  w h ic h  he presents the va rious in te rp re ta tio ns  o f  the  p ro p h e t’ s v is io n  o f  the 
fo u r liv in g  creatures (E zek 1 :4 -24). A lth o u g h  Jerom e’ s te x t re fe rre d  to  c o n s c ie n tia , i t  
w as o f  lit t le  in te re s t to  scholars fo r  n ine  centuries. S t Jerom e’ s renew ed p o p u la rity  in  
the  tw e lfth  ce n tu ry  is  due to  Peter Lom ba rd ’ s re ference to  the  passage in  h is
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Sentences, a w o rk  w h ic h  subsequently came to  be the  standard th e o lo g ic a l te x tb o o k  
fo r  S cho lastics u n til the s ix teen th  cen tu ry .4 E ven Peter L o m b a rd ’ s passing re fe rence 
was enough to  o b lig e  fu rth e r in v e s tig a tio n  b y  co n su ltin g  the G lo s s a  O r d in a r ia ,  and so 
th is  gave rise  to  the  w idespread study o f  a co p y is t’ s e rro r, w h ic h  had substitu te d
1 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 107: “When men of the Middle Ages spoke of 
synderesis, they were referring essentially to the text from St. Jerome’s commentary on Ezekiel.” See, 
St Jerome, Commentaria in Ezechielem, PL 25,22.
2 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 152: “Of the commentators on Ezechiel 
between the end of the fourth century, when Jerome wrote, and the last third of the twelfth century only 
Hrbanus [Rabanus] Mauras seems to have preserved an echo of Jerome. Writing in 842, he quotes, 
with one insignificant omission and without comment, the passage concerning synderesis. Others give 
entirely different explanations of Ezechiel’s vision and make no reference at all to synderesis (or 
synteresis).” Cf. Rabanus Mauras, Commentaria in Ezechielem, I, PL 110, 508C.
3 Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae (Grottaferrata, Rome: Saint Bonaventure 
College, 1971), II, dist. 39, cap. 3,3: “Recte igitur dicitur homo naturaliter velle bonum, quia in bona et 
recta volúntate conditus est. Superior enim scintilla rationis, quae etiam, ut ait Hieronymus, in Cain 
non potuit exstingui, bonum semper vult et malum odif ’ (emphasis mine).
4 M.B. Crowe, “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics, II: St. Thomas and Synderesis,” 
Irish Theological Quarterly 23 (1956): 228-245, at 245.
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syneidesis  fo r  synderesis  a t an unknow n  p o in t in  the  h is to ry  o f  Jerom e’ s te x t. T hus,
the  ke y  p o rtio n s  o f  the  te x t stud ied  and quoted b y  m any S cho lastics ra n  as fo llo w s :
M o s t [a u th o rs ], in  accordance w ith  P la to , re la te  th e  ra tio n a l, ira s c ib le  and 
the  co n cup isc ib le  [e lem ents] o f  the sou l [...] to  the  m an, and the  lio n  and 
the  o x  [...]. A b o ve  and beyond these three th e y  p lace  the  fo u rth , w h ic h  the  
G reeks c a ll synderesis: th a t spark o f  conscience w h ic h  w as n o t 
ex tin g u ish e d  even in  C a in , ju s t as [b y  w h ic h ], w hen  overcom e b y  
pleasures o r b y  rage, and som etim es w hen ha v in g  been dece ived  b y  reason 
its e lf, w e  lik e w is e  fe e l ou r s in fu lness. [ I t  is  th is ] w h ic h  th e y  p ro p e rly  
cons ide r as the  eagle, w ho  does no t m ix  w ith  the [o th e r] th ree , b u t co rrects  
th e ir e rro rs. T h is  is  the s p ir it w ho in tercedes fo r  us w ith  indescribab le  
groan ings. [...] Y e t, as i t  is  said in  P roverbs, ‘ W hen  th e  w ic k e d  m an has 
com e to  the  depths o f  s in , he acts in  con te m p t’ , o fte n  w e see th is  
conscience be ing  cast dow n and lo s in g  its  p lace .5
B y  chance, th is  su b s titu tio n  had found  its  w ay in to  the  G lo s s a  O r d in a r ia ,  
w h ic h  w as a tw e lfth  cen tu ry  b ib lic a l com m entary, lo n g  he ld  to  be the  w o rk  o f  W a lfr id  
S trabo, b u t w h ic h  w as a c tu a lly  com p ile d  by  va rious authors u nde r the  leade rsh ip  o f  
A n se lm  o f  L a o n .6 The G lo ssa  had ra p id ly  becom e an a u th o rita tiv e  te x t, and so soon 
the  inaccura te  passage o f  Jerom e loca ted  in  its  pages becam e n o t o n ly  w idespread , b u t
5 [Walfrid Strabo], Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria: Facsim ile Reprint o f  the Editio 
Princeps Adolph Rusch o f  Strassburg 1480/81, vol. 3 (Tumholt, Belgium: Brepols, 1992), page 224: 
“plerique iuxta platonem rationabilitatem animae et irascentiam et concupiscentiam [...] ad hominem et 
leonem et vitulum referunt [...]. Quartam supra haec et extra haec tria ponunt quam greci vocant 
synderesim quae scintilla conscientie in chaim quoque non extinguitur quasi [qua in Jerome] vieti 
voluptatibus vel furore et ipsa interdum rationis decepti similitudine nos peccare saentimus quam 
proprie aquile députant non se miscentem tribus • sed ipsa errantia corrigentem hic est spiritus qui 
interpellât pro nobis gemitibus inerrabilibus. [...] hanc tarnen conscientiam sicut in prouerbiis dicitur. 
Impius cum venerit in profondimi peccati contemnit* sepe praecipitari videmus et suum locum 
amittere” (spelling and punctuation as in original). See also [Walfrid Strabo], Biblia Sacra cum Glossa  
Ordinaria, primum quidem a Strabo Fuldensi Monacho Benedictino collecta, vol. 4 (Antwerp: Joannes 
Meursius, 1634), col. 1062-63; Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri 
Lom bardi (Quaracchi, Florence: Saint Bonaventure College, 1952), II, dist. 4 0 ,1, a, n .l; Delhaye, The 
Christian Conscience, 107, with Latin text at 107, n. 10; Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica  
(Quaracchi, Florence: Saint Bonaventure College, 1928), II, Inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 4, memb. 2, 
cap. 6 (page 500): “Hanc autem conscientiam, cum impius in profondimi peccatorum praecepitari”, 
and idem, II, Inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 4, memb. 1, cap. 3 (page 493) for a close variant with 
reference to St Gregory instead of the direct mention of the Glossa. St Bonaventure also makes direct 
mention of the Glossa  as his source. See St Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros 
Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera Omnia, vol. 2 (Quaracchi, Florence: St Bonaventure 
College, 1885), II, dist. 39, a. 2, q. 1. See Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter for a comparison of the 
key commentary passages.
6 For comment on Anselm of Laon and Strabo’s role, see The Oxford Dictionary o f  the 
Christian Church, 2nd ed., ed. F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone, s.v. “Glos(s)a Ordinaria.” Cf. Delhaye, 
The Christian Conscience, 107, n. 10; Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 155.
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also d e fin itiv e .7 Indeed, i f  a scribe happened to  see a fu l l  copy o f  Jerom e’ s 
C o m m e n ta ry , the  tendency “ w o u ld  have been to  co rre c t Jerom e b y  the  G lo s s a , i.e . 
substitu te  synderesis  fo r syneidesis .” 8 Thus, e ve n tu a lly  n o t o n ly  the  G lo s s a  was 
co rrup ted , b u t subsequent e d itio n s  o f  the fu ll C o m m e n ta ry  b y  Jerom e w ere  also 
s im ila r ly  a ffec ted , le a d in g  to  the p resum ption  th a t the w o rd  syn deres is  had been there  
fro m  the  ou tse t; a p resum p tion  th a t o n ly  started to  be questioned fro m  the  la te  
n ine tee n th  ce n tu ry  onw ards.9
T he cause fo r  the  e rro r is  as unknow n as the  pe rson  w ho  co m m itte d  i t , 10 
th o u g h  the  m ys te ry  has p roduced d iffe re n t theories. O ne is  a s im p le  m is s p e llin g  w hen  
co p y in g  the  w o rd  in  G reek cap ita ls  fro m  one te x t to  another, a com m on even t g ive n  
the  la c k  o f  know ledg e  o f  G reek am ong the L a tin  S cho las tics .11 O thers, o w in g  to  the  
in d isc rim in a te  m ed ie va l use o f  synteresis  as w e ll as synderes is , see in  the  s u b s titu tio n  
a conscious o r unconscious a ttem pt to  re fle c t “ the e a rly  scho las tic  idea  o f  a fa c u lty
7 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 155: “The G lossa ordinaria was so widely 
accepted that it succeeded in giving currency to the false reading of Jerome.” Cf. Delhaye, The 
Christian Conscience, 107, n. 10; 109. Lottin also points out that, given the influence of the Glossa, 
medieval scholars made such little reference to the actual Commentary of Jerome that some even failed 
to attribute the extract passage to him, citing it as the work of St Gregory. For example, Philip the 
Chancellor and Alexander of Hales both do this. See Odon Lottin, Psychologie et m orale au XIIe et 
XIIF siècles, vol. 2, part 1 (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont César; Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1948), 140, n. 1, 
147; Alexander of Hales, Glossa Sententiarum, II, dist. 40; idem, Summa Theologica, II, Inq. 4, tract. 1, 
sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 4, memb. 1, cap. 1 and 3 (pages 491 and 493).
8 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 155. Cf. Jacques de Blic, “Syndérèse ou 
conscience?” Revue d ’Ascétique et de Mystique 25 (1949): 146-157, at 156.
9 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 153.
10 The least plausible explanation, owing to gross inaccuracy in detail, is Timothy O’Connell’s 
account, in which he claims that Jerome made the mistake himself when translating from an unclear 
Greek manuscript while preparing the first Latin text of the Bible. See O’Connell, “An Understanding 
of Conscience,” 26. De Finance proposes that Rabanus Maurus made the change, when copying 
Jerome’s passage almost in its entirety into his own commentary. However, De Blic proposes that the 
manuscripts of Rabanus Maurus were later altered, in a similar fashion to those of Jerome, and I would 
consider this to be more convincing. Cf. Joseph de Finance, An Ethical Inquiry, trans. Michael O’Brien 
(Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1991), 436, n. 2; De Blic, “Syndérèse ou 
conscience?”, 154.
11 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 109. Indeed, it is not only the Greek that was a 
problem. Poorly written Latin was also misread, and transcribed into other passages, thus starting other 
chains of error. One example related to this passage is the Assisi manuscript of Alexander of Hales’s 
G lossa Sententiarum, II, dist. 40, 77, which states in medieval Latin “hec est sententia conscientie que 
in chain non potuit extinguí,” instead of ‘scintilla conscientiae’, as in the original. See Lottin, 
Psychologie et morale, II, 177.
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preserved a fte r o rig in a l s in ,”  o w in g  to  the s ig n ifica n ce  o f  the  w o rd  s y n te re in , m ean ing  
‘ co n se rva tio n .’ 12
I t  is  c lea r, how eve r, th a t the o rig in a l te x t o f  Jerom e m ade no m e n tio n  o f  
a n y th in g  o th e r than  syneidesis  and its  L a tin  coun te rpa rt, co n s c ie n tia . A  num ber o f  
reasons are g ive n  b y  scholars to  ju s tify  th is  assertion. F irs t o f  a ll, is  the  sense o f  the  
passage its e lf. The co n te x t ca lls  fo r  syneidesis  ra the r than  syn deres is  (o r syn teres is ). 
C row e, fo llo w in g  D e B lic ’ s de ta iled  study, states th a t the  use o f  syn teres is  h is to r ic a lly  
“ is  e xce e d in g ly  ra re ,”  w h ic h  w o u ld  no t f i t  w ith  a d e sc rip tio n  o f  som e th ing  th a t 
m atches the  m ore  com m on te rm  syneidesis, n o r indeed correspond to  the  “ p le r iq u e ”  at 
the  s ta rt o f  the  te x t, w h ic h  ind ica tes th a t the w o rd  fo rm s p a rt o f  an unde rs tan d ing  th a t
n  '
is  fo llo w e d  b y  m any G reek authors. Jerom e also describes syn deres is  as  “ h a n c  
ip sam  c o n s c ie n tia m ”  (th is  ve ry  conscience) tow ards the  end o f  passage, som e th ing  
w h ic h  is  o ve rlo o ke d  in  extracts w here the q u o ta tio n  is  cropped to o  e a rly . T hus, 
“ betw een, suneidesis  and co nsc ien tia , the equ iva lence is  indeed to ta l, som e th ing  
w h ic h  d ic tio n a rie s  exclude  fo r  sunteresis .” 14 H ow ever, i t  is  the  phrase “ s c in t i l la  
c o n s c ie n tia e ”  (spa rk  o f  conscience) w h ich  supports the  co n fu s io n , because th e  n o tio n  
o f  a spark im p lie s  th a t synderesis  is  a pa rt o f  the greater w h o le  kn o w n  as co n s c ie n tia . 
D e B lic  p o in ts  ou t th a t in  c lass ica l L a tin  s c in tilla  was used to  describe  the  rem a ins o f  
so m e th in g .15 Y e t, e q u a lly , as L ie b e r notes, s c in tilla  co n s c ie n tia e  co u ld  a lso  be 
in te rp re te d  as a “ m e tapho rica l c ircu m lo cu tio n , ju s t as w e use ‘ reason ’ and ‘ the  lig h t o f
12 Cf. Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 155; De Finance, An Ethical Inquiry, 
436. The term ‘conservation has in itself a rich history, given its Latin Stoic roots, and so various 
explanations can be found as to what synteresis is meant to preserve, for example, the principles of 
natural law, human nature or human reason, with the former being the most common understanding. 
Potts points out that syntëreô can also draw a reflexive force from the syn- prefix, thus giving the sense 
of preserving oneself from wrongdoing. See Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 11.
13 Cf. Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 154; De Blic, “Syndérèse ou 
conscience?”, 150.
14 De Blic, “Syndérèse ou conscience?”, 150: “Entre suneidesis et conscientia, l’équivalence 
est en effet totale, ce que les dictionnaires excluent pour sunteresis.”
15 Ibid., 148, n. 6.
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reason’ w ith  equa l m ean ing .” 16 Thus, the a m b ig u ity  o f  th e  te x t co u ld  have been 
in te rp re te d  in  e ith e r w a y , b u t g ive n  the in fluence  o f  the  f ir s t w rite rs ’ co n c lu s io n s  on 
the  m a tte r, the  d is tin c tio n  betw een synderesis  and c o n s c ie n tia  w as set in  stone fo r  
cen tu ries to  com e.
A  second reason fo r  dec la rin g  synderesis  in a u th e n tic  is  the  backg roun d  to  the 
te x t. I t  is  suggested th a t St Jerom e was in flu e n ce d  b y  O rig e n  in  h is  unde rs tan d ing  o f  
E z e k ie l.17 T w o  passages are s ig n ific a n t in  th is  regard. T he  firs t, s u rv iv in g  as a 
tra n s la tio n  b y  St Jerom e, presents the eagle as an in te r io r s p ir itu s  p ra e s id e n s  
a n im a e .n  I t  is  c lea r th a t O rigen  understands th is  s p iritu s  (p n e u m a ) as syne id es is , 
w hen h is  ana lys is  o f  E ze k ie l is  com pared to  h is  com m ents on  S t P au l, in  w h ic h  he 
asks:
T h a t w h ic h  the A p o s tle  ca lls  conscience, w ha t m ig h t i t  be? [ . . . ]  I  th in k  i t  
m ig h t be the  s p irit, w h ic h  is  said b y  the A p o s tle  to  be w ith  the  so u l, [...] as 
i f  a k in d  o f  gu ide  and ru le r is  jo in e d  to  it ,  th a t i t  m ig h t in s tru c t i t  [th e  so u l] 
about be tte r th in g s , o r pun ish  it  concern ing  fa u lts , and accuse it ;  in  w h ic h  
connectio n  the  A p o s tle  also said, “ N o  one am ong m en kn o w s th a t w h ic h  is  
o f  a m an, except the  m an ’ s s p irit w h ic h  is  w ith in  h im  (1 C o r 2 :1 1 ).” 19
16 Robert Leiber, “Name und Begriff der Synteresis (in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik),” 
Philosophisches Jahrbuch  25 (1912): 372-92, at 380: ‘“ Scintilla conscientiae’ bedeutet in der Stelle 
entweder etwas, was mit ‘conscientia’ nicht identisch ist, oder es ist nichts als eine bildliche 
Umschreibung für ‘conscientia’ -  wie ja auch wir ‘Vernunft’ und ‘Licht der Vernunft’ in gleichem 
Sinne gebrauchen.” De Blic rejects “the remains of...” as the meaning of the term in this case and 
clearly sees the expression as equivalent to simply using the word conscientia on its own. See 
“Synderese ou conscience?”, 150.
17 Leiber, “Name und Begriff der Synteresis,”378-79; De Blic, “Synddrese ou conscience?”, 
150-51; Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 154-55.
18 St Jerome, Translatio Homilarum Origensis in Jerem iam  et Ezechielem : In Ezechielem, 
Homilia I, PL 25, 706d-707a, at 707a: “Spiritus vero qui praesidet ad auxiliandum, non est a dextris, ut 
homo, vel leo: non est a sinistris, ut vitulis; sed super omnes tres facies consistit. Aquila quippe in alio 
loco nuncupatur, ut per aquilam, spiritum praesidentem significet. Spiritum autem hominis dico, qui in 
eo est. Cf. De Blic, “Synddrese ou conscience?”, 150-51.
19 Origen, Commentarium in Epistolam B. Pauli ad  Romanos, II, in Patrologiae Cursus 
Completus (Series G raeca), gen. ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, n.p., 1857-1866) [hereafter cited as PG], 14, 
893: “Quid istud sit quod conscientiam  Apostolus vocat? [...JArbitror quod ipse sit spiritus, qui ab 
Apostolo esse cum anima dicitur, [...] velut paedagogus ei quidam sociatus, et rector, ut earn de 
melioribus moneat, vel de culpis castiget, et arguat; de quo et dicit Apostolus, quia ‘nemo seit 
hominum, quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est’ (1 Cor 2:11)” (emphasis mine). In 
this passage, the quia  is being used in an otiose manner and is therefore not translated. This is because 
it was a convention of the time to use it to signal quotations, as well as to mean ‘because’.
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F u rth e r evidence is  g ive n  by a passage once a ttrib u te d  to  S t G rego ry  
N azianzen , b u t n o w  considered also to  be O rig e n ’ s.20 T h is  fra g m e n t is  s ig n ific a n t, in  
th a t i t  in c ludes the  G reek w ords fo r ra tio n a l, ira sc ib le  and co n cu p isc ib le  ( lo g ik o n ,
th u m iko n  and e p ith u m é tik o n ) lis te d  in  G reek in  Jerom e’ s passage, b u t a lso , m ore
• • * • 21 im p o rta n tly , i t  con ta ins syneidesis  instead o f  synderesis.
F in a lly , a com para tive  study o f  e x is tin g  m anuscrip ts o f  the  Jerom e passage on 
E ze k ie l revea ls th a t, instead o f  synderesis, 26 o f  them  co n ta in  syneides is , o r va ria n ts  
o f  the  w o rd  o w in g  to  p o o r tra n sc rip tio n .22 T here fo re , w ith  such a w e ig h t o f  sch o la rly  
a rgum ent, i t  is  beyond doub t th a t St Jerom e d id  n o t use the  w o rd  syn deres is , w h ic h  
leaves the  in tro d u c tio n  o f  the  te rm  synderesis  in to  S cho lastic  te a ch in g  as an
“ acc iden t”  o f  h is to ry . Thus, w ith o u t be ing  aware o f  the e rro r, th ro u g h  th e  in flu e n c e  
o f  P eter Lom b a rd  and the  G lo ssa  O rd in a r ia  the co rrup ted  passage o f  Jerom e becam e 
“ a p o in t o f  departu re ”  fo r  any subsequent re fle c tio n  on e th ics , and conscience  in
94 • •
p a rtic u la r. B u t was the  a rriv a l o f  synderesis  an abe rra tion , o r a h e lp fu l c la rific a tio n ?  
The answ er w o u ld  depend upon w hether i t  shaped the m ed ie va l unde rs tan d ing  o f  
conscience, o r m e re ly  fa c ilita te d  it. De B lic  is  o f  the  o p in io n  th a t i t  is  the  la tte r, 
m a k in g  the appearance o f  synderesis  one o f  those “ happy acciden ts”  o f  h is to ry , since 
“ in  h e lp in g  to  d e lim it the  fa llib le  zone and the  tru ly  u n ive rsa l zone o f  m o ra l
judgem en ts, the  de n o m in a tio n  ‘ synderesis’ g re a tly  co n trib u te d  to  the  d o c trin e  o f
conscience o f  L a tin  S cho las tic ism  the s o lid ity  and p re c is io n  w h ic h  i t  had searched fo r
20 De Blic, “Syndérése ou conscience?”, 151.
21 St Gregory Nazianzen (now attributed to Origen), Significatio in Ezechielem, PG 36, 666: 
“Nomizomen ton anthropon einai to logikon; ton leonta, to thumikon; ton moschon, to epithumétikon; 
ton aeton, ten syneidésin epikeimenen tois loipois, ho esti pneuma para  Paulou legomenon tou 
anthrdpou.”
22 In addition to the evidence of four manuscripts first presented by Friedrich Nietzsche, De 
Blic finds a further 22, all of which contain syneidesis. For a detailed list including a presentation of 
how the word appears in each text, see “Syndérése ou conscience?”, 149, 152-53.
23 Ibid., 157: “En somme, du point de vue de la philologie et de l’histoire doctrínale, 
l’enseignement scolastique de la synderesis est un accident.”
24 Eric D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom  (London: Sheed & Ward, 1961), 18.
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in  v a in  everyw here  e lse .” 25 There fo re , i t  is  o fte n  presented as i f  the  d is c o v e ry  o f  
synderes is  fo rce d  S cho lastic ism  to  change the understand ing  o f  conscience 
s ig n ific a n tly , and som e w o u ld  w ish  to  rem ove the te rm  a ltoge th e r and rep lace  i t  w ith
97
som eth ing  else. H ow e ve r, i t  is  m ore the case th a t the unexpected a rriv a l o f  the  new  
te rm  he lped to  express w h a t was a lready he ld  b y  the  S cho lastics. So le t us n o w  
exp lo re  h o w  the  S cho lastics app lied  the te rm  in  th e ir w ritin g s .
25 De Blic, “Syndérèse ou conscience?”, 157: “Et nul doute qu’en aidant à délimiter la zone 
fallible et la zone vraiment universelle des jugements moraux, la dénomination de ‘syndérèse’ n’ait 
beaucoup contribué à donner à la doctrine de la conscience de la scolastique latine la fermeté et la 
précision qu’on cherchait en vain partout ailleurs.” Potts would also defend synderesis as a useful 
addition to terminology, regardless of its unusual provenance: “Disagreement with the medieval 
interpretation of Jerome does not force us, though, to write off the distinction between synderesis and 
conscience as an unfortunate mistake. There would be independent reasons for drawing a distinction 
within what we simply call ‘conscience’ -  never mind the labels for it -  and the right question to ask is 
whether the medieval distinction, in spite of its muddled origin, turned out to be productive. Do the two 
terms mark a distinction which is essential for understanding and speaking clearly about the notion of 
conscience? If so, then the original motivation for its introduction need not trouble us further.” See 
Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 11.
26 Curran, “Conscience,” 6-7; Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 60: “The introduction of this new 
word, although in error, determined all subsequent discussions of conscience. [...] All subsequent moral 
theology made this formal distinction between the innate disposition toward good, which is called the 
habitual conscience and the specific judgments of conscience, which is called actual conscience. While 
these distinctions were occasionally hinted at in earlier authors, the actual source of the distinction can 
be traced to an error in a text of Jerome that was copied and continued by subsequent commentators.” 
The last sentence of Hogan’s historical summary is confusing, in that it indicates that the distinction of 
roles of conscience is “hinted at in earlier authors”, and yet also claims that “the actual source of the 
distinction can be traced to an error in a text of Jerome.” If the distinction is present even only as a 
rough idea before the Jerome textual error, then that “hint” is the “actual source of the distinction,” and 
not the text of Jerome. This leaves synderesis with the role of facilitator rather than originator.
27 Talking of syneidësis and synderesis, Timothy O’Connell says: “There are not two words in 
Greek for conscience, but only one. The distinction between the two concepts may very well be useful, 
and indeed we shall find it so. But in making that distinction, we must be clear that it is ours, not the 
Bible’s.” This statement is strange for two reasons. Firstly, O’Connell says that synderesis is useful, 
but then proceeds to replace it with a tripartite description of anterior conscience, without an 
explanation of why it needs to be replaced. Secondly, the fact that a technical term which facilitates 
precision and clarity in Christian philosophy or theology is not found in the Bible does not render it 
less desirable or inappropriate. If this were the case, O’Connell would not be able to use “anterior 
conscience” or “ordinary magisterium” in his article, nor, indeed, any other non-biblical technical term. 
See O’Connell, “An Understanding of Conscience,” 26, 34.
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U n til 1200 synderesis  o n ly  m akes a sporadic appearance in  th e o lo g ic a l w o rk s .28 The
firs t to  m ake use o f  the  te rm  is  M aster U do, w ho , som etim e betw een 1160 and 1165
w ro te  the  fir s t in  the lo n g  lin e  o f  com m entaries on  Peter L o m b a rd ’ s S entences.29
A lth o u g h  L o m b a rd  does n o t use the w o rd  synderesis  h im s e lf, h is  re fe rence  to  the
passage b y  Jerom e is  enough to  p rom pt U do  to  use the  p a tris tic  te x t as the  source fo r
h is  ana lys is  o f  the  te rm :
Indeed , the eagle s ig n ifie s  synderesis, th a t is , the h ig h e r reason w h ic h  even 
“ in  C a in  is  no t extingu ished. I t  never m ixes w ith  the  [o th e r] th ree  
[e lem ents o f  the so u l], b u t a lw ays corrects th e ir e rro rs.
N e x t, a round 1175, the  canonist S im on B is in ia n o  inc ludes in  h is  S u m m a  s u p e r
D e c re tu m  a fu rth e r q u a lific a tio n  o f  the ro le  o f  the  ra tio n a l syn deres is , nam e ly ,
ope ra ting  as the  seat o f  the na tu ra l la w , w h ic h  can be darkened b y  s in , b u t never
e lim in a te d :
A n d  so, i t  appears to  us th a t na tu ra l la w  is  the  h ig h e r p a rt o f  th e  sou l, 
nam e ly , the  v e ry  reason th a t is  ca lled  synderesis w h ich , S crip tu re  a ttests, 
co u ld  n o t be ex tingu ish ed  even in  C ain. M o re o ve r, a lth o u g h  i t  is  o f  na tu re , 
th a t is  good b y  nature, i t  co u ld  be obscured th ro u g h  the  dem erits  o f  [o u r] 
fa u lts , [b u t] i t  is  never extingu ished .31
2. Early Scholastic Definitions of Synderesis
Peter o f  P o itie rs , in  h is  Sentences in  F iv e  B ooks  o f  1179, w hen  ta lk in g  o f  the  
tw o  opposing  tendencies in  m an, s im ila rly  concludes th a t i t  is  reason w h ic h  in c lin e s
28 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 153; Lottin, Psychologie et m orale, II, 105-
110.
29 Ibid., 106; Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 153; D’Arcy, Conscience and its 
Right to Freedom , 21.
30 Lottin, Psychologie el morale, II, 107: “Aquila uero significat sinderesim ( Vienne 1050: 
sinendesim) id est superiorem rationem que etiam ‘in Cain extincta non est, nunquam se miscentem 
tribus, sed ipsa semper errantia corrigentem’.” (Spelling and parenthesis referring to manuscript 
variance as in original.) Cf. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom , 21.
’'Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 74, at 74, n.3: “Nobis itaque uidetur quod ius naturale est 
superior pars anime, ipsa uidelicet ratio que synderesis appellatur, que nec in Chain potuit, scriptura 
teste, extingui. Cum autem sit natura, id est naturale bonum, delictorum meritis offuscari potuit, 
numquam extingui.” Cf. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom , 21. Note that all textual 
peculiarities are presented as recorded in the sources, such as Lottin or Migne.
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judgem en ts o f  conscience, and th is  act o f  reason is  ca lled  s y n d eres is :
R eason a lw ays denies access to  e v il, a lw ays ob jects  to  i t  and ju d g e s  th a t i t  
shou ld  n o t be done. Indeed, no one is  so bad th a t reason does n o t d is tu rb  
h is  conscience, dec la ring  th is  and th a t to  be e v il. T h is  is  tru ly  th a t lit t le  
spark o f  reason w h ic h  co u ld  n o t be extingu ish ed  even in  C a in , w h ic h  is
'¡'y
ca lle d  synderesis b y  the G reeks.
T hus, the  f ir s t fe w  to  w rite  about synderesis  id e n tify  i t  in  som e w a y  w ith  the 
fa c u lty  o f  reason. T h is  con tinues to  be the case in  the w o rk  o f  S tephen L a n g to n , w ho 
w as “ am ong the  fir s t to  a ttem pt a serious d iscussion o f  the  te rm .”  W ritin g  on  the 
sub ject o f  free  w ill,  he raises the issue o f  the ro le  o f  synderesis , w ith  the  purpose o f  
d is tin g u is h in g  the  tw o .34 H e declares th a t there are three fa c to rs  in v o lv e d  in  the  m o ra l 
life : the  lo w e r appe tite , reason and synderesis ,35 The lo w e r appe tite  m oves the  reason 
tow ards e v il, synderesis  in c lin e s  i t  tow ards good and reason ju d g e s  o v e r the  tw o  
opposing  in c lin a tio n s  (and i t  is  the freedom  o f  th is  ra tio n a l ju d g e m e n t w h ic h  de fines 
lib e ru m  a rb it r iu m ).36 In  a question  devoted to  synderesis  he concludes th a t i t  is  no t
towards the good, repels the individual from choosing evil, and reins in the
32 Peter of Poitiers, Sententiarum Libri Quinque, II, cap. 14, PL 211, 992-993; ibid., cap. 21, 
PL 211, 1030, A: “Ratio [... ] semper recalcitrat, semper contradicit et judicat malum non esse 
faciendum. Nullus enim adeo malus est quin ratio ejus conscientiam remordeat dictans hoc esse malum 
et illud. Haec est enim ilia scintillula rationis quae etiam in Cain non potest exstingui quae a Graecis 
dicitur synderesis.” Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 108-9; D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to 
Freedom , 21.
33 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 156. Lottin, Psychologie et m orale, II, 110.
34 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 112: “Notre théologien ne songe nullement à exclure la 
syndérèse de la partie rationnelle, mais il la distinguée du libre arbitre: l’activité de celui-ci est 
méritoire, parce qu’elle est délibérée; au contraire, le movement de la syndérèse, comme telle, est sans 
mérite, parce q’il est naturel.”
35 Ibid., 110. D’Arcy incorrectly translates Lottin’s description of “trois facteurs” of moral life 
as three faculties. Langton does not consider synderesis to be a separate faculty, but rather part of the 
faculty of reason, as we can see in note 36. Cf. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom , 23.
36 Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 110: “L ’appétit inférieur incite la raison au mal; la 
syndérèse, au contraire, l’incline au bien; entre ces inclinations antagonistes, la raison doit, comme un 
arbitre, juger de ce que lui suggèrent ses deux conseillères; et la liberté de cet arbitrage, libertas 
arbitrii, consiste précisément en ce que la raison désigne ell-même à la volonté la direction à prendre.” 
For original Latin passage, see idem, Psychologie et morale auX IF etXIIF siècles, vol. 1, 12th ed. 
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1957), 60-61, at 61: Est autem quedam superior scintilla rationis, sicut dicit 
Ieronymus super Ezechielem, que est super très uires anime quam Greci uocant sinderesim [...]. 
Interdum autem hoc manifestum est quod ex ilia scintilla est quod hominem peccantem remordet 
conscientia. Ista mouet hominem ad bonum. Sic ergo uis concupiscibilis inferius mouet hominem ad 
malum; superius autem ilia scintilla conscientie mouet ad bonum. Ratio autem que in m edio constituta 
est tamquam arbiter iudicat de hoc quod suggerit sensualitas et de hoc ad  quod mouet synderesis. Et
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o n ly  a p o w e r (v is ) th a t detests e v il, i t  is  “ pa rt o f  the  p o w e r o f  reason,”  w h ic h  is  
concerned w ith  m o ra l judgem en ts at the le ve l o f  general p rin c ip le .37 A lth o u g h  the  
re la tio n sh ip  betw een reason and synderesis  w o u ld  be fu rth e r sp e c ifie d , the  la tte r p o in t 
on the ro le  o f  synderesis  in  m ora l dec is ion -m ak ing  is  s ig n ific a n t in  th a t i t  w o u ld  
becom e a “ pe rm anen tly  accepted”  n o tio n  in  T h o m is t m o ra l th e o ry .38
T hus, w e can see th a t these ea rly  texts a ll lin k  synderesis  to  th e  fa c u lty  o f  
reason in  som e w a y  o r another, and to  the fundam enta ls o f  choos ing  the good, 
w he ther as d r iv in g  fo rce  o r guard ian o f the  na tu ra l la w . The second a ttrib u te  o f  
synderesis  as in c lin in g  the  person to  choosing the good raises the  q u e s tio n  w h e th e r i t  
w o u ld  b e tte r be described as be long ing  to  the fa c u lty  o f  the w ill.  A le xa n d e r N eckham  
(d. 1217) a ttem pts to  loca te  synderesis  in  the w ill,  b u t concludes th a t th is  w o u ld  n o t 
be in  accord  w ith  Jerom e’ s analysis o f  E ze k ie l, since the w ill is  sym b o lise d  b y  th e  ox , 
w hereas synderesis  is  sym bo lised  b y  the eagle. He the re fo re  concludes th a t syn deres is  
is  the  ra t io  s u p e r io r  (b y  descrip tio n , i f  no t b y  nam e) o r a t least the  s c in t i l la  ra t io n is .39 
I t  is  here w e fin d  the  conceptua l background to  the  flo u ris h in g  o f  syn deres is . A s  w as 
noted e a rlie r, the  appearance o f  synderesis  d id  no t occasion a re ro u tin g  o f  m ed ieva l 
m o ra l th e o lo g y . R ather, the  n o tio n  fa c ilita te d  the expression  o f  the  S cho lastic  
understand ing , w h ic h  sought to  com bine access to  o b je c tive  n a tu ra l la w  w ith  fa llib le
hoc consistit libertas arbitrii quod ratio designat uoluntatem ad hoc uel ad illud. Qui bene facit 
consentit sinderesi et refrenat motum concupiscentie; qui autem male, e contrario facit” (emphasis 
mine).
37 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 111: “quaedam uis qua homo naturaliter detestatur malum 
et est pars uis rationalis.” Cf. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom , 22-23; Lottin, Psychologie 
et M orale, II, 113: “sindéresis attenditur in genere et bonum persuadet et malum dissuadet, non 
descendendo ad specialia.”
38 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 22.
39 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 156. Lottin, Psychologie et m orale, II, 122: 
“Ratione ergo usus talis sindéresis comparatur scintillae, ratione simplicitas puero, ratione 
contemplationis rerum supracelestium aquilae [...] secundum dicentes sinderesim esse desiderium, 
deberet synderesis potius figurari per vitulum quam per aquilam.”
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m o ra l ch o ice .40 Thus, the  backdrop fo r ea rly  use o f  synderesis  re fle c ts  th is  v ie w  b y  
m eans o f  lin k in g  i t  in  som e w ay to  the ra t io  s u p e r io r .41 G ive n  the  s ig n ific a n c e  o f  th is  
la tte r concept, and those c lo se ly  re la ted  to  it ,  i t  w o u ld  n o w  be opportune  to  g ive  a 
b r ie f exp la n a tio n  o f  th e ir m eaning.
2.1 R a tio  S u p erior, R a tio  In fe r io r  an d  S yn deresis
A lth o u g h  the  exact te rm s cam e la te r, the d is tin c tio n  betw een ra t io  s u p e r io r  and ra t io  
in fe r io r  ow es its  o rig in s  to  St A u g u s tin e ’ s com m ents in  D e  T r in ita te . A u g u s tin e  
declares th a t reason has tw o  parts, id e n tify in g  one as the s u b lim io r  r a t io .42 The 
d is tin c tio n  does n o t re fe r to  lo ca tio n , bu t ra the r describes the  tw o  ope ra tion s o f  
reason, nam e ly , reason ing  re la ted  to  the  life  o f  co n te m p la tio n , and th a t w h ic h  is  
re la ted  to  the  p ra c tic a l life .43 The m ore sub lim e , h ig h e r reason shou ld  d ire c t th e  lo w e r 
reason so th a t i t  does n o t becom e absorbed in  m a te ria l th in g s , since the  im age  o f  G od
40 See De Blic, “Syndérése ou conscience?”, 157. Cf. Leiber also points out the root 
philosophy behind synderesis existed long before the term does, but highlights different sources from 
Crowe. See “Name und Begriff der Synteresis,” 392: “Die jedenfalls falsche Lesart der 
Hieronymusstelle hat der Scholastik den Namen gegeben für eine natürliche Seelenlage, die sie auch 
ohne Kenntnis dieser Vaterstelle aus guten philosophischen Gründen angenommen hätte, und in deren 
psychologischem Ausbau sie hauptsächlich auf diese Stelle selbst und auf Aristoteles und die Araber 
zurückgeht.” [“ln any case, the false reading of the Jerome passage has given Scholasticism the name 
for a natural disposition of the soul which would have been accepted on good philosophical grounds, 
even without knowledge of this Patristic passage, and which in its psychological extension goes back 
chiefly to this passage itself, to Aristotle and the Arabs.”]
41 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 123.
42 St Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, 2, PL 42, 999: “Sed sublimior rationis est judicare de istis 
corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas” (own emphasis). Cf. St Augustine, The 
Trinity in The Works o f  Saint Augustine: A Translation fo r  the 21s' Century, part 1, vol.5, trans. 
Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn, New York: New City Press, 1991), XII, 2 (page 323): 
“But it pertains to the loftier reason to make judgments on these bodily things according to non-bodily 
and everlasting meanings.” (Hill’s translation referred to hereafter as The Trinity.) See also D e 
Trinitate, XII, 12, PL 1007, for the idea of a superior counsel: “superioris vero auctoritate consilii ita 
membra retinentur.”
43 St Augustine, D e Trinitate, XII, 12, PL 42, 1008: “Haec itaque disputatio qua in mente 
uniuscujusque hominis quaesivimus quoddam rationale conjugium contemplationis et actionis, et 
offlciis per quaedam singula distributis, tamen in utroque mentis imitate servata.” Cf. idem, The 
Trinity. XII, 19 (page 332): “So we have been looking for a kind of rational couple of contemplation 
and action in the mind of everyman, with functions distributed into two several [a/c, should read 
‘single’] channels and yet the mind’s unity is preserved in each.” (Note that Hill’s numbering system 
does not match that of Migne.) Cf. Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 156.
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in  m an o n ly  resides in  the  h ig h e r reason.44 Such a d is tin c tio n  has P la to n ic  in flu e n ce s  
at its  ro o t, co rrespond ing  to  P la to ’ s understand ing o f  the sou l s tra d d lin g  tw o  w o rld s , 
the  im m o rta l and the  m o rta l45 H ow ever, accord ing  to  M u llig a n  and C ro w e , the  
p rim a ry  source fo r  A u g u s tin e ’ s d iv is io n  o f  reason w o u ld  have been the  w ritin g s  o f 
P lo tin u s ,46 w ith  secondary in fluences com ing  fro m  M an ichae ism  and S to ic ism .47 H o w  
such a d is tin c tio n  cam e to  ru le  in  the M id d le  Ages, no one can be sure, b u t i t  is  lik e ly  
th a t its  s im ila r ity  to  the  d is tin c tio n  betw een ra t io  and in te llig e n t ia , a lready p resen t in  
tw e lfth  ce n tu ry  th o u g h t, gave it  greater a tte n tio n ,48 and i t  is  suggested th a t i t  was
44 St Augustine, De Trinitate, XII, 7, PL 42, 1003-1004: “Sicut de natura humanae mentis 
diximus, quia et si tota contempletur veritatem, imago Dei est; et cum ex ea distribuitur aliquid, et 
quadam intentione derivatur ad actionem rerum temporalium, nihilominus ex qua parte conspectam 
consulit veritatem, imago Dei est; ex qua vero intenditur in agenda inferiora, non est imago Dei.” Cf. 
idem, The Trinity. XII, 10 (page 328): “We said about the nature of the human mind that if it is all 
contemplating truth it is the image of God; and when something is drawn off from it and assigned or 
directed in a certain way to the management of temporal affairs, it is still all the same the image of God 
as regards the part with which it consults the truth it has gazed on; but as regards the part which is 
directed to managing these lower affairs, it is not the image of God.” Cf. Crowe, “Synderesis and the 
Early Scholastics,” 156.
45 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in The Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 30c, 39e, 41a-e, at 41d: “Weave what is mortal to what 
is immortal, fashion and beget living things.” See also 69c-70b on the positions of the rational, 
immortal soul in the head and the irrational, mortal soul of passions and appetites in the rest of the 
body. Cf. Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 157.
46 Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna, abridged ed. (London: Penguin, 1991), 
IV, 8, 4: “It has fallen: it is at the chain: debarred from expressing itself now through its intellectual 
phase, it operates through sense; it is captive; this is the burial, the encavemment of the Soul. But in 
spite of all it has, for ever, something transcendent: by conversion towards the intellective act; it is 
loosened from the shackles and soars - when only it makes its memories the starting point of a new 
vision of essential being. Souls that take this way have place in both spheres, living of necessity the life 
there and the life here by turns, the upper life reigning in those able to consort more continuously with 
the divine Intellect, the lower dominant where character or circumstances are less favourable. All this is 
indicated by Plato, without emphasis, where he distinguishes those of the second mixing-bowl, 
describes them as ‘parts’, and goes on to say that, having in this way become partial, they must of 
necessity experience birth.” Translation shown to be complete by comparison. Cf. Plotino, Enneadi, 
Greek text with Italian trans. by Giuseppe Faggin, 3rd ed. (Milan: Bompiani, 2004), IV, 8 ,4 . See also 
Robert W. Mulligan, “Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior: The Historical Background,” New 
Scholasticism  29 (1955): 1-32, at 9-14; Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 157.
47 Mulligan points out that the Manichaean idea would have only had some slight influence, as 
their distinction was that of two souls in man, one drawing him to virtue, and the other to evil; 
something which Augustine firmly rejects. See St Augustine, De Duabus Animabus Contra 
M anichaeos, 13, PL 42, 108. The Stoics referred to the hégemonikon, the upper or ruling part of the 
soul. However, until Philo gave this a spiritual interpretation owing to his Platonic philosophy, the 
Stoic term was strictly materialistic. See Mulligan, “Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior," 5-6; Crowe,
“Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 157.
48 The distinction between ratio and intelligentia was a reduction of three categories of the 
mind: ratio, intellectus and intelligentia. The triple strucure was first described by Abbot Isaac de 
Stella, of the monastery of l’Etoile, who was influenced by Arabic philosophy through the writings and 
translations of Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. 1151). In its simplified and widespread two-part form,
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u ltim a te ly  p o p u la rise d  b y  its  in c lu s io n  in  W illia m  o f  A u ve rg n e ’ s D e  Im m o r ta l i ta te ,49 
and P eter L o m b a rd ’ s Sentences.
A s  a s ta rtin g  p o in t Peter Lom bard  quotes sections o f  A u g u s tin e ’ s D e  T r in ita te  
a lm ost w o rd  fo r  w o rd  and relates the lo w e r reason to  se n su a lity .50 G ive n  the 
s taggering  in flu e n c e  o f  h is  Sentences, “ L o m ba rd ’ s te x t was an im p o rta n t fa c to r w hen  
the  la te  tw e lfth  ce n tu ry  theo log ians began to  discuss the na tu re  o f  s y n d e re s is .” 5X The 
s p lit o f  reason in to  tw o  operations a llo w s  fo r  the d iv in e  and in fa llib le  to  res ide  in  m an 
( ra t io  s u p e r io r), as w e ll as the hum an and the fa llib le  (ra t io  in fe r io r ) .  T hus, w ith  its  
d isco ve ry , synderes is  is  em ployed as a means to  describe th is  u nde rs tan d ing  o f 
reason, and its  subsequent m o ra l a p p lica tio n . A s w e sh a ll see, the  re la tio n s h ip  
betw een r a t io  s u p e r io r , ra t io  in fe r io r  and synderesis  changed o ve r tim e , b u t a t the 
tim e  o f  th e  e a rly  th irte e n th  cen tu ry  the com m on v ie w  o f w rite rs  w as th a t synderes is , 
b y  its  id e n tific a tio n , o r at least in tr in s ic  connection , to  the  r a t io  s u p e r io r , w as “ the
c'y
guard ian  o f  th e  m o ra l o rde r,”  though  the question  o f  its  in fa llib ility  w as s t ill be ing
ST
debated. Such a s ig n ific a n t ro le  p laced synderesis  a lm ost on  the  le v e l o f  a fa c u lty , 
lik e  the  reason o r the  w ill.  So w h a t was synderesis1? W as i t  re a lly  a fa c u lty  o r w o u ld  it  
be be tte r described  as a h ab itu s , a d isp o s itio n  w ith  the purpose o f  p e rfe c tin g  a fa c u lty ?  
I t  is  P h ilip  the  C hance llo r w ho  is  the firs t to  discuss th is  and the  n e x t w r ite r  a fte r 
S tephen L a n g to n  to  push fo rw a rd  s ig n ific a n tly  the in q u iry  in to  the  na tu re  and fu n c tio n
often found in highly popular commentaries on Boethius, ratio was concerned with material things, 
while intelligentia held immaterial, eternal things as its object. For a detailed account, see Mulligan, 
“Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior,” 20-23.
49 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 157.
50 For the collection of quotations from Augustine, see Peter Lombard, Liber Sententiarum, II, 
d. 24, cap. 5, 5, the first of which describes the part of reason relating to eternal things as “rationis pars  
superior” and that relating to temporal things as “portio inferior". Lombard then draws his own 
conclusion at lib. II, dist. 24, cap. 13: “Quod sensualitas saepe in Scriptura aliter quam supra accipitur, 
scilicet ut etiarn inferior rationis portio  eius nomine intelligatur” (emphasis mine).
51 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 157.
52 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 136.
53 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 159. For a detailed presentation of the 
variety of views of the whole period, the reader is referred to Dom Odon Lottin’s magnum opus, which 
remains to this day an invaluable tool for the study of moral theology of the time. See Lottin, 
Psychologie et m orale, II, 104-349.
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o f  the  te rm  b y  p resen ting  in  h is  S um m a de B on o  the “ firs t tre a tise  on  conscience ,”  
w here  syn deres is  is  P h ilip ’ s “ m a in  concern.” 54
3. T h e F irst T rea tise  on  C on scien ce -  P h ilip  th e  C h a n cello r
In  a le n g th y  e xp lo ra tio n , P h ilip  po in ts  ou t th a t there are a num ber o f  reasons w h y  one 
m ig h t conc lude  th a t synderesis  is  a fa c u lty .55 The firs t is  th a t the  Jerom e passage 
d is tin g u ish e s  i t  fro m  the  three fa cu ltie s  o f  the sou l (the  reason, the  co n cu p isc ib le  
appe tite  and the  ira sc ib le  appe tite ), and th a t o the r scrip tu re  passages use the  te rm  
s p ir itu s  to  describe  aspects o f  its  fu n c tio n , w h ich , in  P h ilip ’ s eyes, is  a s tro n g  coun te r 
a rgum ent to  id e n tify  synderesis  w ith  reason. M oreove r, o the r a u th o ritie s  o f  the  past 
ascribed syn deres is  w ith  va ry in g  types o f  status and fu n c tio n  re la tin g  to  the  in te lle c t,
54 Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, 12. Timothy Potts’s presentation of medieval 
conscience is very informative, and so is widely used, but it also contains inaccuracies, and so should 
be used with care. I would suggest that his use of terminology such as ‘general and particular 
deontological propositions’ throughout the book to describe the relationship between synderesis and 
conscientia is both anachronistic and unnecessarily complicated. It also implies a certain nominalism in 
outlook, which would not have been part of the thought of these writers. Potts also seems ill at ease 
with a philosophy of the mind or a medieval psychology and is continually bent upon translating it into 
a theory of meaning and language philosophy. He does this to make it more accessible to his students, 
but it distorts the approach and outlook of the Scholastics. His book also lacks precision and 
theological accuracy at times. For example, he presents an exegesis of Genesis 4:1-16 which declares 
Jerome’s analysis “inconsistent”, and suggests Jerome’s statement that “the spark of conscience [...] 
was not extinguished even in the breast of Cain” is “a rather surprising remark in view of the story of 
Cain and Abel, for at no point in the story does Cain show the slightest sign of being sorry for having 
murdered his brother.” Potts would consider Cain to have no guilt or remorse for his actions, thinking 
only of the burden of his punishment. However, Vogels points out that 'awon can mean both 
fault/sin/crime and  punishment, and so probably combines both ideas. This means that if ’awon is 
‘fault’, then Cain’s complaint that it is too great is an admission of regret. Even if this is not the case, 
the context of Cain’s banishment is placed within a dialogue with God, who explains the reason for the 
banishment. Thus, the punishment serves to indicate guilt, and to awaken realisation of fault (just as the 
pain of conscience serves to confirm guilt). The weight of the punishment would also indicate the 
significance of Cain’s actions, since his sentence is greater than that of his parents. They were expelled 
from paradise to till the soil. He is now driven away even from the soil to have nowhere to call his own, 
to live as a permanent wanderer. That Jerome later states in his Ezekiel passage that conscience can be 
“thrown down and lose its place” (“praecipitari [...] et suum locum amittere”) does not imply that 
conscience is completely lost, as Potts believes, but rather implies dysfunction or paralysis, and so 
Jerome is not as inconsistent as Potts thinks. Indeed the quoque shows that Jerome sees no 
contradiction, but rather only an extreme example. See Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 10- 
12, 79-80, 107; Jerome, Commentaria in Ezechielem, PL 25, 22: “Et tamen hanc quoque ipsam 
conscientiam, [...] cemimus praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum amittere, qui ne pudorem 
quidem et verecundiam habent in delictis”; Walter Vogels, “Ca'rn: L ’etre humain qui devient une non- 
personne (Gn 4,1-16),” Nouvelle Revue Theologique 114 (1992): 321-340.
55 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 138-42.
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em otions and the  w ill,  thus in d ic a tin g  th a t synderesis  is  n o t a separate fa c u lty , b u t a 
po w e r w h ic h  h o ld s  an a n c illa ry , d isp o s itio n a l ro le . The c o n flic tin g  a u th o rita tiv e  
evidence leads P h ilip  to  present a com prom ise as h is  co n c lu s io n : syn deres is  is  b o th  
fa c u lty  and h a b itu s ; i t  is  a h a b itu a l pow er (p o te n tia  h a b itu a lis ) .56 A lth o u g h  the  te rm  
p o te n t ia  h a b itu a lis  is  an in ve n tio n  o f  P h ilip  the C hance llo r, i t  is  n o t e n tire ly  w ith o u t 
in flu e n ce  fro m  p re v io u s  w rite rs . Indeed, h is  d e scrip tio n  o f  the  n o tio n  as m ean ing  a 
po w e r th a t is  ready o r q u ic k  to  act (fa c ilis  a d  a c tu m ),51 re fe rs  back to  the  w o rk  o f  
W illia m  o f  A u xe rre  and G o ttfrie d  o f  P o itie rs .58 T im o th y  P o tts  p o in ts  o u t th a t there 
w as g e n e ra lly  a sharp d is tin c tio n  betw een fa cu ltie s  and va rio u s  h a b itu s  (w h a t he ca lls  
“ p o te n tia litie s  and d isp o s itio n s ” ), w ith  the fa cu ltie s  as pow ers o f  the  sou l b e in g  p a rt o f  
m an ’ s n a tu ra l m ake-up , w h ile , fo llo w in g  A ris to tle , the h a b itu s  are “ v o lu n ta r ily  
acqu ired .” 59 S im ila rly , “ a n y th in g  w h ic h  is  p rope r to  fa l le n  hum an na tu re ”  cannot be 
p a rt o f  m an ’ s n a tu ra l endow m ent, and so the m ed ieva l w rite rs  w o u ld  cons ide r 
a n y th in g  ta in te d  w ith  sin , o r w ith  the im pu lse  to  s in  (fam es p e c c a t i) as “ ou ts ide  the  
substance o f  the  so u l.” 60 Thus, synderesis  is  g iven  the d e s c rip tio n  o f  a p o te n t ia  
h a b itu a lis  n o t o n ly  ou t o f  deference to  p rev ious authors, b u t m ore  im p o rta n tly , to  
designate i t  as a non-acqu ired , innate  d isp o s itio n . T h is  com prom ise  m a in ta in s  the 
inna te  goodness and righteousness o f  synderesis, b u t lim its  its  im p a c t, thus 
a ckn o w le d g in g  the  e ffe c ts  o f  o rig in a l sin. Thus, synderesis  is , “ in  te rm s o f  the 
d o c trin e  o f  o r ig in a l s in , w ha t rem ains a fte r the  F a ll o f  the  fu ll c o n tro l o f  b o d ily
56 Ibid., 142: “Si ergo queratur utrum sit potentia aut habitus respondendum est accipiendo 
medium: potentia habitualis.”
57 Ibid., 148: “Potentia habitualis dicitur que facilis est ad actum; et sic synderesis dicitur 
potentia habitualis, quia non impeditur ab actu suo, quantum in se est.”
58 Ibid., 139.
59 Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, 23: “potentialities of the soul are always aspects 
of what it is to be human”; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis 
and Cambridge: Hackett, 1999), III, 5, 1114b 18: “let us suppose that [how] the end [appears] is 
natural, but virtue is voluntary” (parentheses in text).
60 Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 24-25 (emphasis in text).
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appetites w h ic h  ob ta ined  be fore  i t . ” 61 In  th is  w ay, synderesis  is  a lit t le  lig h t (m o d icu m  
lu m e n ) le a d in g  to  G od o r a “ m u rm u rin g  back” , a w h ispered  o b je c tio n  aga inst s in fu l 
a c tio n  (re m u rm u ra tiv u m  c o n tra  p e c c a tu m ), w h ich  thus p revents the  in d iv id u a l fro m  
be ing  to ta lly  absorbed o r co rrup ted  b y  e a rth ly  th ings. T h is  is  due to  the  in fle x ib le  
nature o f  synderes is  in  its  appetite  fo r the good and its  ha tred  o f  e v il.63 T h is  
d e sc rip tio n  in  te rm s o f  an appetite  o r in c lin a tio n  to  the good show s th a t P h ilip  the 
C h a n ce llo r w ished  to  lin k  th is  inna te  capacity  to  the  fa c u lty  o f  the  w ill,  m ore  than  
reason, a lth o u g h  he “ fudges the issue s lig h tly  b y  saying th a t i t  be longs to  the  ‘ ra tio n a l, 
n o t sense, a p p e tite ’ o f  the w ill. ” 64 H ogan, fo llo w in g  D ’A rc y , a lso  suggests th a t 
P h ilip ’ s q u a lific a tio n  is  m ade w ith  the in te n tio n  o f  lin k in g  synderes is  to  the  ra tio n a l, 
s p iritu a l s ide o f  hum an nature, ra the r than  its  an im a l side, w ith  its  desires and urges,65 
since i t  is  th is  aspect o f  the hum an soul th a t is  pra ised in  p re v io u s  C h ris tia n  w r itin g .66
In  P h ilip ’ s trea tise  w e can see h is  strugg le  to  de fine  syn deres is  a cco rd in g  to
• . ffl • • » • •
the ca tegories o f  h is  tim e . H is  d e scrip tio n  o f  synderesis  con ta ins b o th  ra tio n a l and 
v o litio n a l aspects, a lthoug h  he em phasises the la tte r m ore re a d ily . L o ttin  e xp la in s  th a t 
P h ilip ’ s fo rm u la p o te n t ia  h a b itu a lis  its e lf im p lie s  th a t synderesis  is  on  the  one hand a
z: o t m
ra tio n a l p o w e r, and on the o the r an in s tin c tiv e  p ropens ity  to  good a c tio n . P h ilip  is  
the re fo re  try in g  to  re la te  synderesis  to  the  co g n itive  o rde r and the  a ffe c tiv e  o rder. 
D esp ite  P h ilip ’ s com p lica ted  p resenta tion, the co m b in a tio n  o f  a ffe c tiv e  w ith  c o g n itiv e
61 Ibid., 27; Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 147: “synderesis erit pars rectitudinis prime 
uirium, quam habebat Adam in statu innocentie.”
62 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 147: “synderesis erit pars rectitudinis prime uirium, quam 
habebat Adam in statu innocentie, que remansit tamquam modicum lumen in Deum ductiuum, ne non 
esset ex toto ratio ad temporalia inclinata uel incururata. [...] hec rectitudo non ex toto sublata est. Quod 
ergo remansit, synderesis dici potest. Illud enim est de se remurmuratiuum contra peccatum et recte 
contemplatiuum boni simpliciter, et voluntarium.”
63 Ibid.: “inflexibile enim a boni appetitu et mali detestatione.” Cf. Potts, Conscience in 
M edieval Philosophy, 28.
64 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 68. Cf. D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom , 27; 
Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 111.
65 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 68-69.
66 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 143.
67 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 68.
68 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 156.
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is , how eve r, n o t as co n tra d ic to ry  as i t  m ay seem, g ive n  th a t b o th  orders are 
understood  as fu n c tio n s  o f  the  ra t io n a l sou l as a w h o le .69 T hus, P h ilip ’ s unde rstand ing  
o f  synderes is  is  th a t o f  an inna te , w ow -deliberative in c lin a tio n  to  m o ra l g ood ,70 and so 
d iffe rs  fro m  l ib e ru m  a rb it r iu m  as a p rio r founda tion , since i t  m oves the  la tte r to  seek
n i
the  good in  genera l (co m m u n e). T here fo re , he like n s  synderes is  to  the  n a tu ra l w ill,  
b u t d is tin g u ish e s  the  tw o  b y  the lim ita tio n  o f synderesis  to  ra tio n a l th in g s . H ence 
the  lin k  w ith  the  co g n itiv e  o rde r is  m a in ta ined , bu t the  d e sc rip tio n  d iffe rs  fro m  th a t o f  
S tephen Lang to n . A s synderesis  is  a ttracted to  the good in  genera l, P h ilip  does n o t 
re la te  i t  to  e ith e r supe rio r o r in fe r io r reason, bu t ra the r to  in te ll ig e n t ia , s ince reason 
(w h e th e r su p e rio r o r in fe r io r) re lates to  p a rticu la r th in g s , w h ile  in te ll ig e n t ia  re la tes to  
apprehend ing  the  suprem e good.
In  the  end, P h ilip ’ s firs t a ttem pt a t a treatise on synderesis  re su lts  in  a series o f  
com prom ises, caused b y  d iffe re n t m o tiva tio n s , in c lu d in g  deference to  past sources. 
H ow eve r, P h ilip  the C hance llo r is  s ig n ific a n t in  th a t h is  com m ents set m uch  o f  the  
g ro u n d w o rk  to  fu tu re  w r itin g  on synderesis  and conscien tia . P h ilip ’ s s trugg le  to  keep 
synderes is  in  re la tio n  to  the reason and the  w ill p rov ides co n vo lu te d  read ing , b u t the  
in te n tio n  stands, even though  som e o f the a rgum enta tion  does n o t. Som e w rite rs
69 Cf. Ibid., 147.
70 Ibid., 157; 142: “non dico de habitu acquisito, sed innato”; ibid., 148: “non est iudicium 
deliberationis apud synderesim, sed executionis.”
71 Ibid., 148: “Dico quod synderesis mouet liberum arbitrium dictando bonum et cohibendo a 
malo, et mouet in bonum commune quod inuenitur in isto bono aut in illo. Non ergo est in bonum 
particulare secundum se, sed in commune inuentum in eo.”
72 Ibid.: “Uoluntas natural is est in naturalia et vitalia et rationalia, synderesis tantum in 
rationalia” [,..]“synderesis est idem in subiecto cum uoluntate naturali, sed nominatur per synderesim 
secundum quod est in bona rationalia et secundum hanc rationem est potentia habitualis.
73 Here, what Stephen Langton did with superior reason, Philip is doing with intelligentia, in 
order to better explain the positions of the animals in Ezekiel’s prophecy. Ibid., 144, 147: “Si uero 
ponamus rationem et intelligentiam et concupiscibilem et irascibilem motiuas uires, ita quod  supra sit 
intelligentia sem per adsummum bonum erectiua. [...] Et ratio ilia diuidetur per duas portiones [...] et 
non erit synderesis altera illarum, sed supra utramque et supra irascibilem et concupiscibilem que sub 
appetitu comprehenduntur. Et secundum hunc modum planum est quod dicit beatus Gregorius super 
Ezecheliem I dicens quator esse vires quibus quator animalia proportionantur siue facies eorumdem” 
(emphasis in text).
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cons ide r P h ilip ’ s co n c lu s io n  as “ d isappo in ting ” ,74 b u t I  w o u ld  co n s id e r h is  
co m b in a tio n  o f  the  c o g n itiv e  and the a ffe c tive  as m a in ta in in g  the  dyn a m ism  o f
7 S
h a b itu a l conscience , w h ic h , w as lo s t in  the s te reo typ ica l o p p o s itio n  o f  the  ra tio n a lis t 
and v o lu n ta ris t approaches th a t g rew  ou t o f  it.
A lth o u g h  P h ilip ’ s concern  is  p rim a rily  synderesis  he does com m en t a lso  on 
co n s c ie n tia , and so is  the  firs t to  m ake a study o f  conscience  in  re la tio n  to  
syn deres is ,7 6  C row e p o in ts  o u t th a t the “ close connec tio n  o f  syn deres is  and
conscience w as o f  course, na tu ra l and in e v ita b le ,”  g ive n  the  fa c t th a t the  dom in a n t 
te x t in  scho las tic  d iscussions, nam ely St. Jerom e’ s co rru p te d  te x t, had a lready 
described  synderes is  as s c in tilla  co nsc ien tiae .7 7  Thus P h ilip  in ve s tig a te s  w h e th e r b o th  
n o tio n s  are id e n tic a l. H is  conc lu s io n  safeguards the  in fa llib ility  o f  synderesis ,
78
co n tra ry  to  W illia m  o f  A u xe rre , b u t also adm its the fa llib ility  o f  reason th ro u g h
e rro r and s in . 79 T h is  m eans th a t conscience is  no t the same as s yn deres is , b u t ra th e r is
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the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  synderesis  to  w ha t is  p rov ided  b y  reason o r l ib e ru m  a rb it r iu m .
A t th is  p o in t, ra th e r than  a ttem pt to  g ive  a c h ro n o lo g ic a l accoun t o f  the
deve lopm en t and d iffe rences o f  understanding o f  synderesis  and c o n s c ie n tia , w h ich ,
in  any case, co u ld  n o t com pete w ith  the exhaustive  p resen ta tion  a lready g iv e n  b y
D om  O don L o ttin , I  w o u ld  propose to  pass fro m  P h ilip  the  C h a n ce llo r to  a s tudy  o f
ke y  aspects o f  the  understand ing  o f  Saints B onaventure , A lb e rt the  G rea t and Thom as
A q u in a s  on  the  m a tte r o f  conscience. M y  reason fo r  d o in g  so is , f ir s t o f  a ll, to  p reven t
74 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 27. On the other hand, Lottin considers 
Philip’s work to be progress in comparison to his predecessors. See Lottin, Psychologie et m orale, II, 
156.
15 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 145: “La syndérèse [...] tend au bien rationnel; elle n’est 
pas une simple possibilité d’action, mais une propsension vers ce bien.”
76 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 28; Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 157.
77 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 160.
78 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 150.
79 Ibid., 148-152.
80 Ibid., 149,151-152: “Conscientia turn potest esse recta, turn erronea.” [...] “Sic ergo 
synderesis cum ratione liberi arbitrii facit conscientiam rectam uel erroneam [...]ipsa tamen synderesis 
non est erronea.”
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lo s in g  s ig h t o f  the  genera l trends established p a rtic u la rly  b y  S tephen L a n g to n  and 
P h ilip  the  C h a n ce llo r, and a lso secondly to  m ove on to  th in ke rs  w ho  tru ly  deve loped 
the  n o tio n  o f  conscience. C row e states tha t B onaventure , A lb e rt and A q u in a s  share a
O 1
respect fo r  past a u th o ritie s  w ith o u t s la v ish ly  h o ld in g  to  past o p in io n . T hus, in  
m o v in g  on  to  these p a rtic u la r S cholastics, I  hope to  a vo id  lis tin g  a le n g th y  succession 
o f  w rite rs  w ho  m e re ly  present va ria tio n s  on the  them es d iscussed b y  P h ilip  the  
C h a n ce llo r, w ith  lit t le  in  the  w ay o f  advancem ent.82
A s  D ’A rc y  notes, the  w ritin g  o f  P h ilip  the C h a n ce llo r e ve n tu a lly  p ro vo ke d  
responses w h ic h  d iffe re d  s ig n ific a n tly  in  th e ir em phasis. The v o lu n ta ris t and 
in te lle c tu a lis t approaches o f  the F ranciscan and the  D o m in ca n  schoo ls b o th  sought to  
e xp la in  synderes is  and c o n sc ien tia  b y  means o f  th e ir o w n  p a rtic u la r unde rstand ing  o f  
the  reason and the  w ill.  The greatest exponent o f  the  e a rly  v o lu n ta ris t schoo l is  S t 
B onaven tu re , and so w e w ill n o w  tu rn  ou r a tte n tio n  to  h is  ana lys is  o f  conscience , 
be fo re  g o in g  on  to  lo o k  a t the  in te lle c tu a lis t approach.
4. S a in t B on av en tu re
U n lik e  S t Thom as A q u inas, whose w orks on conscience and its  a u th o rity  span h is  
w h o le  u n iv e rs ity  teach ing  career, and thus re fle c t sub tle  changes in  o u tlo o k  o ve r 
tim e ,84 S t B onaven tu re ’ s co m p a ra tive ly  short te rm  as a u n iv e rs ity  m a g is te r  in  P aris 
(1 2 5 4 -5 7 ) gave h im  less o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  deve lopm ent and o ffe rs  us less m a te ria l fo r
81 Cf. Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 162; idem, “St. Thomas and 
Synderesis,” 244-45.
82 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 28-29.
83 Ibid., 29.
84 The Commentary on the Sentences of St Thomas is the published result of his two years of 
teaching as a baccalaureus sententiarus, on his way to becoming magister (Paris, 1254-56). His De 
Veritate was written in Paris between 1256-59, with the commentary on synderesis and conscientia 
coming from the second year of his professorship (1257-58). The Prima and Secunda Partes of the 
Summa Theologica, which also include reflections on synderesis and conscientia, span his 
professorship in Italy and Paris between 1266 and 1272. See Crowe, “St. Thomas and Synderesis," 
228-29, 236, 241-42; Dennis J. Billy, “The Authority of Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 
Studia M oralia  31 (1993): 237-263, at 262, n. 82.
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com pa rison .85 Indeed, as h is  o n ly  le n g th y  d iscussion o f  conscience is  to  be fo u n d  in  
h is  C o m m e n ta ry  on the Sentences, lik e  Thom as, th is  w o rk  w o u ld  have com e fro m  h is  
o b lig a to ry  te a ch in g  p e rio d  on the Sentences as a b a c c a la u re u s  (1 2 5 0 -5 2 ) be fo re  he 
occup ied  the  c h a ir h is  predecessor A lexande r o f  H ales had secured fo r  the  
F ranciscans.86 I t  is  d if f ic u lt  to  understand the conclusions o f  B onaven tu re  w ith o u t firs t 
lo o k in g  a t h is  ep is tem o log y, so w e sha ll now  b r ie fly  exam ine  h is  p h ilo s o p h y  o f  
know ledg e , be fo re  lo o k in g  at h ow  th a t is  app lied  to  h is  m o ra l th e o ry  o f  conscience .
4.1 E p istem o lo g ica l B ackg rou n d
The S eraph ic D o c to r is  w ritin g  at a tim e  w hen new  p h ilo s o p h ica l in flu e n ce s  are in  the  
ascendancy, be th e y  A ris to te lia n , A ra b ic  o r Jew ish, and so the  a rriv a l o f  co n tra s tin g  
n o tio n s  he lp  to  deve lop  B onaven ture ’ s ow n v ie w . H ow eve r, B o n a ve n tu re ’ s s ta rtin g  
p o in t is  A u g u s tin ia n , and so he adopts the v iew s o f  o the r th in k e rs  o n ly  in s o fa r as th e y  
are in  keep ing  w ith  the  fa ith  and the general understand ing o f  S t A u g u s tin e , w ith  its
87
N e o -P la to n ic  in fluence s . A u g u s tin ia n ism  m a in ta ined  the  p rim a c y  o f  fa ith  and 
“ preserved the  essentia l tenets o f  S t A ugustine  in  re fu s in g  to  d ivo rc e  understand ing  
fro m  illu m in a tio n , know ledge  fro m  the  w ill,  w ill fro m  in c lin a tio n , and in c lin a tio n  
fro m  grace. These co u ld  n o t s ta rt w ith  the senses; they be longed to  the  re a lm  o f  the
85 Bonaventure had less opportunity for systematic theological writing for two reasons. Firstly, 
teaching was interrupted at Paris in 1255 when a fierce dispute between the Friars and seculars broke 
out. The attempt by secular masters, led by William of St Amour, to drive the mendicants out of the 
university failed, and in 1256 Bonaventure resumed his teaching, with a papal appointment to the 
Franciscan chair. However, his professorship came to an abrupt halt in 1257 when he was chosen by a 
general chapter in Rome to be the next minister general of the Order, charged with the task of dealing 
with the split among the Franciscans caused by Joachinism. See Bonaventure, The Soul's Journey into 
God, The Tree o f  L ife & The Life o f  St Francis, trans. and introduction by Ewert Cousins (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist, 1978), 7-8; Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: Saint Augustine to Ockham  (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1958), 197.
86 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 262, n. 82.
87 Leff, M edieval Thought, 190-98, 206: “St Bonaventure did for Augustinianism what St 
Thomas was shortly to do for Aristotelianism: he welded it into a coherent body of doctrine which took 
account of the new philosophical knowledge and which had its own distinctive tenets. Under his 
influence it became general throughout the Franciscan order, prevailing until the appearance of Duns 
Scotus, at the end of the thirteenth century.”
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supe rna tu ra l.”  T hus, B onaven tu re ’ s adop tion  o f  A ris to te lia n  d o c trin e  is  m uch  m ore 
lim ite d  than  A q u inas, and so, in  o rde r to  m a in ta in  the  em phasis on  d iv in e  h e lp  in
hum an understand ing , he creates “ an unusual h y b rid  o f  A u g u s tin ia n  illu m in a tio n is m
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and A ris to te lia n  abstrac tion ism .”  T h is  means th a t u n c e rta in  kn o w le d g e  {m in u s
e v id e n tia )  com es to  us b y  m eans o f  phantasm s abstracted b y  the  a c tive  in te lle c t fro m
exte rn a l sensory pe rcep tion . H ow ever, in  con trast, a ll c e r ta in  kn o w le d g e  (v a ld e
e v id e n tia ) com es fro m  “ a lig h t im parted  to  the  sou l”  {lum en  a n im a e  in d itu m ), w h ic h
a llo w s  us know ledg e  o f  the  e terna l tru ths  w h ic h  are in  kee p in g  w ith  th e  m in d  o f
G od.90 T h is  genera l ep is tem o log y has im p lic a tio n s  fo r  B onaven tu re ’ s m o ra l th e o ry , in
th a t i t  m akes room  “ fo r  b o th  ce rta in  and unce rta in  apprehensions o f  the  m o ra l good
and a co rrespond ing  tw o -tie re d  understand ing o f  conscience ,” 91 w here  erroneous
conscience fa lls  under the ca tegory o f  unce rta in  know ledge  and so m ust a lw ays y ie ld
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to  the  m ore  ce rta in  know ledg e  o f  firs t p rin c ip le s  p ro v id e d  b y  d iv in e  la w .
4 .2  R ea so n  a n d  W ill E n tw in ed  -  B on aven tu re on  C on scien tia  a n d  S y n d eresis
W ith  such an ep is tem o log y, B onaventure declares th a t co n s c ie n tia  is  an inna te  a n d  
acqu ired  h a b itu s  o f  p ra c tic a l reason, w h ich  preserves the p rim a ry  p rin c ip le s  o f  the
88 Ibid., 191.
89 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 237.
90 Ibid., 237-38. Billy translates “lumen animae inditum” as “a light imparted to the soul.” One 
could also translate inditum as ‘endowed’. In either instance, the notion implies what Copleston 
describes as “the dependence of the human intellect on God and the interior activity of God in the 
human soul.” Cf. Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp.: “habitus cognitivi sunt 
quodam modo nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi [...] Omnes [Philosophi et Augustinus] enim in 
hoc concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale iudicatorium” 
(emphasis in text). Cf. Frederick Copleston, A History o f  Philosophy, vol. 2, M ediaeval Philosophy: 
Augustine to Scotus (London: Bums, Oates & Washboume, 1950), 287.
91 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 238; Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, 
dist.39, a .l, q. 3, resp.: “Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia est lex intellectus nostri; dicendum, 
quod verum est, quod lex est, sed non est lex suprema; supra ipsam enim est lex alia, scilicet lex 
divina.”
92 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “vero conscientia non ligat ad 
faciendum, vel non faciendum, sed ligat ad se deponendum, pro eo quod, cum talis conscientia sit 
erronea errore repugnante legi divinae.”
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n a tu ra l la w . The inna te  aspect o f  conscience is  due to  the  presence o f  the  d iv in e  lig h t 
borne in  o u r so u l.94 H ow eve r, conscience is  also acqu ired  because the  ideas o r te rm s 
needed to  apprehend the  un ive rsa l p rim a ry  p rin c ip le s  are ob ta ined  th ro u g h  sense 
p e rce p tio n ,95 and also because the p a rticu la r judgem en ts d e rive d  fro m  th e  p rim a ry  
p rin c ip le s  are the  p ro d u c t o f  ra tio n a l d e lib e ra tio n .96 T h is  d e s c rip tio n  o f  conscience 
m eans th a t he ascribes to  co n sc ien tia  tha t w h ich  w as assigned to  syn deres is  b y  P h ilip  
the  C h a n ce llo r.97
T hus, conscience is  c le a rly  lin k e d  to  the fa c u lty  o f  reason. H o w e ve r, fo llo w in g  
the  v o lu n ta ris t tra d itio n  o f  h is  O rder, p a rtic u la rly  in  the  th o u g h t o f  h is  o w n  M aste r, 
A le xa n d e r o f  H a les,98 synderesis  is  considered b y  B onaven ture  to  be long  to  th e  w ill.99
93 Ibid., dist.39, a.l, q. 2, resp.: “Quoniam igitur conscientia nominat habitum directivum 
nostri iudicii respectu operabilium, hinc est, quod quodam modo habitum nominat innatum, et quodam 
modo acquisitum. Habitum, inquam, innatum nominat respectu eorum quae sunt de primo dictamine 
nature; habitum vero acquisitum respectu eorum quae sunt institutiones superadditae” (emphasis in 
text). Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 203-204. On this Langston misreads the distinction made by 
Bonaventure, and so, although he recognises that “conscience is divided into two general parts by 
Bonaventure,” he declares both of them to be innate. See Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, 25.
94 Thus Bonaventure’s human metaphysics based on creation, exemplarism (as image of God) 
and illumination come to bear upon his morals, since both intellect and will are affected by their 
relationship with God. Cf. Copleston, M ediaeval Philosophy, 219, 285; St Bonaventure, Quaestiones 
Disputatae de Mysterio Ss. Trinitatis, in Opera Omnia, vol. 5 (Quaracchi, Florence: St Bonaventure 
College, 1891), q.l, a.l, resp. Potts says we can equate this innate, natural light to “‘insight’, a moment 
of illumination in which we can see  that a certain thought, whether theoretical or practical, is true.” See 
Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 36 (emphasis in text). The replacement o f ‘light’ with 
‘insight’ is an interesting suggestion, but to my mind, it disguises the Augustinian background. A 
further concern is the lack of reference to God as Creator as the origin of the insight. Rather, Potts 
describes Bonaventure’s analogy as equivalent to our common use of words related to understanding, 
such as ‘see’, to ‘dawn’ upon someone, or to ‘become clear’. See ibid.
95 Here Bonaventure follows Aristotle by saying that the terms are acquired by perception, 
memory and experience: “cognitio principiorum acquiritur via sensus, memoriae et experientiae.” Cf.
In 11 Sententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 2, resp.; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, in The 
Complete Works o f  Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), II, 19, 100a 4-9; Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 204; Billy, 
“Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 238; Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 35. Here 
Potts says that sense perception provides the “basic premisses”, while Lottin presents it as “termes."
See Copleston, M ediaeval Philosophy, 284 for an explanation to the relationship of innate and acquired 
in Bonaventure.
96 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 238; Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, 
d.39, a.l, q. 2, resp.: Innati enim sunt quoad cognitionem in universali, acquisti quoad cognitionem in 
particulari; sive innati quoad cognitionem principiorum, acquisti quoad cognitionem conclusionum; 
unde dignitas est ilia quam quisque probat auditam” (emphasis in text).
97 Cf. Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 32-33.
98 Alexander of Hales, Glossa Sententiarum, II, dist. 40, II, c: “...ergo synderesis pertinet ad
voluntatem.” Note that Alexander talks of the light of synderesis instead of conscience. Ibid., II, dist.
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I t  resides n a tu ra lly  in  th is  fa c u lty  as a “ b ias”  (q u o d d am  p o n d u s ), in c lin in g  the  w ill 
tow ards the  g o o d .100 T he re fo re , Bonaventure d is tingu ish es the  ro le  o f  conscience in  
a ch ie v in g  p a rtic u la r m o ra l acts ( in quantum  d ir ig it  a d  o p e ra  m o r a l ia ) , fro m  th e  task  o f  
synderesis  as th a t w h ic h  in c lin e s  the w ill to  the good inasm uch  as i t  is  r ig h t and 
honou rab le  ( in c lin a re  a d  bonum  hone s tu m ).m  In  th is  w ay b o th  reason and w il l  have 
som eth ing  to  d ire c t them  to  m o ra l goodness, w h ich  is  app rop ria te , g ive n  than  b o th  are
1 O'? . —.
in v o lv e d  in  m o ra l ac tion . Thus, B onaven ture ’ s ana lys is  is  edg ing  to w a rd s  a 
d e sc rip tio n  o f  synderesis  as an innate hab itus  o f  the  w ill,  b u t a fte r re fle c tin g  upon 
w he the r i t  is  a fa c u lty  in s tead ,103 he concludes th a t “ synderesis shou ld  be ca lle d  a 
h a b it- lik e  fa c u lty  ra th e r than  a h ab itu s ., ,m  Hence, a lthoug h  the  S eraph ic D o c to r has 
m oved  synderes is  fro m  the reason to  the w ill,  in  d e scrib in g  its  na tu re  he s t ill fee ls  i t
4 0 ,1, f. Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 174-78; Gervasio Sala, “II Concetto di Sinderesi in S. 
Bonaventura,” Studi Francescani 54 (1957): 3-11, at 4.
99 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a. 2, q. 1, resp.: “synderesis dicit potentiam 
affectivam, in quantum naturaliter habilis est ad bonum et ad bonum tendit” (emphasis in text).
100 Ibid.: “quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione animae intellectus habet lumen, quod est sibi 
naturale iudicatorium, dirigens ipsum intellectum in cognoscendis, sic affectus habet naturale quoddam 
pondus, dirigens ipsum in appetendis. [...] Dico enim quod synderesis dicit illud quod stimulat ad 
bonum” (emphasis in text). Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 207; Potts, Conscience in M edieval 
Philosophy, 34, 116. Here, related to this point, Crowe’s usual accuracy seems to falter in that he links 
two parts of Bonaventure’s argument and comes up with a suprisingly false conclusion:
“Bonaventure’s own view is that synderesis is the faculty of reason endowed with the habitual 
knowledge of first principles, which he calls ‘naturale quoddam pondus dirigens... in appetendis.” See 
Crowe, '‘’Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 163 (emphasis in text). From the fuller quote at the start 
of this footnote we can see that Bonaventure attaches the pondus of synderesis to the will {affectus).
101 Potts relates Bonaventure’s double distinction of rational desire, namely, “desire for what 
is honourable [appetenda in genere honesti] and desire for what it useful [appetenda in genere 
commodi\P The desire for what is honourable is Potts’s translation of the bonum honestum, the good 
in itself as right. Cf. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, 34. Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et morale, 
II, 207; Bonaventure, In II  Sententiarum, dist.39, a.2, q. 1, resp.: “Et quemadmodum conscientia non 
nominat illud iudicatorium nisi inquantum dirigit ad opera moralia, sic synderesis non nominat illud 
pondus voluntatis sive voluntatem cum illo pondere, nisi in quantum illam habet inclinare ad bonum 
honestum” (emphasis in text). For a fuller explanation of the bonum honestum, see Maritain, M oral 
Philosophy, 432-5.
102 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 30; Lottin, Psychologie et m orale, II, 205.
103 Bonaventure, In I I  Sententiarum, dist.39, a.2, q. 1, resp.: “Appropriate tamen synderesis 
dicit potentiam, et conscientia habitum et lex naturalis obiectum” (emphasis in text). Cf. Lottin, 
Psychologie et morale, II, 205.
104 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a.2, q. 1, resp.: “Usitatiori tamen modo loquendi, 
synderesis potius nominat potentiam habitualem  quam nominat habitum” (emphasis in text). Cf. Lottin, 
Psychologie et morale, II, 207; D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom , 30.
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necessary to  b o w  to  the  in flu e n ce  o f  past a u th o rity , and use P h ilip  the  C h a n ce llo r’ s 
fo rm u la .105
B ona ve n tu re ’ s p resenta tion  on the w ill and reason is  fa r fro m  s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  
a t tim es. One cause fo r  th is , m entioned above, is  h is  desire  to  g ive  due respect to  the  
past a u th o ritie s , w h ile  also a im in g  to  deve lop h is  o w n  understand ing  o f  syn deres is  
and conscience . Y e t, th is  leads to  a con fus ing  s itu a tio n  w hereby the  sam e a u th o r is 
in te rp re te d  b y  m odem  w rite rs  as d e fin in g  synderesis  as a fa c u lty ,106 a h a b itu s ,107 o r a 
h a b it- lik e  fa c u lty ,108 w h ic h  belongs to  the w ill o r the  reason. Perhaps the  fa c t th a t 
B onaven tu re  f in a lly  settles fo r  a d e fin itio n  o f  h a b it- lik e  fa c u lty  ra th e r than  h a b it is  
p ro b a b ly  less im p o rta n t than h is  v ie w  on the re la tio n sh ip  o f  synderes is  to  the  w il l  o r 
reason. S ince the  o ve rw h e lm in g  m a jo rity  o f  scholars recogn ise B ona ve n tu re ’ s lin k  o f  
synderesis  to  th e  w ill,  as th a t w h ich  desires the  good and p rom p ts the  search fo r  it ,  i t  
seems p e c u lia r th a t C row e should have concluded th a t th is  F ranciscan  S cho las tic  
lin k e d  i t  to  the reason.109 H ow ever, upon read ing  the te x t, h is  fa lse  co n c lu s io n  shou ld  
n o t com e as a com p le te  surprise. The cause fo r  the  co n fu s io n  is  th a t in  Q ue s tio n  O ne 
o f  D is tin c t io  39, A r tic le  T w o , B onaventure prefaces h is  ow n  co n c lu s io n  w ith  “ tw o  
o p in io n s , w h ic h  d id  no t please h im .” 110 These o p in io n s , th o u g h  n o t nam ed, 
in co rp o ra te  th e  th o u g h t o f  W illia m  o f  A u xe rre , O do R iga ldus and P h ilip  the 
C h a n ce llo r, w ho  gave greater status to  the reason, and to  the d is tin c tio n  o f  h ig h e r and
105 Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 207. Although Philip is the first to present this 
description, it is likely that the work of Alexander of Hales also exerted pressure upon Bonaventure to 
maintain this mix of faculty and habit. See, Alexander of Hales, Glossa Sententiarum, II, dist. 4 0 ,1, f: 
“Ad primum dicendum quod synderesis dicitur materialiter et formaliter. Formaliter, ut cum dicitur 
habitus connaturalis; et materialiter, cum dicitur iudicatorium innatum.”
106 Karl H. Peschke, Christian Ethics: M oral Theology in the Light o f  Vatican II, vol. 1, 
General M oral Theology  (Alcester: C. Goodliffe Neale, 1989), 206.
107 Sala, “Sinderesi in S. Bonaventura,” 8; Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 111.
108 This is by far the majority view. For example, see Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 207; 
D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 30; Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 
240.
109 Crowe, “Synderesis and the Early Scholastics,” 163-4.
110 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 111.
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lo w e r reason .111 The o p in io n s  are presented to  c la r ify  B onaven tu re ’ s o w n  v ie w  b y  
m eans o f  re fu ta tio n . Thus, h is  ow n conc lus ion  is  th a t synderesis  b e lo n g s  to  the  w i l l  
because i t  s tim u la te s  the p e rs o n  to w ard s  the good. H e re in fo rce s  th is  w ith  a series o f  
contrasts, in c lu d in g  one w here he says th a t ju s t as reason cannot m ove  w ith o u t the  
he lp  o f  the  w ill,  so conscience cannot operate w ith o u t synderesis , w h ic h , b y  a na log y  
show s th a t synderesis  cannot be long  to  the reason.112 T he re fo re , fo r  B onaven tu re , the  
ro le  o f  syn deres is  in  m o ra l judgem en t is  n o t as the keeper o f  the  f ir s t  p rin c ip le s  
(w h ic h  he ascribes to  inna te  conscience), bu t ra the r it  has the  im p o rta n t ro le  o f  m o v in g  
th in g s  n a tu ra lly  and r ig h tly  tow ards the good .113
T h is  in  no w ay im p lie s  a strugg le  fo r  suprem acy betw een syn d eres is  and 
c o n s c ie n tia  a cco rd ing  to  B onaventure. In  fa c t, the  S eraphic D o c to r understands the 
fu n c tio n  o f  the  tw o  as com p lem enta ry and necessary. W h ile  synderes is  in  one w a y  is  
subord ina te  to  co n s c ie n tia  as the n a tu ra le  iu d ic a to r iu m , th a t is , the  inn a te  h a b itu s  o f  
reason, on the  o th e r hand, as the in c lin a tio n  to  the good, synderesis  is  the  p e rfe c tio n  o f  
conscience in  its  p ra c tic a l e ffic a c y .114 In  o the r w ords, “ w ith o u t syn deres is  the re  w o u ld  
be no m o ra l life , b e ing  [o n ly ] in e ffe c tu a l p ra c tica l reason w ith o u t the  m o tio n  o f  
na tu ra l w il l. ” 115 M o re o ve r, as w e ll as th e ir m u tu a l dependency, a cco rd in g  to  
B onaven tu re , b o th  co n s c ie n tia  and synderesis  are, in  tu rn , dependent upon  n a tu ra l la w
111 Mario Pangallo, Legge di Dio, Sinderesi e  Coscienza nelle ‘Quaestiones ’ di S. Alberto 
Magno, Studi Tomistici, no. 63 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997), 63. Pangallo’s work 
sets the scene for his study of Albert the Great through comparison with other major figures. 
Interestingly, Pangallo also points out that despite the Augustinianism of Bonaventure, he does not 
subscribe to the ratio superior notion of the intellect. Cf. ibid., 67; Bonaventure, In I I  Sententiarum, 
dist.39, a.2, q. 1, resp.
112 Ibid.: “Unde sicut ratio non potest movere nisi mediante voluntate, sic nec conscientia nisi 
mediante synderesi; et ideo non sequitur, quod synderesis se teneat ex parte congnitionis.”
113 Ibid., (in comparison with the three faculties of the soul mentioned in Ezekiel): “Synderesis 
autem nominai potentiam affectivam, secundum quod movetur naturaliter et recte; et ideo non 
distinguitur ab illis potentiis secundum essentiam potentiae, sed secundum modum movendi; et quia 
secundum ilium modum movendi semper movet recte: hinc est, quod dicitur alias volare  et aliis 
errantibus non se immiscere, sed eas corrigere” (emphasis in text).
114 Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 66.
115 Ibid.: “Senza la sinderesi non ci sarebbe vita morale, essendo la ragione pratica inefficace 
senza la mozione della volontà naturale.”
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as th e ir o b je c t, s ince fo r  co nsc ien tia  i t  acts as the m easure o f  its  com m ands, and fo r  
synderesis  as the  m easure o f  the good to  w h ich  w e are to  be in c lin e d .116 H ere  w e  can 
see s tra ins o f  P la to n ic  exem p la rism  in  the C h ris tia n  con tex t o f  g race .117 T h ro u g h  o u r 
crea tion  w e are g ive n  the  capacity  o f  reason and the  re v e la tio n  o f  d iv in e  lig h t to  be 
able to  see the  n a tu ra l la w , w h ich  is  a p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the  d iv in e  E te rn a l L a w . 
B onaven ture  sees th is  as g iv in g  the key to  the m o ra l life , b y  w h ic h , th ro u g h  the
exercise o f  v irtu e , w e m ig h t reach the true  end o f  hum an life , n a m e ly  a fu lln e s s  o f  life
118
in  G od, w ho  is  the  Suprem e G ood.
H o w e ve r, fo r  va rio u s  reasons, w e o fte n  fa il to  act in  accordance w ith  the  goa l 
o f  life  in  G od. A s  a re su lt, B onaventure exp lores the q u e s tio n  o f  h o w  s in  and 
ignorance a ffe c t synderesis  and co nsc ien tia . In  keep ing  w ith  Jerom e’ s com m en ta ry  on 
E ze k ie l, he concludes th a t synderesis  cannot be extingu ish ed  o r ca rrie d  aw ay b y  s in , 
b u t a t tim es m ay becom e im peded o r obstructed .119 H e g ives th ree  con tex ts  fo r  an 
im peded s y n d eres is : w hen  e v il is  be lieved  to  be good th ro u g h  m o ra l b lindne ss 
(p ro p te r  te n e b ra m  o b c a e c a tio n is ); w hen one is  so absorbed in  the  sins o f  the  fle s h  th a t 
one does n o t n o tice  the  pang o f  conscience (p ro p te r  la s c iv ia m  d e le c ta t io n is ); and in
116 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a.2, q. 1, resp.: “Lex naturalis vocatur collectio  
praeceptorum  iuris naturalis; et sic nominat obiectum synderesis et conscientiae, unius sicut dictantis 
et alterius sicut inclinantis. Nam conscientia dictat, et synderesis appetit vel refugit” (emphasis in text).
117 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaemeron, in Opera Omnia, vol. 5 (Quaracchi, Florence: St 
Bonaventure College, 1891), coll. VI, 6: “Dico ergo, quod ilia lux aetema est exemplar omnium, et 
quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit.
118 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 249; St Bonaventure, Commentaria in 
Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Quaracchi, Florence: 
St Bonaventure College, 1882), I, dist. 1, dub. 15; ibid., resp; dub. 16, resp.; idem, Commentaria in 
Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera Omnia, vol. 4 (Quaracchi, Florence: 
St Bonaventure College, 1889), IV, dist. 49, p. 1, a. 1 q. 1; idem, Breviloquium, in Opera Omnia, vol. 5 
(Quaracchi, Florence: St Bonaventure College, 1891), V, c. 1: “beatitudo aetema consistit in habendo 
summum bonum; et hoc est Deus.”
119 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 240; Bonaventure, In I I  Sententiarum,
dist.39, a.2, q. 2, resp.: “synderesis quantum ad actum impediri potest, sed exstingui non potest. Ideo 
autem non potest exstingui, quia, cum dicat quid naturale, non potest a nobis auferri” (emphasis in 
text).
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in c lin a tio n  to  the  good is  d isabled.
I f  o u r genera l desire  fo r the good can be obstructed , w h a t about o u r reason ing  
w ith  regard  to  p a rtic u la r m ora l choices? T h is  leads to  questions on  erroneous o r 
pe rp lexed  conscience and w hether conscience is  a lw ays b in d in g .121 B onaven tu re  
in troduces the  to p ic  b y  e xp la in in g  tha t conscience can order th ree  types o f  a c tio n : th a t 
w h ic h  is  in  c o n fo rm ity  w ith  G od ’ s la w  {secundum  legem  D e i ) ,  in  a d d itio n  to  G od ’ s
199
la w  (p ra e te r  leg em  D e i) ,  and con tra ry  to  G od ’ s la w  (c o n tra  leg em  D e i ) .  H e 
concludes th a t one is  bound to  fo llo w  one’ s conscience in  the  case o f  the  f ir s t  tw o , bu t 
the la tte r is  m ore  p ro b le m a tic , since the erroneous conc lu s io n  o f  conscience m ay be 
co n tra ry  to  G od ’ s la w , and so i f  w e are to  fo llo w  o u r conscience, w e s in  b y  g o in g  
aga inst G od, b u t he also declares tha t w e s in , to o , i f  w e go aga inst o u r conscience . 
T h is  o b v io u s ly  g ives rise  to  a d ilem m a, w h ich  B onaventure seeks to  reso lve .
S t B ona ve n tu re ’ s e xp lo ra tio n  o f  the p rob lem  o f  e rro r b u ild s  upon  an e a rlie r 
study o f  ignorance  and its  re la tio n  to  c u lp a b ility  and sin . H is  ana lys is  o f  th a t p o in t is  
presented in  te rm s o f  the  le v e l o f  w ilfu ln e s s  and ra tio n a l c a p a b ility , and th is  leads h im  
to  d is tin g u is h  w he the r an in d iv id u a l is  excused fro m  s in  co m p le te ly  (a  to to )  o r o n ly  
p a rtia lly  {a  t a n t o ) } 2A S ince ignorance in  general has a lready been d iscussed, in  h is  
sp e c ific  s tudy o f  conscience B onaventure focuses upon s itu a tio n s  o f  e rro r w here  one 
suspects th a t one m ig h t be w rong ; p a rtic u la rly  the s itu a tio n  o f  k n o w in g  th a t one ’ s
the damned, who are so set in their evil ways (propter duritiam obstinationis), that the
121 Ibid., dist.39, a.l, q. 2. As these problems relate to the application of principles, 
Bonaventure is discussing the acquired aspect of conscience.
122 Ibid., dist.39, a.l, q. 3; cf. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, 27.
123 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a .!, q. 3, resp.: “Si enim faciat quod conscientia 
dicta, et illud est contra legem Dei, et facere contra legem Dei sit mortale peccatum; absque dubio 
moraliter peccater.”
124 Ibid., dist.22, a. 2-3.
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ju d g e m e n t is  a t odds w ith  the teach ing o f  the C h u rch .125 Langsto n  proposes th a t
B onaven tu re ’ s d iscuss ion  o f  the b in d in g  nature o f  erroneous conscience is  presented
| _
in  te rm s o f  its  d ig n ity  as G od ’ s “ representa tive w ith in  us.”  I t  is  tru e  th a t the  P a ris ian  
M aste r describes conscience acting  “ as G od ’ s he ra ld  and m essenger”  ( s ic u t p ra e c o
197
D e i  e t n u n tiu s ), w h ic h  is  the reason fo r its  b in d in g  fo rce . H o w e ve r, o ve r the  course 
o f  the  co n c lu s io n  i t  is  c lea r th a t there are lim ita tio n s  p laced upon  h o w  fa r conscience 
m ay b in d  an in d iv id u a l, and the key n o tio n  w h ich  unde rlies  h is  ana lys is  is  th a t o f  
in te n tio n .128
I f  a person  acts w ro n g ly  in  good fa ith , the act m ay be e v il, b u t the  in te n tio n  o f
the w ill shaped b y  reason rem ains good. Thus, the s in fu l q u a lity  o f  th e  act is
d im in ish e d  o r e lim in a te d  a ltogether. B onaven ture ’ s d iscuss ion  on  igno rance  covers
the  th e o ry  up  to  th is  p o in t. B u t w ha t i f  the in d iv id u a l lacks ce rta in ty , o r is  aw are fro m
an ex te rn a l source th a t w ha t he/she p lans to  do is  considered w ro n g , even th o u g h
p e rso n a lly  i t  has been ju d g e d  to  be rig h t?  A t th is  p o in t, G ils o n  is  p a rtic u la rly  h e lp fu l
in  p resen ting  th e  essence o f  the p rob lem :
Suppose, then, th a t the m o ra l conscience errs in  the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  
p rin c ip le s  to  the d e ta il o f  actions, w ha t, in  th a t case, o ugh t the  w il l  to  do? 
I f  i t  obeys conscience it  w ills  e v il, b u t i f  it  d isobeys i t  sets aside the  v e ry  
th in g  th a t reason presents as good; the  in te n tio n , then  w ill be bad, and 
thus the  w ho le  act w ill be bad .129
125 Key terms indicating the context are given in phrases such as “credens facere contra ipsius 
Dei voluntatem,” describing the situation of the person’s conscience as “perplexus” in relation to “lex 
Dei” and “praeceptum praelati” contained in the conclusion. See ibid., dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp. (emphasis 
mine).
126 Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, 27.
127 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “Conscientia est sicut praeco Dei 
et nuntius, et quod dicit, non mandat ex se, sed mandat quasi ex Deo, sicut praeco, cum divulgat 
edictum regis. Et hinc est, quod conscientia habet virtutem ligandi in his quae possunt aliquo modo 
bene fieri.”
128 Earlier Bonaventure defined intention as the rational appetite. See ibid, dist.38, a.2, q. 1,
resp.
129 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit o f  Medieval Philosophy (Gifford Lectures 1931-1932), trans. 
A.H.C. Downes (London: Sheed& Ward, 1950), 351.
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In  e ffe c t, the  act w ill la ck  in te g rity , as the person w ill n o t be co n v in ce d  he is 
d o in g  r ig h t; h is  heart w il l n o t be in  it. T h is  is  B onaven ture ’ s reason fo r  d e c la rin g  th a t 
in  g o in g  aga inst an erroneous conscience the  person s t ill sins ( a d h u c  p e c c a t) . Such 
im po rtance  is  g ive n  to  in te n tio n , th a t B onaventure states th a t the person s t ill s ins, n o t 
because o f  w h a t he does {non ra t io n e  o p eris ), b u t ra the r because o f  the  bad w a y  th a t 
he does i t  {q u ia  m a lo  m odo f a c i t ), nam ely a c ting  in  con tem pt o f  G od, b y  b e lie v in g  the
1 TO • « •
act to  be d isp leas in g  to  G od (even if ,  in  fa c t i t  is  p leasing  to  G od). So i t  is  the  s p ir it 
in  w h ic h  the  act is  ca rrie d  ou t tha t is p rim a ry  fo r B onaven tu re .131
In  the  s itu a tio n  o f  c o n flic t, the Seraphic D o c to r concludes th a t one shou ld  
re fra in  fro m  a c tin g  upon the judgem en t o f  conscience so as n o t to  in c u r the  g rea te r s in  
o f  b reak ing  G o d ’ s la w .132 H ere B onaventure  h ig h lig h ts  th a t the  d ic ta te s  o f  conscience 
are n o t a lw ays b in d in g , since the la w  o f  G od is  a h ighe r la w .133 Thus the  o n ly  s o lu tio n  
is  to  educate one ’ s conscience th ro u g h  the advice  o f  those w is e r in  o rd e r to  be ab le  to  
act in  good fa ith  {b o no  a n im o )  in  the fu tu re . H e also urges the  pe rson  to  seek G o d ’ s 
he lp  in  p ra ye r i f  th a t advice  shou ld  be la c k in g .134 T here fo re , S t B onaven tu re  c le v e rly  
concludes th a t conscience a lw ays b inds the in d iv id u a l to  do som e th ing , b u t n o t 
a lw ays to  cooperate : a t tim es the person is  bound to  act, and o th e r tim e s  th e  pe rson  is  
m o ra lly  bound  n o t to .135
130 Bonaventure, InIISententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “Si vero facit oppositum eius quod 
conscientia dictat, ipsa manente, adhuc peccat moraliter, non ratione operis, quod facit, sed quia malo 
modo facit. Facit enim in contemptum Dei, dum credit, dictante sibi conscientia, hoc displicere, 
quamvis Deo placeat” (emphasis in text).
131 Ibid.: “... quia non tantum attendit Deus quid  homo facit, sed quo animo faciat” (emphasis
in text).
132 Although there is still an element of sin, if conscience commands something against God, it 
is good not to act in accordance with it. Cf. ibid.: “Facere contra conscientiam semper est peccatum, 
quia semper est in Dei contemptum ...non tamen facere secundum conscientiam semper est bonum 
utpote cum conscientia dictat aliquid, quod est contra Deum” (emphasis in text).
133 See above, at note 91.
134 Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “Et si nescit legem per se de ilia 
iudicare, pro eo quod nescit legem Dei debet sapientiores consulere, vel per orationem se ad Deum 
convertere, si humanum consilium deest.” Cf. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, 27-28.
135 Bonaventure, InIISententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “Sic igitur patet, quod omnis 
conscientia aut ligat ad faciendum quod dictat, aut ligat ad se deponendum. Non tamen omnis
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B ona ve n tu re ’ s answ er to  the question  o f  erroneous conscience is  a lso  re la ted  
to  the  “ so -ca lle d  Is la m ic  p ro b le m a tic ”  o f  the  “ tw o  tru th  th e o ry  o f  k n o w le d g e .” 136 The 
L a tin  A v e rro is ts , such as S iger o f  B rabant ( c . 1 2 3 5 - c . 1 2 8 2 )  and B o e th iu s  o f  D ac ia  
(d ie d  c . 1 2 8 4 ) ,  w ere condem ned fo r m a in ta in in g  th a t the co nc lus ion s  o f  ra tio n a l 
s y llo g is tic  e n q u iry  w ere  to  be uphe ld  even i f  they w ere at odds w ith  the  m a jo r tenets
• ♦ » 1 T7 •
o f  the  C h ris tia n  fa ith . G ive n  w ha t has been said a lready re g a rd in g  ce rta in  and 
u n ce rta in  o p in io n  in  B onaven tu re ’ s though t, i t  is  c lear th a t the  S eraph ic D o c to r has no 
d if f ic u lty  in  d e c la rin g  th a t the  conclusions o f  hum an reason ing  are subo rd ina te  to  the 
d iv in e ly  revea led  tru th s  o f  fa ith , since the fo rm e r rem a in  a t the  le v e l o f  u n ce rta in
1 TO
o p in io n . B onaven ture  does n o t d is tru s t ra tio n a l kn o w le d g e ; indeed  o u r 
understand ing  m ust s ta rt w ith  na tu ra l reasoning. H ow ever, fo r  h im , i t  is  im p o ss ib le  to  
reach a fu lln e ss  o f  tru th  w ith o u t fa ith  and re v e la tio n .139 Thus, B o n a ve n tu re ’ s so lu tio n  
to  the  c o n tra d ic tio n  o f  tru th s  is  to  say th a t fa ith  is  supe rio r to  reason in  cases o f  
c o n tra d ic tio n , and th a t the c la r ity  o f  the com plete tru th  fo u n d  in  G od is  revea led  to  us 
in  stages, fro m  ra tio n a l know ledge  th ro u g h  fa ith  and m ys tic a l illu m in a tio n , f in a lly  to
conscientia ligat adfaciendum , quod dictat; sicut ilia quae dictat, non esse faciendum illud, ad quod 
homo alias tenetur; sed talis conscientia dicitur erronea” (emphasis mine).
136 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 242. Billy also notes here that Aquinas 
also vigorously refuted any contradiction between faith and reason, but his approach differed from 
Bonaventure.
137 Although other lesser-known writers may have taken the theory further, modem scholars 
now hold that the accusation against Siger was unfounded, but the condemnation by Bishop Étienne 
Tempier of Paris in 1270 was sufficient to spark debate on the issue, and for authors like Bonaventure 
and Aquinas to produce a strong rebuttal to the idea. Cf. ibid.; Francesco Gentile, “Attualità e Validità 
Bonaventuriane,” Studi Francescani 77 (1980): 207-51, at 229-32; Jean-Pierre Müller, “Saint 
Bonaventure a-t-il admis lapossibilité d’une double verité?” Miscellanea Francescana  75 (1975): 481- 
494.
138 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 243; Gentile, “Attualità e Validità,” 232-
33.
139 Bonaventure does not dispute the value of reason, though he points out its limits. As a 
result, he declares that it is impossible not to fall into error without the light of faith. See St 
Bonaventure, Collationes de Septem Donis Spiritus Sancii, in Opera Omnia, vol. 5 (Quaracchi, 
Florence: St Bonaventure College, 1891), coll. IV, n. 12: “Esto quod homo habet scientiam naturalem 
et metaphysicam, quae se extendit ad substantias summas, et ibi deveniat homo, ut ibi quiescat; hoc est 
impossibile, quin cadat in errorem, nisi sit adiutus lumine fidei, scilicet ut credat homo Deum trinum et 
unum” (emphasis in text). Consequently, he cautions against the overuse of philosophy in theology, as 
this will timi rich wine of Scripture into water. See, In Hexaemeron, coll. XIX, 14: “Non igitur tantum 
miscendum est de aqua philosophiae in vinum sacrae Scripturae, quod de vino fiat aqua; hoc pessimum 
miraculum esset; et legimus, quod Christus de aqua fecit vinum, non e converso.”
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the  g lo ry  o f  the  b e a tific  v is io n .140 The m o ra l im p lic a tio n  fo r  th is  is  to  act p o s itiv e ly  in  
accordance w ith  fa ith  and C hurch  teach ing , o r a t least a vo id  a c tin g  in  o p p o s itio n  to  i t  
b y  re fra in in g  fro m  action , and to  in fo rm  one’ s conscience to  act in  good fa ith  in  the  
fu tu re .141 T h is  is  w h y  he is  o f  the o p in io n  tha t one can o n ly  be te m p o ra rily  pe rp lexed  
(a d  tem pu s), ra th e r than  rem a in  in  a perm anent state o f  co n fu s io n , s ince the  d ic ta te  o f  
conscience , once com pared to  the h ig h e r la w  o f  G od (in c lu d e d  th a t m ed ia ted  b y  the  
C hu rch ) shou ld  be q u ic k ly  rescinded .142 B illy  proposes th a t i t  is  B o n a ve n tu re ’ s m o ra l 
e p is te m o lo g y  w h ic h  o ffe rs  h im  an escape fro m  p e rp le x ity , s ince “ an in d iv id u a l a lw ays 
has recourse to  the  ce rtitu d e  o f  know ledge  th a t com es fro m  the  in n e r gu idance o f  
G od ’ s illu m in a tin g  lig h t, w henever c o n flic t arises, there  can be no  q u e s tio n  about 
w h ic h  source w ill have precedence.” 143
140 Cf. idem, De Donis Spiritus Sancii, coll. IV, nn. 3-4; idem, In Hexaèmeron, coll. Ill, n. 24; 
Gentile, “Attualità e Validità,” 233.
141 Bonaventure concludes the section by declaring that the precept of a prelate (i.e. a superior) 
has greater standing than conscience, especially (maxime, note: not exclusively) when it is something 
that can and should be ordered by him. See In IISententiarum, dist.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “Patet, enim, 
quod plus standum, est praecepto praelati quam conscientiae, maxime quando praelatus praecipit quod 
potest et debet praecipere.” Cf. Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 253, where he limits 
the validity of the precept to the range of the competency of the prelate. This does not take into account 
the significance of maxime. One motivation for Bonaventure’s understanding of the hierarchy of 
command would be his own Franciscan vow of obedience. Indeed, he would have meditated frequently 
upon the Rules and Admonitions written by his founder, where we find a very clear prescription on 
obedience to a prelate in The Admonitions o f  Saint Francis, III, 5: “And if at times the subject should 
see things which would be better and more useful for his soul than those which his prelate commands 
him, let him willingly sacrifice his [plans] and earnestly strive to fulfil what the prelate has decided” 
(parenthesis in original). Nevertheless, there are obvious differences in the understanding of Ss. Francis 
and Bonaventure, as can be observed in The Rule o f  1221, V, 2:“If however one of the ministers should 
give a command to one of the Brothers which would be against our life or against his conscience, he is 
not to be held to obey him; for that is not obedience in which a fault or sin is committed.” Both works 
contained in The Writings o f  Saint Francis, trans. Ignatius Brady (S. Maria degli Angeli, Assisi: 
Edizioni Porziuncola, 2004), 109; 67.
142 Cf. Bonaventure, In IISententiarum, d.39, a.l, q. 3, resp.: “Patet, enim, quod nemo ex 
conscientia perplexus est nisi ad  tempus, videlicet quamdiu conscientia manet; non tamen est perplexus 
simpliciter, pro eo quod debet illam conscientiam deponere” (emphasis mine); Billy, “Conscience in 
Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 253; 257: “One gets the distinct impression that, for Bonaventure, an 
erroneous conscience would even be easy to change.”
143 Ibid., 257. Billy uses the term ‘moral epistemology’ to describe a scholastic’s theory of 
knowledge as it specifically relates to morals. The notion of where my knowledge and understanding 
come from (e.g. perception or revelation) will have direct bearing upon where my moral knowledge 
and understanding stem from. For example, if my theory of knowledge excludes innate ideas, then this 
cannot be part of my moral epistemology, and vice versa.
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B onaven tu re ’ s approach o f  avoidance o f  a c tio n  in  the  co n te x t o f  an erroneous, 
pe rp lexed  conscience m ig h t be described as a tu tio r is t p o s itio n . Perhaps th is  re fle c ts  
the  a ttitu d e  o f  the  tim e , as D elhaye  says th a t there w as a tra d itio n  o f  tu tio ris m  in  the  
13 th c e n tu ry .144 H ow eve r, th is  v ie w  was n o t he ld  b y  a ll, as w e  sh a ll see th a t, to  a 
ce rta in  ex ten t, S t Thom as takes a m ore nuanced approach than  h is  F ranciscan
145coun te rpa rt.
In  con tras t to  A qu inas, B onaventure is  o fte n  g ive n  lit t le  space in  h is to ric a l 
p resen ta tions, even o n ly  a paragraph at tim es. H ow ever, I  th in k  th a t he has a lo t to  
o ffe r, p a rtic u la rly  in  te rm s o f  h is  n o tio n  o f  synderesis  as a d r iv in g  fo rce  fo r  good, and 
fo r  the  s ig n ific a n t ro le  o f  g ra c e -fille d  illu m in a tio n  in  the  life  o f  the  C h ris tia n . P o tts  
considers B onaven tu re ’ s d is tin c tio n  betw een co nsc ien tia  and syn deres is  to  be 
“ u n c o n v in c in g ” .146 H ow eve r, to  m y  m in d , I  fin d  m uch  o f  P o tt’ s ana lys is  o f  
B onaven tu re  in  te rm s o f  deon tic  p ropositons and in tu itio n is m  to  be m ore 
u n c o n v in c in g .147 A s  a re su lt, I  w o u ld  fin d  m uch in  B onaven tu re ’ s ana lys is  to  be b o th  
in te re s tin g  and u se fu l, and b y  no means the ca rica tu re  th a t i t  is  o fte n  reduced to  in  
sum m ary p resen ta tions, nam e ly, th a t he considered the reason to  be ru le d  b y  the  w ill.  
A s  w e have seen, reason and w ill opera ting  in  the co n s c ie n tia  and syn deres is  are 
com p lem en ta ry  and in te rtw in e d  in  B onaven ture ’ s actua l v ie w . C ogn izance o f  th e ir 
com p lem en ta ry  nature  is  v ita l fo r  la te r cons ide ra tion  o f  the ro le  o f  th e  reason and the 
w ill in  conscience as a w ho le , since excessive separation o f  the  w il l  fro m  the  reason, 
coup led  w ith  a n o m in a lis t approach to  freedom , has led  to  p o la ris a tio n  o r a fe a r o f  the
144 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 217.
145 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 253. Although the term ‘tutiorist’ may be 
of some use, it should be used with caution, says Billy, so that the baggage of a later theological era is 
not applied to Bonaventure. See ibid, 262.
146 Potts, Conscience in M edieval Philosophy, 44.
147 Ibid., 32-44.
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w ill in  conscience , as i f  i t  is  the u n ru ly  o r se lfish  pa rtne r to  c lin ic a l reason .148 St 
B onaven tu re ’ s w r itin g  o ffe rs  an an tido te  to  such exaggera tion .
5 .  S a in t A lb er t th e  G reat
S a in t A lb e rt the  G reat was the  firs t C h ris tia n  w rite r to  m ake extens ive  use o f  
A ris to te lia n  th o u g h t and to  re w o rk  i t  fo r  the b e n e fit o f  the L a tin  S cho lastics. T h is  le d  
to  s ig n ific a n t changes in  the  understand ing o f  na tu ra l th e o lo g y , p syc h o lo g y  and 
e th ics , w ith  the  re su lt th a t the re la tio n sh ip  betw een synderesis  and c o n s c ie n tia  cam e 
to  be d e fin e d  in  d iffe re n t te rm s.149 H is  im pact in  chang ing  the  approach and 
understand ing  o f  m a jo r issues denies the scholars’ v ie w  o f  A lb e rt h e ld  fo r  the  firs t 
h a lf  o f  the  tw e n tie th  cen tu ry , nam e ly, th a t he was n e ith e r coheren t n o r sys tem a tic , and 
w hose encyc lopa ed ic  approach le ft h im  at the le ve l o f  a s k ilfu l exegete, capable o f  
e x p la in in g  the  sense o f  a b road spectrum  o f  texts, p a rtic u la rly  th a t o f  A r is to tle , b u t 
unab le  to  p roduce  m uch  in  the w ay o f  o r ig in a lity .150 A n o th e r m isco n ce p tio n  o f  
A lb e rt’ s approach w o u ld  be to  im ag ine  th a t h is  “ a ss im ila tio n  on  a vast scale o f  the 
S ta g irite ’ s th o u g h t”  im p lie d  a p u rity  o f  use o f  A ris to tle  th a t excludes a ll o the r
148 This false polarisation of the will and reason came to the fore from the time of the moral 
manuals. Herbert McCabe helpfully sums up the situation: “From that line of thinking [i.e. manualist], 
intellect or reason and will are quite separate and even opposed faculties. The right reason of which 
they sometimes speak is a theoretical use of reason which gives an account of what is implied by basic 
laws. [...] The manuals show no serious interest in the development of the Christian life, the growth in 
grace by which people are educated in the moral dispositions, virtues, so that they mature into being 
their true selves. In the place of the truth involved in Aquinas’s account of action (recognition of 
relevant factors in the judgement of means and the discovery of the self in decision) there is an appeal 
simply to obedience -  thought to be the work of a quite unpredictable and almost random free will” 
(original parenthesis, except for those in square brackets). See Herbert McCabe, “Virtue and Truth,” 
Irish Theological Quarterly 62 (1996-97): 161-169, at 168.
149 Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 69-70.
150 A prominent proponent of this opinion was De Wulf. See Maurizio (Maurice) de Wulf, 
Storia della F ilosofia  Medievale, vol. 2, Italian version from 6th French ed., trans. V. Miano (Florence: 
Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1945), 125: “Se si considera la filosofia di Alberto dal punto di vista 
costruttivo, essa manca di coerenza e di spirito sistematico.” [“If one considers the philosophy of 
Albert from a constructive point of view, it lacks coherence and systematic spirit.”] Cf. Leff, M edieval 
Thought, 207: “He was essentially the critical glossator [of Aristotle] rather than the original 
synthesizer. [...] Albert as a thinker is disappointing and muddled.”
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a u th o ritie s .151 Such a v ie w  w o u ld  be a gross o v e rs im p lific a tio n , in  th a t S t A lb e rt’ s 
approach to  A ris to te lia n is m  was “ contam inated b y  n e o p la to n ism ”  and h e a v ily  
in flu e n c e d  b y  A v ice n n a , such th a t the resu lt was q u ite  d iffe re n t fro m  B onaven tu re  o r 
T hom as.152 M o re o ve r, g ive n  th a t h is  A ris to te lia n ism  w as an o rth o d o x  C h ris tia n  one, 
he w as n o t a fra id  to  denounce A ris to tle ’ s errors o r re je c t th a t w h ic h  w as co n tra ry  to
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the C h ris tia n  fa ith . Thus, i t  w o u ld  be m ore accurate to  say th a t A lb e rt m ade e ffo rts  
to  re co n c ile  the  e c le c tic  A u g u s tin ia n ism  o f the tim e  (w ith  its  in flu e n ce s  o f  A v ic e n n a  
and A v ic e b ro n ) w ith  A ris to te lia n is m , w h ile  g iv in g  greater scope to  the  use o f  the  
la tte r.154
Perhaps A lb e rt has been m isrepresented o r underestim a ted  at tim e s  because 
u n til re ce n tly  n o t a ll o f  h is  w o rks  w ere re a d ily  a va ilab le  to  scho lars. F o r exam ple , 
com p le te  c r itic a l e d itio n s  o f  h is  D e  B ono  and Q uaestiones  d id  n o t appear u n til 1951 
and 1993 re sp e c tive ly , m eaning th a t estab lish ing  a ch ro n o lo g y  and unde rstand ing  o f  
the  deve lopm ent o f  h is  th o u g h t w ere n ig h  on im poss ib le  p r io r  to  th is  p o in t in  tim e .1551 
w o u ld  th e re fo re  propose to  d raw  fro m  M a rio  P anga llo ’ s recen t and h ig h ly  d e ta ile d  
research in  o rde r to  present a fu lle r  sense o f  the  deve lopm ent o f  A lb e r t’ s th o u g h t,
151 Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 67: “L ’aristotelismo poteva produrre importanti cambiamenti per 
l’impostazione del nostro tema solo in un autore convinto della necessità di operare un’assimilazione 
su vasta scala del pensiero dello Stagirita: e questo Autore è stato Alberto Magno.”
152 Fernand Van Steenbergen, “La Filosofia di Alberto Magno,” Sapienza 18 (1965): 381-93, 
at 390: “Questa filosofia è fondamentalmente aristotelica. Ma è un aristotelismo fortemente 
contaminato dal neoplatonismo, è un aristotelismo neoplatonizzante e sopratutto avicennizzante, molto 
diverso dall’aristotelismo tomista [...], molto diverso anche dall’aristotelismo neoplatonizzante di S. 
Bonaventura” (emphasis in text); Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 71.
153 Van Steenbergen, “La Filosofia di Alberto Magno,” 391.
154 Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 71-72. Here, following Schooyans’s analysis, Pangallo considers 
Albert’s efforts not to be without success. Cf. M. Schooyans, “La distinction entre philosophie et 
théologie d’après les commentaries aristotéliciens de saint Albert le Grand,” Rivista da Universidade 
C atolica de Sào Paido  18 (1959): 255-79, at 279.
155 Indeed, it is clear that De Wulf s views have been coloured by an inability to establish a 
clear chronology. See Storia della Filosofia, II, 125: “Per scoprire un ordine coerente in questo 
complesso disparato, bisognerebbe dimostrare che in Alberto c ’è stata un [s/c] evoluzione di pensiero, 
ma questo è impossibile allo stato presente delle nostre conoscenze sulla cronologia delle sue opere, e 
sembra poco probabile” [“In order to discover a coherent order in this disparate collection, one would 
have to demonstrate that there has been an evolution in Albert’s thought, but this is impossible in the 
present state of our knowledge about the chronology of his works and seems hardly probable.”]
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som eth ing  w h ic h , desp ite  h is  in flu e n ce  on A qu inas, is  ra re ly  done in  m o ra l w o rks . 
T h is  w ill enable us to  see h o w  A lb e rt’ s in te rp re ta tio n  in flu e n c e d  S t T hom as, and also 
h o w  and w here  h is  v ie w s  d iffe re d  ove r tim e.
5.1 E p istem o lo g ica l B a ck g ro u n d
A s w ith  S t B onaven tu re , i t  is  necessary to  understand som eth ing  o f  the  m o ra l 
e p is te m o lo g y  th a t lie s  beh ind  A lb e rt’ s v ie w  be fore  lo o k in g  at conscience its e lf, and so 
w e stop b r ie fly  to  exam ine the re levan t p o in ts , p a rtic u la rly  conce rn ing  la w  and its  
p rin c ip le s , w he the r u n ive rsa l o r p a rticu la r, since they are ke y  n o tio n s  in  re la tio n  to  the 
fu n c tio n  o f  synderesis  and co nsc ien tia  accord ing to  A lb e rt’ s understand ing .
F o llo w in g  A ris to tle , A lb e rt d is tingu ishes the  specu la tive  fro m  the  p ra c tic a l 
in te lle c t, s ta tin g  th a t the  la tte r is  an “ extension”  o f  the fo rm e r.156 N o t o n ly  are these 
aspects o f  in te lle c t d is tin g u ish e d  by  th e ir fu n c tio n , b u t also b y  th e ir  o b je c t, w h ic h  
shapes th e ir fu n c tio n . H ence the ob ject o f the specu la tive  in te lle c t is  the  v e ru m , bu t 
the  o b je c t o f  the  p ra c tic a l in te lle c t is  the bonum ,157 w h ic h  is  th e  p r im u m  m ovens  o f  the 
la tte r, s ince, once recogn ised  by  the p ra c tica l in te lle c t, the  sub ject is  d ire c te d  tow a rds  
a p a rtic u la r a c tio n  ( bonum  o p e ra b ile ) by means o f  the  a p p e tite .158 T h is  leads A lb e rt to  
id e n tify  the tw o  aspects o f  the p ra c tica l in te lle c t, nam e ly , the  c o g n itiv e  and the 
v o litiv e . The c o g n itiv e  aspect possesses the firs t m o ra l p rin c ip le s , ana logous to  the  
firs t p rin c ip le s  o f  tru th  h e ld  b y  the specu la tive  in te lle c t. A lb e rt ca lls  the  fir s t m o ra l
156 St Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, in Opera Omnia, vol. 35, ed. S. Borgnet (Paris: 
Vives, 1896), II, q.63, a.4, sol.: “speculativus per extensionem fit practicus” ; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 
83. Albert does not mention the work from which he draws his Aristotelian maxim, although it appears 
to be loosely based on De Anima, III, 10. This would seem likely, as Aquinas certainly points to this 
work as the source of the saying. Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. J.A. Smith, in The Complete Works 
o f  Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), III, 10, 433a 10-20; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.79, a. 11, s.c.
157 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.63, a.4, sol.
158 Ibid.; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 81-82.
93
p rin c ip le s  u n iv e rs a lia  ju r is  o r d ig n ita te s .159 In  the S um m a de C re a tu r is  A lb e rt de fines  
the  u n iv e rs a lia  ju r is  as the  source o f  rec titude  in  m o ra l a c tio n .160 These f ir s t p rin c ip le s  
are the  genera l ru les o f  m o ra l action , and so, in  th is  sense, the  p ra c tic a l in te lle c t is  
a lw ays rig h t. T h is  n o tio n  is  also draw n fro m  A ris to tle , w ho declares th a t the  p ra c tic a l 
in te lle c t can be understood  in  three w ays, w ith  the  th ird  re la tin g  to  u n ive rsa ls , w h ic h  
im p lie s  th a t in  th is  sense the  in te lle c t is  a lw ays r ig h t.161 T h is  g ives a f irm  basis o f  
u n ive rsa l m o ra l p rin c ip le s  upon w h ich  m o ra l a c tio n  is  b u ilt and u nde rs too d .162 T hus, 
in  the  S cho lastic  ch icken-and -egg s ty le  question ing  o f  w he the r reason o r the  w ill 
com es firs t, A lb e rt settles on  the side o f  g iv in g  p rim a cy  to  the  reason, d e c la rin g  th a t 
w heneve r th is  p ro p e r n a tu ra l o rde r is d isrup ted , the  p ra c tica l in te lle c t is  le d  in to  e rro r
i /r-i
and s in  (q u an d o q u e  e r r a t) . C le a rly  th is  is  a d iffe re n t approach to  B onaven tu re , w ho
v ie w s  the  w ill in  a m ore p o s itiv e  lig h t. H ow ever, despite th e ir d iffe re n ce s  o f  o p in io n , 
lik e  the  o the r S cho lastics o f  th e ir tim e , b o th  shared the same p a tris tic  sources w h ic h  
he lped  to  shape th e ir understand ing  o f  the reason and the  w ill,  o f  n a tu ra l la w  and 
conscience. A t p o in ts  th e y  w o u ld  equate no tions  o ffe re d  b y  the  Fathers; o th e r tim e s  
th e y  w o u ld  keep them  d is tin c t, bu t add fu rth e r layers o f  m ean ing . A s  w e ll as St
159 Ibid., 82.
160 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.63, a.3, sol.
161 Aristotle, On the Soul, III, 3, 428a 16. Albert describes the three ways in Summa de 
Creaturis, II, q.63, a.3, sol., drawing the following conclusion, which includes a clarification from 
Avicenna: “Si tertio modo accipiatur, tunc ipse erit circa universalia juris, in quibus non est error, et sic 
semper est rectus: et quia sic proprie accipitur, eo quod sit ratione intellectus, ut dicit Avicenna, quod 
sit circa universalia remota a materia et appendiciis materiae, dicit Philosophus, quod semper est 
rectus”; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 82-83.
162 Note that Aristotle does not explicitly affirm that these universal practical principles are 
innate; it is Arab philosophy which provides this view. This would explain the appearance of 
Avicenna’s term dignitates, and the frequent reference to him regarding this issue. Cf. Albert the Great, 
Summa de Creaturis, II, q.63, a.l, sol.: “Et ideo dicit Avicenna [...] In tertia autem principalia operum 
quae sunt dignitates”; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 83.
163 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q. 63, a.3, sol.: “Potest tamen dici, sicut quidam 
dixerunt, quod intellectus ordinatur antecedenter ad voluntatem et consequenter: et quando 
antecedenter ad voluntatem, tunc mo vet voluntatem, et non errat, et ille est ordo proprius: quando vero 
consequenter, tunc quandoque errat, et ille est ordo indebitus et innaturalis, per quem egrediuntur 
mores perversi, ut dicit Avicenna”; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 83.
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A u g u s tin e , o f  course, tw o  o ther m a jo r C hurch Fathers w hose w ritin g s  had a lo n g - 
la s tin g  e ffe c t on  m o ra l ep is tem o logy w ere St B a s il the G reat and S t John D am ascene.
5.2  P atristic  In flu en c es  on  S ch o la stic  M oral E p istem ology
In  h is  H o m il ia  in  P r in c ip iu m  P ro v e rb io ru m , S t B a s il the G rea t ta lk s  o f  “ a ce rta in  
n a tu ra l ju d g e m e n t”  ( ju d ic iu m  q uoddam  n a tu ra le , ¡criterion  p h y s ik o n )  b y  w h ic h  w e  are 
ab le to  d is tin g u is h  good fro m  e v il and consequently fa vo u r v irtu e  o ve r v ic e .164 The 
m ed ieva ls id e n tifie d  B a s il’ s ¡criterion p hys iko n  w ith  conscience , p a rtic u la rly  
synderesis , tra n s la tin g  i t  as n a tu ra le  ju d ic a to r iu m .1 6 5  B a s il’ s concep t o f  a n a tu ra l 
ap titude  fo r  d isco ve rin g  the  good is also found  in  the w ritin g s  o f  S t John D am ascene, 
a lthoug h  couched in  d iffe re n t term s tha t re la te  fa r m ore to  the  w ill than  the  reason. 
Dam ascene presents h is  ow n  v ie w  in  h is  D e  F id e  O rth o d o x a , w h ic h  becam e w id e ly  
kn o w n  to  th irte e n th  cen tu ry  S cho lastic ism  th ro u g h  the L a tin  tra n s la tio n  o f  B u rg u n d iu s  
o f  P isa .166 H ere the Dam ascene d istingu ishes betw een the lesis  and b ou les is . The term s 
fo rm  p a rt o f  h is  d e sc rip tio n  o f  the app e titive  fa c u lty  (as opposed to  the  c o g n itiv e  
fa c u lty ). Thus, the les is  is  the  na tu ra l ra tio n a l appetite  fo r  the  good in  genera l as an 
end, boulesis  is  the  a p p lic a tio n  o f  th is  fundam enta l d rive  fo r the  good to  a p a rtic u la r 
d e fin ite  o b je c t and p ro a ire s is  is  the choice o f  means to  achieve the  im m e d ia te  goa l o f  
boulesis . A c c o rd in g  to  Dam ascene, d iffe re n t stages o f  ra tio n a l ju d g e m e n t are
164 St Basil the Great, Hom iliaXII: In Principum Proverbiorum, PG 31, 405-406; Pangallo, 
Legge di Dio, 15.
165 For example, Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.79, a. 13. Cf. Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 16.
166 Odon Lottin, “La psychologie de l’acte humain chez s. Jean Damascène et les théologiens 
duXIIIe siècle occidental,” Revue Thomiste 14 (1931): 631-661, at 634. Lottin presents in full the 
relevant section of the Burgundius translation, as well as his own, in order to highlight the inaccuracies. 
See ibid., 633-36.
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em ployed  a fte r bou les is  and before  a cho ice is  m ade reg a rd in g  the  m eans. T hus, the 
ra tio n a l fa c u lty  is  ke p t separate fro m  b o u le s is }61
L o ttin  says th a t the  firs t person to  in troduce  th is  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  th e les is  
and bou les is  in to  S cho lastic  w ritin g  was P h ilip  the C hance llo r in  h is  D e  P o te n t iis .l6& 
H ow ever, e rro rs  in  B u rg u n d iu s ’ s tra n s la tio n  presented b o th  bou les is  and b o u leus is  as 
c o n s ilia tio  (d e lib e ra tio n ), ra ther than vo lu n tas  and c o n s ilia tio . A s  a re su lt, the 
tra n s itio n  fro m  the  w ill to  the process o f  ra tio n a l d e lib e ra tio n  and ju d g e m e n t was 
obscured .169 T h is  le d  to  a lo n g  lin e  o f  w rite rs  d is tin g u ish in g  the les is  fro m  b o u les is  as 
the  n a tu ra l w il l  (vo lu n ta s  n a tu ra lis )  and the ra tio n a l/d e lib e ra tiv e  w il l  {vo lu n tas  
ra t io n a lis /d e lib e ra t iv a )  re sp e c tive ly .170 Thus, St B onaven ture  com m ents upon 
vo lu n tas  n a tu ra lis  and vo lu n tas  d e lib e ra t iv a .171 P rio r to  h im , A le xa n d e r o f  H ales 
o ffe re d  a v a ria n t o f  th is  w here he equates the lesis  w ith  synderesis  and bou les is  w ith  
lib e ru m  a r b it r iu m .112 T h is  v ie w  rem ained an im p o rta n t p o in t o f  re fe rence  fo r  the 
v o lu n ta ris t F ranciscan  S choo l u n til the appearance o f  B lessed John D im s Scotus, w ho 
ove rtu rned  the  idea  o f  lin k in g  synderesis  w ith  the (n a tu ra l) w il l . 173 E ven  S t Thom as
167 St John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, II, cap. 22, PG 94, 945-946; Pangallo, Legge di
Dio, 18.
168 Lottin, “La psychologie de l’acte humain,” 637.
169 Ibid., 643. See ibid., 635 for the key corrupted sentence: “Deinde post consiliationem, 
bulisim, id iest voluntatem, inquisitio (zetesis) et scrutatio (skepsis); et post hec, si ex his que in nobis 
sunt est, fit consilium (boule), scilicet consiliatio (bouleusis); consilium autem est appetitus inquisitivus 
de his que in nobis sunt rebus fiens; consiliatur enim si debet pertractare rem vel non” (Greek words 
from the Damascene text inserted by Lottin). Cf. Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 19.
170 Lottin, “La psychologie de Facte humain,” 636-661.
171 Bonaventure, In IISententiamm, d.24, p.l, a.2, q. 3, obj.2; idem, Commentaria in Quatuor 
Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, in Opera Omnia, vol. 3 (Quaracchi, Florence: St 
Bonaventure College, 1887), III, d.17, a.l, q.2, sed contra obj.3.
172 Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, II, Inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q.3, tit. 2, cap. 2 (pages 
465- 466). Here Alexander uses the terms voluntas naturalis and voluntas electiva sive deliberativa.
173 Blessed John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, in Opera Omnia, vol. 8 (Vatican City: Vatican 
Press, 2001), dist. 39, qq.1-2, resp.: “Si synderesis ponatur aliquid habens elicitum, semper tendentem 
in actum iustum et resistentem peccato, - cum nihil tale sit in volimtate, non potest ibi poni; ergo est in 
intellectu. Et non potest aliud poni quam habitus principiorum, qui semper est rectus, quia ex ratione 
terminorum, virtute luminis intellectus naturalis, statim intellectus acquiescit illis.” Cf. translation 
contained in Duns Scotus on the Will & Morality, selected and translated with introduction by Allan B. 
Wolter, ed. William A. Frank, (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 164: “If 
synderesis is assumed to be something having an elicited act that necessarily and at all times inclines 
one to act justly and resist sin, then since nothing of this sort is in the will, we cannot assume it to be
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A q u in a s  a lso in c lu d e s  th is  tra d itio n  in  h is  w o rk  by  d is tin g u is h in g  v o lu n ta s  u t n a tu ra  
(,the lesis ) fro m  vo lu n ta s  u t ra t io  ( boulesis ), b u t he is  ca re fu l n o t to  con fuse  th is  w ith  
synderes is , w h ic h  he locates in  the in te lle c t.174 H ow ever, fro m  A q u in a s ’ s com m ents 
w e can observe th a t he, u n lik e  St A lb e rt, is  im prec ise  in  h is  use o f  S t John 
D am ascene’ s te rm s, since he incorpora tes cho ice  o f  m eans in to  h is  n o tio n  o f
1 •  » i - o
bou les is , som e th ing  w h ich  A lb e rt is  a t pa ins to  avo id , w hen  he describes i t  as a 
general appe tite  fo r  som eth ing, w hether possib le  o r im p o ss ib le .176 T hus, A lb e rt 
d is tingu ish es betw een three m odes o f  ope ra tion  o f  the  w ill:  n a tu ra l w ill (th e le s is ), 
ra tio n a l w ill and the  w ill as concerned w ith  p a rticu la rs  (b o u les is ).
W ith  th is  sum m ary o f  the  no tions p ro v id e d  b y  S t B a s il the  G rea t and S t John 
Dam ascene, and th e ir a p p lica tio n  in  the m id d le  ages, w e can observe th a t in  the 
v o lu n ta ris t d e s c rip tio n  o f  the  synderesis  there is  a con fluence o f  the  ideas o f  n a tu ra le  
ju d ic a to r iu m ,  as the  n a tu ra l capacity  to  ju d g e  w h a t is  good, w ith  th e les is  as the  n a tu ra l 
desire  fo r  the  good. The in te lle c tu a lis t school m a in ta ins  a separa tion  be tw een  th e  tw o
there. Consequently, it is in the intellect, and it cannot be assumed to be anything other than that 
habitual knowledge of principles which is always right. For the intellect, in virtue of its own natural 
light, assents to these principles immediately on the strength of their terms.” Note Scotus appears to 
have assigned to synderesis what Bonaventure ascribes to the innate part of conscientia.
174 Cf. St Thomas Aquinas [S. Tommaso d’Aquino], Commento alie Sentenze di Pietro 
Lom bardo e  Testo Intégrale di Pietro Lombardo, vol. 5, Libro Terzo, Distinzioni 1-22: L ’Incarnazione 
del Verbo e  la  Redenzione, Latin-Italian ed., trans. Roberto Coggi (Bologna: Edizioni Studio 
Domenicano, 2000), dist. 17, q.l, a.l, qc. 3, ad, 1; idem, Summa Theologica, Leonine ed. (Rome: 
Forzani, 1894), III, q. 18, a.3; ibid., I, q. 83, a.4.
175 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q .l8, a.3, resp. As well as the terms given above, 
here, thelesis is described as simplex voluntas, which concerns basic desires, such as health, and 
boulesis is described as consiliativa voluntas, where the will concerns itself with a desire in keeping 
with the basic desire. For example, the will as reason  thus desires to take medicine to achieve health. 
What is not expressed, but is implied is that this counselling will is choosing the means to health, rather 
than concerning itself with the desire to get better from a particular situation of illness. Lottin points 
out that Albert is far more precise that any of his contemporaries on this matter, in that he clearly 
comments on the Damascene’s distinction between the acts of the will prior to the acts of reason. See 
Albert the Great, Summa Theologica, in Opera Omnia, vol. 32, ed. S. Borgnet (Paris: Vivés, 1895), II, 
tract. 4, q.14, memb. 4, a .l; idem, Summa Theologica, in Opera Omnia, vol. 33, ed. S. Borgnet (Paris: 
Vivés, 1895), II, tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 1, sol., ad 2. Lottin suggests that Albert must have used a 
corrected copy of Burgundius’s translation. See Lottin, “La psychologie de l’acte humain,” 647.
176 Albert the Great, Summa De Creaturis, II, q. 65, art. 1: “Has tres voluntates nominat tribus 
modis. Prima enim dicitur thelesis, hoc est naturalis voluntas. Secunda autem proprie dicitur voluntas 
rationalis. Tertia vera boulesis dicitur hoc est qualiscumque voluntas, eo quod generalis est appetitus 
impossiblium, et possibilium, sive per nos sive non per nos operandorum.”
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n o tio n s  and presents the n a tu ra le  ju d ic a to r iu m  as the  seat o f  n a tu ra l la w  and 
id e n tifie s  th is  w ith  synderesis. The separation is  caused b y  p la c in g  b o th  syn deres is  
and c o n s c ie n tia  in  the  p ra c tica l reason. Thus, fo r  A lb e rt, w h ile  S t John D am ascene 
p ro v id e s  the  basis fo r  o the r aspects o f  h is  m o ra l ep is tem o logy, such as th e  in te rp la y  o f  
acts o f  reason, w il l and lib e ru m  a rb it r iu m ,1 7 7  in  the stages o f  d e lib e ra tio n  le a d in g  to
178 * .
m o ra l a c tio n , h is  n o tio n  o f  thelesis  proves to  be less im p o rta n t th a n  th a t o f  B a s il’ s 
n a tu ra le  ju d ic a to r iu m .
5.3 S t A lb er t’s  E arly  A n alysis o f  S yn deresis a n d  C on scien tia
H a v in g  set th e  scene, w e are n o w  in  a p o s itio n  to  lo o k  a t the  U n iv e rs a l D o c to r’ s 
ana lys is  o f  conscience . I  w ill lo o k  m o s tly  at synderesis, as th is  w il l  re ve a l h is  
understand ing  o f  c o n s c ie n tia  b y  contrast. The b r ie f references to  the  v ie w s  o f  A lb e rt 
con ta ined  in  m o ra l tex tbooks la rg e ly  lim it  them selves to  th e  o p in io n s  presented  in  
B o o k  T w o  o f  the  S um m a de C re a tu r is , su b title d  D e  H o m in e .1 7 9  T h is  is  o b v io u s ly  
A lb e rt’ s m ost d e ta ile d  trea tise  on the m a tte r o f  synderesis  and c o n s c ie n tia  in  th e  e a rly  
stage o f  h is  career, and so w e w ill re fe r to  o the r la te r w o rks  o n ly  in s o fa r as th e y  o ffe r 
fu rth e r d e ta il, o r change ta ck  a ltogether. H ow ever, h is  firs t, a lb e it b rie f, m e n tio n  o f
177 For Albert, liberum arbitrium is neither part of the reason nor the will, but a third faculty 
that is distinct from both, though involving both. Here Albert shows the influence of St Augustine, in 
understanding liberum arbitrium as a faculty of both the reason and the will. Cf. Pangallo, L egge di 
Dio, 89; Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.70, a.3, sol.
178 The process consists of investigation of a means (perquirere/perscrutari), deliberation 
(consilium), judgement (judicium), choice (electio, eligentia/prohairesis), command ( imperium 
rationis) and completion of the act. Cf. Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.69, a.2, sol. For a 
full description of Albert’s analysis, see Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 87.
1 9 For example, Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 112-13; D’Arcy, Conscience and its 
Right to Freedom , 31-33. D’Arcy only briefly mentions one other work, namely the Commentary on 
the Sentences, which he says adds little to that presented in the Summa de Creaturis. (Pangallo agrees 
with this opinion, though presents far more detail. Cf. Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 120-25.) Unfortunately, 
this leaves unmentioned other works which do have something to add. Moreover, D’Arcy’s note on 
page 31 dates the Summa de Creaturis to “c. 1132”. This is about one hundred years out. Granted even 
a typographical error, modem scholarship can now present a more accurate date of 1242-43. For a 
more probable chronological reconstruction of Albert’s works between 1233-1268, see Pangallo, Legge  
di Dio, 98.
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synderes is  appears in  h is  D e  R e su rrec tio n e , w ritte n  betw een 1236 and 1242 .180 The
rem arks are o f  s ig n ifica n ce , in  tha t they  com m ent upon syn deres is  in  te rm s o f  its
• • 181 . . .  « 
m o tiv a tin g  ro le . S t A lb e rt d is tingu ishes betw een in te lle c tiv e  pow ers (de ac tib u s
a p p re h e n s iv a ru m  v ir iu m )  and m o tiv a tin g  pow ers {de a c tib u s  m o tiv a ru m  v ir iu m ) .U2
H ere syn deres is  is  id e n tifie d  as a m o tiva tin g  pow er, a long  w ith  the  w ill,  the  l ib e ru m
a rb it r iu m , and supe rio r and in fe rio r reason.183 F o r John D am ascene, as w e ll as
id e n tify in g  conscience as the  in te rn a l la w  o f  the  m in d , the m a jo r m o tiv a tio n  fo r  a c tio n
w as the  desire  fo r  the  good. H ere A lb e rt seems to  stress no t the  good as m o tiv a tio n  fo r
the reason and the  w ill,  b u t e terna l ju s tic e  in  a ll its  beauty (p u lc h r itu d o  a e te rn a e
184 • *
iu s titia e ). T h is  is  n o t to  say th a t the n o tio n  o f  the  good as p rim e  m o ve r and end has 
no p lace  in  the  th o u g h t o f  A lb e rt: fa r fro m  i t . 185 H ow ever, th is  te x t h ig h lig h ts  the 
co n te x t in  w h ic h  conscience is  p laced p rim a rily  in  A lb e rt’ s th o u g h t, n a m e ly  d iv in e  
ju s tic e  and the  e te rna l la w  o f  G od. Indeed, perhaps the idea  o f  e te rna l ju s tic e  shou ld  
be considered  in  tandem  w ith  the n o tio n  o f  the  good, ra the r than  separa te ly , in  o rde r 
to  g ive  fu rth e r shape to  h o w  A lb e rt sees the good. H ence, the  U n iv e rs a l D o c to r 
com m ents th a t b o th  synderesis  and the w ill p a rtic ipa te  d ire c tly  in  e te rna l ju s tic e  
{im m e d ia te  p a r t ic ip a n t ) ,  w h ile  h ig h e r and lo w e r reason, in  d e lib e ra tin g  on  th in g s  
e te rna l and e a rth ly , and lib e ru m  a rb itr iu m , in  its  cho ice o f  a c tio n , p a rtic ip a te  in  
e te rna l ju s tic e  as an e ffe c t o f  the synderesis  and the  w ill,  o v e rflo w in g  fro m  them  {p e r  
re d u n d a n tia m ). A lb e rt exp la ins  in  the passage tha t the w il l  p a rtic ip a te s  in  the 
sp lendour o f  the  la w  o f  G od because o f  its  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  the  u ltim a te  end.
180 Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 98.
181 Ibid., 99-100.
182 St Albert the Great, De Resurrectione, in Opera Omnia, vol. 26, ed. W. Kiibel 
(Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1958), tract. IV, q.2, a.5.
183 Ibid., q.2, a.5, sol.: “Ratio omnium meritorum est pulchritudo aeternae iustitiae ad quam 
convertuntur potentiae motivae secundum ordinem, ita quod superiores immediate participant earn 
sicut synderesis et voluntas, quae est ultimis finis; aliae autem participant per redundantiam sicut 
liberum arbitrium et utraque portio rationis" (emphasis mine).
184 Ibid.
185 For example, idem, Summa De Creaturis, II, q. 63, a.4, sol.
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H ow e ve r, he does n o t e laborate here on h o w  synderesis  p a rtic ip a te s  d ire c tly  in  d iv in e  
la w . T ha t, as w e sha ll see, is  le ft to  the  S um m a de C re a tu r is . H o w e ve r, fo r  n o w , the  
f ir s t ke y  n o tio n  A lb e rt o ffe rs  to  us is  the idea th a t synderesis  m o tiva te s  m o ra l a c tio n  
on  accoun t o f  its  d ire c t re la tio n sh ip  to  d iv in e  ju s tice .
5 .4  T h e S u m m a d e  C reatu ris an d  th e C om m entary on  th e  S en ten ces
In  the  S u m m a  de C re a tu r is  A lb e rt asks the tra d itio n a l set o f  questions on  s y n d eres is : 
its  d e fin itio n , w he the r i t  can err, and w hether i t  can be ex tin g u ish e d . A fte r  a series o f  
p ros and cons, A lb e rt is  convinced  p a rtic u la rly  b y  the  a u th o rity  o f  A u g u s tin e  to  
conc lude  th a t synderes is  is  none o the r than  the n a tu ra le  ju d ic a to r iu m  (the  tra n s la tio n  
o f  S t B a s il’ s k r ite r io n  p h y s ik o n ) ,186 w h ich  ho lds the seeds o f  ju s tic e  (s e m in a  ju s t i t ia e )
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and the  u n ive rsa l p rin c ip le s  o f  na tu ra l la w  (u n iv e rs a lia  ju r is ) ,  and the re fo re  
operates lik e  the  eagle in  E ze k ie l b y  d ire c tin g  in  accord w ith  d iv in e  ju s tic e .188 A s  
such, i t  is  a spec ia l po w e r o f  the sou l (sp ec ia lis  vis a n im a e ), w h ic h  operates n o t in  the
1 8Q
w ill,  b u t in  the  p ra c tic a l in te lle c t, since i t  p rovides the  u n ive rsa l p rin c ip le s  w h ic h
186 At points, terms (even including synderesis) are attributed to St Augustine, when they 
were in fact, created long after his death. One cause for this is the layering of commentary on texts of 
Augustine by later Augustinian writers. Thus, Lottin identifies Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle 
and Jean of Trevise as the first to use the Latin term naturale iudicatorium  roughly based on Basil’s 
words. Cf. Lottin, Psychologie et m orale, II, 210, n. 2; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 26-27. The same goes 
for the notion of universalia iuris, which even Lottin was unable to find in Augustine’s works. Page 
590 of the Borgnet edition of Book II of Albert’s Summa de Creaturis directs the reader to Augustine’s 
De L ibero Arbitrio, II, 10, PL 32, 1256. However, the notion is absent, as Augustine talks here of 
wisdom, its rules and lights of virtues (lumina virtutum) instead. Lottin proposes De L ibero  Arbitrio, 
III, 20, PL 32, 1298, which at least talks of naturale iudicium, but there is no sign of naturale 
iudicatorium  or universalia iuris. See Lottin, Psychologie et morale, II, 211, n. 2.
187 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q. 71, a.l, sol.: “Sine praejudicio dico, quod 
synderesis est specialis vis animae, in qua secundum Augustinum universalia juris descripta sunt” 
(emphasis in text); ibid., ad 1: “sed notabile est quod dicit Basilius, quod in ipsa inserta sunt semina 
justitiae et universalia juris naturalis.”
188 Ibid: “Et etiam debet significari per aquilam in Ezechiele: eo quod alta conspicit, quae 
concordant justitiae divinae.” The link with divine justice matches that presented in D e Resurrectione. 
See Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 106. The connection of natural law to divine justice, as illuminated by 
Revelation, shows that, for Albert, natural law participates in divine law. This shows that there is a 
theological context for morals and law in Albert. See ibid., 119.
189 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q. 71, a.l, solutio: “ex parte operabilium 
quaedam sunt universalia dirigentia in opere, per quae intellectus practicus juvatur ad discretionem 
turpis et honesti in moribus [...] et subjectum illorum synderesis est.” cf. ibid., ad 6. Here we observe
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reason then  app lies  to  p a rtic u la r cases. The a p p lica tio n  is  n o t the  jo b  o f  synderes is , 
says A lb e rt. R ather, th is  is the task o f  reason its e lf,190 b y  m eans o f  p o s itiv e  hum an 
la w .191 H ere, the  U n ive rsa l D o c to r is  m ak ing  an im p lic it re ference to  the  A ris to te lia n  
n o tio n  o f  the  p ra c tic a l sy llo g ism , som eth ing he w ill m ake e x p lic it in  the subsequent 
question  on  conscience. H e then re in fo rces the fa c t th a t syn deres is  operates on  the
u n ive rsa l le v e l, b o th  in  term s o f  content, b u t also in  te rm s o f  n a tu ra l appe tite  fo r  the
1 ' t _
good. I t  is  th is  aspect o f  synderesis  w h ich  m oves the  in te lle c t to  act. T hus, A lb e rt is
re a ffirm in g  synderesis  as a m o tiv a tin g  pow er, as w e ll as keeper o f  u n ive rsa l
p rin c ip le s .193
F ro m  the  above w e can observe th a t A lb e rt’ s co n c lu s io n  con ta ins aspects 
w h ic h  co n tin u e  to  h o ld  past pronouncem ents in  esteem. T h is  w o u ld  accoun t fo r  the  
m u ltip le  re ferences to  S aints A ugustine  and Jerom e, as w e ll as fo rm s  o f  d e fin itio n  
in sp ire d  b y  P h ilip  the C hance llo r, thus describ ing  synderes is  as vis  cum  h a b itu
the influence of William of Auxerre’s understanding of ratio superior, which is in even greater 
evidence in Albert’s Commentary on the Sentences. Cf. Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 107; 31-36; Albert the 
Great, Commentarium in Secundum Librum Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia, vol. 27, ed. S. Borgnet 
(Paris: Vives, 1894), dist. 24, a. 14, ad 3 et 4.
190 Ibid., q. 71, a.l, sol.: “sed non applicat ea [universalia juris] ad particularia, quia hoc est 
officium rationis.”
191 Ibid., ad 1 et 2: “quia oportet universalia juris per jus positivum applicari ad particularia: 
jus enim positivum a  ratione circa particulares casus est inventum” (emphasis mine).
192 Ibid., ad 7.
191 Cf. Albert the Great, In II  Sententiarum, dist. 24; art 14, ad 3 et 4. D’Arcy suggests a neat 
comparison between Albert and Bonaventure with regard to the soul’s inclination to moral goodness. 
For Bonaventure he says it is “an inclination of the will,” and for Albert it is “an innate intellectual 
grasp of the first moral principles.” It is true that in the solutio to Summa de Creaturis, II, q.72, a.l, 
Albert says that the major premise that synderesis provides is to incline to the good through the good 
universal principles (“Major autem istius syllogismi est synderesis, cujus est inclinare in bonum per 
universales rationes boni.”). However, if one combines this comment with those made in q. 71, a .l, ad 
7, Pangallo points out that Albert’s inclusion of a fundamental appetite to the good in synderesis is not 
solely due to the principles themselves, but also concerns the motivating activity of the rational 
appetite, that is, the will. How the will and the reason fit together in general is a complex matter, about 
which Albert is inconsistent, giving primacy to reason in some works and primacy to the will in others, 
especially his Commentary on the Sentences and his Summa Theologiae. Ultimately, probably given 
the inconsistency, Pangallo helpfully points out that how the reason and the will relate is not essential 
to Albert’s anthropological doctrine. However, it is this kind of loose end which I would suggest is 
significant for our definition of conscience, which would lead me to the same conclusion as that of 
Bernard Häring, namely, that both reason and will are inseparably involved. See D’Arcy, Conscience 
and its Right to Freedom , 31; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 109-10; Bernard Häring, F ree  and Faithful in 
Christ: M oral Theology fo r  Priests and Laity, vol. 1, General M oral Theology (Slough: St Paul 
Publications, 1978), 234-35.
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principiorum juris n a tu ra lis t  and potentia cum habitu.195 However, the shift from 
the will to the intellect as the major focus, is a significant departure from the prevalent 
Augustinian approach in favour of adopting a reconstructed Aristotelian approach that 
also has God in mind as the ultimate end and source of justice.196 This reconstruction 
is essential for Albert, as attention must be given to both natural and supernatural
■ • » 1 Q 7levels of human existence in order to obtain its full meaning.
Albert’s analysis of the Jerome passage on Ezekiel leads him to equate 
synderesis to the scintilla conscientiae, and as such it admits no error, unlike 
conscientia, which is dependent not only upon synderesis, but also reason, which is 
deceived at times.198 As well as being the keeper of the seeds of justice and the 
infallible universal moral principles,199 Albert says that synderesis is also so much 
more at a distance from the inclination to sin than anything else, which is why it 
neither errs or sins.200
Probably the most influential change which Albert made to the understanding 
of how synderesis and conscientia functioned and related to each other was to explain 
it in terms of an Aristotelian practical syllogism. In his question on conscience, he 
expands upon what he suggested earlier and declares that “conscience is the
194 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.71, a .l, ad 1 et 2.
195 Ibid., ad 6. See Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t m o ra le , II, 210-15 for the influence of Philip the 
Chancellor on Albert’s thought.
196 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  107.
197 Ibid., 110-11. This, in effect is the thinking behind his answer to why the Saints mention 
syn d e re s is , but the Philosophers do not. He concludes that it is a matter of different points of view, 
natural and eternal. See Albert the Great, S um m a de C re a tu r is , II, q.71, a .l, ad quaestionem.
198 Albert the Great, S um m a de C re a tu r is , II, q.71, a .l, ad 3: “conscientia sequitur ex synderesi 
et ratione, et ex parte synderesis numquam habet errorem, licet ex parte rationis quandoque decipiatur.”
199 Albert’s later work D e  B o n o  supports the view of syn d e re s is  presented in the S u m m a  de  
C re a tu r is ,  but provides complementary terms, defining its content, the u n iv e rs a lia  ju r i s ,  also as the 
innate ( in s e r ta  p e r  n a tu ra m ),  common principles ( p r in c ip ia  c o m m u n ia )  of natural law. St Albert the 
Great, D e  B o n o , in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol. 28, ed. H. Kühle, C. Feckes, B. Geyer, and W. Kübel 
(Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1951), tract. V, q.l, a .l, sol.; ibid., a.3, sol. Cf. Pangallo, L e g g e  
d iD io ,  115-119.
200 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.71, a .l, ad 9: “synderesis est specialis pars 
animae magis inter caeteras elongata a corruptione fomitis.” He concludes this part by reminding the 
reader that some consider it to be part of the primordial human righteous state.
102
conclusion of practical reason from two premises, of which the major is of synderesis 
and the minor of reason.”201 He summaries the process as follows:
All good is to be done. {Synderesis)
This is good. (Ratio: judgement of practical reason)
Therefore this is be done. (Conscientia derives conclusion)202
The syllogism then becomes the framework within which questions and 
problems on conscience are examined and explained. Following Aristotle, Albert had 
already established that the intellect (and hence synderesis) as keeper of universal 
principles is always right, but that deliberative reason itself makes mistakes. What 
about conscience - is it always right? Albert declares that “conscience in itself is 
always right,”203 but that in actuality it is “sometimes right and sometimes wrong.”204 
He is able to combine these seemingly contradictory answers by stating that the fault 
is not of the conscience itself, but rather caused by fallible reason, since he has 
already concluded that it is in the particulars that the error is greatest, and that in its 
application of the infallible universal laws reason is frequently deceived.205 In effect, 
this answer follows the process of logical deduction, declaring that conscience is the 
conclusion of the syllogism and no more, with the exception that as it is a practical 
syllogism, it has a practical, in this case moral, impact about what should be done. 
This means that if either of the premises is wrong, then it will reach an incorrect 
conclusion, however logical and right it is in itself in its process.
201 Ibid., q.72, a .l, sol.: “Dicimus, quod conscientia conclusio est rationis practicae ex duobus 
praemissis, quarum major est synderesis, et minor rationis.”
202 Ibid.: “Omne bonum faciendum. Hoc est bonum: ergo hoc est faciendum.”
203 Ibid., q.72, a. 2, arg. 1: “ergo conscientia semper in se recta est.”
204 Ibid., q. 72, a.2, sol.: “Dicimus, quod conscientia quandoque est erronea, et quandoque
recta.”
205 Ibid., q.71, a.2, sol.: “et quia circa particularia est error maximus, propter hoc ratio 
frequenter decepitur.”
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Given the description of conscientia in logical terms, it is clear that Albert has 
also placed conscience in the practical intellect, but as it is presented solely in terms 
of a logical conclusion, it is declared to be an act rather than a habitus intellectus206 
Based upon the view of St John Damascene, Albert considers conscience also to be 
the law of the intellect.207 It is by dint of its role as lex nostri intellectus, that it 
possesses its binding force.208 But is it always binding? Although Albert only draws 
our attention to the matter briefly in the Summa de Creaturis, this turns out to be his 
longest coverage of the topic.209 It does, nevertheless provide useful clarifications and 
a firm conclusion. Having distinguished between situations of doubt, ambiguity, 
opinion, belief and clear knowledge, Albert the Great states that the judgement of 
conscience is always binding, even if it is erroneous, with the exception of cases of
911 • •doubt or ambiguity. Thus the individual is bound to follow his/her conscience in a 
situation of certainty, even if the individual is mistaken.212 The perplexed person, 
however does not incur the fault of sin, since the person can lay aside the decision of 
conscience, and the individual receives merit or demerit for his/her actions only at the
206 Ibid., q.72, a .l, sol.: “Actus conscientiae est actus rationis.” Cf. Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t 
m o ra le , II, 217; Pangallo, L e g g e  d i D io ,  155. However, Albert reconsiders his view in his S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ic a , describing it as a h a b itu s  a cq u is itu s , since it relates to the science of moral action, and so is 
not simply an act, but a moral disposition which develops. Cf. Albert the Great, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a ,  II, 
tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 3, a .l, ad quaest.l.
207 Albert the Great, S um m a de C re a tu r is ,  II, q.72, a .l , arg. 7. Cf. John Damascene, D e  F id e  
O rth o d o x a , IV, cap. 22, PG 94, 1199-1200. Aquinas also uses Damascene’s idea. For example, see 
S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , I, q.79, a. 13, resp.
208 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.72, a .l, ad 7. Pangallo notes that here Albert is 
following an etymological link between le x  and l ig a re ,  a view that was widely held in the 13th century, 
but modem scholarship has shown to be without foundation. See Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  146.
209 Ibid., 148.
210 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.72, a.2, ad quaest. 1.
211 Ibid.: (talking of the d u b iu m  and the a m b ig u u m ) “Unde quod est in conscientia, habet se 
per aliquem istorum modorum, et secundum hoc magis et minus obligat: sed sine praejudicio loquendo 
dicimus, quod non obligat faciendum, nisi sit ut opinatum, vel creditum, vel scitum id quod est in 
conscientia, et tunc obligat, sive conscientia sit erronea, sive ratio erronea.” Thus erroneous conscience 
is only binding insofar as the person does not suspect that there might be an error. Cf. Pangallo, L e g g e  
d i  D io ,  150.
212 D’Arcy sees this as a new development. See C onsc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  F re e d o m , 85: “All 
previous discussions asked whether conscience, o b je c t iv e ly  true or false, obliges. Albert sees that any 
question o f conscience turns attention to s u b je c tiv e  states as well as objective matters; he breaks very 
new ground by claiming that the answer to the question is to be given, not in terms of true or false, but 
in terms of the subjective firmness with which the judgement of conscience is held” (emphasis in text).
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moment of action. Thus, for Albert “erroneous conscience cannot produce an 
invincible perplexity; the doubt can be removed.”214 The process of moral correction 
presented by Albert relates directly to the syllogism. Since error occurs in the minor 
premise provided by moral reason, the individual should examine the minor premise 
and correct the mistake, in order to achieve a correct conclusion of conscience.215
The application of the syllogism is by far Albert’s most significant 
contribution to the discourse on conscience. However, the Summa de Creaturis 
contains other comments which are worthy of note. The first is the place of remorse. 
Historically, moral theology has now long been accustomed to describing conscience 
as either ‘consequent’ or ‘antecedent’. The consequent aspect of conscience focuses 
upon judging past actions, leading to sensations of remorse or reassurance. However, 
in Albert’s presentation the primary function of conscientia is to reach the conclusion 
of the practical syllogism, set for it by synderesis and moral reason. As a result, 
conscientia is not only understood as simply an act, rather than a faculty or a 
habitus,216 by implication it can only be antecedent in Albert’s view. However, this 
does not mean that guilt or remorse is absent. Remorse becomes the role of 
synderesis?11 This draws us back to Albert’s connection of synderesis to the justice of 
God, where the habit-like faculty not only contains the divinely established universal 
principles of nature, it also acts as a witness to how a person has lived up to these 
principles. The Commentary on the Sentences, written soon after the Summa de
2 1 3
213 Albert the Great, S um m a de C re a tu r is , II, q.72, a.2, ad obj. 1 : “Dicendum est, quod non erit 
perplexus: quia potest deponere conscientiam.” Cf. Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t m o ra le ,  II, 217.
214 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i D io ,  149: “La coscienza erronea non può produrre una perplessità 
invincibile; il dubbio può essere rimosso, si può de pone re  co n s c ie n tia m  ( e rro n e a m )” (emphasis and 
parenthesis in text).
215 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.72, a.2, ad obj.l: “Qualiter deponenda sit? 
Dicendum, quod per examinationem minoris propositionis, quae assumitur a ratione; haec enim 
frequenter falsa est: et sì examinaretur, ultro se offeret falsitas ejus, et tunc cessabit conscientia.”
216 Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t m o ra le , II, 217.
217 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.71, a.3, sol.: “Appetitus autem synderesis 
semper est rectus et in damnatis et vivis, e t est re m o rd e n s  de m a lo  co m m isso  e t b o n o  om isso . Et propter 
hoc dicitur vermis mordens vel rodens damnatos” (emphasis mine).
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Creaturis, expands upon the view presented there, when it says that it is the task of 
synderesis to remurmurare, or to object to sin committed, and to gnaw (rodere) at the 
individual, since it remains as the testis justitiae divinae, even in the damned.218 
Although not all writers attributed remorse to synderesis, 2 1 9  it is clear that Albert has 
followed Philip the Chancellor’s influential position, which I referred to earlier. 
However, the two scholars differ in the reason given. In Philip, synderesis acts this 
way in keeping with its nature as the remnant of primordial human righteousness. In 
Albert, synderesis objects to sin because of its relationship with divine justice.
The second point is that just as divine justice forms the overall background to 
Albert’s concept of synderesis, so this theological context flows through to his
understanding of conscientia. Thus, right conscience is linked to faith and hope
000ordering our life to future beatitude. In the scriptural analysis we observed that the 
later uses of conscience in the New Testament were more intimately connected with 
faith and hope in Christ as the ground or criterion for right judgement. In quoting 1 
Tim 1:5, Albert’s text reflects such an understanding.221 Although Albert rightly
points out that the use of faith in Rom 14:23 is about trust in one’s own conviction,
• 000rather than religious belief, the analysis of 1 Tim 1:5 is clearly from a starting point 
of faith, in that, since he agrees with the opinion of the Glossa Ordinaria,223
218 Idem, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 5; a.6, ad obj. 6 et 7: “synderesis remurmurat contra [...] 
bonum omissum [et] malum commissum [...] est vermis cujus proprius actus est rodere propter 
delictum vel peccatum, et testificari esse dignum poena qui talia commisit: et hoc remanet in testem 
justitiae divinae, et in cumulum damnationis.”
219 For example, Stephen Langton saw that it was the role of reason to prick to conscience into 
a state of remorse. See Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t m o ra le , II, 111-12, 114.
220 Albert the Great, S u m m a  de C re a tu r is , II, q.72, a .l, ad 5 et 6.
221 Ibid., q.72, a .l, arg. 6.
222 Ibid., q.72, a .l, ad 5 et 6: “sed tamen in epistola ad Romanos f id e s  ponitur pro fiducia 
securitatis, quam dat conscientia quando vere concludit” (emphasis in text); cf. Rom 14:23: “But those 
who have doubts are condemned if they eat, because they do not act from faith; for whatever does not 
proceed from faith is sin .”
223 Ibid., q.72, a .l, arg. 6: “Videtur quod sit spes. I ad Timoth. 1,5, super illud: F in is p r a e c e p t i  
est c h a r ita s  de c o rd e  p u ro ,  e t c o n s c ie n tia  bona. Glossa, id est, spe” (emphasis in text).
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conscience in the Timothy passage is to be understood as hope.224 I would suggest 
that the reason for this somewhat clumsy exegesis of the Glossa is to add hope to the 
list presented in 1 Timothy,225 and thus highlight the three theological virtues: faith, 
hope and charity. However, as a consequence, conscience is intimately linked to the 
theological virtues by the glossator, and Albert agrees with this view. Thus, although 
there is only passing reference to faith and hope in Albert’s study of conscience in the 
Summa de Creaturis, the subtle inclusion of the theological virtues should not be 
overlooked, nor should its importance be underestimated, since it transforms Albert’s 
description of conscience from some sterile, logical calculation, to a dynamic, human 
attempt to judge rightly with the help of a life lived in faith, hope and love.
5 .5  L a t e r  W ritin g s
Most of the works of moral theology that refer to the issue of the practical syllogism 
usually describe St Thomas’s application of the notion,226 and no mention is made of 
the fact that Albert was the first to apply it to conscience.227 However, still more 
absent in these texts is any reference to the fact that St Albert changed his mind. 
Albert’s later writings appear to take on a more Augustinian flavour.228 As a result, he 
revises his previous comments and makes some significant alterations. Nevertheless, 
Pangallo is careful to point out that it is an exaggeration to suggest that he totally 
rejected what he had previously written in the Summa de Creaturis and the 
Commentary on the Sentences. Rather, the revisions should be seen as a “maturing of
224 Ibid., q.72, a .l, ad 5 et 6 “In epistola vero ad Timotheum c o n s c ie n tia  pro spe ponitur” 
(emphasis in text).
225 The actual quote of 1 Tim 1:5 is as follows: “But the aim of such instruction is love that 
comes from a pure heart, a good conscience, and sincere faith .”
226 For example, Costigane, “A History of the Western Idea of Conscience,” 10.
227 A notable exception is Eric D’Arcy. See C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m ,  31-33.
228 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  128-141.
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the thought of the Doctor universalis” with regard to a deepening of his understanding 
of the habitual character of synderesis.229
Firstly, in his De Anima he affirms the statement previously made regarding
the role of conscience as the conclusion of the syllogism, which therefore accuses or
excuses the action and obliges it or not on the basis of the conclusion.230 However, the
Augustinian distinction between ratio superior and ratio inferior reappears, with a
1
resultant impact on the structure of the syllogism. Synderesis continues to hold the 
universal principles of natural law, but higher reason can also propose divine law 
(proponente id quod est iuris divini) to the deliberative reasoning process called 
conscience, in order to derive a conclusion. However, the inferior reason can also 
propose positive human law to reach another binding conclusion (quando proponit 
ratio inferior aliquid quod est iuris humani). Thus, Albert declares that an 
individual’s conscience can derive a syllogistic conclusion from universal principles 
related to natural law, divine law or human law. That the syllogism might start with a 
major premise of natural or divine law should come as no surprise, given Albert’s 
understanding of the universal, infallible character of natural law, flowing from its 
intimate connection to divine law. But that he is willing to suggest a universal 
human law as a major premise is somewhat startling, even if we do acknowledge his 
futher clarifications. Indeed, Albert admits that no human positive law is truly
229 Ibid., 141: “Credo piuttosto che siamo di fronte ad una maturazione del pensiero del Doctor 
universalis nel senso di un opportuno approfondimento del carattere ‘abituale’ della sinderesi” 
(emphasis mine).
230 St Albert the Great, D e  A n im a ,  in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol.7, part 1, ed. C. Stroick (Aschendorff: 
Monasterii Westfalorum, 1968), III, tract. 4, cap 10: “et ideo conscientia accusat vel excusat actum 
apud rhetorem; quia quasi ex quadam obbligatione syllogistica obligat vel non obligat agentem.”
231 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  129.
232 Albert the Great, D e  Anima, III, tract. 4, cap 10: “Et similiter est, quando proponit ratio 
inferior aliquid quod est iuris humani, et confert illus cogitativa ad operabilia, venitur in quoddam quasi 
conclusum, quod idem vocatur conscientia propter similem obligationis modum, quia scilicet in 
omnibus his obligatio est quasi ex syllogismo.”
233 Albert sums this up by describing natural law as “a certain model of divine law.” Cf. ibid.: 
“Ius autem naturale quoddam exemplum est iuris divini.”
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universal, which makes the argumentation of the syllogism defective. This implies 
that a human law, although appropriate for a time or a place, may be inappropriate in 
another setting, and if in this wrong setting it is used for the major premise of a moral 
syllogism, the conclusion will undoubtedly be false. This also means that Albert has 
admitted an increased possibility of error into his later analysis of moral decision­
making, in that in the case of the use of human law as the major, both major and 
minor premises are open to error. The application of a local law to a universal context 
also probably implies a lack of prudence, in that the individual is not able to recognise 
the limitations of the law. Perhaps the older Albert gave greater recognition of the 
fallibility of humanity in not only in the application of moral principles, but also in 
their just discernment.
Thus, in the De Anima we see an expansion of the fallibility of reason, not 
only admitting the possibility of error in the formation of the minor premise, but now 
also in the major, through the lower reason. Yet, in the Summa Theologica, Albert 
admits the effects of error even into synderesis. The commentary starts off in the 
usual terms describing synderesis as a full faculty combined with a habitus, as well as 
that spark which always inclines us to good and objects to evil. However, Albert 
then moves towards an Augustinian line of thinking, when he proposes a distinction 
of two fields of operation in synderesis: higher (ad superius) and lower (ad inferius), 
reminiscent of the Augustinian ratio. Though neither the higher nor lower portion
234 Ibid., “Nihil enim in humanis statutis adeo universale est, quod uibque et semper et ab 
omnibus faciendum sit.”
235 Albert the Great, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , II, tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 2, a .l, sol.: “synderesis 
dicit potentiam cum habitu completam.”
236 Ibid., II, tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 2, a.2, sol.: “Synderesis proprium est non peccare 
secundum se: tamen habet duas comparationes: unam scilicet ad superius, et secundum hanc numquam 
peccat: alteram quae est ad inferius quod regit, hoc est ad liberum arbitrium, et ad rationem, et ad 
voluntatem, extra quas et supra quas est, ut dicit Gregorius: est scundum hunc modum praecipitatur per 
accidens, sicut miles cadente equo: qui casus non est vitium militis.” This distinction o f two spheres of 
operation o f s y n d e re s is  does not appear in Albert’s earlier work. Cf. Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  138-39.
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of synderesis can sin in themselves, the inferior aspect can be overthrown per  
accidens. It is affected by error and sin through its connection to the liberum 
arbitrium, reason, and the will. Thus, although the lower synderesis cannot sin, the sin 
of reason, will or free choice is ascribed to it by their accidental relationship to it.237 
Albert gives the image of a soldier being thrown by his horse to show how synderesis 
can be thrown by the lower powers. This argument is not a new one, being rooted in 
the Ezekiel passage and previous discussions on how synderesis can be thrown down. 
Indeed, St Bonaventure also used the same image, without using ‘per accidens’, 
attributing the fall of synderesis to an error of execution of reason and the obstinacy 
of sinfulness of the will, resulting in the loss of its power to rule.238 What is 
significant here is that Albert should adopt a similar approach, though with his own 
terms, and thus admit that synderesis is not impervious to the effects of bad 
judgement or ill will.239
237 Albert the Great, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , II, tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 2, a.2, sol.: “Ita aliquando 
imputatur synderesi peccatum rationis, voluntatis et liberi arbitrii: quia non tenuit ne caderet.” As a 
result, Pangallo says that Albert here declares that lower synde res is  sins p e r  a cc id e n s . However, I am 
inclined to avoid this summary description, given that Albert is at such pains to declare that s yn d e re s is  
remains without fault. Cf. Pangallo, L e g g e  d i D io , 138-40; Albert the Great, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a ,  II, 
tract. 16, q. 99, memb. 2, a.2, ad 1: “Sic videmus earn praecipitari, non culpa sua, sed inferiorum.”
238 Cf. Bonaventure I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 39, a. 2, q.3, resp.: “Et ponitur exemplum in 
milite qui, quantum est de se semper bene sedet super equum, euo tamen niente, praecipitari dicitur.” 
Again here the careful distinction is made to point out that the sin is not the fault of s yn d e re s is . See 
ibid., “Synderesis per peccatum non potest depravari in se, sed tantum praecipitari quoad dominium 
regendi. [...] dominium regendi potest perdere.” Cf. Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t m o ra le ,  II, 209.
239 The purpose of the careful distinction between sinning and being overthrown accidentally 
is to maintain that s yn d e re s is  does not fall from a state of grace. However, as the powers and capacities 
of the soul interconnect, is therefore impeded from operating properly. One o f the Q u a e s tio n e s  of 
Albert, which is of uncertain provenance, sums this up clearly: “Aliter potest dici, quod praecipitari est 
duplicter: primo modo, cadere in peccatum a statu gratiae, sic non convenit ipsi synderesi; aliter dicitur 
praecipitari, scilicet a suo effectu retardari vel impediri, et sic dicitur praecipitari; et sic potest 
praecipitari sine proprio peccato.” See St Albert the Great, Q u a e s tio  de R a tio n e  S u p e r io r i e t S yn d e re s i 
in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol. 25, part 1, Q uaestiones , ed. Albert Fries (Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum,
1993), resp. ad 1. Interestingly, given the emphasis of the unity of the soul, this question also highlights 
that syn d e re s is  shares in the punishment due to the fault of a faculty. See ibid., resp. ad 1: “Et dicitur 
hoc ratione conexionis potentiarum, sicut dicitur una puniri, cum alia punitur, non quia peccet per 
omnem potentiam, sed quia omnes potentiae conexae sunt in una essentia animae, ideo una non punitur 
sine altera.”
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Although Albert’s Quaestiones were written between the Commentary on the 
Sentences and the De Anima around 1250 to 1252,240 I have left them until last. The 
reason for this is that the twenty-two questions and single quodlibetum presented in 
the critical edition taken from the Codex Vaticanus Latinus 781 are of mixed 
provenance. Although, owing to the handwritten title of the manuscript,241 for a long 
time the questions were considered to be composed by St Thomas Aquinas, 
subsequently scholars became uncertain of the manuscript’s authorship, and it took 
many years for them to establish that it is a collection of texts from different 
sources.242 Eighteen questions are now attributed to St Albert, the Quodlibetum VII is 
from St Thomas, but three remain of uncertain provenance. This is all the more 
significant for us in that two of them relate to conscience: De Primis Motibus, De 
ratione superiori et synderesi and De conscientia I. Henquinet became convinced that 
these three also came from St Albert the Great.244 However, Albert Fries, the late 
editor of the full critical edition, was far more sceptical.245 Nevertheless, this still 
leaves us with two questions on conscience that are reliably attributable to St Albert: 
De synderesi and De conscientia (II), as well as a question on higher and lower 
reason. What is worth noting is that both the questions of certain and uncertain 
provenance related to conscience reflect a slight shift in Albert’s approach to include 
Augustinian and Franciscan notions found in Alexander of Hales and St Bonaventure, 
while maintaining the close link of synderesis and natural and divine law, as well as
240 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i D io , 98.
241 The title Q u a es tio n e s  d is p u ta te  e t q u o lib e ta  Thom e de A q u in o  [.s /c] was added later to the 
twelfth century codex. See Albert Fries, “Prolegomena,” in Q uaestiones , v; Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  
161.
242 Ibid., 161-62; F.M. Henquinet, “Vingt-deux questions inédites d’Albert le Grand dans un 
manuscrit à l’usage de s. Thomas d’Aquin,” N e w  S c h o la s tic is m  9 (1935): 283-328, at 283-88.
243 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  162.
244 Henquinet, “Vingt-deux questions inédites,” 322.
245 Fries, “Prolegomena,” vii: “Quamvis hae priorcs ties quaestiones probaliter pro non 
authenticis habendae sint...”
111
continuing to site both synderesis and conscientia in the reason.246 The Augustinian 
flavour is most obvious in the illuminationist decription of synderesis (in its role of 
scintilla conscientiae) as lumen conscientiae, whose role is to enlighten the 
conscience according to the universal law.247 Thus the Quaestiones serve to show the 
development of Albert’s views, which, without submitting to any radical alteration,248 
became more accommodating to Augustinianism as time went on, rather than 
becoming increasingly more Aristotelian with each work, as we might have expected.
6. S a in t  T h o m a s  A q u in a s
The star pupil of St Albert the Great, St Thomas Aquinas, eventually came to 
outshine his master in skill and popularity.249 In many ways, however, Thomas owed 
a great deal to St Albert, as we can observe in Aquinas’s analysis of synderesis and 
conscientia. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the Angelic Doctor soon begins to 
plough his own furrow on the matter, reaching several different conclusions from the 
Universal Doctor. As well as reference to conscience in his Scripture
246 Pangallo, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  301-308.
247 Ibid., 215, 301. Cf. St Albert the Great, Q u a e s tio  de S y n d e re s i in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol. 25, 
part 1, Q u a e s tio n e s , ed. Albert Fries (Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1993), art. 1, ad 8: “et 
quia lumen conclusionis est ex maiore, ideo dicitur synderesis lumen vel ‘scintilla conscientiae’, et non 
ipsa conscientia”; idem [uncertain], Q u a e s tio  de C o n s c ie n tia  I  in O p e ra  O m n ia ,  vol. 25, part 1, 
Q u a e s tio n e s , ed. Albert Fries (Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 1993), art. 3, ad 1: “Unde 
sequitur lumen synderesis, et sic dicitur scintilla conscientiae, non quia sit pars eius, sed quia illuminat 
conscientiam sive rationem, per quam formatur ipsa conscientia.”
248 Pangalio, L e g g e  d i  D io ,  139.
249 Nonetheless, it is a fallacy to think that Aquinas’s thought met with immediate and 
widespread approval. Such was the strength of acceptance of the Augustinian approach that St 
Thomas’s Aristotelian revision met at first with widespread opposition, even leading in 1277 to the 
formal condemnation of a number of its key propositions, carried out by both the Bishop o f Paris 
Etienne Tempier, and the Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardby, and issued within the space of 
eleven days of each other, as part of a rejection of any form of heterodoxy, caused particularly by 
Averroism and Arab philosophy. See, Leff, M e d ie v a l T hough t, 229-45.
250 Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t m o ra le , II, 222.
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• 251 •commentaries, or Quodlibet discussions, St Thomas’s three major systematic 
explorations of the nature of synderesis and conscientia are to be found in his 
Commentary on the Sentences, the De Veritate and the Summa Theologica.
6.1  T h e  C o m m e n ta r y  o n  t h e  S e n t e n c e s
Here, in his first major systematic theological treatise,252 Aquinas follows the long- 
established standard pattern of questions, presenting in counterpoint the diverse views 
of past writers. He begins by asking whether synderesis is a faculty or a habitus. 
Drawing on the writing of Saints Jerome and Augustine, it appears that it might be a 
faculty.253 Indeed, as the liberum arbitrium relates to judgement and is a faculty, this 
might also imply that synderesis is a faculty if it is the same thing as liberum 
arbitrium 254 Moreover, as a habitus can be lost and a faculty cannot, this would
251 For example, the meaning of conscience is raised throughout Thomas’s C o m m e n ta ry  o n  
R o m an s , as well as referred to in his studies of Galatians, 1 Corinthians and 2 Corinthians. For 
example, in studying Romans, Thomas points out our need for the help of the Holy Spirit to avoid error 
in conscience. See St Thomas Aquinas [S. Tommaso D’Aquino], C o m m e n to  a l  “ C o rp u s  P a u l in u m ”  
(E x p o s i l io  e t L e c tu ra  S u p e r E p ís to la s  P a u l i  A p o s to li) ,  vol. 1, L e tte ra  a i  R o m a n i, Latin-Italian ed., trans, 
and introduction by Battista Mondin (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2005), cap.9, lectio 1, 
page 594: “Et quia interdum conscientia errat, nisi per Spiritum Sanctum rectificetur, subdit ‘ I n  S p ir i tu  
S a n c to ’ ”  (emphasis in text). He also exhorts us not to wound others “with the sword of bad example.” 
See St Thomas Aquinas [S. Tommaso D’Aquino], C o m m e n to  a l “ C o rp u s  P a u l in u m ”  (E x p o s it io  e t 
L e c tu ra  S u p e r E p ís to la s  P a u l i  A p o s to li) ,  vol. 2, P r im a  L e tte ra  a i  C o r in z i,  Latin-Jtalian ed., trans, and 
introduction by Battista Mondin (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2005), cap.8, lectio 2, page 
372: “ ‘Sic autem peccantes in fratres’, peccato scandali, ‘et percutientes conscientiam eorum 
infirmam’ , gladio mali exampli.” For further references to conscience, corresponding to its appearance 
in Paul’s writing, or relating to Paul’s discussion of a moral life in the Spirit, see St Thomas Aquinas 
[S. Tommaso D’Aquino], C o m m e n to  a l  “ C o rp u s  P a u lin u m  ”  (E x p o s it io  e t L e c tu ra  S u p e r E p ís to la s  
P a u li  A p o s to li) ,  vol. 3, S econda  L e tte ra  a i C o r in z i e L e tte ra  a i G a la t i,  Latin-Italian ed., trans, and 
introduction by Battista Mondin (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2006). Cf., for example,
S u p e r S e cu n d a m  E p is to la m  a d  C o r in th io s  L e c tu ra ,  cap.l, lectio 4, page 44: “de testimonio purae 
conscientiae”; S u p e r E p is to la m  a d  G a la ta s  L e c tu ra ,  cap, 5, lectio 1, page 786: “Sic ergo dico, quod nisi 
faceret hoc ad quod inducit conscientia, peccaret mortaliter, non quidem ex genere operis, sed ex 
intentione operantis. Et similiter si facit, peccai; quia huiusmodi ignorantia non excusat, cum sit 
ignorantia iuris. Nec tamen est perplexus simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia potest deponere 
erroneam conscientiam.”
252 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S yn d e res is ,” 229.
253 Saint Thomas Aquinas [S. Tommaso d’Aquino], C o m m e n to  a l le  S entenze  d i  P ie t ro  
L o m b a rd o  e T esto  In te g ra le  d i  P ie t ro  L o m b a rd o , vo i. 4, L ib ro  Secondo, D is t in z io n i 2 1 -4 4 : I l  P e c c a to  
O r ig in a le ,  la  G ra z ia  e i l  L ib e ro  A r b it r io ,  i l  P e c c a to  A ttu a le ,  Latin-Italian ed., trans. Roberto Coggi 
(Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2001), dist. 24, q.2, a.3, ad 1-3.
254 Ibid., ad 4.
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suggest that synderesis is a faculty, as it continues to rebuke sin even after death.255 
However, the faculty of reason is open to opposite views. Since synderesis does not 
admit this possibility and is always right, Aquinas declares that perhaps it is a habitus 
rather than a faculty.256
St Thomas bases his resolution of the problem largely on Aristotle’s notion of 
an unmoved mover.257 The process of reasoning is changeable and open to variety in 
order to reach new conclusions, both valid and mistaken, and so it requires something 
solid and stable to start the process off. This, according to Aquinas, in the practical 
sphere, is synderesis, which provides the self-evident principles for the practical
OCQ
intellect. Here St Thomas describes synderesis as a habitus, seemingly feeling less 
obliged to try to accommodate the past opinion of it being a faculty, or a quasi- 
faculty, or so it appears, at first. Similar to St Bonaventure, though related to 
synderesis rather than conscientia, we find here an interplay between the innate and 
the acquired. Aquinas declares synderesis to be acquired, in that the terms of the
255 Ibid., ad 5: “Praetera, habitus amittitur per oblivionem, vel alio modo. Sed synderesis 
semper manet quae etiam post mortem peccato remurmurat, cuius murmur vermis dicitur. Ergo 
synderesis potentiam, et non habitum.”
256 Ibid., sed contra: “Potentia rationalis se habet ad opposita. Sed synderesis se habet 
determinate ad unum quia numquam errat. Ergo videtur quod non sit potentia, sed habitus.”
257 Aristotle, P h y s ic s , trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in The C o m p le te  W orks  o f  A r is to t le :  
The R e v is e d  O x fo rd  T ra n s la t io n ,  ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), VII-VIII.
258 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.3, sol.: “Sicut est de motu rerum naturalium, 
quod omnis motus ab immobili movente procedit [...] ita etiam oportet quod sit in processu rationis; 
cum enim ratio varietatem quamdam habeat, et quodammodo mobilis sit, secundum quod principia in 
conclusiones deducit, et in conferendo frequenter decipiatur; oportet quod omnis ratio ab aliqua 
cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem quamdam habeat...”
259 Ibid.: “[...] oportet quod omnis ratio ab aliqua cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et 
quietem quamdam habeat; quod non fit per discursum investigationis, sed subito intellectui offertur: 
sicut enim ratio in speculativis deducitur ab aliquibus principiis per se notis, quorum habitus intellectus 
dicitur; ita etiam oportet quod ratio practica ab aliquibus principiis per se notis deducatur, ut quod est 
malum non esse faciendum, praeceptis Dei obediendum fore, et sic de aliis: et horum quidem habitus 
est synderesis.”
260 D’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m , 33-34. Thomas overcomes the issue o f the 
non-permanent nature of a h a b itu s  raised in arg. 5 by declaring that a natural (as opposed to an 
acquired) h a b itu s  is never lost, and so just as the h a b itu s  of speculative principles remains, so it is also 
the case for s yn d e re s is  in the practical order. See Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.3, ad 5: 
“Habitus naturalis nunquam amittitur, sicut patet de habitu principiorum speculativorum, quem semper 
homo retinet; et simile est etiam de synderesi.”
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principles need to be learned through experience, but it is also innate, in that once the 
pump has been primed, as D’Arcy puts it,261 that is, once there is familiarity with the 
terms, “the truth of the principles is seen without discursive reasoning.”262 Thus, 
synderesis is the habitus of immediately-known first principles of practical reason. 
From the argumentation presented, Aquinas should stop there, but clearly it is still too 
early in his writing for him to resist the weight of past opinion. As a result, he now 
qualifies his conclusion with a double possibility: either synderesis is simply a habitus 
or a faculty with an innate habitus. Both Crowe and D’Arcy point out that there is 
no justification for the conclusion, except out of deference to past authors.264 
Moreoever, it is clear that Aquinas is uncomfortable with this accommodation, since 
there is no mention of faculty in his replies to objections.265
Elsewhere, St Thomas uses the neo-Platonic princple of participation, or 
continuity, to define synderesis. The idea, drawn from the Book o f  Divine Names of 
Pseudo-Dionysius, is that Divine Wisdom arranges the whole of creation in a
261 D’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m , 37. For helpful comments on the 
Aristotelian background to the innate-acquired complex regarding syn d e re s is  and first principles, see 
José Antonio G. Junceda, “La Sinderésis en el Pensamiento de Santo Tomás,” A u g u s tin u s  6 (1961): 
429-64, at 438-42.
262 Cf. D ’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m , 37; Aquinas, I n  11 S e n te n tia ru m , dist.
24, q.2, a.3, sol.: “Unde dico, quod synderesis a ratione practica distinguitur non quidem per 
substantiam potentiae, sed per habitum, qui est quodammodo innatus menti nostrae ex ipso lumine 
intellectus agentis, sicut et habitus principiorum speculativorum, ut, omne totum est majus sua parte, et 
hujusmodi; licet ad determinationem cognitionis eorum sensu et memoria indigeamus, ut in 2 Post, 
(ult.) dicitur. Et ideo statim cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur, ut in 1 Poster. (1) dicitur” (parentheses in 
text).
263 Aquinas, In  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 24, q.2, a.3, sol.: “Et ideo dico, quod synderesis vel 
habitum tantum nominat, vel potentiam saltern subjectam habitui sic nobis innato.”
264 D’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  F re e d o m , 37: “Nothing has prepared us for this; 
apparently Jerome’s ghost has not been laid [to rest]” (parethesis added). Crowe, “St. Thomas and 
S yn d e res is ,”  231. Here, Crowe says that the revised conclusion is more out o f respect for St Albert’s 
views, something which, I would say, should come as no surprise. Cf. Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t M o ra le ,
II, 223.
265 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S ynde res is ,” 231, n. 1 ; D’Arcy, C o n s c ie n c e  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  
F re e d o m , 37-38. Nevertheless, St Thomas maintains the possibility in the solution to the next article. 
See I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol.
266 Idem, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 39, q.3, a .l, sol.
267 S. Dionysius Areopagitae [Pseudo-Dionysius], D e  D iv in is  N o m in ib u s ,  VII, 3, PG 871, B 
(concerning how our minds can know of God): “quoniam ipsa [Sapientia], secundum Scripturam, est 
omnium effectrix, quaeque semper erat cuneta componens, et indissolubilis rerum omnium connexionis
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harmony (concordiam et consonantiam concinnat) in such a way that created beings 
are arranged “in an orderly series without any gaps -  in a hierarchy.”268 The “overlap” 
between the states of created order means that, at its highest point of development, 
“the inferior participates in some measure in the perfection of the superior,”269 namely 
the lowest point of development of the latter.270 Thus, Aquinas declares that the 
rational soul follows the angel in the order,271 and so, although generally the corporeal 
human being must search for truth by means of the senses, at its highest level, like the 
angels, the rational soul has an immediate apprehension of the first principles of 
nature, both in the speculative and practical spheres, without the need for
272investigation.
Both the Aristotelian and neo-Platonic arguments used by Aquinas place 
synderesis in the practical intellect, which shows that he is following St Albert’s 
teaching. This would also account for the occurrence of some Augustinian turns of 
phrase, for instance, when he talks of “the light of synderesis that can never be 
extinguished.” In the Commentary on the Sentences, St Thomas’s explanation of 
how synderesis functions is left to his article on conscientia, which in itself shows the 
intimate relationship between the two, operating within the faculty of practical reason. 
However, the fact that both operate within reason does not imply that St Thomas’s
ordinisque causa, semperque fines praecedentium cum principiis sequentium connectit, unicamque 
totius universi concordiam et consonantiam concinnat.”
268 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S ynderes is ,” 231.
269 Ibid.
270 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a .l, sol.: “Secundum Dionysium (De div. nom. 
7), divina sapientia coniungit prima secundorum ultimis primorum.”
271 Ibid.: “Inter creaturas autem tabs est ordo ut primo sit Angelus, et secundo sit rationalis
anima.”
272 Ibid.: “Oportet ergo quod in anima rationali, quae Angelo in ordine creaturarum 
configuratur, sit aliqua participatio intellectualis virtutis, secundum quam aliquam veritatem sine 
inquisitione apprehendat, sicut apprehenduntur prima principia naturaliter cognita tarn in speculativis 
quam etiam in operativis; unde et tabs virtus intellectus vocatur, secundum quod est in speculativis, 
quae etiam secundum quod in operativis est, synderesis dicitur.”
273 Ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a .l, ad 1: “lumen synderesis in se nunquam extinguitur.” Cf. Crowe, “St. 
Thomas and S y n d e re s is ,"  233. See also Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.19, a.4, resp.: “... lumen 
rationis, quod in nobis est, intantum potest nobis ostendere bona, et nostram voluntatem reguläre, 
inquantum est lumen vultus tui, idest a vultu tuo derivatimi.”
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position is overly intellectualist, to the exclusion of the will. On the contrary, as Billy 
points out, “by associating both synderesis and conscience with the practical intellect, 
Thomas establishes a close rapport between reason and will.”274 This is because the 
Angelic Doctor considers the operation of the will in moral matters to be connected to 
what the practical reason presents to it. Thus, in the moral realm, Thomas “sees 
voluntas as naturally drawn not toward the good in se, but as it is presented to it by 
the practical reason, with the good presented to the will by practical reason being 
either a bonum verum or a bonum apparens.”275 Given reason’s role in apprehending 
the good (or at least what appears to be good), for Thomas, this explains why the
274 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 241 (emphasis in text). Cf. Terence 
Kennedy, “L ’ldea di Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” in L a  C o sc ie n za  M o ra le  O g g i:  
O m a g g io  a l  P ro f.  D o m e n ic o  C a p o n e , ed. Marian Nalepa and Terence Kennedy, Quaestiones Morales, 
no. 3 (Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1987), 145-75, at 163: “ S yn d e re s is  e coscienza sono 
legate fra loro ontologicamente, tramite la ragione pratica” [ “ S ynde res is  and conscience are 
ontologically linked to each other by means of practical reason”]. Surprisingly, even though Aquinas 
saw conscience as the conclusion of a practical syllogism, as we shall see, and hence operating in the 
practical sphere of reason, Leo Elders is of the opinion that “the judgement of conscience concerns 
reason alone and not the practical intellect” [“le jugement de la conscience relève de la raison seule et 
non de l’intellect pratique”]. As such “it remains purely speculative,” operating only as “an appraisal of 
the morality of an act or its omission” prior to the final decision to act. I find Elders’ argumentation 
unconvincing. The fact that Aquinas saw the judgement of conscience as preceding the final affective 
choice of l ib e ru m  a rb it r iu m  should not imply that conscience does not belong to the practical order. 
However, Elders’ conclusion may be the result of an attempt to safeguard the rational objectivity of 
conscience, which he considered to be under threat. Cf. Léon Elders, “La doctrine de la conscience de 
saint Thomas d’Aquin,” R evue  T ho m is te  83 (1983): 533-557, at 533, 540-41; idem, “St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ Doctrine of Conscience,” in L e x  e t L ib e r ta s : F re e d o m  a n d  L a w  A c c o rd in g  to  St. T ho m a s  
A q u in a s :  P ro c e e d in g s  o f  th e  F o u r th  S ym pos ium  on  St. Thom as A q u in a s  ’ P h ilo s o p h y , R o ld u c ,
N o v e m b e r 8  a n d  9, 1 986 , ed. L.J. Elders and K. Hedwig, Studi Tomistici, no. 30 (Vatican City:
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1987), 125-134, at 125-27. Delhaye, quoting Noble, gives a far more 
balanced presentation o f this issue: “Although it [the judgement of conscience] is applied in the 
practical order, it assumes a ‘cognitive’ and speculative mode that is indifferent to the actual 
performace of the act.” Thus, the idea that conscience offers an objective moral appraisal o f the 
problem does not conflict with its place in the practical intellect. Cf. Delhaye, The C h r is t ia n  
C o n sc ie n ce , 169, quoting Henri-Dominique Noble, L a  consc ie n ce  m o ra le  (Paris: Lethielleux, 1923), 
54-55.
275 Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 241. Cf. Aquinas, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , 
dist. 39, q.3, a.3, sol.: “obiectum enim voluntatis est bonum vel malum secundum quod est imaginatum 
vel intellectum. [...] Unde cum actus voluntatis ex obiecto specificetur, oportet quod secundum rationis 
iudicium et conscientiae, voluntatis actus procédât: et per modum istum conscientia ligare dicitur. [...] 
et similiter si ratio diceret aliquod bonum esse malum, voluntas non potest in illud tendere, quin mala 




For Aquinas, as well as being the solid point of universal, natural first 
principles, synderesis is inextinguishable and innate,277 and has the task of inclining 
the individual to the good.278 1 would suggest that Thomas’s Aristotelian emphasis on 
immovability makes it difficult to see synderesis falling or being overthrown, and so 
he attributes any fault to a defect in the conclusion of conscience through false 
induction, or impulse of pleasure or passion. Hence the view of Albert and the 
Franciscan School that the sin of the lower powers might taint or impede the function 
of synderesis is firmly rejected by Aquinas.279 The one limitation Aquinas places on 
synderesis is its relationship to faith. As a result, a judgement of heresy is not within 
its ambit, since the light of synderesis relates to the universals of nature, and so does 
not include the supernatural order, neither at the general level, nor at the level of 
particulars of faith.280
Having established synderesis as the fixed point from which the moral act is 
set in motion, Thomas turns his attention to conscientia. This time, Aquinas follows 
Albert even more closely than before, by defining conscientia as an act rather than a
981 • •habitus or even a faculty. Thus, Aquinas defines conscience as an act of
reason has priority in the determination of the act, while the will has priority in
276 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.9, a .l, resp.; “D u p l ic i te r  autem aliqua vis animae 
invenitur esse in potentia ad diversa. U n o  m odo , quantum ad agere, vel non agere. A l io  m o d o , quantum 
ad agere hoc, vel illud. [...] indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad e x e rc it iu m  vel 
usum actus; et quantum ad d e te rm in a tio n e m  actus. [...] Et ideo isto modo motionis intellectus movet 
voluntatem, sicut praesentans ei obiectum suum” (emphases in text). Cf. Billy, “Conscience in 
Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 241.
277 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a .l, sol.: “haec superior rationis scintilla quae 
synderesis est, extingui non potest, sed semper repugnat omni ei quod contra principia naturaliter sibi 
indita est.”
278 Ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a .l, sed contra.
279 Ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a .l, ad 1: “Et ideo non dicit quod synderesis praecipitatur, sed quod 
conscientia praecipitatur.”
280 Ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a .l, ad 3. Cf. D’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  F re e d o m , 38.
281 Cf. Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  et m o ra le , II, 227-28; Elders, “La Doctrine de la Conscience de 
Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” 536-40; Aquinas, In  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol.: “quamdam
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• 9 89consideration made by the reason. The act of consideration in question is the
judgement made by conscience necessary to reach a syllogistic conclusion from the
premises presented by synderesis and reason.283 Here Aquinas follows his master in
using Aristotelian logic to describe the workings of conscience,284 and therefore
rehearses the application of the practical syllogism taught to him by Albert. However,
St Thomas’s explanatory example contains more detail than Albert’s, and focuses
upon a decision not to act:
All evil is to be avoided. (Major premise from synderesis)
Adultery is evil because (Minor premise from ratio superior)
it is prohibited by God’s law.
or
Adultery is evil because it is (Minor premise from ratio inferior)
unjust or dishonest.
285This adultery should be avoided. (Conclusion derived by conscientia)
The example shows that the specific minor premise is drawn from higher or 
lower reason. This shows that Aquinas accepted the Augustinian distinction, but
actualem considerationem.” This would be expressed even more clearly in his S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a  I, 
q.79, a. 13, resp: “conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus.”
282 Aquinas, In  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol.: “quamdam actualem considerationem 
rationis, per conscientiam, communiter loquentes intellegere videntur.” Cf. Crowe, “St. Thomas and 
S yn d e res is ,”  235, n.l (note the reference should be dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol, and not article 1 as cited). 
Crowe translates the Latin as an “actual consideration on the part of reason.” ‘Actual’ may be unclear 
to a modem reader, and so I have translated it as an act of consideration made by reason.
283 Note, once again, that Thomas is careful to distinguish the judgement of conscience from 
the final decision of l ib e ru m  a rb it r iu m  ( iu d ic iu m  e le c tio n ìs  l ib e r i  a rb i t r i ! ) ,  where the sinner can still 
choose to carry out an act (the affective conclusion) deemed sinful previously by his conscience (the 
cognitive conclusion). Cf. Aquinas, In  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 24, q.2, a.4, ad 2; Lottin, P s y c h o lo g ie  e t 
m o ra le , II, 228.
284 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol.: “Sicut in 6 Ethic. (8) Philosophus dicit, 
ratio in eligendis et fiigiendis, quisdam syllogismis utitur.” See Aristotle, N ic h o m a c h e a n  E th ic s ,  VI, 8,
1142a 22-23: “deliberation may be in error about either the universal or the particular.” Book Seven 
contains Aristotle’s expansion upon this statement in the context of incontinence and its effects on the 
use of knowledge in practical inference. See Aristotle, N ic h o m a c h e a n  E th ic s ,  VII, 3-6, at 1147a 1-18,
1147a 27, 1147b 3-9, 1149a 33. The detail is then drawn upon by Thomas I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 39, 
q.2, aa. 1 -2. For a detailed description of the debate over the nature of the breakdown of the practical 
syllogism or inference in an individual in the state of a k ra s ia ,  or incontinence, see Mark Sultana S e lf-  
D e c e p tio n  a n d  A k ra s ia :  A  C o m p a ra tiv e  C o n c e p tu a l A n a ly s is ,  Analecta Gregoriana, no. 300 (Rome: 
Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2006), 285-303.
285 Aquinas, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol.
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Crowe points out that it is of less importance to him than previous writers. The reason 
for this is that he does not separate the two in terms of different objects (eternal and 
earthly things); rather he distinguishes them as two ways of thinking about the same 
thing (according to God’s law or according to use and/or dignity).286
St Thomas’s assessment of conscientia as an act of reason is the basis for his 
conclusion that conscientia can err by means of a faulty application of the general
787 •knowledge. Thus, while the major premise of the practical syllogism is “immune 
from error,” neither the content of the minor premise nor the process of reaching a 
conclusion are similarly blessed.288 In terms of errors of application, Thomas 
distinguishes varying levels of principle. As has already been noted, the Angelic 
Doctor specified synderesis as the preserve of self-evident principles pertaining to 
action (principia per se nota). However, he also points out that we require 
intermediate principles, which are the source for the minor premises that enable us to 
reach a particular conclusion. These principles derived from rational discourse or 
through an assent of faith (principia appropriata) are not self-evident, and so can be
♦ 78Qsubject to error. Thus, if conscientia is purely the result of a syllogistic application 
of principles, then in the case of faulty information, the judgement of conscience will 
undoubtedly be faulty.
286 Ibid., dist. 24, q.2, a.2, sol.: “Unde ex hoc patet quod ratio superior, prout contra inferiorem 
dividitur, non distat ab ea sicut speculativum et practicum, quasi ad diversa obiecta respiciant, de 
quibus fíat ratiocinatio; s e d  m a g is  d is t in g u u n tu r  secundum  m ed ia , unde  r a t io c in a t io  s u m itu r ;  ratio enim 
inferior consiliatur ad electionem tendens ex rationibus rerum temporalium, ut quod aliquid est 
superfluum vel diminutum, utile vel honestum, et sic de aliis conditionibus quas moralis philosophus 
pertractat; superior vero consilium sumit ex rationibus aetemis et divinis, ut quia est contra praeceptum 
Dei, vel eius offensionem parit, vel aliquid huiusmodi” (emphasis mine).
287 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a.2, sol.: “contingit in conscientia errorem esse 
propter hoc quod ratio decipitur in principiis appropriatis.”
288 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S yn d e re s is ,"  235. Cf. Aquinas, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 39, q.3, 
a.2, ad 2. Aquinas will comment on errors of process in D e  V e rtía te , q. 17, a.2, resp.
289 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a.2, sol.: “Haec autem propria principia non sunt 
per se nota naturaliter sicut principia communia: sed innotescunt vel per inquisitionem rationis, vel per 
assensum fidei [...] ideo circa ista principia contingit errare.”
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This description of error in reasoning and perception also forms the root to 
Aquinas’s analysis of whether erroneous conscience binds the individual: erroneous 
conscience is binding per accidens. In other words, the will is obliged to act 
depending upon the condition of the person’s conscience. Conscience does not oblige 
the will to act wrongfiilly per  se: the will is bound per accidens by what reason 
apprehends as good.290 Obviously, the context is that of the reason mistaking evil for 
good in good faith, and in moral certainty. In this situation the intention of the 
individual’s conscience remains intact: to do good, to do God’s will, and so one is 
obliged to act upon this erroneous judgement of conscience, since it is still 
intentionally understood that one is acting in accord with God’s will.291 In making this 
distinction, Aquinas is highlighting the importance of the intention of an act in
9Q9defining its moral quality. Thus, even in cases of material error, one may still judge
290 Ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a.3, sol.: “Sed conscientia erronea non obligat nisi per accidens, et 
secundum quid: si enim dictet aliquid esse faciendum, illud fieri in se consideratum, non est bonum 
necessarium ad salutem, sed apprehenditur ut bonum: et ideo cum non liget nisi secundum quod est 
bonum, non obligatur voluntas per se ad hoc, sed per accidens, scilicet ratione apprehensionis, qua 
judicatur bonum.: et ideo si fiat aliquid quod est secundum se malum, quod errans ratio judicat bonum, 
peccatum non evitat; si autem non fiat, peccatum incurritur: quia unus defectus bonitatis sufficit ad hoc 
quod aliquid dicatur malum, sive desit bonitas quae est per accidens, secundum quod res apprehenditur 
in ratione boni, sive bonitas quae est rei per se; sed si sit altera tantum, scilicet quae est per accidens, 
non propter hoc erit actus bonus.” Cf. Aquinas, Q ua es tio n e s  Q u o d lib e ta le s , in O p e ra  O m n ia , voi. 9 
(New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949; reprint of 1852-1873 Parma ed.), Q u o d lib e tu m  III, a.27, resp.: 
“Et ideo actus humanus iudicatur virtuosus vel vitiosus secundum bonum apprehensum, in quod per se 
voluntas fertur, et non secundum materialem obiectum actus: sicut si aliquis credens occidere patrem, 
occidat cervum, incurrit parricidii peccatum; et e contrario si quis venator putans occidere cervum, 
debita diligentia adhibita, occidat casualiter patrem, immunis est a parricidii crimine. (Note other 
editions use the questions to divide up the articles. Hence, Q u o d lib e tu m  III, a.27 is also Q u o d lib e tu m  
III, q.12, a.2.)
291 Cf. Delhaye, T he  C h r is t ia n  C onsc ience , 181-82.
292 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n tia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a.3, sed contra 3 and sol., at sol.: “Intentionem 
autem boni ve! mali ratio ipsa demonstrat. Unde cum actus voluntatis ex objecto specificetur, oportet 
quod secundum rationis judicium et conscientiae, voluntatis actus procedat: et per modum istum 
conscientia ligare dicitur.” Vereecke points out that Peter Abelard was the first to propose a morality of 
intention, whereby a good act is understood as having proceeded from a good intention. This theory 
influenced subsequent writers, including Albert, Bonaventure and Aquinas, although the theory was 
significantly refined in different ways, particularly with regard to what extent blame and sin could be 
apportioned to an individual, in the case of an objectively evil act. Cf. Louis Vereecke, “Coscienza in 
S. Alfonso,” in M o ra le  e R edenz ione , ed. Lorenzo Alvarez Verdes and Sabatino Majorano, Quaestiones 
Morales, no. 1 (Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1983), 169-83, at 172-73; Albert the Great, 
S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a ,  II, tract. 22, q. 138, memb. 2, ad 1: “intèndo confert aliquid bonitati, sed non totam 
bonitatem. Sed cum sit radix boni operis, influit bonitatem suam super opus, sed non totam operis 
bonitatem, sicut quaelibet causa influit suam causalitatem super causatum.”
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onself to be doing no wrong, and so be bound to follow one’s conscience in the 
matter.293 Indeed, St Thomas states that if one rejects the judgement of erroneous 
conscience, even in the case of truly misjudging grave matter, such as fornication, 
then one sins, since one is acting aginst that which is presumed to be the herald of 
God’s law, and therefore acting in contempt of God.294
The next obvious question regarding St Thomas’s analysis is whether a person 
in material error, but with good intention, has sinned by following the dictate of 
conscience. The Angelic Doctor’s answer bears a certain resemblance to that 
proposed by St Bonaventure. Thus, even if the individual has remained in good faith, 
Thomas declares that if the act is evil in itself then the person does not avoid sin, that 
is, some measure of subjective guilt will apply, yet, the individual still sins if he/she 
does not follow the dictate of conscience,295 since a thing only requires a single defect 
in goodness for it to be bad. In that case, the defect would be carrying out an act 
that lacked the per accidens perceived goodness, which the act deemed right by
293 Aquinas, In  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a.3, sol.: “et ideo sive ratio sive conscientia recte 
judicet, sive non, voluntas obligatur hoc modo, quod si judicium vel dictamen rationis, quod est 
conscientia, non sequitur actus voluntatis, inordinatus est; et hoc est obligare, scilicet astringere 
voluntatem, ut non possit sine deformitatis nocumento in aliud tendere, sicut ligatus non potest ire.” 
[therefore whether reason or conscience judges correctly or not, the will is obliged in this way: that if 
the act of will does not follow the judgement or dictate of reason, which is conscience, it is disordered; 
and it is this which obliges, that is, binds the will, such that it cannot tend to something other without 
the injury of deformity, just as someone who is bound cannot move.] Cf. Aquinas, Q u o d lib e tu m  III, 
a.27, resp.: “Et ideo dicendum est quod omnis conscientia, sive recta, sive errónea, sive in per se malis, 
sive in indifferentibus, est obligatoria; ita quod qui contra conscientiam facit, peccat.” [“And therefore 
it is to be stated that every conscience, whether right or wrong, whether it concerns a things evil in 
themselves or indifferent matters, obliges us, such that the one who acts against his conscience sins.”] 
Cf. Patrick Hannon, M o r a l  D e c is io n  M a k in g ,  ed. Eoin G. Cassidy and Patrick M. Devitt (Dublin: 
Veritas, 2005), 48-49. Vereecke points out that this view differed from that proposed by the first 
Franciscan scholars, who said that the obligation to follow one’s conscience related only to morally 
indifferent acts, and not to those which are intrinsically evil. See Vereecke, “Coscienza in S. Alfonso,” 
173.
294 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, a.3, arg. 3, sed contra and ad 3. In the third reply 
to objections, St Thomas compares the relationship between conscience and God to that of a prince 
passing on the commands of a king. Thus even if the prince lies, the people are to obliged to follow, 
since it is still understood as having been commanded by the king, and therefore deserving of 
obedience.
295 Ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a.3, sol.: “et ideo si fiat aliquid quod est secundum se malum, quod 
errans ratio judicat bonum, peccatum non evitat; si autem non fiat, peccatum incurritur.”
296 Ibid.: “quia unus defectus bonitatis sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid dicatur malum, sive desit 
bonitas quae est per accidens, secundum quod res apprehenditur in ratione boni, sive bonitas quae est 
rei per se; sed si sit altera tantum, scilicet quae est per accidens, non propter hoc erit actus bonus.”
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conscience had possessed. In other words, like Bonaventure, he judges that such an 
act would lack moral integrity. Later in his third Quodlibet he would expand upon this 
to say that ignorance of God’s law does not excuse a misdeed, except in the case of 
the mad and the insane, whose ignorance is so invincible that they are completely
• 7Q7excused from sin.
Thus, Aquinas judges that an individual sins both in the context of evil 
intention (intentione mala stante), where one rejects what is perceived to be good, and 
in the situation of an erroneous conscience {stante erronea conscientia) where one
• • 708acts upon its bad judgement. This means that one is blameworthy of a wrong act in 
an erroneous state of moral certainty and also in a state of perplexity, where one’s 
view is challenged. Aquinas admits the possibility of perplexity, but concludes that 
one should not remain perplexed, any more than one should continue to act under a 
bad intention.299 Thus, like Bonaventure, Thomas concludes that the way out of this 
sinful dilemma is to eliminate the error.300 Indeed, Kennedy concludes that Aquinas 
would have seen the obligation to follow an erroneous conscience, despite its sinful 
consequences, as neither a real contradiction nor a true dilemma, “since the 
‘perplexed’ man has the power to get rid of his error.”301 Kennedy identifies this as an 
act of conversion,302 a view that is supported by Thomas’s comment in the third
297 Aquinas, Q u o d lib e tu m  III, a.27, ad 2: “si alicui dictat conscientia ut faciat illud quod est 
contra legem Dei, si non faciat, peccat; et similiter si faciat, peccat: quia ignorantia iuris non excusat a 
peccato, nisi forte sit ignorantia invincibilis, sicut est in furiosis et amentibus; quae omnino excusat.”
298 Aquinas, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 39, q.3, a.3, ad 5.
299 Ibid.: “simpliciter nullus perplexus est, absolute loquendo.”
300 Ibid.: “Sed potest homo conscientiam erroneam, sicut et intentionem pravam, deponere; et 
ideo simpliciter non est perplexus.” Cf. idem, Q u o d lib e tu m  III, a.27, ad 2: “Potest enim erroneam 
conscientiam deponere, et tunc faciens secundum legem Dei non peccat.”
301 Kennedy, “L ’Idea di Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” 168: “l’uomo ‘perplesso’ ha 
il potere di sbarazzarsi del suo errore.” St Thomas’s emphasis on man’s capability o f escaping 
perplexity leads me to think that Dennis Billy has exaggerated Aquinas’s acceptance that perplexity 
can occur and persist. See Billy, “Conscience in Bonaventure and Aquinas,” 257: “One gets the distinct 
impression that, for Bonaventure, an erroneous conscience would even be easy to change. Thomas, on 
the other hand, gives the impression that an erroneous conscience can be difficult to change and can 
even endure for a long time.”
302 Kennedy, “L ’Idea di Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” 168.
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Quodlibet, when he says that an individual would act without sin after having done 
penance. Therefore, we can see that Aquinas presents a thorough analysis in his 
Commentary on the Sentences. We shall now examine his later comments to see if 
they are consistent, or whether, like St Albert, they change with time.
6 .2  Q u a e s t io n e s  D is p u ta ta e  d e  V er ita te
The views proffered by St Thomas in his De Veritate are the fruit of a series of 
discussions, or disputationes ordinariae, which, along with the quodlibetales, he was 
obliged to organise for the benefit of his students.304 The analyses of synderesis and 
conscientia are very similar in approach and content to those presented in his 
Commentary on the Sentences, though far more thorough in their detail.
Having acknowledged the range of views on the nature of synderesis,305 
Aquinas draws once more from the neo-Platonic doctrine of participation as presented 
by Pseudo-Dyonisius in order to define synderesis. The soul participates in angelic 
nature’s capacity for reaching the truth without investigation, at least to the extent of 
being able to know both speculative and practical first principles, albeit with the aid 
of the senses.306 Thus, synderesis is the habitual knowledge of first principles of
303 Aquinas, Q u o d lib e tu m  III, a.27, ad 2 (talking of a priest who has to sing at the liturgy while 
in a state of sin): “nee tamen est simpliciter perplexus, quia potest poenitentiam agere, et absque 
peccato cantare.”
304 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S ynde res is ,” 236. These debates differed from d is p u ta tio n e s  de  
q u o d l ib e t , which did not have a set question, as a bachelor was asked to prepare the s ta tu s  q u a e s tio n is  
in advance.
305 St Thomas Aquinas, Q u a es tio n e s  D is p u ta ta e  de V e rita te , in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol. 9 (New 
York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949; reprint of 1852-1873 Parma ed.), q.16, a .l, argg.1-16 and resp.; at 
resp.: “circa hanc quaestionem diversae inveniuntur opiniones.” For an English translation, see St. 
Thomas Aquinas, T ru th ,  vol. 2, Q u e s tion s  1 0 -2 0 , trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1994; reprint of 1954 ed. published by Henry Regnery).
306 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q. 16, a .l, resp.
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• 307 •action, which acts as a “seedbed” for all subsequent particular thought in the
♦ 308practical order. It seems that Aquinas is now even more confident in shaking off 
past, faculty-based definitions by clearly weighting his definition of synderesis in 
favour of it being a natural habitus, which always inclines to good.309 However, he 
still feels obliged to accept the possibility that it is a particular power of reason with a
• • 3 1 0habitus of principles. The distinction is so slight that St Thomas has to admit that
311“it makes little difference,” giving us leave to shift our attention to its other 
characteristics and functions.
Having rehearsed his neo-Platonic argument to describe the content of 
synderesis, in the next article he returns to the Aristotelian notion ofprimum immobile 
to discuss the infallibility of synderesis. As in the Commentary on the Sentences, he 
concludes that all changeable things depend upon some first unchangeable thing, and 
that there would be no stability or certainty in nature if principles were not 
unchangeable and permanent.312 Thus, Aquinas asserts the permanence in synderesis’ 
role of inclining to the good and rejecting evil, which means that it cannot err or sin in
307 Ibid.: “Sicut igitur humanae animae est quidam habitus naturalis quo principia 
speculativarum scientiarum cognoscit, quern vocamus intellectum principiorum; ita etiam in ea est 
quidam habitus naturalis primorum principiorum operabilium, quae sunt universalia principia iuris 
naturalis; qui quidem habitus ad synderesim pertinet.” Cf. Aquinas, T ru th , q.16, a .l, reply: “Thus, just 
as there is a natural habit of the human soul through which it knows principles, so, too, there is in the 
soul a natural habit of the first principles of action, which are the universal principles of the natural 
law. This habit pertains to synderesis.”
308 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.16, a .l, resp.: “quasi seminarium quoddam totius cognitionis 
sequentis.”
309 Ibid., q.16, a .l, ad 7: “synderesis ex habitu aliquo naturali habet quod semper ad bonum 
inclinet.”
310 Ibid., q. 16, a. 1, resp.: “Restat igitur ut hoc nomen synderesis vel nominet absolute habitum 
naturalem similem habitui principiorum, vel nominet ipsam potentiam rationis cum tali habitu.”
311 Aquinas, T ru th , q.16, a .l, reply. Cf. idem, D e  V e rita te , q.16, a .l, resp.: “Et quodcumque 
horum fuerit, non multum differt; quia hoc non facit dubitationem nisi circa nominis significationem.” 
D’Arcy observes that in this remark Aquinas “seems to show his dissatisfaction” with having to 
accommodate the traditional faculty view once more. See D’Arcy, C o n s c ie n c e  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  
F re e d o m , 41.
312 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.16, a.2, resp.: “principia enim manere oportet, ut dicitur in I Phys. 
Non enim posset esse aliqua firmitas vel certitudo in his quae sunt a principiis, nisi ipsa principia essent 
firmiter stabilita. Et inde est quod omnia mutabilia reducuntur ad aliquid primum immobile.”
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providing first principles of action.313 Indeed, as was noted earlier, he states that the 
error arises in a mistake in application of the first principles on account of a false 
deduction or a false assumption.314
St Thomas then proceeds to make some helpful insights on the matter of 
whether synderesis can be extinguished. In his reply he distinguishes its existence 
(iquantum ad lumen habitúale) from its operation {quantum ad actio), such that 
although the habitual light of synderesis cannot be extinguished, as it belongs to the 
nature of the soul itself, its operation can be disabled or effectively destroyed. This 
can happen in two ways. Firstly, an act or operation of synderesis (actus synderesis) 
can be completely obstructed {omnino intercipitur), effectively extinguished in its 
possibility, by means of a loss of free choice or use of reason through injury to the 
organs upon which reason relies for its information.316 Secondly, the operation of 
synderesis can be deflected towards its contrary. This does not extinguish the 
operation altogether, as in the first case, but destroys its effectiveness in particular
o t nacts when one sins in one’s moral choice. In such a case concupiscence or another 
passion overwhelms reason, such that the universal principles of synderesis are not
313 Ibid.: “Unde et in operibus humanis, [...] oportet esse aliquod principium permanens, quod 
rectitudinem immutabilem habeat [...]. Et haec est synderesis, cuius officium est remurmurare malo, et 
inclinare ad bonum; et ideo concedimus quod in ea peccatum esse non potest.” This fundamental 
attribute of syn d e re s is  as being infallible leads Junceda to define it as a “perfect habitus”. See Junceda, 
“La Sinderésis en el Pensamiento de Santo Tomás,” 449: “diremos que la sindéresis es un hábito 
perfecto, esto es, en el cual no cabe error, no cabe peccado.”
314 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.16, a.2, ad 1, 2 and 6.
315 Ibid., q.16, a.3, resp.: “Uno modo quantum ad ipsum lumen habitúale; et sic impossibile est 
quod synderesis extinguatur: sicut impossibile est quod anima hominis privetur lumine intellectus 
agentis, per quod principia prima et in speculativis et in operativis nobis innotescunt; hoc enim lumen 
est de natura ipsius animae, cum per hoc sit intellectualis.”
316 Ibid.: “Uno modo ut dicatur actus synderesis extinguí, in quantum actus synderesis omnino 
intercipitur. Et sic contingit actum synderesis extinguí in non habentibus usum liberi arbitrii, neque 
aliquem usum rationis: et hoc propter impedimentum proveniens ex laesione organorum corporalium, a 
quibus ratio nostra accipere indiget.”
317 Ibid.: “Alio modo per hoc quod actus synderesis ad contrarium deflectatur. Et sic 
impossibile est in universali iudicium synderesis extinguí; in particulari autem operabili extinguitur 
quandocumque peccatur in eligendo.”
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• 31 £ —applied to the particular act, and so one sins. In short, Aquinas concludes that 
although synderesis is never extinguished absolutely, it is extinguished in some
319respects.
In his analysis of conscientia, St Thomas begins by reviewing comments and 
views from tradition which would suggest that it is a habitus, and contrast these with 
evidence which would define conscientia as an act. Acknowledging a common 
triple distinction, made especially by the Franciscans, St Thomas then rehearses the 
varied uses of the term conscientia, indicating that its root meaning relates to sense 
knowledge, that is, being conscious of an act, or aware of a past event through
399 . o omemory. It is only in its subsequent uses that it concerns moral awareness. It is here 
we find a summary of the functions of the moral conscientia, clearly identifying its 
dual role of operating before and after an action.323 In the former, conscientia is 
involved in deliberation and examination of the right course of action, prodding, 
urging or binding the person to carry it out (instigare, vel indue ere, vel ligare)', in the 
latter it is involved in examination, or evaluation, of the act that has been carried out, 
accusing or excusing the individual accordingly (accusare vel remordere... defendere
318 Ibid.: “Vis enim concupiscentiae aut alterius passionis ita rationem absorbet, ut in eligendo 
universale synderesis iudicium ad particularem actum non applicetur.” Later Aquinas also includes 
vicious habits as factors which can stifle reason such that the person does not make a choice in accord 
with the general principles of synde res is . Cf. ibid., q.16, a.3, ad 1 and 3.
319 Ibid., q.16, a.3, resp.: “Sed hoc non est extingui synderesim simpliciter, sed secundum quid 
tantum. Unde simpliciter loquendo, concedimus quod synderesis nunquam extinguitur.”
320 Ibid., q.17, a .l, arg 1-14. Note that although the content is the same, the numbering in this 
question varies from edition to edition.
321 Ibid., q.17, a .l, resp.: “Dicendum, quod quidam dicunt conscientiam tripliciter dici.” 
McGlynn says that this threefold distinction in the meanings of c o n s c ie n tia  is understood to have been 
common among medievals. For example, Bonaventure, I n  I IS e n te n t ia rn m ,  dist.39, a .l, q. 1, resp. For a 
list of further examples, see McGlynn’s note in Aquinas, T ru th , page 449, n.14.
322 Aquinas, D e  V e n ta te , q.17, a .l, resp.:“in prima applicatione qua applicato scientia ad 
actum ut sciato  an factum sit, est applicato ad actum particularem notitiae sensitivae, ut memoriae, 
per quam eius quod factum est, recordamur; vel sensus, per quern hunc particularem actum quern nunc 
agimus, percipimus.”
323 Ibid.: “Sed in secunda et tertia applicatione, qua consiliamur quid agendum sit, vel 
examinamus iam facta, applicantur ad actum habitus rationis operativi, scilicet habitus synderesis et 
habitus sapientiae, quo perficitur superior ratio, et habitus scientiae, quo perficito ratio inferior; sive
simul omnes applicentur, sive alter eorum tantum.”
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autem vel excusare). Aquinas therefore concludes that in all three modes of use, 
conscientia is an act, that is, an act of application of knowledge,325 which in the two 
moral uses, occasions the deliberation or examination of what should be or what was 
done.326 Thus, “conscience is neither a power [faculty] nor a habit, but an act.”327
3 2 4
Aquinas then tackles the now familiar question of whether conscience can err. 
Here his answer is based upon his description of how conscience functions as an act 
of application of knowedge. He states that this application is made syllogistically (or 
at least analogous to the syllogistic process), since in order to allow the general 
principles of synderesis to reach the particular moral situation, they must be combined 
with a minor premise taken from higher or lower reason. However, such application 
is not without its flaws. In the Commentary on the Sentences he highlighted errors of 
content. Here he points out that that “mistakes can happen in two ways: either from 
the use of false premises, or from faulty construction of the syllogism.”329 Yet, unlike 
St Albert in his later writings, St Thomas does not admit any error in the major 
premise taken from synderesis, but only ascribes an error of content to the minor
325 Ibid.: “Nomen enim conscientiae signiflcat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid.”
326 Ibid.: “Examinatio tamen non solum est de factis, sed etiam de faciendis; sed consilium est 
de faciendis tantum.”
327 Aquinas, T ru th ,  q.17, a .l, ad 9 (parenthesis added). Cf. idem D e  V e r ita te , q.17, a .l, ad 9: 
“conscientia nec est potentia nee habitus, sed actus.” I have included by ‘power’ and ‘faculty’ as both 
are commonly used to translate p o te n t ia .  In this same paragraph, Aquinas concludes that the act of 
conscience does not exist in one who is asleep. Given the fact that the mind certainly operates during 
sleep, sometimes with powerful consequences in the choice of future action, or in recognising fault in 
past actions, I am not so sure that no act of conscience exists in sleep. Given that Thomas defined 
c o n s c ie n tia  in syllogistic terms it is perhaps surprising that he excludes the possibility of its operation, 
since he admitted the possibility that the mind continues to syllogise even while asleep. Indeed, the fact 
that he thought the syllogism in sleep is likely to be flawed would not be sufficient cause to deny the 
existence of an act of conscience, since Thomas accepts that we are able to make errors of conscience 
while we are awake. Cf. idem, S um m a T h e o lo g ica , I, q.84, a.8, ad 2.
328 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.17, a.2, resp.:“ non potest applicari iudicium synderesis ad actum, 
nisi fiat assumptio alicuius particularis, quam quidem particularem quandoque subministrat ratio 
superior, quandoque vero ratio inferior; et sic conscientia perficitur quasi quodam syllogismo 
particulari.”
329 Aquinas, T ru th , q.17, a.2, resp.; idem, D e  V e rita te , q. 17, a.2, resp.: “Sicut etiam in 
syllogizando contingit peccatum dupliciter: vel ex eo quod quis falsis utitur, vel ex eo quod non recte 
syllogizat.”
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premise taken from reason.330 As to error in logical process Thomas concludes that, 
just as in speculative formal logic one can stray from the sound form of 
argumentation, hence compromising the validity of the syllogism, so this can also 
occur in practical syllogisms.331
To the general question of the binding nature of conscience, the reply given by 
the Angelic Doctor in De Veritate is straight and to the point: “without doubt, 
conscience is binding.” However, here he introduces a study of the metaphorical 
use of binding in order to explore how conscience binds the will to act. In the spiritual 
realm, to bind something means to impose a necessity, that is, to make something 
happen.333 Just as someone is restrained physically by means of something coming 
into contact with him or her, such that the person is obliged to follow or rendered 
immobile, so in the spiritual realm the will cannot be constrained to act unless 
something comes into contact with it, namely, an act of the intellect: a communication 
of a precept. Hence one is bound by a precept (communicated by conscience) through 
knowledge of that precept:
Therefore, one who is not capable of the knowledge of a precept is not bound by 
the precept. Nor is one who is ignorant of a precept bound to carry out that precept 
except in so far as he is required to know it. If, however, he is not required to 
know it, and does not know it, he is in no way bound by the precept. Thus, as in 
physical things the physical agent acts only by means of contact, so in spiritual 
things a precept only binds by means of knowledge. [...] Consequently, since 
conscience is nothing else but the application of knowledge to an act, it is obvious 
that conscience is said to bind by the power of a divine precept.334
330 Ibid., D e  V e rita te , q. 17, a.2, resp.:
331 Ibid.: “Ex hoc autem quod non recto modo applicatio fiat, etiam in conscientia error 
contingit; quia sicut in syllogizando in speculativis contingit formam debitam argumentandi 
praetermitti, et ex hoc in conclusione accidere falsitatem: ita etiam contingit in syllogismo qui in 
operabilibus requiritur, ut dictum est.”
332 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.17, a.3, resp.: “conscientia procul dubio ligat.”
333 ibid.: “quod ligatio metaphorice a corporalibus ad spiritualia assumpta necessitatis 
impositionem importai.”
334 Translation from Aquinas, T ru th , q.17, a.3, resp. Cf. idem, D e  V e r ita te , q.17, a.3, resp.: 
“Unde nullus ligatur per praeceptum aliquod nisi mediante scientia illius praecepti. Et ideo ille qui non
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Clearly, as well as showing the connection between knowledge and obligation, 
this passage also raises the issue of ignorance and whether a lack of knowledge of a 
precept is excusable.335 Aquinas is stating that there are certain things which we are 
“required to know,” and as such error regarding these matters would be inexcusable. 
Patrick Hannon observes that Aquinas arrives at this view because he “found it 
difficult to think that one might bona fide be mistaken about or ignorant of the moral
•5 o r
law.” As a result, St Thomas concludes that conscience cannot err with regard to 
propositions such as “I ought to love God” or “evil should not be done,” by thinking 
that the opposite is acceptable, since general principles of synderesis are directly 
applied to the particular circumstance in these instances, such that both the major and 
minor premises are self-evident, given that the minor premise contains ideas from the 
major premise, which are even expressed in the same terms.337 Obviously this raises 
the thorny question of the content of synderesis and its accessibility, which we shall 
attempt to explore in the next chapter. In the meantime, assuming his view on the 
matter of that which we are able and required to know, we arrive at Aquinas’s
est capax notitiae praecepti, non ligatur praecepto; nec aliquis ignorans praeceptum dicitur esse Iigatus 
ad praeceptum faciendum, nisi quatenus tenetur scire praeceptum. Si autem non teneatur scire, nec 
sciat, nullo modo ex praecepto ligatur. Sicut igitur in corporalibus agens corporale non agit nisi per 
contactum, ita in spiritualibus praeceptum non ligat nisi perscientiant. [,..] Unde, cum conscientia nihil 
aliud sit quam applicatio notitiae ad actum, constat quod conscientia ligare dicitur in vi praecepti 
divini.”
335 Cf. also Aquinas, Q u o d lib e ta  Vili, q.6, a.5, resp.; IX, q.7, a.2, resp.
336 Hannon, M o r a l  D e c is io n  M a k in g , 55, n. 3.337 * /  - .Aquinas, D e  V e n ta te , q.17, a.2, resp.: “Sciendum tamen, quod in quibusdam conscientia 
nunquam errare potest; quando scilicet actus il le particularis ad quern conscientia applicatur, habet de 
se universale iudicium in synderesi. Sicut enim in speculativis non contingit errare circa particulares 
conclusiones quae directe sub principiis universaiibus assumuntur in eisdem terminis, ut in hoc quod 
est, hoc totum esse maius sua parte, nullus decipitur; sicut nec in hoc, omne totum est maius sua parte; 
ita etiam nec in hoc quod est, Deum a me non esse diligendum, vel, aliquod malum esse faciendum, 
nulla conscientia errare potest; eo quod inutroque syllogismo, tarn speculabilium quam operabilium, et 
maior est per se nota, utpote in universali iudicio existens; et minor etiam in qua idem de se ipso 
praedicatur particulariter; ut cum dicitur: omne totum est maius sua parte. Hoc totum est totum. Ergo 
est maius sua parte.” Aquinas concludes here with a speculative example o f the whole being greater 
than its part. Perhaps it would help to spell out one of his moral examples. Thus: “All evil is to be 
avoided; this is an evil; therefore it is to be avoided.” This would exclude the validity of the statement 
“some evil should be done”. What the self-evident minor premise might be in the case o f “I should love 
God” is harder to fathom, given that there is a non-self-evident act of faith involved. As a result, it may 
be “You are (my) God; therefore I should love you.” We shall return to the question of self-evident 
principles in the next chapter.
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conclusion that an erroneous conscience is insufficient grounds to absolve an 
individual from sin if the issue should have been known in the first place.338
Aquinas repeats this conclusion in his next article dedicated specifically to the 
binding force of an erroneous conscience.339 Although presented with greater 
explanatory detail, his analysis of how erroneous conscience binds the will is identical 
to that found in his Commentary on the Sentences, concluding that false conscience 
binds only per accidens, on account of the false understanding.340 Correct conscience 
binds on account of the good nature of the act in itself, while erroneous conscience 
binds because of an extrinsic reason: the perceived goodness of an act which is bad in 
itself.341 This forms the basis for an important distinction: objectively correct 
conscience binds absolutely, without qualification, in every circumstance, while 
objectively false conscience binds only conditionally, that is, upon the condition of 
the subject continuing under the misapprehension that the evil act is in fact good.342 
This conditional limitation on one’s duty to follow one’s wrong conscience offers an 
escape from sin and hence the opportunity to grow in virtue,343 since if one were 
obliged absolutely to abide by the judgement of an erroneous conscience, even though 
one now knew that the judgement was surely wrong, one would have the desperate 
situation of being obliged to do something that is knowingly sinful.
338 Ibid., q.17, a.3, ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod tunc conscientia erronea non sufficit ad 
absolvendum, quando in ipso errore peccat, ut quando errat circa ea quae scire tenetur. Si autem esset 
error circa ea quae quis non tenetur scire, ex conscientia sua absolvitur; sicut patet in eo qui ex 
ignorantia facti peccat, ut cum quis accedit ad alienam uxorem, quam credit suam.”
339 Ibid., q.17, a.4, ad 3.
340 Ibid., q.17, a.4, resp.: “Dico etiam quod conscientia recta per se ligat, erronea autem per 
accidens.”
341 Aquinas, T ru th , q.17, a.4, resp. ‘ Intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic reason’ are not literally found in 
Aquinas’s original Latin text, but seem to be a useful dynamic equivalent in McGlynn’s text.
,42 Ibid.: “Dico autem rectam ligare simpliciter, quia ligat absolute et in omnem eventum. [...] 
Sed conscientia erronea non ligat nisi secundum quid quia sub conditione.”
543 Ibid.: “Hie enim cui dictat conscientia quod teneatur ad fomicandum, non est obligatus ut 
fomicationem sine peccato dimittere non possit, nisi sub hac conditione, si talis conscientia duret. H a e c  
au tem  c o n d ic io  r e m o v e r i p o te s t  e t absque  p e c c a to . Unde talis conscientia non obligat in omnem 
eventum (emphasis mine).”
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Change in one’s understanding is dependant upon probability, doubt and 
external counsel. Thus, “when conscience is not probable, it should be changed.”344 
This leads Delhaye to draw from Aquinas that if the individual “has the slightest 
doubt, he must interrupt his action, think about it and ask for advice.345 However, 
what should one do if one disagrees with the advice given by Church authority? St 
Thomas’s understanding is that, in indifferent matters, the bond of conscience is more 
binding than the command of a superior, since conscience binds through its 
conformity to a divine command (whether real or perceived), either in the form of a 
written law or on the basis of the natural law that is inherent to us.346 Therefore, since 
a divine precept is more binding than the command of a prelate or superior, the 
command of conscience binds more strongly than that of the superior, even in the case 
when the superior has commanded the contrary.347 However, Aquinas does make a 
distinction between correct and erroneous conscience. Correct conscience binds 
simply and perfectly, such that to reject it to follow the command of the prelate would 
be a sin. Indeed its binding force is such that one is free from sin, regardless of what 
the prelate commands, if one follows it.348 On the other hand, erroneous conscience is
344 Aquinas, T ru th , q.17, a.4, ad 4: “When a conscience is not probable, it should be changed. 
But, as long as such a conscience remains, one sins mortally if he acts against it.” Cf. idem, D e  
V e n ta te , q.17, a.4, ad 4: “quando conscientia non est probabilis, tunc debet earn deponere; sed tarnen 
dum manet, si contra earn faciat, mortaliter peccat.” Another possible translation o f p r o b a b i l is  is 
‘credible’. This translation may be helpful in giving further explanation to Aquinas’s comment: “When 
conscience is not credible, it should be changed.”
345 Delhaye, The C h r is t ia n  C onsc ie n ce , 182.
346 Aquinas, D e  V e r ita te ,  q.17, a.5, resp.: “conscientia non ligat nisi in vi praecepti divini, vel 
secundum legem scriptam, vel secundum legem naturae inditi. Comparare igitur ligamen conscientiae 
ad ligamen quod est ex praecepto praelati, nihil est aliud quam comparare ligamen praecepti divini ad 
ligamen praecepti praelati.”
347 Ibid.: “Unde, cum praeceptum divinum obliget contra praeceptum praelati, et magis obliget 
quam praeceptum praelati: etiam conscientiae ligamen erit maius quam ligamen praecepti praelati, et 
conscientia ligabit, etiam praecepto praelati in contrarium existente.” Cf. Aquinas, Q u o d lib e tu m  VIII, 
q.6, a.3, resp.
348 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.17, a.5, resp.: “Conscientia enim recta simpliciter et perfecte contra 
praeceptum praelati obligat. Simpliciter quidem, quia eius obligatio auferri non potest, cum talis 
conscientia sine peccato deponi non possit. Perfecte autem, quia conscientia recta non soluni hoc modo 
ligat, ut ille qui earn non sequitur peccatum incurrat, sed etiam ut ille qui earn sequitur sit immunis a 
peccato quantumcumque praeceptum praelati sit in contrarium.”
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imperfect in its binding force, since it does not oblige in all circumstances, but only 
for as long as it lasts.349 Thus since error should be removed as soon as possible, while 
the error lasts the individual sins against the superior by refusing to follow his/her 
command. However, given the dignity of conscience, the individual incurs a greater 
sin by going against his erroneous conscience in favour of the superior’s command.350 
One should bear in mind that here Aquinas is discussing situations of conflict over 
morally indifferent acts. Therefore, one should not assume that by extenstion he is 
sanctioning conscientious objection to the Church’s moral teaching; such an issue is 
left untouched. Yet, given the historical and theological context of St Thomas, one 
could probably surmise that he would not have admitted the possibility of an 
opposition between conscience and authority on serious moral matters, given the 
Church’s role as external herald of God’s law.351
From our review of the questions on synderesis and conscientia in De Veritate 
it is clear that most of the key ideas offered there by St Thomas are a repetition of 
those first articulated in his Commentary on the Sentences, although the arguments are 
now presented in much greater detail.352 The similarity leads Crowe to conclude that 
its content lacks “any startling development” in contrast to the thought already found
349 Ibid., “Sed conscientia errónea ligat contra praeceptum praelati etiam in indifferentibus 
secundum quid et imperfecte. Secundum quid quidem, quia non obligat in omnem eventum, sed sub 
conditione suae durationis: potest enim aliquis et debet talem conscientiam deponere. [...] in tali enim 
casu peccat, sive non faciat, quia contra conscientiam agit, sive faciat, quia praelato inobediens est.”
350 Ibid.: “Magis autem peccat si non faciat, conscientia durante, quod conscientia dictat; cum 
plus liget quam praeceptum praelati.”
351 He does make passing reference to the question of acting according to conscience even in 
the face o f excommunication, but this is in the context of exploring the difficulties with the question of 
a binding false conscience, and so does not reflect his own view on the matter, which is, in fact not 
declared in the response or reply to the argument. Cf. idem, D e  V e rita te , q.17, a.4, arg. 4 ; ad 4.
352 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S ynde res is ,” 241. Junceda states that D e  V e r ita te  is St Thomas’s 




in the Commentary. Nevertheless, the detail serves to clarify Thomas’s viewpoint, 
and will assist us in our understanding of his analysis in the Summa Theologica.
6 .3  T h e  S u m m a  T h e o lo g i c a
Given the amount of detail provided in De Veritate, one might have presumed that St 
Thomas’s study of synderesis and conscientia in the Summa Theologica, his crowning 
achievement, would be similar in its detail, or developed even further. However, this 
is not the case. Crowe comments that the relevant articles are “surprisingly 
laconic.” 354 Although the lack of material may surprise us, its absence should lead us 
to expect little change in the direction of Aquinas’s thought, and this is, in fact, what 
we discover.
The Angelic Doctor makes mention of synderesis and conscientia in the Prima 
and Secunda Partes. In the Prima Pars, discussion of the two divisions of conscience 
takes place within a study of the intellectual faculties of the soul. The two articles 
dedicated to whether synderesis and conscientia are faculties (that is, powers) almost 
take on the semblance of a rapid summary of what he has said elsewhere.355 Thus, 
after only three brief objections in each article, drawn from Scripture and the writings 
of Saints Jerome and Augustine, Aquinas concludes that “synderesis is not a power, 
but a habitus,” and that “conscientia [...] is not a power, but an act.”357 Synderesis is, 
once again, identified as the natural habit endowed with the first practical principles,
353 Crowe, “St. Thomas and S ynde res is ,”  241.
354 Ibid., 242.
355 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , I, q.79, aa.12-13.
356 D’Arcy suggests that in the S um m a  Aquinas is far more confident in expressing 
independent views, and so feels far less obliged to try to accommodate previous, conflicting Patristic 
comments. D’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m , 44-45.
357 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , I, q.79, a.12, resp.: “synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus”; 
ibid., I, q.79, a.13, resp.: “conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus.”
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which incite to good and murmur at evil in the process of discovering what we are to 
do, or in judging what we have done. Aquinas provides an etymological reason for 
his conclusion regarding conscientia, namely, that it comes from cum alio scientia, 
which implies knowledge shared with something. As a result, conscience is an act of 
application of knowledge to an individual case,359 which falls under the three 
categories of recognising what is happening, judging what is to be done or not done, 
and judging that something has been well done or done badly.360 Here Aquinas also 
neatly accommodates the faculty-based definitions of conscientia, with their Patristic 
background, by stating that sometimes a cause is identified by its effect, and vice 
versa. Accordingly, synderesis, the habitus at the root of every act of conscience, is 
sometimes called conscientia. Thus, we find ourselves having gone full circle in the 
history of conscience, with the two precise terms melting into each other, leaving us, 
for a moment, back where we started, with one term: syneidesis or conscientia.
Having established the basic nature of synderesis and conscientia in the Prima 
Pars, we find further mention of the topic in the moral section of the Summa. Here we 
might have imagined a lengthy presentation of the issues related to conscience, as so 
much detail is provided in Aquinas’s analysis of the different aspects of the human 
act, from its end, its means and its relation to sin, passion and virtue, and yet the
i- " T Ocoverage is far from exhaustive. In the context of a discourse on the natural law, 
passing reference is made to synderesis, as the habit containing the precepts of natural
358 Ibid., I, q.79, a.12, resp.: “unde et synderesis dicitur in s t ig a re  a d  bonum , e t m u rm it ra re  de  
m a lo , inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et judicamus inventa” (emphasis in 
text).
359 Ibid., 1, q.79, a. 13, resp.: “Conscientia enim secundum proprietatem vocabuli importat 
ordinem scientiae ad aliquid: nam conscientia dicitur cum a lio  s c ie n t ia ” (emphasis in text).
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.: “consuetum enim est, quod causae, et effectus per invicem nominentur.”
362 Although the treatment is significantly reduced in the Sum m a, Crowe’s account implies 
that Aquinas barely mentions syn de res is  and omits c o n s c ie n tia  altogether in the P a rs  S e cu n d a . This is 
because Crowe fails to mention St Thomas’s analysis of error in la Ilae, q.19, aa. 5-6. This is quite a 
significant omission. Cf. Crowe, “St. Thomas and S ynde res is ,” 243.
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law; the indemonstrable first principles of human action,363 and the term makes 
another brief appearance in the course of Thomas’s study on the virtue of prudence. 
Here he makes the familiar parallel between the operations of the speculative and 
practical intellect, pointing out that synderesis moves prudence in a similar way to the 
understanding of the speculative principles moves science, in that synderesis dictates 
the end of moral virtues, namely the human good, because of its fundamental drive for 
the good.364
Apart from these brief references, no other mention of synderesis is made. 
However, conscientia is given somewhat greater attention, when Aquinas discusses 
the will in the light of erring reason. Firstly, he dismisses the early Franciscan 
theory, which Johnstone describes as “absolute objectivism.” According to this 
viewpoint, if conscientia judges that an act which is evil in itself (per se malum) to be 
good or an act which is good in itself (per se bonum) to be evil, then the judgement of
'lf.n
conscience is not binding. In this analysis the object is considered completely 
separately lfom the subject, and so the judgement of the reason, namely conscience, is 
bypassed in such a way that the goodness or badness of the object is imposed directly 
on the will of the subject.368 Johnstone points out that “this kind of bypass or detour is 
not tenable” according to St Thomas. As we have already observed, Aquinas offers a
363 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.94, a .l, ad 2: “synderesis dicitur lex intellectus nostri, inquantum est 
habitus continens praecepta legis naturalis, quae sunt prima principia operum humanorum.”
364 Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.47, a.6, ad 1: “virtutibus moralibus praestituit finem ratio naturalis, quae 
dicitur synderesis”; Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.47, a.6, ad 3: “synderesis movet prudentiam, sicut intellectus 
principiorum scientiam.” We shall look at the relationship between conscience and prudence, as well as 
other virtues in more detail in the fourth chapter.
365 See Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.19, aa. 5-6. In article six he states that article 
five is equivalent to the question of whether an erring conscience binds, and article six is the same as 
asking whether an erring conscience excuses.
366 Brian V. Johnstone, “‘Objectivism’, ‘Basic Human Goods’and ‘Proportionalism’ : An 
Interpretation of the Contemporary History of Moral Theology,” S tu d ia  M o r a l ia  43 (2005): 97-126, at 
99.
367 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.19, a.5, resp.: “sed ratio, vel conscientia errans 
praecipiendo ea, quae sunt per se mala, vel prohibendo ea, quae sunt per se bona, et necessaria ad 
salutem, non obligat: unde in talibus voluntas discordans a ratione, vel conscientia errante, non est 
mala. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur.”
368 Johnstone, “‘Objectivism’, ‘Basic Human Goods’and ‘Proportionalism’,” 99-100.
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more nuanced approach which identifies the importance of apprehension and 
intention. Thus, the goodness or badness of the will depends not so much upon the 
quality of the object itself (propter objectum secundum sui naturam), but rather upon 
how it is perceived by reason {secundum quod per accidens a ratione
'1/Q
apprehenditur), since a good act can take on per accidens the character of an evil
T70 •act, and vice versa. Thus, in the case of the will disobeying the dictate of erroneous 
conscience, where the chosen act is perceived to be good, the will is evil, even though 
the act is good in itself. Aquinas summarises this by concluding that “every will 
which is at odds with reason, whether right or wrong, is always evil.” 371
This obviously leads Aquinas to ask the opposite question, namely, whether 
the will is good when it abides by erring reason. St Thomas declares that the issue 
depends upon our understanding of ignorance and its effect on culpability.372 As a 
result, he distinguishes between three states of ignorance: involuntary, directly 
voluntary and indirectly voluntary ignorance. In the case of involuntary ignorance, the 
moral character of an act is removed, since the moral evil or goodness of an act 
depends upon its voluntary nature.373 However, the moral character of an act is
369 Aquinas, S u m m a  T he o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q. 19, a.5, resp.: “In indifferentibus enim voluntas 
discordans a ratione, vel conscientia errante est mala aliquo modo propter objectum, a quo bonitas, vel 
malitia voluntatis dependet, non autem propter objectum secundum sui naturam, sed secundum quod 
per accidens a ratione apprehenditur ut bonum, vel malum ad faciendum, vel ad vitandum.”
370 Ibid.: “Non solum enim id quod est indifferens, potest accipere rationem boni, vel mali per 
accidens: sed etiam id quod est bonum, potest accipere rationem mali, vel illud quod est malum, 
rationem boni, propter apprehensionem rationis.”
371 Ibid.: “omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta, sive errante, semper est mala.”
372 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.19, a.6, resp.: “Haec autem quaestio dependet ab eo, quod supra de 
ignorantia dictum est; dictum est enim supra (q .6 . a rt. 8 ), quod ignorantia quandoque causat 
involuntarium, quandoque autem non” (parenthesis and emphasis in text).
373 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.19, a.6, resp.: “Et quia bonum, et malum morale consistit in actu, 
inquantum est voluntarius, ut ex praemissis patet (a r t .2 . hu j. q .), manifestarti est, quod ilia ignorantia 
quae causat involuntarium, tollit rationem boni, et mali moralis; non autem ilia, quae involuntarium 
non causat” (parenthesis and emphasis in text). Earlier Aquinas had further qualified involuntary 
ignorance as a n tece d e n t, that is, lacking particular knowledge of the circumstances (which was not the 
person’s duty to know) that would otherwise have changed the course of the action had it been known. 
In effect, this is the definition of an accident, lacking any blame. Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.6, a.8., resp.: 
“ A n te c e d e n te r  autem se habet ad voluntatem ignorantia, quando non est voluntaria, et tamen est causa 
volendi, quod alias homo non vellet” (emphasis in text).
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affected by the voluntary forms of ignorance, since direct voluntary ignorance 
describes the situation of wilfully not wishing to know what should be known, while 
indirect voluntary ignorance refers to a situation of plain negligence.374 The 
distinction is fine in its character, but made clearer by an earlier comment. Aquinas 
defines direct voluntariness as proceeding from an act of the will, while indirect
» T7 Svoluntariness is an inaction of the will. Thus, one could say that both are occasions 
of negligence, but that the direct form contains deliberate wilful avoidance of what 
should be known, while the indirect form is an occasion of blameworthy carelessness. 
In addition to this, in another article Thomas defines these two forms of consequent
ignorance as “affected ignorance” (ignorantia affectata) and “ignorance of evil
♦ 376choice” (ignorantia malae electionis).
Having clearly established the differences between these forms of ignorance,
Aquinas is now in a position to declare their effect upon the will. Voluntary ignorance
does not excuse the will from sin in the case of acting upon the judgement of an
erroneous conscience, since the person is ignorant of what should have been
known.377 Once again, we observe that Aquinas presumes an obligation to know the
general principles or fundamental tenets of the moral law, both natural and divine.
Here St Thomas is referring to a principle of Roman law, much used in the Middle
Ages, which differentiated between ignorance of the law (ignorantia iuris) and
374 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.19, a.6, resp.: “Si igitur ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario, vel 
directe, vel propter negligentiam...” From this quote one can see that Aquinas does not elaborate upon 
the nature of direct voluntariness, as he presumes the reader has read the earlier article on the matter.
375 Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.6, a.3, ad 1.
376 Ibid., Ia Ilae q.6, a.8.
377 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q. 19, a.6, resp.: “Si igitur ratio vel conscientia erret errore voluntario, vel 
directe, vel propter negligentiam, quia est error circa id, quod quis scire tenetur, tunc talis error rationis 
vel, conscientiae non excusat, quin voluntas concordans rationi, vel conscientiae sic erranti sit mala.”
378 Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.19, a.6, resp.: “quod error iste provenit ex ignorantia legis Dei, quam 
scire tenetur”; Ia Ilae q.6, a.8, resp.: “ ig n o ra n t ia  u n iv e rs a liu m  ju r is ,  quae quis scire tenetur, voluntaria 
dicitur, quasi per negligentiam proveniens” (emphasis in text).
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ignorance of fact (ignorantia facti)?19 Thus, error regarding God’s law does not 
excuse sin, while a genuine error about the facts of a case is simply a mistake, and so 
the will is excused from acting sinfully, since this is involuntary ignorance.380 From 
this Aquinas concludes that in the case of conscience erring through inexcusable 
ignorance the will would be evil. Yet, although an erroneous conscience is binding, 
there is really no dilemma in this instance, since “the ignorance is vincible and
ioi t
voluntary.” This means that the person can lay aside the error and act uprightly 
with a pure conscience.
Combining what Aquinas stated in his third Quodlibet with his comments 
here, we can conclude that the will is excused the sin caused by an erroneous 
conscience only in cases where an individual is not morally culpable through grave 
mental incapacity or through simple factual error affecting the circumstances, and not 
the law applied to the circumstances.382 Thus, Kennedy is right in pointing out that
379 See Hermann Kantorowicz, S tud ies  in  the  G lo ssa to rs  o f  the  R o m a n  L a w :  N e w ly  
D is c o v e re d  W r it in g s  o f  th e  T w e lfth  C e n tu ry  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 77-80, 
244-46. Kantorowicz describes the influence of the writings of Búlgaras on Gratian, quoting their 
comments on ignorance. See pages 244-46 for a fuller extract from the s u m m u la  o f Búlgaras on 
ignorance of fact and law, written around 1140, and page 80 for a synopic comparison of the two 
authors. Thus, Búlgaras states “In iu r is  errore distinguitur n a tu ra le  et c iv i le  iu s , quia plus est culpe, 
n a tu ra le  iu s  ig n o ra re  quam c iv ile .  [...] Cum enim facti ig n o ra n t ia  in lucro captando prosit, multa 
fortius in  e v ita n d o  d a m p n o  non nocet (emphases in text).” The portion of Gratian’s d ic ta  (IV, par. 2, c. 
l.q. 4 ) quoted by Kantorowicz, is remarkably similar in its wording. Cf. Kennedy, “L ’ldea di 
Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” 166; 167, n.52. Cf. Aquinas, Q u a e s tio n e s  D is p u ta ta e  de  
M a lo ,  in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol. 8 (New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949; reprint of 1852-1873 Parma 
ed.), q.3, a.7; idem, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.76, a.2, resp.: “unde omnes tenentur scire 
communiter ea, quae sunt fidei, et universalia juris praecepta: singuli autem ea, quae ad eoram statum, 
vel officium spectant.”
380 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.19, a.6, resp. Brian Johnstone offers some helpful 
insights with regard to Aquinas’s understanding of involuntary ignorance. Thomas can say that the will 
is excused from evil because in an involuntary act the inculpably erroneous judgement “disengages the 
subject from the disorder which is really present in the act because the act is not in accord with the 
divine reasoned will.” He points out that Aquinas neither says the person is “excused from ‘subjective’ 
guilt,” nor that the erroneous act of the person is “‘objectively’ evil,” since these phrases belong to “a 
later period, where the object and subject are considered as separate.” See Johnstone, “ ‘Objectivism’, 
‘Basic Human Goods’and ‘Proportionalism’, 100-101.
381 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.19, a.6, resp.
382 Thus, St Thomas attributes the former understanding of the Germans (as reported by Julius 
Caesar) that theft was not wrong to a perversion of reason through the effects o f passion, an evil habit 
or an evil disposition of nature. The list of causes implies that Aquinas would not have seen this as 
excusable. As a result, Grisez’s description of primitive people carrying out human sacrifices as an 
example of blameless error according to Aquinas’s view may not have actually been understood as
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Aquinas provides “strictly defined exceptions related to invincible ignorance.”383 As a 
result, one should be wary of presenting Aquinas’s theory without sufficient detail, as 
it may be miscontrued as implying greater scope for excuse than Aquinas had 
intended. It should also be noted that St Thomas never says that an act excused from 
sin is a good act, because, while it is believed to be good and true,384 it is still 
disordered in relation to God’s will. This view was to change, however, with the 
arrival of William of Ockham, who stated that the will that produces an act in 
conformity with an invincibly erroneous conscience “acts virtuously and 
meritoriously.” 386
Although conscientia fits into Aquinas’s detailed discourse on ignorance, its 
only other appearance in the Summa Theologica relates to the binding quality of 
human postive law, a topic which is dealt with in one article. Aquinas declares a just 
law to be binding on a conscience through their relationship to the divine law (cf. 
Prov 8:15), but an unjust and injurious law, or one which goes against the commands 
of God to lack any binding quality, since, following Augustine, a law that is unjust is
such by Aquinas. Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T he o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q 94, a.4, resp.; Grisez and Shaw, 
F u lf i l lm e n t  in  C h r is t ,  30-31.
383 Kennedy, “L ’Idea di Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” 167-68: “ma egli sarà 
scusato dal peccato soltanto in eccezioni strettamente definite derivanti dall’ignoranza invincibile.” 
Aquinas defines invincible ignorance as that which cannot be removed with effort (s tu d iu m ). See 
S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.76, a.2, resp.: “unde horum ignorantia in v in c ib i l is  dicitur, quia studio 
superari non potest” (emphasis in text).
384 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q. 19, a.5, ad 1 : “tamen ratio errans judicium suum proponit ut verum, et per 
consequens ut a Deo derivatum, a quo est omnis veritas.”Cf. Vereecke, “Coscienza in S. Alfonso,” 173.
385 See Johnstone, “‘Objectivism’, ‘Basic Human Goods’and ‘Proportionalism’, 100.
386 William of Ockham [Guillelmus de Occam], S u p e r Q u a tu o r  L ib ro s  S e n te n tia ru m , in O p e ra  
P lu r im a ,  vol. 4, facsimile reprint of 1494-96 Lyon ed. (London: Gregg Press, 1962), III, q .13,1 (second 
conclusion): “et ideo voluntas eliciens actum conformiter tali rationi erroneae virtuose et meritorie 
agit.” Cf. Michael G. Baylor, A c t io n  a n d  P e rs o n : C onsc ience  in  L a te  S c h o la s tic is m  a n d  th e  Y o u n g  
L u th e r  (Leiden: E J .  Brill, 1977), 87, n.57. Here Baylor incorrectly cites his source as ‘3 Sent., q. 13, C’ . 
Vereecke uses Baylor’s text as the source for his quotation of Ockham. Baylor and Vereecke correctly 
point out that that Ockham makes a departure from Aquinas in declaring in v in c ib ly  erroneous acts not 
simply excused, but also virtuous and meritorious. Nevertheless, the authors are also careful to indicate 
that, for Ockham, vincibly erroneous acts remain sinful.To this extent the Venerable Inceptor repeats 
Aquinas’s view. Cf. Baylor, A c t io n  a n d  P e rso n , 88-89; Louis Vereecke, “La Prudenza in Guglielmo di 
Ockham,” in L a  C o sc ie n za  M o ra le  O g g i:  O m a g g io  a l  P ro f. D o m e n ic o  C a p o n e , ed. Marian Nalepa and 
Terence Kennedy, Quaestiones Morales, no. 3 (Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1987), 177- 
97, at 182-83; Ockham, S u p e r I I I  S e n te n tia ru m , q.13, M: “et per consequens peccat in eliciendo talem 
actum et non recte agit” (expanded from abbreviated Latin).
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no law at all. The relatively few references to conscientia in the Summa has led to 
speculation by moral theologians as to why this should be so. Crowe suggests that the 
cause lies in Aquinas’s desire to use less Augustinian theology, with its neo-Platonic 
influences, in favour of a moral theology linked to Aristotelian ethics, with its strong
TOO
basis in virtue. Others, such as Josef Pieper, have suggested something similiar, 
though specifically with regard to Thomas’s use of the virtue of prudence, which they 
would propose to be the replacement of conscientia in Thomas’s own theory.389 
Whatever the reason, the reduction in the discussion on synderesis and conscientia is 
somewhat surprising, nonetheless, given the intensity of detail in St Thomas’s 
previous works.
With these remarks on the Summa Theologica, we draw our study of the 
medieval analysis of synderesis and conscientia to a close. Given the consistency of 
St Thomas’s writing, there is more repetition of ideas than in the previous writers. 
Nonetheless, I have included the major areas of repetition for the purpose of verifying
387 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.96, a.4; Augustine, D e  L ib e ro  A r b i t r io ,  I, 5, PL 32, 
1227, “Nam mihi lex esse non videtur quae justa non fuerit.” The only exception to Aquinas’s 
comments on the non-binding nature of an unjust law, is where a person’s conscience feels bound to 
tolerate an injustice for the sake of charity, to avoid scandal or disturbance. With regard to laws that 
oppose God’s commands, Aquinas refers to Acts 5:29 “We must obey God rather than any human 
authority.” See S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a ,  la Ilae, q.96, a.4, resp.
388 Crowe, “St. Thomas and Synderesis ,'”  245. Given that Aquinas’s commentary on 
Aristotle’s E th ic s  makes no mention of conscience, though it does refer to Scripture and Patristic 
writings, some see this as evidence of two approaches in Aquinas, the traditional one favouring 
s yn d e re s is  and c o n s c ie n tia , and the other operating largely without them. The limited reference to 
s yn d e re s is  and c o n s c ie n tia  in his last major work, the S um m a, coupled with its extensive commentary 
on the virtues is substantial evidence in favour of assuming that the notions of c o n s c ie n tia  and 
s yn d e re s is  were eventually almost eclipsed by his virtue theory. (This, however, does not necessarily 
imply complete replacement, as we shall discuss in chapter five). Crowe rightly points out the absence 
of c o n s c ie n tia  in the commentary on the E th ic s , but is inaccurate in his claim that the S u m m a  C o n tra  
G e n tile s  does not deal with the question of conscience. It is true that there is no specific question, but 
Aquinas does make passing mention of c o n s c ie n tia  in three places. Cf. St Thomas Aquinas, I n  D ece rn  
L ib ro s  E th ic o ru m  a d  N ic h o m a c h u m ,  in O p e ra  O m n ia , vol. 21 (New York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949; 
reprint of 1852-1873 Parma ed.); idem, S um m a C o n tra  G e n tile s , III, 127 (quoting Scripture); IV, 54; 
IV, 77; Crowe, “St. Thomas and S yn d e res is ,”  243.
389 For example, see Josef Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V ir tu e s : P ru d e n c e , J u s tice , F o r t itu d e ,  
T e m p e ra n ce , trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1966), 1-40, at 11. We shall return to this when we explore the nature of prudence.
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his consistency, and also for the purpose of relating any detail which may expand 
upon Aquinas’s description of conscience, or clarify his previous comments.
7. C o n c lu s io n s
Surveying the analysis of the Scholastics, it should be clear that our first conclusion is 
that their study of synderesis and conscientia is far more detailed than is often given 
credit in many moral text books. This is surely understandable, as the aim of these 
books is to provide a summary of the views of the period. Nevertheless, I would 
suggest that this summarising is often probably too restricted, so as to lead the reader 
to misconceptions, or a disregard for the richness of the analysis of that period. For 
example, Scholastics are often portrayed in contrast according to rationalist or 
voluntarist schools. It is true that the different schools laid greater emphasis on either 
the reason or the will, but it should not be inferred from this that they considered the 
two to operate in stark opposition. Rather they function in intimate reciprocity; indeed 
opposition of the reason and will was understood by the Scholastics as sin.
On the other hand, one may ask whether the Scholastic study of conscience 
was overly complicated; simply an exercise in hair-splitting. This view would 
probably support the abandonment of synderesis, considering it to be an unecessary, 
accidental complication. However, along with De Blic, I would suggest that this was a 
‘happy accident’, which enabled Scholastics to formulate with greater precision their 
already existing understanding of how conscience could be linked to the natural law, 
while at the same time be potentially flawed in its operation. Thus, synderesis came to 
represent the firm basis for morals, both as understanding and/or appetite, without 
which there would be no root in objective morality. Clearly the Scholastics provided a
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whole range of views and refinements, but at the core of them all, one could describe 
synderesis as an innate non-deliberative inclination to the moral good; an essential 
basis for our moral judgements. We shall look further into the nature of synderesis in 
the next chapter, but for now it may be useful to bear in mind Aquinas’s refinement, 
which points out that this innate capacity nonetheless needs to acquire material from 
the senses in order to articulate its terms. This is a useful clarification, as it draws us 
away from naive immanentism or illuminationism. Conscientia by the time of 
Aquinas came to be understood as an act of judgement of practical reason, which is 
the conclusion of the process of an application of universal moral principles to the 
particular situation. Albert and Aquinas presented this in terms of a syllogism. 
Although this marked a definitive stage in the understanding of conscience, it was not 
completely unrelated to what had gone before, as even Philip the Chancellor had 
already alluded to some process of application being in operation. This process is 
subject to flaw and failure, but nevertheless, the medievals also saw it as the herald of 
God’s law, and was thus deserving of the greatest respect.
The medieval analysis probaby leaves us with a whole raft of questions to 
explore. However, in this thesis I will select two areas for research, not only because 
of the limitation of time, but also because they will serve in particular to give the 
necessary grounding which will justify our relocating conscience in virtue and grace. 
It is to these questions, therefore, that we will turn our attention in the next chapter.
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Appendix 1
A Shift in the Understanding of Conscience: The Influence of the Manuals
The purpose of the historical section of this thesis was to explore the details of 
writings on conscience in order to present substantial evidence regarding its status as 
a human capacity whose moral judgement is intimately related to God’s law, and as 
such, although it stands as the proximate subjective norm of morality, it receives that 
authority from its relationship to God, who created, redeemed and sustains us. This 
view of conscience, fully aware of its limitations, is nonetheless based upon an 
objective morality, where the individual does not create the truth, but seeks to find it. 
This would be in stark contrast to a subjectivist notion, which stands in isolation and 
determines what is moral for the person. Such a subjectivist understanding of 
conscience is a common impoverished understanding of the concept, where the 
proximate norm becomes the absolute norm, whose verdict is “ultimately 
unarguable,” absolving the self from all blame, provided that one holds to one’s 
personal convictions.390 Indeed, on occasion this understanding is used 
anachronistically to describe the motivations of people from another era, in such a 
way that their own understanding of conscience and morality is seriously obscured. 
One example of this misreading is to be found in the accounts of the conscientious 
decisions of Saint Thomas More, where the self and authenticity to one’s beliefs, 
rather than fidelity to the truth, is given centre stage in some modem portrayals.391
390 Herbert McCabe, “Aquinas on Good Sense,” N e w  B la c k fr ia rs  67 (1986): 419-431, at 421.
391 Robert Bolt, A  M a n  f o r  A l l  Seasons, (Oxford: Heinemann, 1963; first published in 1960), 
act 2, page 53: “But what matters to me is not whether it’s true or not but that I believe it to be true, or 
rather not that I b e lie v e  it, but that /  believe it” (emphases in text). For some, Bolt’s play has taken on 
considerable authoritative status in its description of conscience, and in describing Thomas More’s 
understanding of conscience. This, however, is unjustified. As a technical description of Christian 
conscience, with particular reference to More, Robert Bolt’s play is as accurate (though perhaps not 
quite as scientifically influential) as Albrecht Diirer’s famous woodcut of a rhinoceros: artistically 
meritorious, but factually incorrect. As such, one should be wary of using A  M a n  f o r  A l l  S easons  as a
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In the first chapter I attempted to trace the development of the subjectivist 
notion, mentioning the influence of nominalism, the related shift in the notion of 
freedom and passage to casuistry as a result of the atomisation of morality. However, 
the period of manualistic theology deserves more attention, as the subjectivist ideal of 
conscience of more recent times owed its development significantly to a reaction 
against the prescriptive legalism of the manuals. Therefore, in this appendix we will 
look at the style of moral theology presented by the manuals to see how it differs from 
the Scholastic method, and how the description of conscience changed.
Moral Theology has been described by those who are impatient of refined 
analysis, as the obsession of the Decalogue, the poison and virulence of 
systems that make all Christian conduct to consist in obedience to a law. It is 
thought, by them, to be too juristic, yet it is also condemned as a system that 
enables one to evade obligations. It must be admitted, however, that the 
science cannot be anything but juristic.392
Thus in the 1930s Henry Davis, a Jesuit at Heythrop College, summed up the 
criticism of casuistry and the manualistic tradition. He was not unaware that the 
system of casuistry had gone to extremes in the past, both rigorous and lax in its 
analysis, such that the “extravagances of some of the casuists in the seventeenth and 
eigteenth centuries rendered a disservice to Moral Theology.” 393 As a result, he called 
for “a sane legalism,” and “a sane casuistry,” in order to “determine the reasonable
solid point of reference in the serious study of conscience. At most, it should be seen as an example of 
the modem subject-centred notion of conscience, where one’s conviction and the good of integrity or 
authenticity have been severed from the good of truth. For examples of moral theologians who refer to 
Bolt, see Richard M. Gula, R eason  In fo rm e d  b y  F a ith :  F o u n d a tio n s  o f  C a th o lic  M o r a l i t y  (New York 
and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1989), 14-15, 133-34,138-39; Walter E. Conn, “Conscience and Self- 
Transcendence in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan,” in R e a d in g s  in  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y  N o . 1 4 :  
C o n sc ie n ce , ed. Charles E. Curran, (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), 151-62, at 155- 
56. For a detailed critique, see Twomey, “A Discourse on Thomas More’s Great Matter: Conscience,” 
156-80, at 163: “In a word, his [More’s] decisions of conscience were his attempt to know and do not 
his own will but the will of God.” McCabe also criticises the description o f More’s conscience 
portrayed by Bolt, pointing out that it relates to the modem concern for the rights of conscience as  
such , rather than the judgement made by conscience. See McCabe, “Aquinas on Good Sense,” 421.
392 Henry Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y  in  F o u r  V o lum es, vol. 1, H u m a n  A c ts , L a w ,  
Sin, V ir tu e  (London: Sheed & Ward, 1935), 3.
393 Ibid.
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and necessary implications of all law,” since “it is precisely about law that Moral 
Theology is concerned.” 394 The concern for an abuse of casuistry is evident, but Davis 
still firmly upheld the validity of the approach which typified manualistic moral 
theology, namely, legalism. From this viewpoint, the law and its observance become 
the benchmark for moral action. This therefore restricts the focus of the science of 
moral theology to establishing that which is in accordance with the law, particularly 
either from the Decalogue, or from Canon Law. In this context, it is the task of moral 
theology to consider “the obligation in conscience [...] that arises whensoever the 
Church through its canons, imposes such definite rules of conduct.” In other words, 
moral theology does not concern itself with the growth of the individual, but only the
OQC
proper fulfilment of obligation, and thus the field of morals was focused primarily 
on the training of priests, in order that they might adequately recognise where 
obligation had not been fulfilled, that is, where sin had been committed.396 Indeed, 
with this in mind, Slater goes so far as to say that “manuals of moral theology [...] are
TQ7books of moral pathology.” In this context, there is no room for spiritual theology, 
and little space for a study of the virtues intended to help perfect the human person;398
395 Thomas Slater, Cases o f  C onsc ience  f o r  E n g lis h -S p e a k in g  C o u n tr ie s ,  vol. 1, (New York, 
Cincinnati, and Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1911), 36: “But moral theology does not cover the whole 
field of Christian conduct. Its object is not to place high ideals of virtue before the people and train 
them in Christian perfection. Its task is much more restricted and humble. It lays down rules for 
determining what is right and what is wrong according to the teaching of the Christian faith. [...] It is 
not intended for edification, nor for the building up of character.” Cf. Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l  
T h e o lo g y , I, 4.
396 Slater, Cases o f  C onsc ie n ce , I, 36: “Its primary object is to teach the priest how to 
distinguish what is sinful from what is lawful, so that he may fruitfully administer the sacrament of 
Penance and perform the other duties of his sacred minstry.”
397 Thomas Slater, A  M a n u a l o f  M o r a l T he o lo g y , with notes on American legislation by 
Michael Martin, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1908), 5-6.
398 Coverage of virtue in manuals was typically limited to the theological virtues, of which 
greatest attention was given to charity. Christopher Kaczor, who offers a comparison between the 
influential writing of Jean-Pierre Gury (1801-1866) and St Thomas, points out that Gury’s 
C o m p e n d iu m  T h e o lo g ia e  M o r a l is  “offers no thorough treatment of human action,” since there is “no 
independent treatment of the cardinal virtues of temperance, fortitude, prudence or justice,” with only 
the theological virtues being mentioned. See Christopher Kaczor, P ro p o r t io n a lis m  a n d  th e  N a tu ra l  
L a w  T ra d it io n  (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 173. Kaczor refers to 
the 1874 edition of Gury’s C o m p e n d iu m , published after his death. In order to confirm that Kaczor’s
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however helpful this is for the Christian and however much it forms part of the role of 
the pastor,399 these spiritual “lofty ideals” were still presented by some as optional, 
non-obligatory extras.400 As a result, the fundamental moral theology of the 
manualists was organised around three key themes: human acts, conscience and the 
law, where the acts are discussed largely in isolation from the subject of those acts.401
From this brief overview, it is clear that the law shaped the understanding of 
morality to the point that most of the content of the manuals related to obligations 
under different types of law.402 Although certain periods of casuistry offered an 
analysis of cases which aimed at lightening the load of obligation, particularly 
laxism,403 it would be inaccurate to conceive all casuistry and the manualistic tradition 
as an attempt to provide an escape from “the burden of the moral law.”404 
Nonetheless, the moral law was still considered explicitly or implicitly in terms of
comments applied to the structure presented by Gury himself, since later editions were co-edited and 
expanded with large commentaries, I consulted the original 1850 edition and the 1866 edition, which 
was co-edited by Antonio Ballerini. Both editions lack any study of the cardinal virtues, concentrating 
on the theological virtues instead. Cf. Jean-Pierre Gury, C o m p e n d iu m  T h e o lo g ia e  M o r a l is ,  vol. 1 (Lyon 
and Paris: Perisse, 1850), 126-70; idem, C o m pe n d iu m  T h e o lo g ia e  M o ra lis ,  7th ed., revised with 
commentary by the author and Antonio Ballerini, vol. 1 (Rome: Typis Civiltatis Catholicae; Turin: 
Marietti, 1866), 177-253. Despite Davis’s continued legalist approach, his manual seems to be using 
the vestiges of a Scholastic model, as it contains a brief introduction concerning man’s ultimate end, 
and a short discourse on the cardinal virtues. See Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y , I, 7-10; 259-71.
399 Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T he o lo g y , I, 4.
400 Slater, M a n u a l o f  M o r a l  T heo logy , I, 6.
401 Kaczor, P ro p o r t io n a lis m  a n d  the  N a tu ra l L a w  T ra d it io n ,  36.
402 For example, one can see that law has become the defining model for Gury if we note that, 
in addition to his treatise on justice and right (pp. 526-708), four out of the nine sections of his 
C o m p e n d iu m  deal specifically with laws : tra c ta tu s  de  le g ib u s  (pages 83-138), t ra c ta tu s  d e p ra e c e p t is  
d e c a lo g i (pages 254-493), tra c ta tu s  de p ra e c e p tis  e cc les iae  (pages 494-525), tra c ta tu s  de  c o n tra c t ib u s  
(pages 709-835). Kaczor points out that, in contrast, Aquinas dedicates a great deal of attention to 
virtue and vice, and apart from a small section of the P r im a  S ecundae, only deals with law in passing. 
Cf. Gury, C o m p e n d iu m  T h e o lo g ia e  M o ra lis ,  1866 ed.; Kaczor, P ro p o r t io n a lis m  a n d  th e  N a tu r a l  L a w  
T ra d it io n ,  173.
403 Mahoney refers to two moralists, whose ingenuity at creating bizarre loop-holes in 
obligation earned them striking nicknames: one was called ‘the lamb of God’, “because he took away 
so many of the sins of the world,” and Juan Caramuel, a Spanish Cistercian bishop was called ‘the 
prince of laxists’ by St Alphonsus de Liguori. See John Mahoney, The M a k in g  o f  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y : A  
S tu d y  o f  th e  R o m a n  C a th o lic  T ra d it io n , The M a r t in  D 'A r c y  M e m o r ia l L e c tu re s  1 9 8 1 -2  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 138. Cf. V. Ob let, “Caramuel y Lobkovitz, Jean,” in D ic t io n n a ire  de  
T h é o lo g ie  C a th o liq u e ,  ed. A Vacant, E. Mangenot and E. Amann, vol. 2, part 2 (Paris: Librairie 
Letouzey et Ané, 1923), 1709-12, at 1711.
404 Slater, C ases o f  C onsc ie n ce , I, 36: “nor, it may be added, is it [moral theology] intended to 
teach people how to shake off the burden of the moral law, or to minimize its obligations.”
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burden, imposition and obligation, and in this voluntarist context, it should come as 
no surprise that attempts to allieviate the burden of prescription, or to rebel against 
prescriptive authority would arise, or even come to prevail.
John Mahoney offers a very helpful insight into the social background which 
contributed to a change in attitude toward the notion of obligation to positive law. 
Aquinas had taught that just, positive laws were binding in conscience, but that laws 
that were unjust, injurious or contrary to God’s law did not obligate the person.405 
From this it is clear that in situations of obvious injustice a person is not obliged to 
comply with a law. Mahoney gives two examples of such injustice in sixteenth 
century Spain, whose magnitude had such an impact upon the lives of the poor that 
moral theologians were forced to consider the question of law and conscience, and in 
doing so, created a new concept, whose influence endured in the manuals for nearly 
four centuries. The first injustice was caused by the expansion of sheep farming. In 
the desire for maximising profit from wool exports, Spain experienced a period of 
“widespread deforestation,” which left many lacking wood for fuel and necessary 
construction.406 When “severe and absolute laws [were enacted] forbidding the taking 
of wood even from common land,” many were unable to comply if they were to 
survive, and as a result, the people concluded that these laws did not bind their 
consciences.407 The second social injustice was the burdensome tax laws applied to 
the sale and transfer of goods, which were decreed in order to increase the royal 
revenue for the funding of court activities and to meet the cost of war.408 These laws 
also led to non-compliance, which further precipitated moral reflection upon whether 
the individuals had been guilty of stealing or fraud, and whether they were bound to
405 Aquinas, S u m m a  T he o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.96, a.4, resp.




carry out restitution or pay the fine imposed by the authorities. Some theologians used 
this context of injustice as a stimulus to reflect upon the common good and the 
foundations of just law.409 However, others were less inclined to declare royal laws to 
be simply unjust, and so directed their efforts to offering another motivation for 
guiltless non-compliance. Their solution was the moral theory of the ‘purely penal 
law’, where the intention of the lawmaker was reinterpreted as not expecting that the 
laws themselves would bind the conscience, but only that the individual was bound to 
paying the penalty for breaking the law.410 The theory of ‘purely penal law’ came to 
be firmly established in moral theory, and formed part of the moral manual well into 
the twentieth century, though the detail of the theory was much contested, and was 
more concerned with cases where there was uncertainty as to whether a particular 
civil law was just or not, rather than plain cases of injustice.411 Nevertheless, the 
convoluted thinking behind it led to a shift in the understanding of law and the 
relationship of the individual to law and authority, where penalty becomes the driving 
force behind law, rather than right.412 We can see behind this a voluntaristic view of 
law in operation, which had two major effects. Firstly, the relationship between law 
and moral goodness is disrupted, where the law is not considered so much in terms of 
its foundation in the goodness or wickedness of an act, but rather in terms of the will 
and intention of the lawgiver. In this context an act is understood as wrong not so
5 1 ’
411 Ibid. Cf. Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y , I, 142-48. Davis offers a resumé of views 
prevalent at the time of his work. They range from the obligation to comply with civil laws, to forms of 
purely penal law. For example, Davis presents Black’s view which distinguishes actions which are 
m a la  in  se from those which are only m a la  p ro h ib ita .  In the latter case, Black states that “conscience is 
no farther concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty, in case of our breach of these 
laws.” Black points out that this only applies in cases lacking “public mischief or private injury,” where 
the laws are “simply and purely penal, where the thing forbidden or enjoined is wholly a matter of 
indifference, and where the penalty inflicted is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience 
supposed to arise from the offence.” See Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y , I, 144-45.
412 Noldin thought that “most laws nowadays are penal,” and so their binding nature does “not 
go beyond penal measures, and good people do not commonly suppose otherwise.” See Davis, M o r a l  
a n d  P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y , I, 146.
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much because it is bad, but because it is against the law.413 Secondly such an 
approach distances the acting person from the perceived root cause of the law, such 
that, rather than being based upon inherent goodness and the common good of the 
people, it is seen to be based upon the will of an external authority, who has the power 
to impose arbitrary laws upon the individual. This perception of law as a purely 
externally imposed obligation places the person in opposition to the lawgiver, since 
the excessive emphasis on the (arbitrary) will of the lawgiver precipitates a defensive 
reaction in favour of protecting one’s liberty.414 This antagonism may have advanced 
by a context of civil injustice, as Mahoney observes, but, in the end, the voluntaristic 
analysis has implications for law at all levels, to the point that the authority of the 
Church and, ultimately, God are called into question. These implications are 
obviously not part of the manualistic tradition, but its emphasis on obligation played 
its part in a fierce reaction against authority, which has shaped the general mindset on 
this matter to this day.
It is from within this tension between obligation and the defence of one’s 
liberty or implicit opposition between authority and self that the manualists’ 
preoccupation with moral systems begins to make sense. The systems enumerated in 
manuals range from strict tutiorism (rigorism), through mitigated tutiorism, 
probabiliorism, equiprobabilism and (moderate) probabilism, to a laxism based on 
remote probability at the other end of the spectrum.415 Each system pits the law
413 Kaczor, P ro p o r t io n a lis m  a n d  the  N a tu ra l L a w  T ra d it io n , 173. Perhaps this is also 
ultimately the source of the line of thought where something is only wrong if you get caught.
414 Mahoney, The M a k in g  o f  M o r a l  T he o lo g y , 229: “Conscience thus becomes the cockpit 
where one’s freedom and another’s law face each other as antagonists, and where it is the individual 
who judges whether or not his freedom must yield to law.”
415 See Gury, C o m p e n d iu m  T h e o lo g ia e  M o ra l is  (1850 ed.), 35. Mahoney, T he  M a k in g  o f  
M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , 137: “Thus, to sum up the different systematic replies elaborated in the sixteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries to answer the question of what to do when in doubt, the tutiorist would 
advocate obedience to the law or any other course which was the safer to follow, the probabiliorist 
would urge doing what seemed the more likely to be right, the aequiprobabilist would judge that either
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against the freedom of the individual, or vice versa, in the case of a doubtful 
obligation in order to establish whether the conscience is bound by the obligation or 
not. For example, Davis defines moderate probabilism according to the principle that 
“when I have a solidly probable opinion in favour of my liberty as against law, then 
the obligation of the law does not bind me.”416 In this case, “I shall certainly act 
morally correctly if I disregard the doubtful obligation.”417 This is likely to make 
more sense if we look at an example. Davis presents the case of giving alms to a 
beggar:
On seeing a beggar, I may reflect that I am bound to bestow an alms on him; 
I have, however, other obligations which probably cannot be fulfilled if I• • 41 opart with my money. The probability in the latter case is real and solid, 
but yet it is not so great as the probability that I am bound, here and now to 
assist the beggar. Would anyone insist on the bestowal of alms under pain of 
sin? Not at all; the obligation of almsgiving does not clearly exist in the case, 
precisely because the contrary obligation may exist. Most people, however, 
would doubtless bestow the alms. They would do well and would be acting 
charitably, and yet when it is not a question of a graver obligation 
superseding a lighter one, but only a question of greater or less probabilities, 
either course may be rightly chosen. To insist on the bestowal of an alms in 
the case would be to adopt a system of conduct wherein more probable 
obligations would have to be always fulfilled [that is, probabiliorism].419
Therefore, the moral systems were designed to assist an individual in assessing 
possible contrary lines of action in order to establish what was morally legitimate in 
cases where doubt had arisen over the person’s obligation. When the notion of 
obligation came to be understood as “onerous,” rather than morally necessary, this led
of equally balanced alternatives could be followed, and the simple probabilist would reply that any 
action was morally justified for which a good case could be made.”
416 Of course, tutiorism would demand the opposite view, giving way always to the law.
417 Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y , I, 100. Here, however, Davis also firmly points out 
that favouring liberty should never be misunderstood as acting immorally.
418 Davis describes probable opinion as having “good and solid reasons for thinking that a 
certain line o f action is morally correct.” In keeping with this, Mahoney suggests that p ro b a b i le  should 
really be translated as ‘proveable’ or ‘arguable’, that is, “something for which there is a good argument 
[...] irrespective of the merits of any alternative,” as the common understanding of ‘probable’ is quite 
different, namely, “something which is more likely than not to be the case.” Cf. Mahoney, T he  M a k in g  
o f  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , 136; Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T heo logy , I, 78-79.
419 Davis, M o r a l  a n d  P a s to ra l T he o lo g y , I, 101-102.
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Suarez to introduce a juridical principle to moral thinking to reduce the burdensome 
obligation.420 The solution proposed was a curious introduction of the principle of 
possession, taken from property law, a principle which Deman considered to be 
“absolutely foreign” to moral thinking.421 Thus, if there is any doubt over the 
dominion or claim of ownership over an individual’s conscience and actions by an 
externally imposed law, then the possession of one’s innate freedom of choice and
A')'}
action remained undisturbed: lex dubia non obligat.
Such a struggle of dominion over freedom, and emphasis on obligation 
without sufficient emphasis on the motivation behind the obligation had two side- 
effects. The first was the growth in the attitude of doing the bare minimum; the 
second was the collapse of the power of obligation. Thus, a morality of obligation 
encourages a minima moralia to flourish, but ultimately a morality of obligation only 
holds sway insofar as the person feels under the dominion or under the threat of the 
authority. If, therefore, the power of that authority is called into question, the 
dominion is ruptured and the morality of obligation fractures. Two examples which 
affect modem times can be seen in the secular rejection of God, with the subsequent 
rejection of Christian moral tenets that have been upheld in society for centuries 
(many of which relate to the nature of life and the family), and in the challenges to the 
ability of the Magisterium to speak authoritatively on moral matters, made from both 
within and without the Church.
420 Cf. Th. Deman, “Probabilisme,” in D ic t io n n a ire  de T h é o lo g ie  C a th o liq u e ,  ed. A. Vacant, 
E. Mangenot and E. Amann, vol. 13, part 1 (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1936), 477: “la règle 
juridique est fondée sur une conception de l’obligation comme onéreuse, qu’il faut donc restreindre et 
n’imposer que si elle est certaine” [“the juridical rule is based upon a conception of obligation as 
(being) onerous, which it is therefore necessary to be restricted and only imposed if it is certain”].
421 Deman, “Probabilisme,” 478.
422 Mahoney, The M a k in g  o f  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , 228, 227. Deman quotes from passages by 
Suarez which refer to the principle of possession. Deman, “Probabilisme,” 473: “in dubiis melior est 
conditio possidentis.” Cf. Suarez also emphasised an intimate connection between the letter o f the law 
and one’s obligation. This led to minute analysis in casuistry aimed at finding excuses from obligation. 
Cf. Deman, “Probabilisme,” 473: “lex non obligat nisi sit sufficenter promulgata”; Mahoney, The  
M a k in g  o f  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , 227-28.
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Therefore, we can see that, paradoxically, the legalist morality of obligation 
presented by the manualists led not to greater compliance with the law, whether, 
divine, natural, ecclesiastical or civil, but to the opposite extreme, through a 
heightened opposition between authority and the self, and through casuistry which 
offered the means of escape. It is within this context that the relationship of 
conscience to sources of morality, such as the Magisterium, becomes progressively 
more distant, leading ultimately to an absolute subjectivist position, since more and 
more, the starting point is the defence of the freedom of conscience, rather than the 
goodness or wickedness of the action being considered;423 precisely the opposite of St 
Thomas More’s understanding of conscience as being subject to the truth, where even 
martyrdom is seen as necessary at times, “when all else fails” to preserve that truth.424
423 As noted before, obviously for the manualists, the desire was not to permit choosing a 
wrong action. As a result, the action being considered was of great importance. Nevertheless, the shift 
of emphasis to defending the freedom of conscience as such is a significant foundation for the purely 
subjectivist notion, where the idea of wrong action ultimately no longer makes any sense.
424 Twomey, “A Discourse on Thomas More’s Great Matter: Conscience,” 166. Cf. V e r ita t is  
S p le n d o r  90-94, A  A S  1205-1208. See also Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Spe S a lv i  (Vatican City: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007), 38: “the capacity to accept suffering for the sake of goodness, truth 
and justice is an essential criterion of humanity, because if my own well-being and safety are ultimately 
more important than truth and justice, then the power of the stronger prevails, then violence and untruth 
reign supreme. (Official text in A A S  yet to be published.)
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A p p en d ix  2
A  C o m p a riso n  o f  K e y  C o m m e n ta ry  P assag es C o n ta in in g  S y n d e r e s i s
C o m m en tar la  in  E z ec h ie lem  
by Saint Jero m e (PL 25, 22)
Plerique, juxta Platonem, rationale 
animae, et irascitivum, et concupiscitivum, 
quod ille XoyiKÒv et OvpiKÒv et 
£jri(h)pi|TiKÒv vocat, ad hominem, et 
leonem ac vitulum referunt: rationem et 
cognitionem, et mentem, et consilium 
eamdemque virtutem  atque sapientiam 
in cerebri arce ponentes: feritatem vero et 
iracundiam atque violentiam in leone, 
quae consistât in felle. Porro libidinem, 
luxuriam, et omnium voluptatum 
cupidinem in jecore, id est, in vitulo, qui 
terrae operibus haereat. Quartamque 
ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria 
est, quam Graeci vocant ovviriptjoiv, quae 
scintilla conscientiae, in Cain quoque
425 • ipectore, postquam ejectus est de 
paradiso, non extinguitur, et qua vieti 
voluptatibus, vel furore, ipsaque interdum 
rationis decepti similitudine nos peccare 
sentimus. Quam proprie Aquilae députant 
non se miscentem tribus, sed tria errantia 
corrigentem, quem in Scripturis interdum 
vocari legimus spiritum, “qui interpellât 
pro nobis gemitibus inerrabilibus” 
(Rom.VIII, 26). “Nemo enim seit ea quae 
hominis sunt, nisi spiritus qui in eo est”
(I Cor. II, 11). Quem et Paulus ad 
Thessalonicenses scribens, cum anima et 
corpore servari integrum deprecatur 
(I Thess. V). Et tarnen hanc quoque ipsam 
conscientiam, juxta illud quod in 
Proverbiis scriptum est: “Impius cum 
venerit in profundum peccatorum, 
contemnit” (Prov. XVIII, 13)426: cemimus 
praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum 
amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et 
verecundiam habent in delictis, et meretur 
audire: “Facies meretricis facta est tibi, 
noluisti erubescere” (Jerem 111,3).
425 A number of manuscripts contain p e c c a to re  
instead of p e c to re ,  thus changing the sense 
from “in the heart o f Cain” to “in the sinner 
Cain”. De Blic considers the latter to be the 
original. See De Blic, “Syndérèse ou 
Conscience?”, 153.
426 This should, in fact, be Proverbs 18:3.
C om m en taria  in  E z e c h ie le m ,  L ib er I  
by Rabanus M aurus (PL  110, 508C )427
plerique juxta Platonem, rationale animae 
et irascitivum et concupiscitivum ad 
hominem et leonem et vitulum referunt, 
rationem et cognitionem et mentem et 
consilium eamdemque virtutem que  
atque sapientiam in cerebri arce ponentes, 
feritatem vero et iracundiam atque 
violentiam in leone, quae consistât in felle. 
Porro libidinem, luxuriam et omnium 
voluptatum cupidinem in jecore, id est, in 
vitulo, qui terrae operibus haereat. 
Quartamque ponunt quae super haec et 
extra haec tria est quam Graeci vocant 
ovvrrjprioiv, quae scintilla conscientiae, in 
Cain quoque peccatore postquam ejectus 
est de paradiso, non extinguitur, et qua 
vieti voluptatibus vel furore ipsaque 
interdum rationis decepti similitudine nos 
peccare sentimus, quam proprie aquilae 
députant non se miscentem tribus, sed tria 
errantia corrigentem, quem in Scripturis 
interdum vocari legimus spiritum, “qui 
interpellât pro nobis gemitibus 
inerrabilibus (Rom.VIII).” “Nemo enim 
seit ea quae hominis sunt, nisi spiritus qui 
in eo est,” quem et Paulus ad 
Thessalonicenses scribens, cum anima et 
corpore servari integrum deprecatur. Et 
tarnen hanc quoque ipsam conscientia 
juxta illud quod in Proverbiis scriptum est: 
“Impius cum venerit in profundum 
peccatorum contemnit (Prov. X V III),” 
cemimus praecipitari apud quosdam et 
suum locum om ittere, qui ne pudorem 
quidem et verecundiam habent in delictis, 
et meretur audire: “Facies meretricis facta 
est tibi, nescis erubescere (Jerem 111,3).”
427 Excluding minor textual differences, I have 
highlighted words which differ significantly 
between the original passage o f St Jerome, and 
the later texts provided by Rabanus Maurus or 
the G lo ssa  O rd in a r ia .  The difference may be a 
change in word, a misspelling, or an omission.
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C o m m en tar io  in  E z ec h ie lem  
by Saint Jero m e (PL  25, 22)
Plerique, juxta Platonem, rationale 
animae, et irascitivum, et concupiscitivum, 
quod ille ^oyucòv et Supucòv et 
¿TtiônpqxiKÔv vocat, ad hominem, et 
leonem ac vitulum referunt: rationem et 
cognitionem, et mentem, et consilium 
eamdemque virtutem atque satpientiam in 
cerebri arce ponentes: feritatem vero et 
iracundiam atque violentiam in leone, 
quae consistât in felle. Porro libidinem, 
luxuriam, et omnium voluptatum 
cupidinem in jecore, id est, in vitulo, qui 
terrae operibus haereat. Quartamque 
ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria 
est, quam Graeci vocant mivrqpqciv, 
quae scintilla conscientiae, in Cain quoque 
pectore, postquam ejectus est de paradiso, 
non extinguitur, et qua vieti voluptatibus, 
vel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis 
decepti similitudine nos peccare sentimus. 
Quam proprie Aquilae députant non se 
miscentem tribus, sed tria errantia 
corrigentem, quem in Scripturis interdum 
vocari legimus spiritum, “qui interpellât 
pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus” 
(Rom.V ili, 26). “Nemo enim seit ea quae 
hominis sunt, nisi spiritus qui in eo est”
(I Cor. II, 11). Quem et Paulus ad 
Thessalonicenses scribens, cum anima et 
corpore servari integrum deprecato  
(I Thess. V ). E t tarnen hanc quoque ipsam 
conscientiam, juxta illud quod in 
Proverbiis scriptum est: “Impius cum 
venerit in profundum peccatorum, 
contemnit” (Prov. XVIII, 13)428: cemimus 
praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum 
amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et 
verecundiam habent in delictis, et meretur 
audire: “Facies meretricis facta est tibi, 
noluisti erubescere” (Jerem 111,3). Hanc 
igitur quadrigam in aurigae modum Deus 
regit, et incompositis currentem gradibus 
réfrénât, docilemque facit, et suo parere 
cogit imperio.
428 This should be Prov. 18:3.
plerique iuxta platonem rationabilitatem 
animae et irascentiam et concupiscentiam  
quod ille logicon et cunicon et 
epimecicon430 vocat. ad hominem et 
leonem et vitulum referunt rationem et 
cogitationem et mentem et consilium 
candemque virtutem atque sapientiam in 
cerebri arce ponentes * feritatem vero atque 
iracundiam et violentiam in leone quae 
consistit in felle, libidinem. luxuriam. et 
omnium voluptatum cupidinem. in iecore. 
id est. in vitulo qui terre  operibus heret. 
Quartam supra haec et extra haec tria 
ponunt quam greci vocant sinderesim  
quae scintilla conscientie in chaim  
quoque non extinguitur quasi vieti 
voluptatibus vel furore et ipsa interdum 
rationis decepti similitudine nos peccare 
saentimus quam proprie aquile députant 
non se miscentem tribus • sed ipsa errantia 
corrigentem hic est spiritus qui interpellât 
pro nobis gemitibus inerrabilibus.431 Nemo 
enim seit ea quae hominis sunt, nisi 
spiritus hominis qui est in eo. Unde 
paulus. integer spiritus vester et anim a  
et corpus sine quere, etc. hanc tarnen  
conscientiam sicut in prouerbiis dicitur. 
Impius cum venerit in profundum peccati 
contemnit * sepe praecipitari videm us et 
suum locum amittere. cum  quidam  sine 
pudore peccant, quibus m erito dicitur. 
facies m eretricis facta est tibi. noluisti 
erubescere * hanc quadrigam  quasi 
auriga deus regit. et incompositis 
currentem  gradibus suo p arere  cogit 
imperio
Glossa Ordinaria (1480 ed.) 429
429 As in the 1480 Strassburg edition, vol. 3, 
page 224. The text is in abbreviated Latin, and 
so I have presented it here in complete words, 
following the abbreviation key provided in the 
facsimile edition. All significant words, 
however, such as s in d é re s is , are written in full 
in the original. The punctuation is presented as 
in the original.
430 Here the copyist has struggled with the 
Greek transliteration. No actual Greek is to be 
found in this edition.
431 The abbreviation key notes that this edition 
summarises words from well-known Scripture 
passages with single letters. Thus, the text 
reads: “interpellât -p nobis.g.in.”
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C om m en tar io  in  E z ec h ie lem  
by Saint Jero m e (PL 25, 22)
Plerique, ju x ta  Platonem , rationale 
animae, et irascitivum, et concupiscitivum, 
quod ille A,oyucòv et Supucòv et 
¿TriOvpqTiKÒv vocat, 
ad hominem, et leonem ac vitulum  
referunt: rationem  et cognitionem, et 
mentem, et consilium eamdemque 
virtutem atque satpientiam in cerebri arce  
ponentes: feritatem  vero et iracundiam  
atque violentiam  in leone, quae consistât 
in felle. Porro libidinem, luxuriam, et 
omnium voluptatum cupidinem in jecore, 
id est, in vitulo, qui terrae operibus 
haereat. Quartamque ponunt quae super 
haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci 
vocant onvriipqaiv, quae scintilla 
conscientiae, in Cain quoque pectore, 
postquam ejectus est de paradiso, non 
extinguitur, et qua vieti voluptatibus, vel 
furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti 
similitudine nos peccare sentimus. Quam 
proprie Aquilae députant non se 
m iscentem  tribus, sed tria errantia 
corrigentem , quem in Scripturis interdum 
vocari legimus spiritum, “qui interpellât 
pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus” 
(Rom .V III, 2 6 ) . “N em o enim seit ea quae 
hominis sunt, nisi spiritus qui in eo est”
(I Cor. II, 11). Quem et Paulus ad 
Thessalonicenses scribens, cum anima et 
corpore servari integrum d ep recato  
(I Thess. V ). E t tarnen hanc quoque ipsam  
conscientiam , ju xta  illud quod in 
Proverbiis scriptum est: “Impius cum  
venerit in profundum peccatorum , 
contem nit” (Prov. X V III, 13): cemimus 
praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum  
amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et 
verecundiam  habent in delictis, et meretur 
audire: “Facies m eretricis facta est tibi, 
noluisti erubescere” (Jerem  111,3). Hanc 
igitur quadrigam in aurigae modum Deus 
regit, et incom positis currentem gradibus 
réfrénât, docilemque facit, et suo parere 
cogit imperio.
plerique iuxta Platonem  rationabilitatem  
animae et irascentiam et concupiscentiam , 
quod ille tatyiKÒv et Supucòv et 
èwi&upqniTiKÒv433 vocat, ad hom inem  et 
leonem et vitulum referunt rationem  et 
cogitationem et mentem et consilium , 
eademque virtutem atque sapientiam in 
cerebri arce ponentes; feritatem  vero atque 
iracundiam et violentiam  in leone, quae 
consistit in felle; libidinem, luxuriam , et 
omnium voluptatum cupidinem, in iecore  
id est, in vitulo, qui terrae operibus haeret. 
Quartam supra haec et extra haec tria  
ponunt, quam G raeci vocant 
oiUUTrjpqoiv434 synderesin, quae scintilla 
conscientiae in Cain quoque non 
extinguitur, quasi vieti voluptatibus vel 
furore, et ipsa interdum rationis decepti 
similitudine nos peccare sentimus, quam  
proprie aquilae députant non se m iscentem  
tribus, sed ipsa errantia corrigentem , hic 
est spiritus, qui interpellât pro nobis 
gemitibus inerrabilibus. N em o enim seit 
ea, quae hominis sunt, nisi spiritus 
hominis, qui est in eo: vnde Paulus, 
In teg er  S piritus S p iritu s vester, e t  an im a , 
et corp u s s in e  qu ere , etc. H an c tarnen  
conscientiam, sicut in P rou erb . dicitur, 
Im pius cum  ven erit in pro fu n du m  p ec c a ti ,  
contem nit, saepe praecipitari videm us et 
suum locum am ittere, cum  quidam  sine 
pudore peccant: quibus m erito dicitur, 
F a c ie s  m eretr ic is  f a c t a  es t  tibi, n o lu ist i  
e ru b esc e r e ;  quadrigam  quasi auriga  
Deus regit, et incompositis cu rren tem  
gradibus suo parere cogit im perio.
Glossa Ordinaria (1634 ed.) 432
432 As in the 1634 Antwerp edition, vol. 4, 
columns 1062-63
433 The Antwerp text contains several errors in 
this word. As well as additional consonants, 
most notable is the replacement o f a p i  with an 
om ega . In the text, the accent over the o m e g a  
is more pronounced, making it look similar to 
a p i .  This gives a clear example of how easy it 
would have been to misread a Greek word, * 
thereby giving rise to ownjpriau; in the first 
place. A printed note in the margin also 
specifies the nominative in Latin as S in d é re s is .
434 Here, I have tried to represent the unclear 
font, where in the Antwerp edition the ‘nv’ 
blur into each other in three rounded loops.
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C h a p te r  F o u r  
Issu es  o n  th e  N a tu r e  a n d  F u n c tio n  o f  C o n s c ie n c e
1. I n t r o d u c t io n
Having gathered together historical data on the concept of conscience in an attempt to 
establish the key aspects of its nature as understood prior to a shift to a more 
subjectivist basis, I would now like to explore some issues in order to elaborate 
further on the nature of conscience. Here I would like to investigate questions related 
to two main themes: the limits of rational, deductive conscience, and the content of 
synderesis, as a basis for establishing whether synderesis, and conscience in general, 
is simply a formal principle, where the individual establishes the moral parameters, or 
whether the content is in some way established for us. This chapter will be made up of 
a series of subsections, or sub-questions, designed to build up a chain of evidence. 
However, in case the chain proves to be too long to see the end, I will summarise the 
goal before we start.
In discussing the question of deduction and conscience, I am attempting to 
highlight the limits of deductive reasoning in conscience in two respects. Firstly, I 
will aim to show, using an interdisciplinary method, that a purely deductive model of 
conscience is incomplete, and that the dynamic of moral reasoning incorporates a 
much richer mix of human capacities, which centre around deduction, but are not 
restricted to it. Hence conscience operates beyond the limits of deduction. Secondly, I 
wish to highlight that conscience as a capacity for moral reasoning has limits, most 
temporary, some permanent, that are peculiar to each individual. Here the purpose of 
dicussing limitations of reasoning owing to errors of function or content, including 
those resulting from psychological difficulties, is to emphasise the fact that our 
capacity is far from perfect, and so cannot operate in isolation, but rather is in
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constant need of development and of the assistance of others, as well as God’s mercy 
and grace. Thus, in exploring these areas, I hope to present a balanced appraisal of 
the human conscience, which is both capable and yet limited in its recognition of 
moral truth, but still open to the possibility of growth or refinement, given the right 
environment, and I would consider the optimum environment to be not simply a life 
of virtue, but a life of graced virtue, lived in holiness. Therefore, with these 
introductory remarks in mind, we turn now to our exploration of our themes of the 
limits of deduction, and the content of synderesis.
2. T h e  Q u e s t io n  o f  D e d u c t io n  in  C o n s c ie n c e
As we have seen from the writings of Saints Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, 
both rely upon Aristotle in their application of the practical syllogism to the 
relationship of synderesis to conscientia. Given the importance they attribute to the 
deductive syllogism, it would make sense to explore the issue of deduction in 
conscience more fully. Kevin Flannery provides many helpful insights into the use of 
Aristotelian logic in the moral thought of Aquinas,1 but as Aquinas is dependent upon 
Albert for his application of the syllogism to the problem, I will take it that the 
general comments on syllogisms apply to both. In addition to his analysis, we can 
draw from the field of cognitive psychology, which has made recent advances in the 
study of the nature of the logic of deduction and its underlying mental processes. The 
fruit of their experimental study has been a model theory, which alters somewhat our 
understanding of how people reason naturally. The research is built upon an
1 Kevin L. Flannery, A c ts  A m id  P re ce p ts : The  A r is to te l ia n  L o g ic a l S tru c tu re  o f  T ho m a s  
A q u in a s ’s M o r a l  T h e o ry  (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001).
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accumulation of over “80 years’ worth of experiments on deductive reasoning,” 
which, over time, have developed markedly in their scientific rigour.2
The deductive process presented by the two Scholastics consists of a major 
premise from synderesis, minor premise from reasoning, and the conclusion from 
conscience. The idea seems to be very neat and tidy, but I would suggest that, while 
offering a clear image to show the relationship between the two parts of conscience, 
as well as giving an explanation of where error lies in reasoning, this neatness 
conceals the complicated nature of moral reasoning. Moreover, the summary 
caricature of their analysis presented in moral manuals further reduces the possibility 
of recognising the complexity of moral decision-making, or in reconciling the 
description with everyday experience. This should lead us to question the role of the 
deductive syllogism in conscience with a view to observing whether the model is in 
fact complete or partial. If the latter is the case what should be added to the picture? 
This question raises both the issue of types of reasoning and reflection, but also the 
moral and spiritual tools necessary to improve our ability to reach good, moral 
judgements, and to act upon them.
The obvious place to start is to ask: what, in general, is deduction? Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne sum up the process as follows:
2 P[hilip] N. Johnson-Laird and Ruth M.J. Byrne, D e d u c tio n  (Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1991), 3. Although Binet and other researchers in the field of intelligence testing made the 
first psychological study o f deductive reasoning problems, the first cognitive studies looking at the 
mental processes were probably those of Wilkins in 1928 and Woodworth and Sells in 1935. Much of 
their methodology is still in use today. See Jonathan St.B.T. Evans, Stephen E. Newstead, Ruth M.J. 
Byrne, H u m a n  R e a s o n in g : The P s y c h o lo g y  o f  D e d u c t io n  (Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993), 
4-5. It has to be noted, however, that “early studies of syllogistic deduction were vitiated by 
methodological flaws.” This was because experimenters provided the conclusions, which the subjects 
were asked to evaluate. This meant that “subjects could use guessing and other non-inferential 
processes” to find the correct answer. However, in the 1970s, studies began in which the subjects were 
asked to provide their own propositional conclusions, which thereby excluded guessing, and showed 
their process of reasoning more clearly. See Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c t io n , 106.
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What happens when people make a deduction? The short answer is that they 
start with some information -  perceptual observations, memories, 
statements, beliefs, or imagined states of affairs -  and produce a novel 
conclusion that follows from them. Typically, they argue from some initial 
propositions to a single conclusion, though sometimes from one proposition 
to another. In many practical inferences, their starting point is a perceived 
state of affairs and their conclusion is a course of action. Their aim is to 
arrive at a valid conclusion, which is bound to be true given that their 
starting point is true.3
2 .1  T h e o r i e s  o f  D e d u c t io n  a n d  t h e  N a tu r e  o f  t h e  P r a c t i c a l  S y l lo g is m
Johnson-Baird and Byrne’s summary describes the goal, the mental material used and 
refers to the issue of validity. However, what is missing is the process used by the 
individual to reach a (valid) conclusion. It is the process which has been the topic of 
study not only of philosophers, but also cognitive scientists, who over the years have 
proposed three main classes of theory about the process of deduction: formal rules of 
inference, content-specific rules of inference, and semantic procedures that search for 
interpretations of the premises that are counterexamples to conclusions: a process 
known as the mental models theory.4 We will look briefly at the nature of each of 
these theories to see which best explains everyday human deduction. The results 
should help us to acknowledge the complicated nature of deduction in general, and 
hence moral deduction in particular, thus helping us to avoid an oversimplification of 
the process, which either demands too much or too little of people’s moral capability.
3 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n , 18.
4 Ibid., 2 3 . 1 am indebted to Dr Paul Kinnear, of the University of Aberdeen, for his assistance 
in my research for this section.
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For many years formal theories were presented as the only possible explanation for 
the human capacity of deduction. “Theorists originally assumed without question that 
there is a mental logic containing formal rules of inference, such as the rule for modus 
ponens, which are used to derive conclusions.” 5 The first psychologist to emphasize 
the issue of logic in human development was the late Jean Piaget.6 He argued that 
children internalise their own actions and reflect on them,7 and in doing so eventually, 
by their early teens, arrive at a set of formal operations, which allows them to reason
o
logically by hypothesis. Piaget and his followers were convinced that formal logic 
completely explained adult deductive reasoning.9 Modem writers are less convinced
2.1.1 F orm al R ules Theory
5 Ibid. In these theories of natural reasoning, a distinction is made between formal and natural 
logic, which further defines the quantity of rules a person uses. See Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 
H u m a n  R e a s o n in g , 13-14: “While the validity of arguments in formal logic can be established by a 
method known as ‘truth table analysis’ [ ...] , philosophers and psychologists in search of a mental logic 
have proposed that people adopt what are termed ‘natural logics’ for deductive reasoning. A natural 
logic is comprised of a limited set of abstract rules or reasoning which can be applied in combination to 
deduce conclusions lfom premises. There have been a number of different proposals about the precise 
number and nature of rules or inference schemata that are required to account for natural inference.”
6 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n ,  23.
7 Jean Piaget, L o g ic  a n d  P s y c h o lo g y  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953), 8: 
“Psychologically, operations are actions which are intemalizable, reversible [being able to return to 
their original starting point], and coordinated into systems characterized by laws which apply to the 
system as a whole. [ .. .]  Finally, since operations do not exist in isolation they are connected in the 
form of s tru c tu re d  w h o le s ” (emphasis in text, parenthesis added, with explanation based on page 13).
8 Ibid., 18 (commenting on the development of propositional or formal operations in 11-12 to 
14-15 year-olds): “The final period of operational development begins at about 11 to 12, reaches 
equilibrium at about 14 to 15 and so leads on to adult logic. [ ...]  The new feature marking the 
appearance of this fourth stage is the ability to reason by hypothesis.” Piaget saw a parallel between the 
intellectual/logical evolution of a child and its moral development, where, assisted by education, in the 
former the child intériorisés formal logical rules, and in the latter it achieves a balance o f autonomy and 
reciprocity. Cf. Jean Piaget (and collaborators), The M o r a l  J u d g m e n t o f  th e  C h ild ,  trans. Marjorie 
Gabain (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 403-404; Sabatino Majorano L a  C o s c ie n z a : P e r  u n a  L e t tu ra  
C r is t ia n a  (Cinisello Balsamo, Milan: San Paolo, 1994), 39-42. Piaget’s moral conclusions were later 
criticised for their basis upon “faulty methodology”. See Mannes Tidmarsh, “Education and the 
Growth of Conscience,” N e w  B la c k f r ia rs  46 (1965): 640-645, at 642.
9 Bärbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The G ro w th  o f  L o g ic a l T h in k in g  f r o m  C h ild h o o d  to  
A d o le s c e n c e  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 305: “No further operations need be introduced 
since these operations correspond to the calculus inherent to the algebra of propositional logic. In short, 
reasoning is nothing more than the propositional calculus itself.”
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of Piaget’s arguments,10 and are less inclined to accept that formal logic is the sum 
total of the process of deduction.11
2 .1 .2  C o n t e n t - S p e c i f i c  R u le  T h e o r y
Once research had begun to show that a formal logic theory was inadequate, cognitive 
psychologists started to look for a more nuanced theory. The resultant proposal was to 
modify the rule-based theory to include the content of past experience, which is 
known as content-specific rule theory. Here background information, the content of 
memory, is converted into rules of inference in readiness for future deductive 
situations. Although the theory found its origin in pioneering work on a programming
• • • 19language for artificial intelligence, psychologists quickly saw this as a possible 
answer to how we make deductions. Later, the artificial intelligence specialists 
Riesbeck and Schank revised the theory to come up with a new form based on case- 
based reasoning, 14 where memory and experience play such a large part in reasoning 
that there is, in fact, no logic involved at all, but rather the reasoning operates solely 
in a case-based fashion.15 According to this theory, the problem in hand reminds the
10 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n , 23: “Piaget’s logic was idiosyncratic [ .. .]  He had a 
genius for asking the right questions and for inventing experiments to answer them, but the vagueness 
of his theory masked its inadequacy perhaps even from Piaget himself. The effort to understand it is so 
great that readers often have no energy left to detect its flaws.”
11 Ibid.: “Deductive competence must depend on more than pure logic in order to rule out 
banal, though valid, conclusions.”
12 For a description of how the P L A N N E R  language functions, see ibid., 31-33. For a 
discussion on MBRtalk, a memory-based reasoning system for computers, see Craig Stanfill and David 
Waltz: “Toward Memory-Based Reasoning,” C o m m u n ic a tio n s  o f  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  f o r  C o m p u t in g  
M a c h in e ry  29 (1986): 1213-28, at 1213: “The intensive use of memory to recall specific episodes from 
the past -  rather than rules -  should be the foundation of machine reasoning.”
13 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n , 34: “Psychologists have also proposed that the mind 
uses content-specific conditional rules to represent general knowledge.” Cf. John R. Anderson, The  
A rc h ite c tu re  o f  C o g n it io n  (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1983), 23-26, 45- 
85. In fact, the description of a propositional code forms only part of Anderson’s theory of knowledge 
representation. See in particular ibid., 75-76.
14 Christopher K. Riesbeck and Roger C. Schank, In s id e  C a se -B a se d  R e a s o n in g  (Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989), 25: “A case-based reasoner solves new problems by 
adapting solutions that were used to solve old problems.”
15 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n , 34.
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individual of a past case, and so the person decides what to do on the basis of the 
outcome of an earlier scenario by following the “script” of the previously experienced 
situation.16 Hence, through repetition of the case, the activity begins to function like a
« 1 7 . .  •content-specific rule, where one should do Y if X  happens. Philip Johnson-Laird and 
Ruth Byrne point out that “the only difficulty with this theory is that it fails to explain 
how people are able to make valid deductions that do not depend on their specific 
experiences.” 18 That experiential knowledge permeates everyday deductions should 
come as no surprise, but it is doubtful that it is the sole source and form of our 
capability of reasoning and deduction.19
2 .1 .3  M e n t a l  M o d e l s  T h e o r y
Some psychologists now propose that as neither formal rule theory nor content- 
specific theory adequately explains the mechanism of natural, untutored deduction,
90 • • •another theory needs to take their place. As a result, cognitive psychologists, such as 
Johnstone-Laird, Byrne and Newstead are proposing a mental models theory. The
91core of this theory, “which depends on semantic procedures,” centres around first
16 Riesbeck and Schank, In s id e  C ase -B ased  R e a s o n in g , 4.
17 In fact, Riesbeck and Schank identify that past experience is used in different ways to shape 
the understanding of new situation. Accordingly, they distinguish three types of cases: o s s if ie d  cases, 
p a ra d ig m a t ic  cases  and sto rie s . Ossified cases act like rules, “because they have been extracted from 
cases,” and are typified by the proverb. Paradigmatic cases are single event cases, which act as a 
prototype for new experiences by means of adaptation. Lastly stories combine detail with proverbial 
‘rules’ to offer a depth of insight to enable creativity. See, ibid., 12-13, at 12.
18 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n ,  34.
19 Ibid. Such a view as presented (or criticised) by cognitive psychologists would probably be 
an oversimplification of Riesbeck and Schank’s original view, as they do recognise that humans also 
carry out spontaneous, complex thought, though only do so when a case scenario is not applicable. See 
Riesbeck and Schank, In s id e  C a se -B a se d  R e a so n in g , 5: “given a choice between thinking hard and 
adapting an old script, people will choose the script every time.”
20 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, D e d u c tio n ,  35. The authors’ argument is that formal rule theory 
is insufficient, since the content of premises (i.e. the subject matter and the order of presentation) can 
have a significant effect on the deductive outcome. Thus normal, everyday reasoning, in contrast to its 
formal philosophical counterpart, cannot be reduced to a list of rules to be employed. However, the fact 
that people c a n  make valid deductions which only use connectives and quantifiers (once the process 
has been adequately explained) implies that one cannot reduce deduction or natural logical competence 
purely or largely to memories of past events, as the case-based theories would propose.
21 Ibid., 35.
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creating a model or problem in one’s mind based upon one’s understanding of the 
situation, followed by posing a putative solution or conclusion, and then by a process 
of validation, the individual either draws a valid conclusion or searches for other 
models until a valid conclusion is reached.22 The theory has similarities with semantic 
propositional calculus, but differs in that “logical accounts depend on assigning an 
infinite number of models to each proposition, and an infinite set is far too big to fit 
inside anyone’s head.”23 The psychological model therefore works on the 
presumption of the bare minimum. This means that the psychological theory “assumes 
that people construct a minimum of models: they try to work with just a single 
representative sample from the set of possible models, until they are forced to 
consider alternatives.”24
2 .1 .4  T he P ra c tic a l S y llog ism
Whether the models theory is the best possible description of the deductive process is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and beyond the competence of the writer. However, I 
am persuaded by the arguments put forward by its proponents that neither abstract 
rules nor memory form the whole picture of ordinary deduction, particularly given the 
significant factor of fallibility, to which we shall return shortly. Thus, ordinary 
deduction may not be purely based on following a process of logical rules as was long
22 Ibid., 36, 196: “In contrast, the model theory assumes that people reason from their 
understanding of a situation, and that their starting point is accordingly a set of models -  a single model 
for a single situation - that is constructed from perceiving the world or from understanding discourse, 
or both. As we have illustrated for a variety of domains, models follow the principle of structural 
identity [...] : their structures are identical to the structures of the states of affairs, whether perceived or 
conceived, that the models represent. They can represent disjunctive alternatives and they can represent 
negation directly. [...] According to this theory, the difficulty of a deduction depends on two principal 
factors: whether implicit information has been made explicit, and whether the deduction depends on the 
construction of more than one model.”
23 Ibid., 36.
24 Ibid. The mental models theory is an attempt to balance logical competence with human 
limitations. See ibid., 43: “What is needed is a theory that reconciles the semantics of truth tables with 
the constraints of mental processing, and that does so in a way that explains human performance.”
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presumed. However, everyday deduction contains a further problem. Typically,
formal logic is m on oton ic , that is,
if a conclusion follows from some premises, then no subsequent premise 
can invalidate it. Further premises lead monotonically to further 
conclusions, and nothing ever subtracts from them. Thought in daily life 
appears not to have this property.25
The authors here give the example of Alicia having a bacterial infection.
Given the premise that the preferred treatment for a patient with a bacterial infection
is penicillin, then the preferred treatment for Alicia is penicillin. But, what if Alicia is
allergic to penicillin? Here the conclusion is not valid, thus implying that some
everyday inferences are “non-monotonic”, that is, “their conclusions can be
withdrawn in the light of subsequent information.” This shows that there is a
difference between theoretical and practical syllogisms and between the two forms of
reasoning in general.
In contrast to synthetic rule-based thought, Kevin Flannery describes practical
reasoning as having an upward or upstream direction, starting from a basic need or
good that requires to be attained, leading to the solution of how that can be achieved
onin a particular way or situation. He goes on to concur with the psychologists that the 
practical syllogism does indeed have the characteristic of “defeasibility”, as it is
sometimes called, that is, “the conclusion of the practical syllogism is ‘defeatable’ by
• . . .  » extraneous factors.” Thus, although the practical syllogism is still concerned with
truth, the premises are also there to reach the good of the conclusion. “In the practical
25 Ibid., 20.
26 Ibid.
27 Flannery, Acts Amid Precepts, 9-10. Following modem scholarship, Mark Sultana also 
highlights a difference between theoretical and practical reasoning, and points out that given what 
Aristotle says in Book Three of the Nichomachean Ethics, one should not presume that there is a “top- 
down” application of rules, but rather that one reasons “‘backwards’, in the light of the aim, to ways 
and means to bring this about.” Cf. Sultana, Self-Deception and Akrasia, 292; Aristotle, N ichom achean  
Ethics, III, 1112b 15 [Irwin trans.]: “Rather, we lay down the end, and then we examine the ways and 
means to achieve it.”
28 Flannery, Acts Amid Precepts, 10.
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syllogism they [the premises] ensure (as best they can) that we get to where we are 
going. It establishes a link between a goal and an action in such a way that the good of 
the goal is preserved in the action.”29 The notion of defeasibility does not negate the 
value of the syllogism as such as a tool for deduction, nor as a description of the 
deduction process. Rather, inclusion of defeasibility gives greater accuracy to our 
attempt to describe the process of everyday moral deduction, one which 
acknowledges the possibility of one revisiting the conclusion in the light of new 
information, something which also seems to fit the flexible, cyclical mental models
orj
theory. The description of the movement of the practical syllogism also gives further 
detail to our understanding of moral deduction, showing that it does not start with the 
general premise, but rather an expression of need, or recognition of a good to be 
achieved, which sets in motion the process of determining the correct course of 
action. Thus, there may also be inductive inferences involved in setting the 
deliberation in motion.
2 .2  D edu ction  A lon e?
The second question one might ask is: Is the moral reasoning of conscience purely 
deductive? The first hurdle to overcome is the fact that the term ‘deduction’ is 
misused in everyday speech. As a result, what may at first seem to be deduction, may 
in fact be something else. For example, according to Johnson-Laird and Byrne, Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s account of the analytical mind of his character Sherlock 
Holmes “popularized a profound misconception about deduction.”31 What was 
presented as elementary deduction, was in fact a description of induction, “where an
29 Ibid., 12 (parenthesis in text).
30 As we saw earlier, St Albert also talked of revisiting the syllogism to correct error, which he 
saw (by and large) in the minor premise provided by reason. See Albert the Great, Summa de 
Creaturis, II, q.72, a.2, ad obj.l.
31 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, Deduction, 34.
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individual infers a conclusion by drawing upon assumptions or guess-work that is not
• Y)part of the facts provided.” Others might debate the purity of the description of 
induction, preferring to call it pragmatic inference, which is understood to be a fusion 
of both inductive elaboration of the context from prior assumptions or further 
knowledge, followed by a process of deductive reasoning. In real life, whether by 
choice or not, it is often the case that individuals are not in possession of all the facts, 
and so lack sufficient information to make valid deductions. As a result, people fill in 
the gaps with inductive inferences in order to be able to proceed to a conclusion.34
If it is a common occurrence that human reasoning in general often uses a mix 
of deduction and induction, it is likely that this also applies to moral reasoning and the 
functioning of conscience. Indeed, rather than describing it as a mechanical or 
completely ‘top-down’ logical process, it would be more appropriate to 
acknowledge the mixture of factors involved in a conscientious judgement. This 
complex nature of moral decision-making is highlighted by a number of moral
32 Ibid., 1-2, at 2: “Induction sacrifices validity for plausibility. Like Sherlock Holmes, one 
often does not have sufficient information to be able to draw a valid inference.”
33 Evans, Newstead and Byrne, Human Reasoning, 3: [The pragmatic inference is] a type of 
inductive inference which is plausible given the context rather than logically necessary. Whether such 
pragmatic inferences are inductive or deductive is a matter of debate. Clearly, they go beyond the 
information given and so appear to be inductive.”
34 Johnson-Laird and Byrne, Deduction, 205. Here a test example is given: “The old man was 
bitten by a poisonous snake. There was no known antidote available.” The initial conclusion of many 
may be “The old man died.” Yet, this is an invalid deduction, as there is insufficient information given 
to draw this conclusion. The study subjects provided four other possible answers, namely, “The poison 
was successfully removed, e.g. by sucking it out,” The old man was immune to the poison,” “The 
poison was weak, and not deadly,” and “The poison was blocked from entering the circulatory system, 
e.g. by the man’s thick clothing.” All of these are examples of inductive reasoning, where the 
individual fills in the gaps in the constructed mental model of the problem posed.
35 Leibniz longed for a universal system that would resolve all disputes by means of 
dispassionate logical calculations. It was a noble aim, but misguided in its choice of means, which 
failed to recognise the value of the different aspects of human nature. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, D e Scientia 
Universali seu C alcalo Philosophico  (extracts from 1684 work), in Scritti di Logica, trans, and ed. 
Mariarosa Vignato Rizzo (Padua: Editrice R.A.D.A.R., 1972), 114-120, at 117: [Having agreed to 
replace the confusion of words with calculus], “when controversies arise, it will no longer be necessary 
to have any greater dispute between two philosophers than between two Calculators. Indeed, all that 
will be required will be to take up pens in hand and sit at tables for calculus and to say to one another 
(at the invitation of a friend of one’s choice): let us calculate.” [“Fatto questo, quando sorgeranno 
controversie, non sarà necessario una disputa più grande tra due filosofi, che tra due Calcolatori. Sarà 
sufficiente infatti prendere le penne in mano e sedere ai tavoli per calcoli e dirsi reciprocamente (con 
l’invito di un amico a piacere): calcoliamo.”] Cf. Johnson-Laird and Byrne, Deduction, 5.
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theologians, who are concerned that certain aspects of human insight or experience 
have been downplayed or are unduly neglected.36
Charles Curran presents a brief analysis of the history of moral theology which 
sums up the period of the moral manuals (17th - 20th centuries) as not only employing 
legalism and casuistry in its approach, through the influence of nominalism, but also 
presenting the function of conscience purely in terms of a deductive syllogism.37 
Clearly this was inspired by the description given by St Thomas Aquinas, but it 
lacked much of its original context. However, prompted by a comment by Marcelino 
Zalba, Curran notes that although deduction was the primary model given as a
36 For example, Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 135-50; Häring, F ree  and Faithful in Christ, I, 
235: “One’s conscience is healthy only when the person -  the emotional as well as the intellectual 
elements and the energies of the will -  is functioning in a profound harmony in the depth of one’s 
being [...] where we are touched by the creative Spirit and brought to ever greater wholeness”; Hannon, 
M oral Decision Making, 47: “Moral knowledge is not like mathematical knowledge, nor is moral 
judgment like the process of reaching a conclusion in algebra or geometry or arithmetic. It would be 
possible to set out Fermat’s theorem, say, and to follow it to its conclusion without being stirred in 
one’s soul, but the conclusion that the torture of prisoners of war is wrong is as likely to come from, or 
be accompanied by, a feelin g  of revulsion as it is from an inference from the principle that we shouldn’t 
harm people” (emphasis in text).
37 Curran, “Conscience,” 8. Cf. Januarius Bucceroni, Institutiones Theologiae Moralis 
secundum Doctrinam S. Thomae et S. Alphonsi, vol. 1 (Rome: Forzani, 1892), 42-43, at 42: “Ut ergo 
hanc conscientiam efformare possimus syllogismum facimus.” Not all manuals followed the same 
pattern. Indeed, Vermeersch’s Theologia Moralis does not mention the syllogism, and instead describes 
conscience as the herald of the principles of moral law, a concept we noted earlier in the writing of St 
Bonaventure. See Arthurus Vermeersch, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Responso, Consilia, vol. 1, 
Theologia Fundamentalis (Rome: Università Gregoriana; Paris: Charles Beyaert; Bruges: Firme 
Beyaert, 1922), 289-347, at 290: “Conscientia est ergopraeco, quo mediante, leges actionum 
nostrarum nobis applicantur” (emphasis in text). Slater also describes conscience as “herald or 
ambassador of God” regarding the eternal, divine law, but then goes on to describe the process of 
arriving at the judgement of conscience in terms of the deductive syllogism. See Slater, M anual o f  
M oral Theology, I, 55.
38 As time went by, many of the manuals became increasingly truncated in their presentation 
of moral themes, replacing much of the theological content with dry formulae. By the nineteenth 
century, it is evident that much of the presentations of the moral theologies of St Thomas Aquinas or St 
Alphonsus de Liguori (whether separate or combined) lack the original spirit of these Doctors. Cf. 
Raphael Gallagher, “The Fate of the Moral Manual Since Saint Alphonsus,” in History and  
Conscience: Studies in Honour o f  Father Sean O ’Riordan CSsR, ed. Raphael Gallagher and Brendan 
McConvery (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1989), 212-39, at 226. See also Janz who describes the 
earlier impact of excessive use of syllogisms in theology. Denis R. Janz, “Syllogism or Paradox: 
Aquinas and Luther on Theological Method,” Theological Studies 59 (1998): 3-21, at 9: “Fascinated as 
Aquinas was with syllogisms, his followers wildly exaggerated this aspect of his thought. This 
development within Thomism reached its pinnacle in the person of Capponi della Porrecta who in 1588 
published a five-volume work entitled Elucidationes form ales in Summam theologicam  S. Thomae in 
which every one of the 2,669 articles in the Summa Theologiae was reduced to a syllogism! Here 
Aquinas’s masterful work was dismembered into discrete little blocks of cold logic, emptied of its 
richness and complexity, and hence distorted.”
168
description of conscientious reasoning, the manuals also “contain hints that 
conscience can operate in a way other than deduction, but they never develop such an 
approach.”39 Zalba’s description of conscience upheld the central role of strict 
deductive reasoning in conscience, but also mentioned “a certain sense or intuition of 
probity” as another means of reaching the conclusion of conscience from general 
moral principles.40 Although Zalba only makes one mention of this intuitive means of 
reasoning, he does point in the footnote to St Thomas’s S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , P r im a  
S ecu n d a e , q.58, a.5 on prudence and moral virtues, for comment on the virtuous 
support needed for valid deduction and the eventual development of connatural right 
judgement,41 and S ecu n d a  S ecu n d ae, q.45, a.2 on wisdom, for an explanation of this 
gift of the Spirit which assists in connatural right judgement.42 Hence Zalba’s 
comment is sufficient stimulus to lead Curran to present a more “holistic 
understanding of conscience,”43 which includes that which is allied to deduction. 
Thus, Curran is of the view that reason is employed in the judgements of conscience 
“in at least three different ways -  a discursive deductive way, a connatural way, and a 
discerning and prudential way.”44 However, he also points out that “reason acting in
39 Curran, “Conscience,” 8.
40 Marcelino Zalba, Theologiae Moralis Summa, vol. 1, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis: 
Tractatus de Virtutibus Moralibus (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1952), 242: “Conscientia moralis est 
dictamen intellectus practici seu iudicium ultimo practicum rationis [...] est nimirum conscientia 
formaliter actus categoricus intellectivus, per modum conclusionis saltern virtualis ex principiis 
moralibus obtentus, sive via stricti rationcinii, sive ex quodam sensu et intuitu honestatis quo 
cognoscimus quid rectus ordo a nobis postulet.” Translation from Curran, “Conscience,” 8 .1 have kept 
Curran’s own translation, as ‘probity’ here seems to be the best rendition of honestas.
41 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.: “prudentia sine virtute morali esse non 
potest. Cujus ratio est quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, non autem solum in universali, sed etiam 
in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones. [...] oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus, secundum quos 
fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte judicare de fine: et hoc fit per virtutem moralem.” Cf.
Zalba, Theologiae Moralis Summa, I, 242, n.7.
42 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.45, a.2, resp.: “sapientia importat quamdam 
rectitudinem judicii secundum rationes divinas. [...] sic ergo circa res divinas ex rationis inquisitione 
rectum judicium hebere pertinet ad sapientiam, quae est virtus intellectualis: sed rectum judicium 
habere de eis secundum quamdam connaturalitatem ad ipsas, pertinet ad sapientiam, secundum quod 
donum est Spiritus Sancii.”
43 Curran, “Conscience,” 14.
44 Ibid.,” 16.
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these ways is always informed by faith.”45 He concludes that four aspects of the 
individual are involved in conscience, namely “reason, grace, emotions and intuition,” 
placed within the context of community relationships, both natural and ecclesial.46
Other writers also come to the same multi-facted conclusion. For example, 
emphasising the importance of our relationship with God in choosing our actions, 
Richard Gula defines moral decision-making of the Christian conscience as 
“discernment”,47 which he describes as “an art form.”48 Consequently,
it is more than a linear sequence of stepwise logical procedures. 
Discernment discovers what is the reasonable thing to do by engaging not 
only the head but also the heart. In and around the linear flow of discursive 
reasoning, discernment is an experienced perception involving the back- 
and-forth, around-and-about movement of intuition, affective sensibility to 
values, and subtle assessments of the relationships of multiple factors. 
When we embark down the road of the practical moral reasoning of 
discernment, we commit ourselves to a process that, like a four-stranded 
cable, circles back upon itself to intertwine fa i th ,  r e a s o n , em o tio n , and. . 49
intuition.
Here Gula acknowledges Sydney Callahan’s approach as his source of 
inspiration with regard to the four-fold dimensions of conscience.50 Therefore, we can 
see that a number of authors offer variations on the theme of the holistic conscience, 
often with very similar headings.51 However, the idea has not been without criticism, 
and while agreeing with some ideas, I would join in the criticism of others. A key 
thread running through the criticism is the issue of terminology. As with all fields, the 
same words at times are used to signify completely different ideas, and I would
45 Ibid., 17.
46 Ibid., 17, 14.
47 Richard M. Gula, M oral Discernment (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997),
46: “‘Discernment’ is the privileged name we give to the decision-making process that reaches into the 
heart of one’s fundamental commitment to God.”
48 Ibid., 50.
49 Ibid. (emphasis in text).
50 Ibid., 133, n. 2. See Sydney Callahan, In G ood Conscience: Reason and Emotion in M oral 
Decision Making (San Francisco: I larperCollins, 1991).
51 For example, to reason, intuition, emotion and spiritual discernment, Linda Hogan also adds 
imagination and creativity. I will return shortly to the issue of creativity in relation to Veritatis 
Splendor. See Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 135-50, at 147-49.
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suggest that a number of the terms related to the notion of holistic conscience also 
suffer from this same problem. The main categories involved in holistic conscience 
are reason, emotion, intuition and grace (or faith), and none of the categories has gone 
without some criticism. For the purposes of this thesis, I shall touch upon some of the 
issues concerning each category, so that having clarified the nature of conscience, we 
can then explore how it can flourish in the right environment.
2.2 .1  R ea so n  -  T h e Q uestion  o f  C onnaturality
The first disputed issue is that of connatural judgement and intuition. Does 
connaturality provide us with a different form or reasoning or understanding which 
allows the conscience to reach its judgement in a non-deductive manner? As I have 
already mentioned Charles Curran’s proposal of the matter, at this point I will focus 
upon his explanation. The content of his argument will also help us to understand that 
‘connatural’ can refer to both innate and acquired capacities, which, if not noticed or 
made clear, can lead to a misinterpretation of both the extent of our natural, instinctive 
capabilities and of the necessity and means of a more developed connatural 
understanding.
Curran bases his argument for connatural reasoning upon a distinction 
between the ontological and gnoseological aspects of natural law, a differentiation 
made by Jacques Maritain in the course of his analysis of Aquinas.52 From this 
distinction, Curran states that we come to know the natural law “not through the 
conceptual exercise of the intellect nor by way of rational knowledge but through the 
guidance of the inclinations of human nature,” that is, the law of nature contained in
52 Curran, “Conscience,” 10-11; Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1956), 84-94. Here Maritain explores Aquinas’s understanding of the natural 
inclinations as the justification for the ontological basis of natural law. Cf. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, la Ilae, q. 94, a.2.
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our ontological reality. As a result, this knowledge is unclear and lacks conceptual 
form, and so is “obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or 
congeniality.”54 Curran’s conclusion is that the “intellect in making its judgment 
consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding 
tendencies make present in the subject.”55 Thus, Curran is highlighting the importance 
of the natural inclinations in our awareness of the good.56
It is true that Aquinas’s moral theology is largely built upon natural 
inclinations and our free response to them,57 and so in seeking a Thomistic basis for 
his arguments on connaturality, Curran is right in identifying the ontological basis for 
our recognition of the good and the true. This primordial awareness of this ontological 
ground is, however, I would say, sy n d eres is : that which converts experience of reality 
into the basic general law of human action, both as desire for the good and true, and 
command to do the good and true.58 Thus, although Aquinas saw the precepts of 
natural law as the external expression of the natural inclinations, with the virtues 
helping us to follow the natural law of our own created reality,59 he envisaged the
53 Curran, “Conscience,” 11. For more on ethics based on ontology, see Josef Pieper, Living 
the Truth: The Truth o f  All Things and Reality and the Good, trans. Lothar Krauth and Stella Lange 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989).
54 Curran, “Conscience,” 11.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 405.
58Cf. Pieper, Living the Truth, 158-63; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q. 94, a.2, resp.: 
“Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum 
vitandum.”
59 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q. 94, a.2, resp.: “Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum 
legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum; et super hoc fundantur omnia 
alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia ilia facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis 
naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana. Quia vero bonum habet rationem 
finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia ilia ad quae homo habet naturalem 
inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et 
contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda; secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium, est ordo 
praeceptorum legis naturae.” [“Hence this is the first precept of the law, that good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil is to be avoided; and all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: such 
that all that is to be done or avoided, which practical reason naturally perceives as human goods, 
belongs to the precepts of the natural law.”] Ibid., Ila Ilae, q. 108, a.2: “virtutes perficiunt nos ad 
prosequendum debito modo inclinationes naturales, quae pertinent ad jus naturale.” Cf. Pinckaers, 
Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 403-404.
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precepts (which he considers to be practical principles60) to be of different levels, 
general and particular, with the particular being derived closely from the first 
principles.61 He concludes that while the particular precepts related to contingent 
detail can be lost by error, concupiscence or intense emotion,62 the general, first 
principles of practical reason cannot be lost from the human heart.63 Hence, although 
the term is not mentioned in the question, to my mind, this has resonances of the 
description of sy n d eres is  as that which cannot be extinguished from any person, and 
that which concerns the natural law at the most general level.
My conclusion from this is that an appeal to a primordial knowledge of natural 
law in conscience leaves us at the level of sy n d eresis . However necessary this is as the 
starting point for our moral judgement, it does not form a complete moral process in 
itself, since reason must be involved in elaborating secondary, particular principles 
which contain the detail of particular action. Accordingly, I would suggest that 
Curran’s presentation of connatural knowledge or inclinations implies more than it 
should, since this natural, ontological basis for moral understanding does not in itself 
contstitute another way that conscience knows and judges something to be good. 
Indeed, if he is actually describing syn d eresis , then, rather than presenting a mode of 
knowing and judging different from deduction, Curran has presented an elaboration of 
a stage in the process of deduction, focusing upon its ontological foundation. To that
60 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q. 94, a.2, resp.: “praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se 
habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia prima demonstrationum se habent ad rationem 
speculativam, utraque enim sunt quaedam principia per se nota.” We shall return to the question of the 
self-evident nature of natural law {principia per se nota) later.
61 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q. 94, a.6, resp.: “ad legem naturalem pertinent primo quidem quaedam 
praecepta communissima, quae sunt omnibus nota, quaedam autem secundaria praecepta magis 
propria, quae sunt quasi conclusiones propinquae principiis.”
62 Ibid.: “Deletur tarnen in particulari operabili, secundum quod ratio impeditur applicare 
commune principium ad particulare operabile, propter concupiscentiam vel aliquam aliam passionem, 
ut supra dictum est.” Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q. 77, a.2, resp.
63 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q. 94, a.6, resp.: “Quantum ergo ad illa principia communia, lex naturalis nullo 
modo potest a cordibus hominum deieri in universali.”
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extent, Curran is right in stating that “the intellect in making its judgments consults 
and listens to the inner melody” of the individual.
In presenting his case, Curran relies on the comment made by Zalba. 
However, if we return briefly to the phrase which prompted Curran’s description of 
connatural knowledge, one may note a discrepancy between what Zalba alluded to 
and what Curran proceeded to present. Curran discusses the influence of natural 
inclinations (using connatural to describe that which belongs to our human nature). 
Zalba refers to “a certain sense or intuition of probity,” by which conscience judges 
something to be good, pointing to passages from Aquinas which refer to 
connaturality. Yet, surprisingly Curran does not present an analysis of these passages, 
but rather Question 94 of the P rim a  S ecu n d ae, which makes no mention of the term 
‘connatural’. I would therefore propose that the analysis of the ontological basis of 
natural law does not refer to what Zalba is actually describing.64 Neither of the two 
cited passages of Aquinas refer to our natural inclinations. Rather both discuss the 
growth of the individual in being able to judge rightly through practice of the moral 
virtues and through the action of the Holy Spirit.65 Thus, although connatural is 
(perhaps confusingly) used in different ways by Aquinas,66 I would say that here 
Curran has presented that which requires development as that which is complete 
(though obscure) in our original nature. Earlier-written material in Arthur 
Vermeersch’s T h e o lo g ia  M ora lis  may assist in clarifying the matter, since his
64 Indeed, while not repeating the phrase ex quodam sensu et intuitu honestatis, Zalba’s later 
comments and related footnotes clearly link prudence with connaturality, implying that Zalba 
understands prudence to be the sense of probity which assists the function of deductive reason 
(cooperante prudentia), such that the person is able to make correct judgements easily. See Zalba, 
Theologiae Moralis Summa, 1,244, including n.14.
65 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.58, a.5; Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.45, a.2, resp.; Zalba, 
Theologiae Moralis Summa, 1,242.
66 Thomas Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas,” 
Theological Studies 66 (2005): 49-68, 54-55, 62. Ryan points out that Aquinas uses connaturalitas in 
two ways: to describe what fits with the natural state of a being, and to describe a developmental 
process, where one becomes attuned to something. For an example of the former use, see De Veritate, 
q. 27, a. 2, resp.: “soli Deo connaturalis existens” [being connatural only to God],
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treatment is fuller.67 Like Zalba, his comments attest to right judgement being reached 
not only through strict reasoning (deduction), but also through “a certain sense of 
probity or a certain intuition.” He quotes St Thomas to state that reason, and hence 
our understanding of the application of principles to the particular, can be corrupted 
by disordered emotion, or concupiscence, but that “through moral virtue, right 
judgement about the end [of actions] can become in a certain way connatural to man.” 
Thus, Vermeersch’s explanation clearly describes ‘connatural’ right judgement as a 
process of virtuous development “in v iro  p r o b o .. .  p e r  virtutem  m o r a le m ,” rather than 
something which is fully present in human beings from the start.
In contrast, if my understanding of Curran’s analysis is correct, Curran 
considers connatural judgement to be some form of innate preconceptual knowledge, 
unrelated to deduction or the reasoning process. If this is the case, I would consider 
this to be a misreading of the text, presumably rooted in the double meaning of 
connatural. Therefore, rather than describing a capacity which replaces moral norms 
or moral reasoning and the judgement of conscience, here the notion of connaturality
67 Arthurus Vermeersch, Theologiae Moralis Principia, Responso, Consilia, vol. 1, Theologia 
Fundamentalis, rev. ed. (Rome: Università Gregoriana; Paris: Charles Beyaert; Bruges: Firme Beyaert, 
1926), 312 (Passage not present in earlier 1922 ed.): “Ne tamen existimes rectum iudicium de 
actionibus faciendis vel omittendis sola via ratiocinii stricte diete obtineri. Etenim, in re morali, magni 
faciendus est sensus quidam honestatis seu intuitus quidam quo plura, praecipue a viro probo, 
immediate percipiuntur esse bona vel mala. Hoc S. THOMAM minime fugit. [...] Immo observat 
Angelicus Doctor, quaedam maior veritatis securitas virtute procuratur. Naturalis enim intellectus 
principiorum ‘non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particulada. Contingit enim quandoque quod 
huiusmodi universale principium cognitum ... corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem: sicut 
concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra 
universale rationis.’ Per virtutem autem moralem fit quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de 
fine. (Vermeersch quotes from the Summit Theologica, la Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp. Ellipsis not in 
parenthesis indicates his omission.) [“However, one must not think that right judgement about what is 
to be done or omitted is only obtained by means of reasoning in the strict sense. Indeed that which is to 
be esteemed in moral matters is a certain sense of probity or a certain intuition of many things, chiefly 
by the virtuous/upright man, immediately perceived to be good or bad. This hardly escapes ST. 
THOMAS. [...] On the contrary, the Angelic Doctor observes that a certain greater security of truth is 
obtained by virtue. Indeed, the natural understanding of principles ‘is not enough for right reasoning 
about particulars. For it happens sometimes that a universal principle of this kind known [through 
understanding or science] is corrupted in the particular by some emotion: such as in the case of one 
affected by concupiscence, where when concupiscence wins, that which he desires is seen to be good, 
although it is opposed to universal reason.’ However, through moral virtue, right judgement about the 
end [of actions] can become in a certain way connatural to man.” (Parenthesis in the Summa quotation 
translated from la Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.)]
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for Aquinas describes the situation in which “a virtuous person has integrated the 
moral norms, so that his or her own moral reasoning is facilitated and made certain.”68 
Thus, the use of connatural in this case is not to be understood as innate, but rather as 
“second nature,”69 like riding a bike or playing an instrument, that is, where an 
individual is attuned to the right way of doing something, and so no longer has to 
think out every stage of the process. In terms of virtue, that is prudence, this would be
70 • • •a situation of so le r t ia . In terms of life in the Spirit, this would be a situation of being 
gifted with divine Wisdom. Both of these indicate dimensions of growth in an 
individual’s conscience, where reason is attuned to Natural Law and Eternal Law to 
such a degree that one does not need to go through every step of the reasoning 
process, because the conclusion is already evident.71 Therefore, although Curran is 
right to highlight connaturality in relation to the operation of conscience, I would 
propose that inclinations should be viewed as an inroad into understanding sy n d eres is ,  
and connaturality should be considered as the result of practice of reasoning in a 
context of virtue and grace, resulting in a quick-wittedness or wisdom attuned by
79 •charity. Thus, the connatural sense of probity or intuition is not be viewed as a
68 Grisez, The Way o f  the Lord Jesus, I, 81. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.57,
aa.5-6.
69 Bernard Häring, The Law o f  Christ: M oral Theology fo r  Priests and Laity, vol. 1, General 
M oral Theology, trans. Edwin G. Kaiser, (Cork: Mercier Press, 1963), 133. Häring defines this ‘second 
nature’ connaturality as our natural “affinity for the good,” which is either nurtured or damaged by our 
lifestyle. This appears to combine both concepts of connaturality (innate and developmental) in one. 
Aquinas explains his use of connatural by declaring it to be ‘sympathy’ with the matter to be judged, 
for example divine things. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.45, a.2, resp.: “compassio, sive 
connaturalitas.”
70 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.47, a.9; Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 13-
14.
71 Marcelino Zalba, Theologia Moralis Compendium, vol. 1, Theologia M oralis 
Fundamentalis, Tractatus de Virtutibus Moralibus (Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1958), 358, “Saepe, 
propter habitum [i.e. synderesis], Syllogismus abbreviatur et habet rationem simplicis illationis ex 
principio satis patente.” [“Often, because of the habitus (i.e. synderesis) the syllogism is shortened and 
reason/understanding is reached by simple inference from a sufficiently clear principle.”] Explanatory 
parenthesis mine.
72 Cf. Veritatis Splendor, 64; AAS 85 (1993), 1183: “Eiusmodi connaturalitas radicesit et eresit 
rectis in propositis ipsius hominis: prudentia ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus, et vel in primis 
virtutibus theologalibus fidei spei et caritatis.”
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completely alternative route to judgement which renders deduction redundant. Rather 
it should be seen as a corrective measure or supportive disposition to the reason and 
the will to counteract the effects of concupiscence on reason, and thus its perfection 
through virtue and grace. It is this lived, experiential context which gives 
“dynamism and life” to moral knowledge and bridges the gap between the universal 
and the particular.74 If we exclude the lived experience of virtue and grace (or 
conversely of vice and sin, in terms of a negative, inhibiting context) from our 
understanding of moral knowledge, we will not be able to reach beyond a legalist
• • • ♦ • 7Smodel of passive deduction from seemingly general, arbitrary principles.
Hopefully, this reflection gives us cause to accept the general principle of this 
thesis, namely that our ability to make judgements of conscience has the scope to 
develop, and that virtue and grace form the context in which it is able to flourish. To 
this we shall return in the subsequent chapters.
2 .2 .2  R ea so n  -  T h e Q uestion  o f  th e C reativity an d  Im ag in ation  in  C o n sc ien ce
Another area of non-deductive reasoning explored by some moralists is the issue of 
imagination and creativity in conscience. However, in fact, this topic raises two
73 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.; Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis, I, 
(1926 ed.) 312.
74 Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 55-56, at 56: “[The role of practical reason] is 
achieved through concrete, personal knowledge supplied by virtues such as wisdom, knowledge and 
above all prudence, combined with the virtues related to the appetites. Practical reason goes hand in 
hand with the connatural knowledge of which the Angelic Doctor so often speaks. Thus, by means of 
the virtues, vital connections are forged, in the dynamic inner depths of the person who is performing 
the action, between the universal and the individual, between principles and action.”
75 Ibid., 55-56: In the context of [a moral theory of obligation], it is hard to see how principles 
and moral science flow from an experience of reality, human and divine, and lead back to it. They seem 
to emerge arbitrarily from the sphere of ideas, being worked out to the last detail in the imperative 
mood. We can no longer find in them the sources of light contained in the active, upright experience. 
Principles and laws are applied to actions by deductions of pure reason, while the agent remains overly 
passive. Moral knowledge loses its dynamism and life. Its horizon shrinks to the measure of legal 
formulas and its activity is reduced to the eternal debate between law and freedom as applied to cases 
of conscience.”
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distinct questions: whether conscience has the capacity to create law, and whether 
creativity or imagination is involved in the reasoning process.
With regard to the first question, among certain theologians of recent decades 
a shift occurred in their understanding of conscience which led to identifying 
conscience as that which established what was right on the practical level, rather than 
seeing its operation as an application of the law to the concrete particular situation. 
Such a view developed from writers such as Joseph Fletcher, who advocated a 
pragmatic situation ethics, where universal law is reduced to love, and that although 
guiding principles accumulated by human experience are necessary, ultimately it is up
• * • If,to the individual to decide what is right in the given situation. To this trend we can 
then add another rooted in the writings of Josef Fuchs, who in his later writings 
changed his approach and separated morality into two distinct levels: transcendental 
and categorical.77 There are two main effects of this analysis. Firstly, Christian ethics 
is relegated to the transcendental level, that is, the level of general attitudes, with the 
result that there is only human ethics on the categorical level of particular action. 
Secondly, related to conscience, Church teaching regarding morals is also placed at 
the level of the transcendental, providing a general framework or a religious climate 
with “motivational force”, within which to decide what is morally right in a particular
• • 70situation reducing the role of the Magisterium to the level of “assistance.” This
76 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (London: SCM Press, 1966), 64, 32, at 
33: “In situation ethics even the most revered principles maybe thrown aside if they conflict in any 
concrete case with love”; at 53: “There is no conscience; conscience is merely a word for our attempts 
to make decisions creatively constructively, fittingly” (emphasis in text). Cf. Pinckaers, Morality, 53.
77 Josef Fuchs, Esiste una Morale Cristiana? Questioni Critiche in un Tempo di 
Secolarizzazione, trans, from German and Latin articles by Paolo Leporati (Rome: Herder; Brescia: 
Morcelliana, 1970), 14-35. See page 30 for the description of “forza motivazionale”. Cf. Pinckaers, 
Morality, 46-49.
78 Josef Fuchs, Christian Morality: The Word Becomes Flesh, trans. Brian McNeil (Dublin: 
Gill and Macmillan; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1981), 130-31: “Thus it follows 
for the object-orientated conscience [Fuchs’s term for the act of judgement by practical reason] that 
moral norms of correct conduct and other normative authorities coming from outside offer basically 
nothing more than assistance -  real assistance, but nonetheless merely assistance -  in the assessment of
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would be an explanation of Fuchs’s broader definition of conscience: that which 
includes “theoretical moral evaluation and formulation of moral norms,” rather than 
simply application of laws and principles.79 As a result, Fuchs places greater 
emphasis on the responsible personal decision of conscience as an expression of 
authentic self-realisation, rather than judgement dependent upon a received expression 
of the law, which is too abstract to apply to the h ie  e t  nunc of life.80
While this development in moral theology may have stemmed from an
O 1
“allergic reaction to casuistry” and an understandable desire to move away from
morally correct decisions made in the conscience.” Here Fuchs bases his argument upon the 
“qualitative peculiarities” of a concrete situation. See ibid., 130. Compare the view expressed above to 
that written earlier: “Both the word of Revelation and the teaching authority of the Church constituting 
a higher authority than personal consideration, if accepted in the true attitude of the Christian, will 
silence these contradictions and exclude the general suspicion of considerations purely personal [i.e. 
the fear of error].” See Josef Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation, trans. Helmut Reckter 
and John A. Dowling (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965), 160 (parenthesis mine, summarising from the 
same page).
79 Josef Fuchs, Christian Morality, 120: “Conscience means -  particularly in Catholic moral 
theology -  in a narrower sense, the authority which determines good and correct conduct in a concrete 
situation. Another conception of conscience, on the other hand, does not limit the authority of 
conscience to the assessment of a concrete situation, but extends its competency to include theoretical 
moral evaluation and formulation of norms.” One should bear in mind, however, that the structural 
descriptions of conscience differ, and so what Aquinas would describe as moral reasoning, that is, that 
which derives secondary principles, separate from the concluding act of judgement, namely conscience, 
Fuchs ascribes to conscience, by looking at reasoning/insight, judgement and choice/decision as a 
whole. Cf. idem, 121 : “This then makes it understandable that judgment based on practical reason, 
being judgment in conscience, has above all else, but not exclusively, the characteristics of insight, and 
simultaneously, to a certain extent, those of decision.” That moral reasoning should arrive at particular 
principles (with the help of other people) should not be in question. The question remains as to how 
independently the subject formulates norms, rather than merely elaborating norms from more general 
principles. Fuchs would argue that conscience does not invent or create the norms as such, but rather 
they are “recognized ‘creatively’, in the (merely) created human participation in God’s own wisdom” 
(parenthesis in text). Although they are based upon natural inclinations, because of contingency, these 
norms or conclusions “are not logical inferences but new pieces of knowledge, innovations,” resulting 
in ethical pluralism (emphasis in text). With regard to non-inferential recognition of first principle 
moral norms by synderesis, I think Fuchs would be in accord with Aquinas. However, I would be of the 
understanding that Aquinas saw the attainment of secondary principles as a matter of derivation or 
logical inference. Here, I think, Fuchs would be somewhat at variance with Aquinas. See idem, M oral 
Demands and Personal Obligations, trans. Brian McNeil (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 1993), 163 and 112-113.
80 Josef Fuchs, Responsabilità Personale e  Norma M orale: Analisi e  Prospettive di Ricerca, 
trans, and ed. Salvatore Privitera (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1978), 195, 197: “Quindi il compito 
principale della coscienza non è l’adempimento delle norme prestabilite, ma l’autentica realizzazione 
dell’Io nella realtà concretamente esistente.” [“Therefore the principal task of conscience is not the 
carrying out of already-fixed norms, but the authentic realisation of the Ego in the concretely existing 
reality.”]. Cf. Veritatis Splendor, 54-55; AAS 85 (1993), 1177-78.
81 Pinckaers, Morality, 50.
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legalism, where the conscience is reduced to the carrying out of obligations,82 
concerns were raised that the greater subjective emphasis of the ‘creative conscience’ 
approach would run “the risk of confusing conscience with personal, subjective 
opinion,” making the personal conscience “the ultimate judge of what is good and 
evil.”83 Pinckaers considers the root of this view to be a “sublimation of freedom.”84 
Thus, although it has long been held that the individual subject’s conscience is to be 
given due respect as the proximate norm of morality, this was traditionally understood
nr
as being so only insofar as it is intimately connected to and reflective of divine law.
To that extent, there are limits on human freedom, but this should not be understood
in negative terms. Rather human freedom in the conscientious decision is called to
“intersect” with God’s law as a “participated theonomy,” participating in the wisdom
of God rather than blindly following or angrily fighting against obligations.86 Thus,
Pope John Paul reaffirmed the traditional view:
The judgement of conscience does not establish the law; rather it bears 
witness to the authority of the natural law and of the practical reason with 
reference to the supreme good, whose attractiveness the human person
» 07perceives and whose commandments he accepts.
82 Fuchs, Responsabilità Personale e  Norma M orale, 196: “Non è possibile sostituire alla 
concezione legalistica e statica della coscienza e le sue esigenze di applicazione materiale un sistema 
che non sia esclusivamente determinato dal riferimento alle norme?” [Is it not possible to substitute the 
legalistic and static conception of conscience and its requirements of material application with a system 
that is not exclusively determined by reference to norms?]
83 Servais (Th.) Pinckaers, “An Encyclical for the Future: Veritatis splendor,” in “ Ver it at is 
Splendor” and the Renewal o f  M oral Theology, ed. J.A. DiNoia and Romanus Cessario, trans. Sr Mary 
Thomas Noble (Princeton, NJ: Scepter; Huntington: Our Sunday Visitor; Chicago, IL: Midwest 
Theological Forum, 1999), 11-71, at 41.
84 Pinckaers, “An Encyclical for the Future,” 42.
85 Veritatis Splendor, 60; AAS 85 (1993) 1181: “... conscientia, norma proxima moralitatis 
cuiusque hominis. Postulationis huius rationalis dignitas atque vocis eius ac iudiciorum auctoritas 
oriuntur ex ipsa boni malique ventate, quam eius est audire ac demonstrare. Haec veritas significatur 
‘lege divina’, quae est moralitatis norma universalis et obiectiva”; Pinckaers, “An Encyclical for the 
Future,” 43-44; Zalba, Theologia Moralis Compendium, 366: “Conscientia antecedens recta est regula 
necessaria actuum humanorum subievtiva et proxima.”; 368: “Ergo ea [conscientia] sola est per se 
norma subiectiva harum actionum, applicans divina praecepta” (parenthesis mine).
86 Veritatis Splendor, 41 ; AAS 85 (1993) 1165-66.
87 Veritatis Splendor, 60; AAS 85 (1993), 1181: “Conscientiae iudicium non condit legem, sed 
testatur auctoritatem legis naturalis ac rationis practicae quod attinet ad summum bonum, cuius persona 
humana attractivam virtutem suscipit atque praecepta accipit.” Cf. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter 
Donum et Vivificantem, 43; AAS 78 (1986), 859: “conscientia non est forts aptus ex sese  et unicus ad 
statuendum quid bonum sit quidque malum; est, contra, in ea penitus insertum principium oboedientiae
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It is the role of conscience, therefore, to live and move in accord with God’s 
law and so naturally apply that to the particular situation in hand. But what if  the 
situation is a very complex one, or where a variety of possibilities arise? For example, 
what would you do if you were a member of the surgical team debating whether to 
separate Siamese twins who shared vital organs? This is where imagination starts to 
come to the fore, in order to allow deduction to proceed. In other words, the inductive 
process of creating mental scenarios assists the mind in trying to work out what is 
good. Linda Hogan points out that “the imaginative, abstract stage can be very 
important in allowing one to see possibilities that are not immediately obvious,” and
00
is also useful for reflecting upon the potential implications of an action. However, 
abstract imagination needs verification to translate it from hypothesis into that which 
is recognised as being good in reality. Therefore, either the individual uses reliable 
memory in combination with moral norms as the basis of his/her imaginative search 
for the best possible, just action, or once an action has been judged to be good and 
appropriate, the details of the chosen action need to be checked in order to reach the 
point of moral certainty. This further enquiry will either verify the choice or will 
nullify it, demanding that the person think again. Thus, conscience can arrive at any 
number of abstract judgements prior to reaching a final judgement which is chosen to 
be acted upon. This process of a putative conclusion deduced from possible scenarios,
erga normam obiectivam ” (emphasis in text). English translation from John Paul II, Encyclical Letter 
Donum et Vivificantem (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1986), 43: “The conscience is therefore not 
an independent and exclusive capacity to decide what is good and what is evil. Rather there is 
profoundly imprinted upon it a principle of obedience vis-a-vis the objective norm”; Second Vatican 
Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World Gaudium et Spes, 16; A AS 58 
(1966), 1037. English text consulted translated by Ambrose McNicholl, in Vatican Council II: The 
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, general ed. Austin Flannery (Dublin: Dominican 
Publications, 1977), 916-17; Second Vatican Council, Declaration on Religious Liberty Dignitatis 
Humanae, 3; A AS 58 (1966), 931-32. English text consulted from Flannery edition, trans. Laurence 
Ryan, 801-802. See also Zalba, Theologia Moralis Compendium, 368: “Cum conscientia non sit norma 
constitutiva ordinis recti sed solum manifestativa, patet earn est essentialiter dependere ab ordine 
obiectivo” (emphasis in text.)
88 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 147-48.
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which is subject to verification or defeasibility seems to tally with the mental models 
theory, discussed earlier, and the nature of the practical syllogism, as well as the role 
of the pragmatic inference in starting off the moral search for an answer.
2 .2 .3  A  P la c e  f o r  E m otion  in  C on scien ce?
Some moral theologians have expressed their concern that there has been a distinct 
lack of attention given to passions (or emotions) in the moral act and, therefore, in
OQ m
conscience. Indeed, Servais Pinckaers points out that their inclusion is essential if 
we are to pursue integrated, “truly human morality,” which reflects the unity of the 
human person and the coordination of the faculties.90 Vincent Twomey draws on 
Aristotle and C.S. Lewis to point out that one’s feelings not only need to be in tune 
with right reason,91 but can also assist the reason in achieving the moral action.92 He 
quotes Lewis, who clearly thinks that deduction needs support: “In the battle it is not 
syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third
89 Twomey, “Recovery of the Passions in Moral Theology,” 240: “And even where virtue has 
been recovered as the context for moral discourse, the passions, it seems, have not yet been the subject 
of much rigorous discussion within moral theology.”
90 Servais Pinckaers, “Les passions et la morale,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et 
Théologiques 74 (1990): 379-91, at 381: “Si nous voulons comprendre la portée et la richesse du traité 
des passions de S. Thomas, nous devons donc nous replacer dans la perspective si profondément 
humaine des morales du bonheur qu’il a systématisées. La passion est une des composantes directes et 
nécessaires de la réponse à la question du bonheur. On ne peut construire une morale vraiment humaine 
sans en tenir compte.” [“If we want to understand the significance and the richness of St Thomas’s 
treatise on the passions, then we have to put ourselves back into the profoundly human perspective of 
the morals of happiness which he systematised. Passion is one of the direct and necessary components 
of the answer to the question of happiness. One cannot construct a truly human morality without taking 
it into account.”]
91 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VII, 1152a 8-10: “Nor can the same person be at once 
both prudent and incontinent. For we have shown that a prudent person must also at the same time be 
excellent in character, (and the incontinent person is not). [...] Moreover, someone is not prudent 
simply by knowing; he must also act on his knowledge. But the incontinent person does not.” 
(parenthesis in text).
92 Twomey, “Recovery of the Passions,” 224: “In other words, knowledge of ethics or moral 
principles as such is insufficient to make one act in a morally upright way in the concrete 
circumstances of life marked by myriad fears and attractions.”
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hour of the bombardment.” Lewis explains that this is because “without the aid of 
trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism.”94
Thus, although the emotions can be a disruptive force,95 there is a growing 
recognition of the positive contribution that they make to human action, and so 
scholars are making new efforts to explore the role of emotions, and also to recover 
past wisdom on the subject.96 Indeed, it is suggested by some that Aquinas “considers 
that emotions and affectivity are in some way involved in practical reason’s role of
07determining what is truly reasonable, truly good.”
The difficulty with the study of emotion in moral judgement is first of all due 
to the fact that both in classical and in modem languages, the words ‘passion’, 
‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ elicit a whole range of ideas, since over time the meanings of 
these words have undergone subtle changes.98 Secondly, our use of the terms will be 
predicated upon a particular anthropology, which may differ from others analysing 
emotion. Consequently, some will see “emotions as irrational forces and others as 
intentional forms of cognition.”99 This, too, adds to the challenge of debating the role
93 Ibid., 224, 240, quoting from C.S. Lewis, The Abolition o f  Man (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1943; Fount Paperbacks, 1978), 19.
94 Lewis, The Abolition o f  Man, 19. For a discussion on how reason controls or rules the 
passions, see Romanus Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN and 
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 63-66. Cessario states that Aquinas, following 
Aristotle, describes a non-despotic, political rule by reason, which allows freedom to remain in place. 
Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.56, a.4, ad 3.
95 Leget, while strongly advocating greater inclusion of the passiones anim ae in our 
understanding of moral judgement, warns that one should not be overly optimistic in re-incorporating 
them, as this would not give due acknowledgment to “the darker side of emotions”, with their layers of 
contradiction and destructive tendencies. See Carlo Leget, “Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas on 
the Emotions,” Theological Studies 64 (2003) 558-81, at 578.
96 Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge and Connaturality in Aquinas,” 52: “In general 
terms, without denying their destructive potential, emotions have a positive and integral role in 
psychological, moral and spiritual dimensions of Aquinas’s anthropology.” Leget bemoans the absence 
of Aquinas in Martha Nussbaum’s extensive study on the passions or emotions. See Leget, “Martha 
Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas,” 569-571. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals o f  Thought: The 
Intelligence o f  Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
la Ilae, qq.22-48.
Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge,” 51.
98 Leget, “Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas,” 571.
99 Ibid., 571-72.
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of emotions in moral choice. Indeed, St Thomas acknowledges this difficulty of
interpretation when he opposes the Stoic understanding of the passions:
As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently 
held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of the act; since the 
admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less 
good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the 
inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances 
or ailments. But if we give the name of the passions to all the movements of 
the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man’s good that his 
passions be moderated by reason. [...] Hence, since the sensitive appetite can 
obey reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A 7), it belongs to the perfection of the 
moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled 
by reason. Accordingly just as it is better that a man should both will good 
and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral 
good, that man should be moved, not only in respect of his will, but also in 
respect of his sensitive appetite.100
As well as indicating that emotions can be understood in different ways, 
Aquinas here also highlights that man can also be moved to the good by means of his 
passions, if they are in an ordered state.101 Thus, in this circumstance, the passions or 
emotions assist reason not only in apprehending what is truly good, but also in
1 A-l
desiring to act upon that understanding. In this situation, the passion, having been
100 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.24, a.3, resp.: “Respondeo dicendum quod Stoici, 
sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter onmem passionem 
animae diminuere actus bonitatem, omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit 
minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animae solum inordinatos motus 
sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus 
omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones 
sint moderatae per rationem. [...] Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum 
est, ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint 
regulatae per rationem. Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita 
etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum 
voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum.” English translation from St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica: First Complete American Edition in Three Volumes, vol. 1, literal trans, by the 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York, Boston, Cincinnati, Chicago, and San 
Francisco: Benziger Brothers, 1947), la Ilae, q.24, a.3, resp.
101 The object of the affective virtues, fortitude and temperance, is properly ordered emotions. 
See Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge,” 55-60. We shall return to fortitude and temperance in the 
chapter on how the virtues assist conscience.
102 Ryan, “Revisiting Affective Knowledge,” 58 (talking of the stage of perfect virtue): 
“Emotions, guided by virtue, have moved from fittingness in its conditional form (consonans),
(conveniens) to one of being ‘naturally fitted’ (connaturalitas). Feeling, thinking, willing resonate with 
each other that this particular response is ‘right’” (parentheses in text).
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shaped by virtue, is not only operating a c c o r d in g  to  right reason, but w ith  right 
reason.103
From these comments we can see that the place of human emotion in morals 
can vary radically, depending upon the underlying anthropological analysis of the 
nature of emotions. If they are considered as permanently disruptive, irrational, or 
evil, then the conclusion is that they have no place in moral judgement. If, at the other 
extreme, their role in assisting reason is over-optimistically presented, then the power 
of strong misleading emotion is not given due credit. However, rightly considered, as 
integrated with right reason and trained by moral virtue, emotion does have its part to 
play in our moral choices, in helping to perceive the good and to delight in doing it, or 
in perceiving the evil which through revulsion is to be avoided.
This brings us to a comment in Pope John Paul’s encyclical letter V eritatis  
S p len d o r  on the nature of conscience. Emotion is mentioned in passing in the context 
of a criticism against the notion of creative conscience. The pejorative context implies 
that either emotion has no part to play in conscience, or at least undermines its 
objectivity:
These authors also stress the com plex ity  typical of the phenomenon of 
conscience, a complexity profoundly related to the whole sphere of 
psychology and the emotions, and to the numerous influences exerted by 
the individual’s social and cultural environment.104
Clearly the backdrop of this passage is the concern for the maintenance of the 
objectivity of truth in conscience, and it is true that each factor mentioned could 
indicate subjective variation in terms of time, place, or development. However,
103 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.24, ad 3; Pinckaers, “Les passions et la morale,” 
383: “Dans cette vue, la sensibilité se parfait en servant l’ésprit, avec l’aide des vertus qui l’éduquent.”
104 Veritatis Splendor, 55 (trans. from Catholic Truth Society éd., emphasis in text); AAS 
85(1993), 1178: “Iidem porro peculiarem notant implicationem phaenomeni conscientiae: haec cum 
psychologo ambitu cumque animi affectione penitus iungitur, aeque cum multiplicibus condicionibus, 
ad societatem et cultum personae pertinentibus.”
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psychological and sociological factors in the development of the conscience of an 
individual would be hard to deny.105 Indeed, Pope Benedict has long highlighted the 
effect of these different factors in conscience. When he was professor at the 
University of Tübingen, Ratzinger was considered to have written “the most negative 
criticism” of G audiu m  et S p es  16, since in stressing the conscience as the inner 
sanctuary where God’s voice echoes, giving his law, he thought that it failed to give 
due reference to the blindness and obtuseness of the human mind in hearing that 
voice.106 Thus, although there is reference to ignorance and sin in the text, Ratzinger 
was looking for more detail to explain why the conscience can err.107 As a result, he 
considered the text overly optimistic in its presentation of conscience, and therefore
105 Indeed, while affirming that objective moral norms are not defined by the statistical 
“normality” of the behavioural sciences, Veritatis Splendor does acknowledge the impact of 
psychological factors on the choice and subjective imputability of an individual. See Veritatis 
Splendor, 111-12, 70; AAS 85 (1993), 1220-21, 1189. For examples of a variety of theologians on 
psychological factors in conscience, see Grisez and Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ, 26-27; Wojciech 
Giertych, “Conscience and the Liberum Arbitrium,” in Crisis o f  Conscience, ed. John M. Haas (New 
York: Crossroad, 1996), 51-78; Kennedy, Doers o f  the Word, I, 204-31; Robert Hodge, W hat’s 
Conscience For? Personal Responsibility in Relation to Conscience and Authority (Middlegreen, 
Slough and Maynooth: St Pauls, 1995), 190-93; Majorano La Coscienza, 28-48. For a lengthy study of 
moral development in the context of psychological analysis, see also B.M. Kiely, Psychology and  
M oral Theology (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1980).
106 Bernard Häring, “La Legge Naturale nella Luce della Legge di Cristo Iscritta nei Cuori,” in 
La Coscienza M orale Oggi: Omaggio al Prof. Domenico Capone, ed. Marian Nalepa and Terence 
Kennedy, Quaestiones Morales, no. 3 (Rome: Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1987), 289-90, n.4: 
“La critica più negativa all’intero n. 16 di Gaudium et spes venne dal teologo JOSEPH RATZINGER, 
allora professore all’università di Tübingen. [...] Al suo parere, il testo ignorebbe quella cecità e 
quell’ottusità della mente umana che tanto hanno impressionato il pensiero di Lutero.” Cf. Michael E. 
Allsopp, “Conscience, the Church and Moral Truth: John Henry Newman, Vatican II, Today,” Irish 
Theological Quarterly 58 (1992): 192-208, at 197; Joseph Ratzinger, “The Dignity of the Human 
Person,” in Commentary on the Documents o f  Vatican II, vol. 5, Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern World, gen. ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (London: Bums & Oates; New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1969), 115-63, at 135.
107 Ratzinger, “Dignity of the Human Person,” 134: “How conscience can err if God’s call is 
directly to be heard in it, is unexplained.”
108 Ibid., 135, at 136: “In this essential kernel the ‘objectivism’ of the schema is certainly right 
and not vulnerable to critical thought. What is unsatisfactory is simply the way the concrete form of the 
claim of conscience is dealt with, the inadequate view of the facts of experience and the insufficient 
account taken of the limits of conscience.” One can compare this view to that of Clémence, who 
thought that the Council’s optimism was balanced and sufficiently cognisant of error. I am more 
inclined to agree with Ratzinger in thinking that the presentation is incomplete, particularly with regard 
to exploring the limitations of conscience. Cf. J. Clémence, “Le mystère de la conscience à la lumière 
de Vatican II,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 94 (1972): 65-94, especially 89-94.
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judged it to stand as a “general outline of a Christian doctrine of conscience,”109 but 
one which “passes over the epistemological question and excludes the psychological 
and sociological factors.”110 In effect this was a call for a fuller description of 
conscience which acknowledged the various elements that assist, or at least inhibit, its 
right function.111
With Ratzinger’s comments in mind, we can now return to the issue of 
emotion, as emotion has both cognitive and psychological elements and so forms part 
of the epistemological question of conscience. I would therefore suggest that as well 
as the psychological and socio-cultural factors, human emotion forms part of the 
“com p lex ity  typical of the phenomenon of conscience” which is mentioned in 
V eritatis S p len d or . As I said earlier, the clear concern of Pope John Paul II was that 
the objectivity of truth should not be lost from our understanding of conscience. 
However, depending upon one’s starting point, acknowledging emotional, 
psychological or social factors need not necessarily extinguish objectivity. If one were 
to reduce conscience to super-ego, cultural conformity or emotivism, then clearly 
objectivity would be lost. If, however, objectivity is real, that is, if “truth is not
♦ • « * 1 1  'ysomething we create but something that we discover and so stands on its own,”
109 Ratzinger, “Dignity of the Human Person,” 134. Indeed, Ratzinger thought that the 
incomplete nature of the text meant that what resulted was a description still rooted in the Scholastic 
tradition, but “freed from the framework of the schools and looser in structure.” In this way it lacked 
Scholastic precision, but also lacked a serious examination of the modem emphasis on the subject of 
conscience by making inadequate use of modem disciplines. See ibid., 134-35. Years later, Gaffney 
would echo Ratzinger’s concerns. See James Gaffney, Matters o f  Faith and M orals, 128-29: “But in 
that year [1965], Catholicism published, at the highest level of official discourse, a theological 
statement about conscience that not only broke with the Thomistic heritage, but employed the term in a 
combination of senses which not even the most benign exegetical subtlety can fully rescue from 
incoherence. [...] It incorporates elements from the traditions of both synteresis and conscientia, with 
no attention to the importance of the distinctions the Scholastics made between them. [...] It affirms the 
fallibility of conscience after having described it in terms that make its fallibility incomprehensible.”
110 Ratzinger, “Dignity of the Human Person,” 134.
111 For example, see Ratzinger’s comments on the suppression of the individual’s conscience 
by totalitarian regimes, and the stunting effects of the super-ego on the development of the conscience 
in “Conscience in its Age,” 168-69.
112 Twomey, P ope BenedictXVI, 49. Cf. Cahal B. Daly, “Faith and Reason: Diatribe or 
Dialogue? A Reflection on Fides et Ratio,” in The Challenge o f  the Truth: Reflections on F ides et
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then subjectivity with its strengths and weaknesses stands before that truth, either 
knowingly or blindly. Here psychology, emotion, culture and society can be 
understood as not only the potential context for stunting conscience’s appreciation of 
the truth, but also as aspects of the very means by which we come to know that truth 
through experience, perception and reflection. Therefore, without being overly 
optimistic, while acknowledging the blinding effects of sin, the deafening effects of a 
social bombardment of emotivist messages or periods of strong emotion, and the 
crippling effects of psychological pathology, due acknowledgment of the positive role 
of emotions, when in a balanced state and in harmony with right reason, in 
appreciating and choosing the good, is necessary in providing a moral theory which
1 IT
truly relates to human nature.
2 .2 .4  In tu ition  in C on sc ien ce
We turn now to the question of intuition, and its involvement in the judgement 
process of conscience. A clear difficulty with this concept is that if one even strays
Ratio, ed. James McEvoy with preface by Cardinal Cahal Daly (Dublin: Veritas, 2002), 219-39, at 230: 
“Connected with confused ideas about moral values is, inevitably, a confused concept of conscience, 
though this can sometimes be traced back to theological as well as to philosophical aberrations. In the 
case of conscience, as well as in that of moral values, what is overlooked is that moral judgement, as 
well as conscience, is a grasp of moral truth. [...] moral truth is not something that I create, but 
something that is independent of me, judges me, challenges me, humbles me and often condemns me.”
113 Cardinal Newman also saw emotion (supported by the intellect) as an essential part of 
conscience. Not only are the reactions of remorse and satisfaction intimately connected to emotion, but 
he states that one is unable to have these reactions unless they are a response to a “living object”, that is 
another subject, and the ultimate living object is God. Newman, therefore highlights the essential 
relational quality of conscience. See John Henry Cardinal Newman, An Essay in A id o f  a  Grammar o f  
Assent, introduction by Nicholas Lash (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1870; 1979), 99-110, at 100-101: “Conscience [...] is always emotional. [...] Inanimate things cannot 
stir our affections; these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are 
ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. [...] if on 
doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing satisfactory delight which 
follows on our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the image of a person, to 
whom our love and veneration look.” See also ibid., 106: “Thus conscience is a connecting principle 
between the creature and his Creator.” Cf. Terrence Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The 
Religious and Theological Idea l o f  John  Henry Newman, with foreword by Ian Ker, Louvain 
Theological and Pastoral Monographs, no. 7 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1991), 36-37; Teresa Iglesias 
Rozas, “Newman on Conscience and our Culture,” Milltown Studies 49 (2002): 19-49, at 37-39.
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beyond the simplest of definitions, the term swiftly becomes prey to widely differing 
interpretations, particularly with regard to the level of moral understanding that 
intuition can offer, and from where it is drawn. One could sum up the notion of moral 
intuition as “the immediate apprehension of a [moral] object by the mind without the 
intervention of any reasoning process.”114 Yet, does the apparent immediacy of 
understanding truly imply a complete lack of moral reflection, as if the answer were 
completely ready-made?115 The presumption here is that because it appears that one 
“apprehends some moral object immediately,” no reasoning is therefore involved.116 
However, some would question the lack of any process taking place, given the mind’s 
capacity for swift non-verbal conceptualisation. Indeed, although Cardinal Newman 
talked of “natural or material inference”117 as an “intuition,”118 or an “instinctive
114 William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics (London: Methuen, 1948), 131.
115 The physicist Roger Penrose discusses the experience of non-verbal (though still 
conceptual) thought, which allows the mind often to “compress” analysis, memory and creative 
thought, such that something can be conceived of very quickly indeed. Penrose would argue that the 
function of the mind cannot be reduced purely to logical, algorithmic computation, as if it were a 
computer, since we have an appreciation of the aesthetic and a capacity to make mental leaps which 
cannot be explained by logic alone. The detail of his work does not apply here. However, his comments 
on compression should encourage us to question the idea that all that appears immediately is without 
reasoning behind it. See Roger Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and  
the Laws o f  Physics (London: Oxford University Press, 1990), 548-50, 576-81, at 549: “Almost all of 
my mathematical thinking is done visually and in terms of non-verbal concepts, although the thoughts 
are quite often accompanied by inane and almost useless verbal commentary, such as ‘that thing goes 
with that thing and that thing goes with that thing’.” Toner also raises the issue of people gifted with an 
“amazingly quick and unreflective form of reasoning on objective data,” which “could be mistaken 
even by [the individual] as well as by others for an intuition.” See Jules, J. Toner, Discerning G o d ’s 
Will: Ignatius o f  Loyola's Teaching on Christian Decision Making (St. Louis, MO: The Institute of 
Jesuit Sources, 1991), 190. Sydney Callahan would also affirm that intuition is far from an irrational 
activity, appearing now to be a complex mix of mental functions, which serve to prompt further 
(consciously reflective) investigation of a moral problem. Interestingly, she also refers to the thought of 
Roger Penrose on creative insight and swift forms of global reasoning. Cf. Callahan, In G ood  
Conscience, 63-94, at 82-83.
116 Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, 131. Of course, both connotations of immediate (i.e. 
without mediating means, and at a rapid pace), could be applicable to this description of intuition.
Some may prefer to describe the idea of immediate understanding as ‘insight’. The terms seem to be 
almost interchangeable, though intuition highlights the inclusion of affective content.
117 Newman, Grammar o f  Assent, 260.
118 Ibid., 262. Newman also sees such moral instinct as instrinsically linked to our created 
relationship with God, who is the ground for both the existence and morality of things. Thus, it is 
through conscience as a type of first principle that we can both search for the “Hidden God”, and arrive 
at a real, personal (rather than notional and abstract) assent of faith in a Divine Sovereign and Judge.
See ibid., 93, 96-97, 102, 104, 309; Merrigan, Clear Heads and Holy Hearts, 37; John Henry Newman, 
Words o f  Conscience in P arochial and Plain Sermons, edited and introduced by Fabio Attard (Valetta, 
Malta: Midsea Books, 2002), xxxviii. Note that although Newman acknowledges that there are external
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apprehension” about what is right,119 this does not mean that he considered all forms 
of reasoning to be excluded from it. In fact, it is this natural capacity of “right 
judgment in ratiocination,” that he calls the “Illative Sense.”120
Following the views of Newman and Penrose, I would therefore be of the 
opinion that much of what is often termed as intuition is in fact an experience of non­
verbal conceptualisation, which, with the support of memory and emotion, swiftly
191 » • »reaches its conclusion. The fact that people also describe intuition at times as ‘gut 
feeling’122 indicates a clear affective quality, but this should not exclude the 
possibility that following a sensory experience, there flows, even unconsciously, 
some form of vague, but swift reasoning, which, although may not follow the strict 
method of deduction, is nonetheless a rational process.124 This means that although an 
individual may find it difficult to give clear reasons or express in logical terms the 
stages by which he or she reached a particular understanding, the ‘intuition’ is not
influences to our morality, he does not develop this in the Grammar, as it does not fit into the argument 
he is exploring. In contrast, as well as discussing the interior aspect of morality, Raztinger highlights 
also the necessary role of community, both social and ecclesial, in counteracting subjectivity. Cf. 
Newman, Grammar o f  Assent, 304; Joseph Ratzinger, “Bishops, Theologians, and Morality,” in On 
Conscience: Two Essays by Joseph  Ratzinger (Philadelphia: The National Catholic Bioethics Center; 
San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984; 2007), 43-75, at 53-58.
119 Newman, Grammar o f  Assent, 264, 263.
120 See ibid., 269, and 270-99 for elaboration on its nature and range of operation.
121 Ibid., 261: “A peasant who is weather-wise may yet be simply unable to assign intelligible 
reasons why he thinks it will be fine tomorrow; and if he attempts to do so, he may give reasons wide 
of the mark; but that will not weaken his own confidence in his prediction. His mind does not proceed 
step by step, but he feels all at once and together the force of various combined phenomena, though he 
is not conscious of them.” Even in the complicated world of mathematics, Penrose says that the 
construction of a proof can initially have “a globality and seemingly vague conceptual content,” which 
“bear little relation to the time that it would seem to take in order fully to appreciate a serially presented 
proof.” See The E m peror’s New Mind, 576-77. This capacity for global, vague conceptual thought may 
well be critical in the functioning of intuition or insight.
122 For example, see Gula, Moral Discernment, 87.
123 See Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 141 (highlighting intuitions based upon a sensitive 
reading of a person’s behaviour): “The person often experiences intuitions as surprising, as being 
outside conscious awareness. Yet, even though this may be true superficially, if one investigates it 
carefully one can usually account for an intuition. [...] Intuitions usually do have some basis in actual 
experience. They are rarely completely arbitrary and random. They usually result from being sensitive 
to the behavior of another person or from conclusions drawn from actions in another context.”
124 In contrast to strict logical deduction, Newman calls this the “subtle and elastic logic of 
thought.” See Grammar o f  Assent, 281.
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without structure, nor accumulated background knowledge.125 Therefore, the swift 
and partly inexplicable nature of an intuition should not necessarily bar it from 
contributing to the judgement of conscience. Nevertheless, just like deductive
reasoning, an intuition can be affected by bias, prejudice, strong emotions, memories,
106 • *sin or temptation, and so the reliability of an intuition, or swift global judgement, 
needs to be tested carefully.127
2 .2 .5  G race a n d  th e  Q uestion  o f  D iscern m en t in  C on scien ce
Discernment is another word which is used in different ways, thus making its 
inclusion and clear application in moral theology difficult, to say the least. We have 
already seen that Richard Gula uses it to sum up the whole process of moral decision­
making. However, here I would like to focus upon discernment as understood in 
spiritual theology -  a decision made under the prompting of the Holy Spirit. Like 
emotion and intuition, discernment has been considered by some to be something of 
an anomaly in moral theology, probably as it is hard to describe, and runs the risk of 
being purely subjective. This would be the view of writers such as Grisez and Shaw:
125 Ibid., 261: “there is a method in it, though it be implicit.” That having been said, some 
would still argue for the legitimacy of immediate intuition in morals. Bernard Hoose argues that
“intuitions can and do play  a  bigger role than theologians have hitherto conceded .” Hoose points out 
that we have an innate, intuitive foundation for our moral understanding, since we have “an intuitive 
awareness or knowledge” of the self-evident principles of the practical realm through the habitus of 
synderesis. By means of a comparison of Aquinas with the intuitionist philosophers G.E. Moore and 
W.D Ross, he comes to the conclusion that we have a natural capacity to intuit as self-evident that 
certain actions, such as slavery and the torture and execution of heretics, are clearly wrong. However, I 
do not find Hoose’s argument convincing. Firstly, I think he has mixed the two levels of conscience, 
and as a result overstretched what belongs to conscience as self-evident, without the need for moral 
reasoning to take place. Moreover, the fact that some individuals recognised the wrongness of certain 
activities prior to any widespread public outcry does not necessarily imply that they must have intuited 
the true nature of these acts. See Bernard Hoose, “Intuition and Moral Theology,” Theological Studies 
67 (2006): 602-24, at 602 (emphasis in text). On the problem of confusing the first, or ontological, 
level of conscience (synderesis) with the act of judgement of the second level, see Twomey, P ope  
Benedict XVI, 136.
126 Cf. Newman, Grammar o f  Assent, 261: “in ordinary minds it [natural inference] is biassed 
[sic] and degraded by prejudice, passion and self-interest”; Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 141.
127 Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 142: “One has to determine if an intuition is well founded, 
if the conclusions drawn from it are warranted, if this intuition is consistent with the rest of one’s 
beliefs and values, if the normal requirements of evidence are fulfilled.”
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It is a sign that one has not reached this ideal state of conscience formation if, 
knowing the relevant facts in a situation, one remains in doubt about whether 
one may or may not do something. What then? Today it is fairly common for 
people, particularly persons of a religious bent, to turn to what they call 
discernment: “I’m going to ‘discern’ whether this choice would be right, and 
then follow my conscience.” Discernment has an honorable place in the 
spiritual life, but this is not it. In such cases, ‘discernment’ is simply another 
name for falling back on one’s feelings and doing as they dictate. This way of 
proceeding easily leads to persistent rationalization in support of a practice of 
sinning.12
Grisez and Shaw are right to criticise any misuse of spiritual discernment.129
• 1 TO •Nevertheless, “the possibility of abuse does not do away with the use,” if the use 
does indeed have an application to the question in hand. Therefore, it would be wrong 
to pass over the issue of discernment with such alacrity, as if  it were so much spiritual
j i t
woolly thinking or the excuse for not confronting wrongdoing. So does prayerful 
discernment have any place in conscience? I would suggest that a balance between 
two extremes needs to be found. One extreme, as we have seen, virtually excludes it 
from moral deliberation, largely leaving it on the level of life choice. The other, 
however, probably exceeds the level of prescription in particular situations that is 
possible without the use of deduction in tandem, or at least its use in confirmation, 
which probably gives fuel to the view that would exclude its involvement. How would 
we define spiritual discernment in relation to deductive judgement? Our 
understanding of the notion is rooted in the Bible, and so we should look there first, 
before turning our attention to later Christian spiritual works.
128 Grisez and Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ, 34.
129 Cf. Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 101: “Some seem ready to refer to any decision as a 
‘discernment’ even though made without any understanding or serious, well-informed effort to reach 
indifference to all but God’s will by sound method. Such so-called discernment appears to others as, at 
best, the consequence of ignorance and, at worst, a camouflage for laziness and/or self-will.”
130 Curran, “Conscience,” 17.
131 One might imagine that Grisez and Shaw would therefore only limit their presentation of 
discernment to that of vocational choice or a personal vocation to a moral Christian life which matches 
God’s call to holiness. Indeed, this is clearly a major thread in their writing. However, they also use the 
term to describe the binding force of the judgement of conscience: “Discerning what one takes to be the 
truly good -  and, for a Christian, holy -  thing, one only need make up one’s mind to do it.” See Grisez 
and Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ, 30. For a comparison of uses of discernment, cf. ibid., 77, 120, 257, 
273, 321, 325, 332, 340, 361-64 (all related to vocation), and 30, 368 (related to conscience).
192
In the broadest terms, discernment could be described as a mix of 
examination, recognition, understanding and judgement. Different words in the Bible 
are used to describe the idea, and so it would be useful to note these, so as to build up 
a picture of what it involves. Jesus criticises the crowds who are able to recognise the 
consequences of changes in the weather, but are not able to recognise the time of the 
Kingdom (k a ir o s ), and the consequence of repentance and reconciliation with God 
(Lk 12:54-56).132 The Greek word used is dok im azein , one which spans the ideas of 
‘prove’, ‘test’, ‘examine’, ‘verify’, ‘distinguish’, ‘discern’ and ‘judge’.133 Such a 
collection of nouns clearly implies a complex process and not some kind of bolt out of 
the blue experience. Christ’s challenge to the crowd obviously had a spiritual context. 
The same is true for St Paul and St John, who both discuss the issue of the 
discernment of spirits. Paul lists the ability to distinguish (d ia k r is is ) between good 
and bad spirits as one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 12:10). John discusses the 
testing of spirits (d ok im a ze in ) to be able to recognise (g in d skein ) the Spirit of truth 
from a spirit of falsehood (1 John 4:1-6). Once again, we see that the biblical 
description of discernment of what is good (or conducive to salvation) involves a 
process of examination, recognition, and judgement, but always made in the context 
of the spiritual life. This leads us to conclude that the “work of discernment is 
obviously not an easy task, nor the fruit of a judgement that is purely theoretical,
132 Giuseppe Trentin, “Coscienza e Discernimento: Osservazioni in Margine alla Nota 
Pastorale dei Vescovi Italiani dopo Loreto,” in La Coscienza M orale Oggi: Omaggio a l Prof. 
Domenico Capone, ed. Marian Nalepa and Terence Kennedy, Quaestiones Morales, no. 3 (Rome: 
Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, 1987), 641-54, at 644.
133 Cf. Xavier Léon-Dufour, “Discern,” in Dictionary o f  the New Testament, trans, from 2nd 
rev. French ed. by Terrence Prendergast (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1980), 165; Ceslas Spicq,
“Dokimazo,” in Theological Lexicon o f  the New Testament, vol. 1, trans, and ed. James D. Ernest 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 353-57, at 356: “Dokimazo means ‘discern’ what is important to 
do, the best course to follow, the decision to make, and especially to discern what is pleasing to the 
Lord (Eph 5:10), which presupposes spiritual renewal and the possession of love, which consequently 
gives a religious sense, a kind of spiritual instinct that allows a person to recognize true values (Rom 
12:2).”
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abstract and detached from life.”134 On the contrary, spiritual discernment is very 
much rooted in human existence, particularly a life shaped by grace and faith. The 
notion of discernment is therefore important in the description of conscience, as it 
highlights “the recovery of the relationship between fa i t h  a n d  m o r a ls ,” leading to a 
fuller understanding of the nature of conscience, rather than confining oneself to a
• « « • . . n cdefinition solely from juridical or philosophico-naturalistic models. This means that 
discernment rightly understood is a broader notion than an act of judgement, and 
clearly depends upon the action of grace for its operation.
However, when one thinks of discernment often one’s initial impression is
that it is about receiving direct insights from the Holy Spirit. Indeed, the classic
treatises on the discernment of spirits usually discuss three types of phenomena:
“revelations and visions that come from outside the person, internal enlightenment or
impulses concerning a determinate object of choice, and general states of consolation
1
or desolation that the soul experiences.” So should we consider the role of 
discernment in conscience as an experience of direct understanding of what is right in 
a particular case, or is it the case that the grace of the Holy Spirit assists reason, so 
that we are helped in our process of working something out? Although the Christian 
faith would acknowledge occasions of deep encounter with God, leading to a change
1 <3 _
in the direction of someone’s life and actions, ordinarily the prompting of the Holy 
Spirit is less straightforward and harder to perceive. So if God’s will is not normally 
so blindingly obvious, what do internal, spiritual impulses and experiences of
134 Trentin, “Coscienza e Discemimento,” 644-45: “Questa opera di discernimento non e 
owiamente un’opera facile, ne il ffutto di un giudizio puramente teorico, astratto, avulso dalla vita.”
135 Ibid., 647, “il recupero del rapporto fe d e  e morale” (emphasis in text).
136 Curran, “Conscience,” 10.
137 Just think of the conversion experience of St Paul (Acts 9:1 -19). St Ignatius of Loyola 
describes the call of Saints Matthew and Paul as examples of “first-time election”, where the will is a 
drawn immediately and without any doubt to what God is calling the individual to do. There is no need 
for discernment in this circumstance. See Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises, in Spiritual 
Exercises and Selected  Works, trans. and ed. George E. Ganss, (New York and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 
1991), no. 175 (page 162).
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peaceful consolation offer to the activity of moral decision-making? Although many 
other spiritual writers and saints, such as John Cassian, Gregory, Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Thomas a Kempis, Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross and Francis de Sales, 
wrote on discernment,138 for brevity, in exploring this question here I will confine my 
comments to Saint Ignatius of Loyola.
First of all, it should be noted that the process of spiritual deliberation 
presented by St Ignatius is articulated so as to reach a significant choice or decision, 
which he calls an ‘election’.139 A major concern is with vocations, such as priesthood 
or marriage, which he calls ‘unchangeable elections’.140 However, equally, Ignatius 
also recognises the need to discern in matters which will affect one’s life, but in a 
temporary way, such as whether to accept or refuse goods, something which he calls 
‘changeable elections’.141 Therefore spiritual discernment is concerned with a well- 
ordered seeking to know, and hence choose, God’s will, in particular circumstances 
where it is unclear as to what that will is.142
From the outset of the S piritu al E x erc ises , it is clear that Ignatius considers a 
person to be subject constantly to spiritual challenge and support.143 As such Karl 
Rahner declares that “Ignatius reckons on psychological experiences, arising in 
consciousness, which originate from God” (as well as from Satan, and good and evil
138 Jules J. Toner, A Commentary on St. Ignatius ’ Rules fo r  the Discernment o f  Spirits (St. 
Louis, MO: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1982), 7.
139 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, nos. 169-174 (pages 161-62). See also the subtitle 
of the Spiritual Exercises, which describe their purpose as reaching ordered decisions for life (“To 
overcome oneself, and to order one’s life, without reaching a decision through some disordered 
affection.”). See ibid., no. 21 (page 129).
140 Ibid., no. 171, (page 162).
141 Ibid. On the basis of this, I think Grisez and Shaw oversimplify discernment by keeping it 
largely to the broad level of lifestyle or personal vocation.
142 Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 26.
143 Here we are talking mostly of what Ignatius describes as second-time elections. 
Nevertheless, divine help is clearly understood as essential to first-time experience, and still part of the 
reasoning and weighing up process described as third-time election. Cf. Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual 
Exercises, nos. 175-183 (pages 162-64)
195
angels).144 This means that St Ignatius “believes in the possibility of a manifestation 
of the divine will (not derivable from the universe and its principles and facts) which 
may concern the individual as such and his individual decision.”145 Here Rahner is 
presenting the case that, in keeping with the thought of St Ignatius, we should take 
seriously the influence of the Holy Spirit in our lives by accepting the possibility of 
his intervention, rather than explain everything away as the result of the subconscious, 
memory, logic or some kind of change in mood, even when there is no instance of 
psychopathology.146 While taking into account the developments of modem 
psychology, Rahner still thinks it naive to believe that Ignatius was not aware of most 
of this, and so the charge of Illuminism or “uncontrollable mysticism” should not 
pertain to Ignatius.147 Indeed, apart from the rare instances of first-time election, 
Ignatius’s description of discernment presumes time and repetition in a calm state.
Nevertheless, Ignatius is sure that we can be guided by God in a variety of 
ways, many of which are not confined to our rational capacities. Rahner therefore 
concludes that St Ignatius has an understanding of how we reach decisions which is 
not fully contained in syllogistic deductive ethics.149 So how does God lead us to
144 Karl Rahner, “The Logic of Concrete Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” in The 
Dynamic Element in the Church, Quaestiones Disputatae series, no.12, trans. W.J. O’Hara (Freiburg: 
Herder; London: Bums & Oates, 1964), 84-169. Original text: “Die Logik der existentiellen 
Erkenntniss bei Ignatius v. Loyola,” in Das Dynamische in der Kirche (Freiburg: Herder, 1958), 74- 
148. Cf. Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, nos. 330-31 (pages 205-206).
145 Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 92. Cf. ibid., 94: “If one attends 
calmly and objectively and tries to learn from Ignatius, without claiming to know beforehand what he 
is permitted to say, one cannot but come to the conclusion that in the Exercises Ignatius candidly 
assumes that a man has to reckon, as a practical possibility of experience, that God may communicate 
his will to him. And the content of this will is not simply what can be known by the rational reflection 
of a believing mind employing general maxims of reason and faith on the one hand and their 
application to a definite situation that has also been analysed in a similar discursively rational way, on 
the other.” See also Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 36: “Within that relationship of personal 
communion, Ignatius believes, we are open to receive the divine influence, mediate or immediate, on 
our discernment.”
146 Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 141-42.
147 Ibid., 142, 94.
148 Cf. ibid., 159, 166;
149 Ibid., 122, at 169: “It is not the logic of a deductive ethics of general principles, though this 
too is necessary and the Exercises take its existence for granted. It is a logic of concrete individual
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recognise his will? Briefly stated, Ignatius divides the occasions for recognising and 
choosing God’s will into three times. The first time, as has already been noted, 
contains such a clarity that there is no doubt as to what God’s will might be.150 The 
second time is rooted in spiritual impulses or counsels backed up by experiences of 
consolation or desolation, caused by good and bad spirits. Thus, the second time of 
election is properly the occasion for a discernment of spirits, to test the origin of these 
impulses, always with the desire to seek God’s will and glory.151 The third time is 
described as a tranquil period, in which the soul is not moved by spiritual experience, 
but rather is called to discern by means of one’s natural faculties, such as reason.152 In 
addition to this, Ignatius is of the opinion that people not only discern in different 
‘times’, but in different ways within these times, and so he offers different methods, 
and even two levels of discernment of spirits. Thus, we can see that Ignatius presents 
a variety of contexts for recognising or discerning God’s will, yet in all of them, to a 
greater or lesser extent God’s help in recognising that will is present and active. Even 
in the third time election, which is dependant upon one’s natural faculties, such as 
“insight, reason, imagination, memory and will,” is not determined by these 
capacities alone. Indeed, third-time election starts and finishes with prayer to God 
asking for help, initially “to put into my mind what I ought to do in regard to the
knowledge which can only be attained in the actual accomplishment of concrete cognition itself, in this 
instance knowledge of the particular will of God addressed to the individual as such.”
150 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 175 (page 162): The First Time is an occasion 
when God our Lord moves and attracts the will in such a way that a devout person, without doubting or 
being able to doubt, carries out what was proposed” (emphasis in text). Cf. Toner, Discerning G o d ’s 
Will, 107-29.
151 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 176 (page 163): “The Second Time is present 
when sufficient clarity and knowledge are received from the experience of consolations and 
desolations, and from the experience in the discernment of various spirits” (emphasis in text). Cf.
Toner, Discerning God's Will, 130-60.
152 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 177 (page 163): “The Third Time is one of 
tranquility [s/c]. [...] By a time of tranquility I mean one when the soul is not being moved one way and 
the other by various spirits and uses its natural faculties in freedom and peace.” (emphasis in text). Cf. 
Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 161-190.
153 Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 167.
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matter proposed,”154 and then to offer what has been reached in the election, “to beg 
his Divine Majesty to receive and confirm it, provided that it is conducive to his 
greater service and praise.”155 Therefore, even when reasoning and imagination are to 
the fore, God’s help underpins the whole exercise.156 Given that some communication 
of the divine will is presumed in all instances, how should we describe it?
Rahner focuses his analysis on a comment made at the beginning of the 
second set of rules on discernment of spirits, namely that “Only God our Lord can 
give the soul consolation without a preceding cause [that is, one which is not 
dependent upon any previous or intervening stimulus]. For it is the prerogative of the 
Creator alone to enter the soul, depart from it, and cause a motion in it which draws 
the person wholly into love of his Divine Majesty.”157 Rahner describes this as the 
“fundamental consolation,”158 a “wordless experience”,159 or “‘non-conceptual’ 
experience of God,”160 which as such acts as the necessary “condition of the 
possibility of all cognition,” and is as such “without error.”161 However, this 
experience is not only an intellectual phenomenon, but also an experience of freedom 
and love, which makes it a consolation to the soul.162 For Rahner this non-conceptual
154 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 180 (page 163)
155 Ibid., nos. 183, 188 (pages 164-65).
156 Here Rahner is inconsistent. He notes that even in this more deductive method, Ignatius 
understands that God still guides and confirms the decision. Yet later on he is more ambivalent, 
describing third-time election either as a situation of a person having to “fend for himself with his 
reasonings and reflections,” or as a tranquil period of reasoning under the influence of the motion of a 
good spirit. Cf. Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 96, 168; Toner, Discerning G od ’s 
Will, 164.
157 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 330 (pages 205-206).
158 Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 158.
159 Ibid., 153. For corroboration of this understanding, Rahner refers to the letter to Teresa 
Rejadell, in which Ignatius says that “[God] opens up our soul; that is, he speaks inside the soul 
without the din of words, raising it up wholly to his divine love, so that we are incapable - even if we 
wanted to -  of resisting his intention.” For an English translation of the letter, see Ignatius of Loyola, 
Selected Letters no.3: To Teresa Rejadell: On Discernment o f  Spirits, in Spiritual Exercises and  
Selected Works, trans. and ed. George E. Ganss, (New York and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1991), 332- 
338, at 337.




experience of “transcendence pure and simple”163 is the measure to which the object 
of election is compared, with the synthesis of the two either bringing peace and 
tranquillity or a disturbance to the soul, meaning in the latter case that the object 
should not be chosen.164
Toner would disagree with Rahner’s analysis that a wordless consolation 
without previous cause is a necessary presupposition for every occasion of 
discernment, as if this experience alone acted as the general premise of a supernatural 
logic.165 I would agree with Toner that this is reading into the text. Indeed, such a 
description is only presented in the context of a “more probing discernment of 
spirits.”166 Nevertheless, one can still affirm that what Rahner arrives at in describing 
“a ‘perception’ or ‘sense’ of God” or his will potentially applies to all situations of
prayerful discernment. The supernatural logic that Rahner aims to explore does not
• • • 1 require a consolation without previous cause. The object of election is the occasion
of some sort of spiritual consolation, even when a person’s understanding and will
have been involved. This is why God is asked to confirm one’s reflections on the
problem in hand to communicate an experience of peace. In determining how
discernment relates to deduction and to moral conscience in general, the key issue is
not so much how God communicates the confirmation, but rather how we perceive it.
Toner offers a useful clarification here, that the perception is not so much intellectual,
as volitional. Thus, at the heart of spiritual discernment we find communication
163 Ibid., 149.
164 Ibid., 158.
165 Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 301-313, at 305; Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius 
Loyola,” 155.
166 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 328 (page 205).
167 Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 154.
168 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 331 (page 206): With or by means of a 
preceding cause [i.e. some perception or understanding of the object ], both the good angel and the evil 
angel are able to cause consolation in the soul, but for their contrary purposes.”
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between God and the individual on the affective level.169 However, this is not some 
blind impulse from God, which bypasses human freedom.170 Rather, we are dealing 
with a union of wills, human with divine, achieved in love through grace.171 This 
means that the counsel from spiritual consolation “is a sen tim en t, a judgment by 
affective connaturality,” where the person’s will is attuned to God’s will.172
That having been said, for the most part, such affective cognitions should not 
be understood as containing absolute certainty, which is why the discernment process 
calls for scrutiny and repetition in prayerful humility. Nor should such affective 
cognitions be understood as being opposed to reason, nor operating at odds with 
moral law.174 Indeed, this is very much presumed by Ignatius and is considered by 
him to be part of the ground rules for authentic discernment. The context presumes 
moral knowledge, fidelity to Church teaching and a teleology of action, which serves 
to praise God and which is in keeping with eternal salvation. The fact that moral
169 Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 134 and at 163; “Volitional impulse or desire, however, is in 
one way or another both a necessary presupposition or discernment in every mode and an element in 
each time for discernment.” Cf. Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 154.
170 Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 136: “The impulse, then is a conscious movement of the 
will as intellectual conation and, as such, is consciously motivated by love, the root of all volitional 
desires and aversions.”
171 Cf. Ratzinger, “Bishops, Theologians, and Morality,” 52: “Morality means the free ‘yes’ 
given by one will to another, in this case, the conformity of man to the will of God and the consequent 
correct perception of things as they really are.”
172 Toner, Discerning G od ’s Will, 137 (emphasis in text).
173 Ibid., 147: “[Experience of a consolation] gives no absolute assurance that the Holy Spirit 
is the prompting source of the counsel. Until shown otherwise, the consolation favors that 
interpretation but does not exclude our being lead by ‘our own’ thoughts and desires or by an evil 
spirit. That is why no single second-time experience can ordinarily, if ever, yield adequate evidence 
regarding God’s will and why Ignatius looks for plentiful light and understanding from many such 
experiences.”
174 Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 91 : “It goes without saying that with 
an Election [...] all principles of general abstract ethics, of universal natural law, of moral precepts of 
the gospel must not only be observed, that is, may not be infringed, but also must exercise a positive, 
discriminating, directive function. The only question is whether that is all that is involved and whether 
it is sufficient.”
175 Ignatius sums up his presuppositions in his explanation of elections and in his description 
of the third-time election. See Spiritual Exercises, no. 170 (page 161): “It is necessary that all the 
matters about which we wish to make an election should in themselves be either indifferent or good, so 
that they function constructively within our Holy Mother the hierarchical Church, and are not bad or 
opposed to her”; ibid., no. 177 (page 163): “I consider first the end for which I was bom, namely, to 
praise God our Lord and save my soul; then, desiring this, as the means I elect a life or state of life
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knowledge is presumed is clearly indicated in the first set of rules for discernment, 
which begin with a reference to syn deresis. Thus, in the case of people who are 
stumbling “from one mortal sin to another,” the “good spirit” [...] “stings their 
consciences with remorse” by means of their sy n d eres is  (p o r  e l  sy n d e re s e ) in order to 
draw the person away from sin. In addition, after discussing the purpose and effect 
of consolations and desolations, these rules also conclude with a reference to the 
“theological, cardinal and moral virtues, ” and the efforts of the “enemy of human
i nn
nature” to find the weaknesses in our practice of them. Therefore, prayerful 
discernment is not made in a vacuum, and so the affective cognitions which draw the 
human will to serve God’s will are at the same time understood as only making sense
178 * •if they follow God’s moral law, as known by reason. Hence, discernment is to be 
seen not in conflict, but in harmony with moral knowledge and deduction, assisting 
the person in his or her conscientious decision to reach a greater degree of fidelity to 
God.
within the bounds of the Church, in order to be helped in the service of my Lord and the salvation of 
my soul.”
As such, models which include the rejection of Church teaching on account of knowledge 
intuited connaturally in a state of grace would simply have been inconceivable for St Ignatius. One 
example of this view is presented by John Glaser, who combines a loose interpretation of Rahner’s 
comments on non-conceptual knowledge (which Glaser calls “preconceptual”), with ideas on 
inclination and intuition from Maritain and Fuchs. Thus Glaser considered systematic, conceptually 
formulated knowledge to be secondary to preconceptual knowledge, and only contains a portion of “a 
richer primary knowledge,” which we intuit in a state of grace. Thus, in the moral sphere, the 
connatural intuitive application of general moral principles to concrete situations not only has “genuine 
authority,” but also “superior insight” to any conceptual formulations, giving justification for 
challenges to the formal moral teaching of the Church. See John W. Glaser, “Authority, Connatural 
Knowledge, and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful,” Theological Studies 29 (1968): 742-51, at 
751. Cf. Jacques Maritain, The Range o f  Reason (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952), 16-28; 
Josef Fuchs, Theologia M oralis Generalis (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1965), 154,48. 
For Grisez’s critique, see Germain Grisez, The Way o f  the Lord Jesus, I, 81, 95, n. 18.
176 Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises, no. 314 (page 201). Here synderesis is translated as 
“habitual sound judgment on problems of morality.” However, note 135 on page 425 indicates that the 
original Spanish was “P or el synderese."
177 Ibid., nos. 316-327 (pages 202-205), at no. 327.
178 Cf. Baldwin of Canterbury (d. 1191), Tractatus Sextus, PL 204, 451-468, at 467A: 
(Speaking of directing one’s intention to doing God’s will in simplicity of heart) “Haec est autem vera 
discretio, rectae cogitationis et piae intentionis conjunctio” [And this conjunction of right thought and 
holy intention is true discernment.].
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Discernment, practiced in the context of the gifts of the Spirit,179 thus forms 
part of the moral life and part of the workings of conscience. Discernment is an 
example of the life of grace affecting our moral action,180 where our conscience is 
completely open to the Spirit,181 but the extent of the influence of grace and holiness 
in morals goes well beyond the capacity for connatural affectivity, as we shall see 
later. The whole Christian life of virtue is inextricably linked to grace in that we are 
called to choose not only what is right and good, but what is best and according to 
God’s will. We shall return to this, however, in the subsequent chapters on virtue and 
holiness.
The purpose of this section was to discuss whether conscience is limited to a 
deductive process or is also influenced by a variety of other elements. Our exploration 
of the question leads us to conclude that conscience is much more than simply 
deductive reasoning, but that this still remains the backbone of its judgements. This 
conclusion, however, raises another question, namely, concerning the limitations of 
human reasoning.
2 .3  H op eless ly  F la w ed  T h in kers -  H op elessly  F law ed  D oers?
Having explored the nature of practical deduction, and the role of other human 
capacities in the judgement of conscience, we can conclude this section with a brief
179 Häring sees discernment as a virtue of critique under the virtue of prudence. As the gifts of 
the Spirit work hand in hand with virtue, the gifts also will affect discernment. See Häring, F ree  and  
Faithful in Christ, I, 255; The Law o f  Christ, I, 298: “The gifts of the Holy Spirit complete and perfect 
prudence particularly in regard to right knowledge of self, to ‘the testing of spirits,’ affecting us 
through profound movements and impulses.” We shall return to the gifts in the final chapter.
180 Toner, Discernment o f  Spirits, 69. Accordingly, as an expression of the impact of the life of 
grace on moral action, rather than setting it aside as irrelevant, I would agree with Rahner’s proposition 
that Ignatius’s ascetical theology of discernment should be incorporated into moral theology. See 
Rahner, “Individual Knowledge in Ignatius Loyola,” 170. Pope Benedict would also support giving a 
greater place to the wisdom of the saints in morality, since he thinks that they have “the greatest right” 
to speak about it. See Ratzinger, “Bishops, Theologians, and Morality,” 56.
181 Cf. Häring, F ree  and Faithful in Christ, 1 ,256.
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review of the reliability of reason. The Scholastics acknowledged that the devil was in 
the detail (pun intended, given also the influence of sin on reasoning), in that greater 
error arose in the particulars. Indeed, Pangallo points out that the introduction of 
the syllogism by Albert into the Christian treatise on conscience was to explain “the
1 OQ
mystery of the human heart, ordered to the Good, but tending to evil.” Thus, the use 
of the syllogism to describe conscience reflects Aristotle’s original purpose in using it 
to explain the Socratic paradox of virtue.184 Socrates presumed that if one knew what 
to do, one would do it, and so all action which “conflicts with what is best” is the 
result of ignorance alone.185 However, Aristotle rejected this opinion by identifying 
another principle cause, namely, the state of incontinence (a k r a s ia ), in which an
i or t
individual does not act upon his/her knowledge, and therefore lacks virtue. It is in 
this context that, alongside the description of how an appetite can overpower a 
person’s knowledge of the good, Aristotle also presents the structure of the practical 
syllogism as a part-explanation of the discrepancy between knowledge and action
ion m t t
caused by ignorance, incapacity or incontinence. His final analysis is that the 
conclusion of the syllogism can be corrupted by a premise of false belief resulting
i oo
from plain error, or distortion due to strong emotions or desires.
182 For example, cf. Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.71, a.2, sol.: “et quia circa 
particularia est error maximus, propter hoc ratio frequenter decepitur”; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la 
Ilae, q.94, a.4, resp.: “Et hoc tanto magis invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia descenditur”; 
idem, D e Ventate, q. 17, a.2, ad 2: “conscientia addit supra scientiam applicationem scientiae ad actum 
particularem; et in ipsa applicatione potest esse error, quamvis in scientia error non sit. Cf. idem, Truth, 
q. 17, a.2, ad 2: “Conscience adds to scientific knowledge the application of that knowledge to a 
particular act. There can be error in the application, although there is not error in the scientific 
knowledge itself.”
183 Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 96: “Per illustrare il mistero del cuore umano, ordinato al Bene ma 
propenso al male, S. Alberto deve chiarire in sede filosofica il processo di riconoscimento del bene 
nell’uomo, valorizzando il sillogismo pratico aristotelico senza però dimenticare la filosofia della 
volontà e la filosofia della libertà, che in ogni tempo accompagnano il pensiero cristiano.”
184 Crowe, “St. Thomas and Synderesis," 234.
185 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VII, 1145b 25-30.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid., VII, 1146b 35-1147b 19.
188 Aristotle points out that particulars are controlled by perception. Thus, if the perception is 
distorted by desire, the minor premise would be ill-conceived, and so the wrong choice would be made.
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This background detail should help us to realise that from the outset the 
practical syllogism was not only presented as an attempt to explain the function of 
moral deliberation, but also as an acknowledgement and means of explaining the 
malfunction of that same moral deliberation. Consequently, any moral theory rooted 
in deduction of moral norms which does not give adequate recognition of the limits of 
reason is not sufficiently grounded in reality. Indeed, the Scholastics not only came to 
the conclusion that reason can be tripped up, they also concluded that this was a 
frequent occurrence,189 and that deductive error can be accounted for not only through 
faulty content, largely in the minor premise, but also through a fault in the deductive 
process itself.190 We have, in passing mentioned the key causes of deductive error. 
However, it may be of use to pause for a moment to consider the causes in relation to 
errors of function and errors of content.
See ibid., VII, 1147a 25-1147a 35. In the context of faith, sin is at times defined in terms of a 
disruption of the appropriate desirability of certain goods in relation to higher goods. Here temptation 
distorts the perception of the reality that one encounters. See St Augustine, D e Magistro, II, 19, PL 32, 
1269: “Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut 
ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccai”; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.73, a .l, resp., ad 3; la Ilae, 
q.78, a.l. Cf. Grisez, The Way o f  the Lord Jesus, I, 319.
189 For example, cf. Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.72, a.2, ad obj.l: “Qualiter 
deponenda sit? Dicendum, quod per examinationem minoris propositionis, quae assumitur a ratione; 
haec enim frequenter falsa est: et si examinaretur, ultro se offeret falsitas ejus, et tunc cessabit 
conscientia”; Aquinas, In IISententiarum, dist. 24, q.2, a.3, sol.: “Sicut est de motu rerum naturalium, 
quod omnis motus ab immobili movente procedit [...] ita etiam oportet quod sit in processu rationis; 
cum enim ratio varietatem quamdam habeat, et quodammodo mobilis sit, secundum quod principia in 
conclusiones deducit, et in conferendo frequenter decipiatur; oportet quod omnis ratio ab aliqua 
cognitione procedat, quae uniformitatem et quietem quamdam habeat...”
190 Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 2, resp: “In qua quidem applicatione contingit esse errorem 
dupliciter: uno modo, quia id quod applicato, in se errorem habet; alio modo ex eo quod non recte 
applicat. Sicut etiam in syllogizando contingit peccatum dupliciter: vel ex eo quod quis falsis utito, vel 
ex eo quod non recte syllogizat.” Cf. idem, Truth, q. 17, a. 2, resp: “Error, however, can occur in this 
application in two ways; in one, because that which is applied has error within it, and, in the other, 
because the application is faulty. Thus, in using a syllogism, mistakes can happen in two ways: either 
from the use of false premises, or from faulty construction of the syllogism.”
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2.3.1 Errors of Function
Given the universal experience of making mistakes, it should be beyond question that, 
to some degree, the process of human reasoning is in itself fallible in every person. 
Yet, surprisingly, even until recent times, some have held that logical error in humans 
is impossible, and that the universal principles of logic are always applied flawlessly. 
Thus, according to this view, error is only the result of a mistake in the content of a 
premise.191 However, such an understanding does not stand up to current scientific 
scrutiny, which upholds the view that “people are rational in principle, but fallible in 
practice.”192
St Thomas identified logical error as a moral issue, but did not make a lengthy 
study of the matter. It is true that we could identify senility, tiredness, emotion or sin
1QTas major factors in derailing the train of practical deduction, but modem studies are 
able to elaborate further upon this to explain other causes rooted in the limits of 
reason itself. The first and most obvious cause is the complexity of the deduction 
itself. Although some syllogistic deductions “are so easy that a nine year old child can 
spontaneously draw a correct conclusion, [...] others are so hard that barely any adults
191 Johnson-Laird and Byme point out that this view owes its development to writers such as 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Boole. Cf. Johnson-Laird and Byme, Deduction, 18. For modem examples, 
cf. L. Jonathan Cohen, “Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?” Behavioral and  
Brain Sciences, 4 (1981): 317-70; Mary Henle, “The Relation between Logic and Thinking,” 
Psychological Review, 69 (1962): 366-78; idem, Foreword to Russell Revlin and Richard E. Mayer, 
eds., Human Reasoning  (Washington, DC: V.H. Winston, 1978), xii-xviii, at xviii: “I have never found 
errors which could unambiguously be attributed to faulty reasoning.” Henle believes that mistakes only 
occur in reasoning because people forget or re-interpret the premises, or import material that is 
extraneous to the deduction in hand. Similarly, Cohen considers error to be the result of poor 
performance or educational ignorance rather than naturally faulty competence. In other words, human 
thought is not irrational: just mistaken or lacking in education. The article cited above by Cohen also 
contains extensive critique (both for and against this view) by other authors from a range of fields.
192 Johnson-Laird and Byme, Deduction, 19.
193 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.94, a.5, resp. Here Aquinas states that the rectitude 
of a conclusion can be corrupted by means of certain obstacles (propter aliqua particularia  
impedimenta), but does not specify them, other than alluding to the fact that created things fail at times. 
This may be a reference to the mind itself failing in advanced age. To this he adds that the content of 
reason can be perverted by passion, evil habit or evil disposition of nature (ex passione, seu ex m ala 
consuetudine, seu ex mala habitudine naturae).
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perform better than chance with them.”194 It is certainly not the case that everyday life 
presents unfathomable problems all the time, but it is true that some moral problems 
are more complex than others, particularly when the details of the circumstances that 
help define the act,195 are numerous and out of the ordinary. Here Thomas’s own 
example of conscientious syllogistic reasoning proves to be deceptively simple.196 
Clearly, for teaching purposes, the example given had to be straightforward. 
However, the disadvantage to this is that it conceals the eventuality of complicated 
moral deduction, with complex premises containing a combination of quantifiers,197 
and it is here we find that faulty reasoning starts to become far more prevalent. 
Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, experiments on test-subjects show that different 
people have different deductive capabilities,198 and that the more complicated the 
deduction, the fewer the people who are able to derive the correct conclusion.199
Beyond the issue of variance in natural deductive competence, studies have 
also identified particular sources of error, namely, conversion, belief bias, content and 
figure. Conversion error arises when the components of a universal proposition are 
reversed.200 Belief bias affects deduction by persuading or dissuading further 
investigation, depending upon whether the first conclusion is believable or not.201 In 
this way, the person’s response to a problem is determined by the “believability of the
194 Johnson-Laird and Byme, Deduction, 106.
193 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.18, a.4, resp.
196 See idem, In II Sententiarum, dist. 24, q.2, a.4, sol., as quoted earlier.
197 On increasing error in cases of multiple quantifiers, cf. Johnson-Laird and Byme, 
Deduction, 133-146; Evans, Newstead and Byme, Human Reasoning  259-262. In terms of the mental 
models theory, creating a problem with multiple models increases the likelihood of error. See Johnson- 
Laird and Byme, Deduction, 124.
198 Johnson-Laird and Byme, Deduction, 62.
199 Even in problems of single quantifiers, error increases depending upon the type of 
quantifier, such that simple modusponens is most successfully completed, and problems containing 
negative disjunction are the least successfully reasoned. See ibid., 55.
200 Ibid., I l l ;  Evans, Newstead and Byme, Human Reasoning, 217,240. For example: All A 
are B, therefore all B are A (invalid). In contrast, propositions containing ‘either’, ‘some’or ‘no’ are 
convertible.
201 Johnson-Laird and Byme, Deduction, 125: “Reasoners will search for refuting models 
more assiduously if their initial conclusion is unbelievable than if it is believable.”
206
conclusion rather than by its logical validity,” thus compromising the thoroughness 
of the judgement. The content of the matter under discussion also has the potential to 
colour the judgement, particularly when it is an emotive issue.203 Lastly, the figure of 
a syllogism relates to the order of the terms contained in the deduction, namely, the 
middle term, the subject of the conclusion and the predicate of the conclusion, with 
some being more straightforward than others.204 Here, in effect, the order of the terms 
can either serve to assist or confuse the mind.
From this we can see that there are a number of causes of error in reasoning, 
which would short-circuit the logical process. Given the occurrence of these factors, 
and the reality of varied deductive competence in the human population, we can 
conclude that functional error, to a greater or lesser degree, forms part of the reality of 
everyone’s life. This being so, we should recognise our need for help in moral 
decision-making,205 particularly in complex matters, and also acknowledge the 
charitable value of offering help, when appropriate.
2 .3 .2  E rro rs  o f  C on ten t
In keeping with Aristotle’s analysis, St Thomas points out that knowledge of the 
principles is still not enough to ensure right judgement, as the individual’s application
202 Evans, Newstead and Byrne, Human Reasoning, 243-45, at 243.
203 Daniel Osherson, “Logic and Models of Logical Thinking,” in Rachel Joffe Falmagne, ed., 
Reasoning: Representation and Process in Children and Adults. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 1975), 81-91, at 89: “How people understand and reason with if...then... and
a ll ... are ... statements is surely very sensitive to the content that fills in the blanks of these statements, 
that is, to the subject matter being reasoned about” (emphasis in text).
204 Evans, Newstead and Byrne, Human Reasoning 212. There are four syllogistic figures. For 
example, a syllogism in figure three runs as follows: Some doctors are archers. No doctors are  
farm ers. Therefore, som e farm ers are not archers. For this example and further detail on all four 
figures, see ibid., 212.
205 Cf. Tobit 4:18: “Seek advice from every wise person and do not despise any useful 
counsel.”
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may be corrupted by concupiscence or emotion.206 This would imply that the 
assessment of the particular situation in hand could be distorted such that the matter is 
perceived incorrectly (simple misunderstanding, such as in the case of a heated 
argument), or perversely or unjustly (where the inclination to sin disrupts the 
recognition of the true value and consequences of an action). It follows that the more 
a person is overcome by powerful, disordered emotion, or immersed in temptation, 
the more difficult it will be for that person to see clearly and judge wisely. Aquinas 
sums this up by quoting Aristotle: “as the man is, so does the end seem to him.” 
Here we see that disposition is identified as playing a vital role in right reason and 
right action. Thus, Aquinas concludes that in the individual reason not only needs to 
be perfected as prudence, but also requires the support of moral virtue.208 Once again, 
this shows St Thomas’s understanding of the reality of fallibility and the necessity of 
moral growth, which has implications for the function (or malfunction) of conscience 
in different stages of development.
With regard to the development of right dispositions (or h ab itu s) understood 
in terms of virtue, we shall explore this in the next chapter. However, we should also 
take care that our understanding of moral development does not become detached 
from ordinary experience, as if the reality of it were simply a straight climb to virtue, 
given time and effort. Therefore, we should acknowledge the existence of
206 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.: “oportet autem rationem circa 
particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus [...] 
sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod 
hujusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectual, vel scientiam corrumpitur in particulari per 
aliquam passionem: sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod 
concupiscit, licet sit contra universale rationis.’
207 Ibid.: “qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei, ut dicitur in 3. Ethic.” See Aristotle, 
Nichomachean Ethics, III, 1114b 1-4: “But someone may say that everyone aims at the apparent good, 
and does not control how it appears, but, on the contrary, his character controls how the end appears to 
him. [We reply that] if each person is in some way responsible for his own state [of character], he is 
also himself in some way responsible for how [the end] appears” (parentheses in text).
208 Ibid.: “et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo 
habeat virtutem moralem.”
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psychological factors that may impede such development, and in turn affect the 
ordered rational function of conscience.209 To omit any reference to the reality and 
effects of psychiatric disorder or problems of psychological integration210 from our
description of the moral person would reduce our moral theory to some form of
♦ ♦ 211“benign projection”, which optimistically presents “the hope of continual and 
almost automatic progress, associated with an exaggerated trust in human reason and
9 1 9the goodness of human nature.” Veritatis S p len d or  counsels against creating moral 
theory upon empirically derived statistics or upon the existence of psychological
91 T . . . .defect, but this should not be seen as a rejection of its significance. Due recognition 
of moral failure, and also the limitations to the moral freedom of the individual are not 
incompatible with a normative, objective aspect to morality; indeed, moral failure 
would make no sense if it were not measured against some benchmark of objectivity.
209 Equally, however, we should not presume that conscience is nothing more than a complex 
of uncontrollable psychological factors, which lacks the possibility of any alteration and is therefore 
beyond moral reponsibility.
210 Kiely, Psychology and M oral Theology, 40-44, at 44 (based upon common evidence of 
various studies): “In round numbers, about 20% of any large group reveal difficulties in living that are 
usually considered psychiatric symptoms; 60% show some degree of immaturity or incomplete 
development affecting the range of their freedom; and 20% may be considered relatively free of 
psychological liabilities of the kind in question.” With particular reference to studies made of priestly 
and religious vocations, Kiely also discusses the problems which arise when the levels of personality 
are not integrated or in harmony. The levels are “the ideal self’, composed of the ideals an individual 
wishes to achieve, “the conscious actual self’, or how the person perceives him/herself at present, and 
the “latent self’, which is the subconscious actual self. See ibid., 71-112, at 73.
211 Kiely claims that moral theology often contains “a kind of implicit or explicit optimism 
with regard to the reflective capacity and the emotional equilibrium of people-in-general.” As an 
example, he quotes Aquinas, who explains that his Summa is designed for beginners (ad  eruditionem  
incipientium). That Aquinas’s idea of what is suitable for a beginner might be somewhat coloured by 
his own genius, is not surprising. However, although in general I would not disagree with Kiely’s view 
that some moral theology is in danger of being unrealistic in its optimism, I would suggest that Aquinas 
was not blind to human frailty. Indeed, one of the purposes of this section is to highlight that the 
medievals readily recognised the impact of sin, error and emotional frailty, which bears consequences 
on their understanding of conscience. Cf. Kiely, Psychology and M oral Theology, 6; Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, prologue.
212 Kiely, Psychology and M oral Theology, 254. To this “rationalistic-optimistic” view, 
Costello would add two other forms of reductivism, namely, spiritual-transcendental and psycho- 
biological, where a particular aspect is exaggerated to the detriment of a fuller and more accurate 
understanding of the mystery of the human person. See Timothy Costello, Forming Priestly Identity, 
Analecta Gregoriana, no. 287 (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2002), 148-50, at 152: 
“At the heart of the mystery [of the self] lies the fact that development can bring about the actualization 
of countless potentials and possibilities inherent in the personality, and yet a successful outcome to the 
process of development can be neither assumed not assured.”
213 Veritatis Splendor, 70, 111-12; ^ 4 5  85 (1993), 1189, 1220-21.
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To contrast objective morality with psychological disorder would be to create a false 
dichotomy between objective norms and human frailty. Therefore, the fact that an 
individual suffers from a situation of severe limitation of freedom should not imply 
that none of his/her actions is morally significant or that even all of his/her actions 
should be deemed good in relativist terms. Rather one has a responsibility to exercise 
one’s (limited) freedom to choose the good, to the limits of that freedom.214 To
* • • •  * 215counsel otherwise would leave the individual in stagnant meaninglessness, and 
would be a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the community, particularly in 
cases where a person’s actions endanger the safety or life of another.
Nevertheless, a real pastoral issue exists in the care of individuals with 
psychological disorder or seriously stunted development, including the development 
of their conscience. In presenting moral norms or moral virtue as the standard to 
which one is expected to conform, there is the danger that if the presentation is too 
stark or lacks sufficient reference to the frequency of sin and the very real situation of 
human frailty,216 affecting awareness or consent, it may appear to those with
214 Grisez, The Way o f  the Lord Jesus, I, 324. It should be noted that, ultimately, Kiely does 
not reach the conclusion that, given the levels of moral and psychological immaturity present in 
society, one should abandon all efforts to do the good, as if it were beyond reach. Instead, based upon 
the thought of Longergan, he proposes a threefold conversion: intellectual, moral and religious, which 
provides a process of self-correction coupled with the necessary religious foundation for morality. 
Nevertheless, Kiely takes the prevalence of psychological and moral underdevelopment seriously, and 
so acknowledges that the extent to which such a conversion will be possible in any individual will vary 
widely from person to person. Consequently, he emphasises the role of institutions, particularly the 
Church in offering external support to the individual in the process of correcting value-judgements by 
revealing objective norms which may not be obvious to the individual. See Kiely, Psychology and  
M oral Theology, 212-247, 260-61. Cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973; paperback ed., 1999), 104-105, 237-44. Browning (following 
MacIntyre, Ricoeur and Johannes Van der Ven) also affirms the role of the community in shaping 
practices and offering narrative meaning and discipline to basic human desires. See Don S. Browning, 
Christian Ethics and the M oral Psychologies (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 
2006), 60-65.
215 In contrast, the use of freedom for the good can be understood as an expression of the inner 
dynamic of the person as imago Dei, which each individual is called to develop or reveal. Cf. Veritatis 
Splendor, 111;X 15, 85 (1993), 1220.
216 St Alphonsus describes this as “intrinsic frailty” (fragilitas intrinseca). For his comments 
which combine strong moral challenge with compassion, see St Alphonsus de Liguori, Praxis 
Confessarii a d  Bene Excipiendas Confessiones, in Theologia Moralis, 9th ed., vol. 9, ed M. Heilig,
210
particular ingrained habits or psychiatric disorder that their situation is hopeless, and 
accordingly the gap between their actions and expected behaviour is unbridgeable. 
Kiely points out that an exaggerated moral optimism, which in effect is a reductivist 
view of human nature, can create or fuel unrealistic expectations,217 such that a sense 
of failure or the level of guilt experienced on account of acts may far exceed the 
reality of their limited imputability. None of this affects the nature of the moral norm 
or moral theory. Rather it attests to a pastoral reality affecting a significant portion of 
people,218 who may feel overwhelmed by a persistent inability to reach or maintain 
the high standards that are preached about.
One clear problem is the way in which people receive their moral education or 
information. In the case of adults who regularly practice their faith, probably a 
significant portion of this will come through preaching, and it is difficult to present a 
great deal of detail in a sermon to a large group without either losing the interest of 
the congregation or reaching a point where the argument becomes too complicated to 
be followed. This is not some excuse for not attempting to give accurate information, 
rather an expression of the natural limitations of a single discourse to an audience of 
all ages and backgrounds. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, the homilist may tend to 
offer a summary, which will emphasise one aspect to the detriment of others, to get 
his message across. However, unless the homilist is aware that he must return to the 
issue to give a more balanced picture, two extremes may be presented (or interpreted
(Mechlinia: P.J. Manicq, 1852), V (“De habituatis et recidivis”), no.77. However, such an approach 
combining compassion with moral challenge needs to be done carefully and wisely, otherwise it may 
add to the sense of moral failure, as we shall see.
217 Kiely, Psychology and M oral Theology, 254: “The optimism involved may favour a 
misleading view of human nature. False and unrealistic expectations may be a direct result of the 
psychological liabilities of individuals [...], and ‘benign projection’ may help to reinforce them.
18 Ibid., 44: “psychological liabilities of a kind that may be morally relevant are not rare; 
there exists a class of problems which merits closer scrutiny.” I would agree with Kiely on the basis of 
my own pastoral experience.
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• 910as such): either a rationalist or spiritual optimism, which gives little mention of sin, 
frailty and error, or a psycho-biological pessimism, which lacks sufficient exhortation 
to exercise one’s freedom or personal responsibility, however restricted that may be. 
Clearly sermons are not enough, and so in addition people require on-going catechesis 
of varying forms suited to their age and circumstances. St Alphonsus also exhorts the 
confessor not to miss the opportunity for offering appropriate catechesis in the 
sacrament of reconciliation.220 Thus, it is the task of the Church to seek to catechise in 
many and varied ways, so that people are not left with unrealistic expectations, but 
equally not without sufficient moral encouragement to keep trying to serve the Lord 
“in holiness and righteousness [...] all our days” (Luke 1: 74-75).
The reality of psychological disorder or the existence of a range of levels of 
moral development in society should not lead the Church to change its teaching on 
moral norms, so that, for example, they are based on the lowest common 
denominator. Rather, in recognising that particular individuals have a sense of moral 
failure, exaggerated by false expectation, the Church has a specific role to play. As 
well as giving appropriate encouragement to individuals to seek the help of medical 
practitioners or counsellors, the Church has the duty to effect clarity of catechesis 
consonant with its role as a bearer of hope: 21 the hope of God’s mercy and grace in 
the concrete situation of the individual.222 In this way, people are helped to seek and
219 An example of this could be a homily on Matthew 5:48, “Be perfect, therefore, as your 
heavenly Father is perfect.” Clearly there is a danger of a sense of hopeless inadequacy, if it is not 
made sufficiently clear that such a path to perfection is neither immediate nor permanent in this life, 
nor made without God’s help. Indeed, Kiely points out that high moral optimism, whether taught or 
mistakenly understood, has difficulty in integrating the necessity of our redemption through Christ’s 
death and resurrection, since it seems as if we are supposed to be able to do everything so well on our 
own. See Kiely, Psychology and M oral Theology, 255.
220 St Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, I, 17-18; V, 77.
221 Cf. Veritatis Splendor, 112; 4 4 5  85 (1993), 1221.
222 Cf. Lamentations 3:19-23: “The thought of my affliction and my homelessness is 
wormwood and gall! My soul continually thinks of it and is bowed down within me. But this I call to
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recognise God’s presence and help in their difficulties, rather than seeing God as the 
cause of their problems, by relating to him as the One who makes laws they cannot 
keep.
3. T he C on ten t an d  P u rp ose o f  S yn deresis
From our investigation of medieval writing on the subject of s y n d e re s is , this question 
may at first seem to be superfluous. As we have seen, the Scholastics attributed 
operations to sy n d eres is  which could be subdivided into a function of attitude and a 
function of content. Thus, sy n d eres is  provides a fundamental drive for the good and a 
revulsion from evil, as well as providing the general principles of the moral law, both 
natural and divine, which form the root for any moral judgement, that is, any act of 
conscience. That having been said, if we stop to examine this further, we begin to 
notice that the question is not as simple as it first seems, particularly if we look at the 
issue of what sy n d eres is  contains. If we look at what the Scholastics mention as 
examples of general principles, they offer very few. Are these general principles 
sufficient to ground all occasions of moral reasoning in any meaningful way, or is the 
theory an unsuccessful attempt to neatly compartmentalise what cannot ultimately be 
known? In this question I will endeavour at least to raise, if not solve, some of the 
difficulties with the content of sy n d eresis , in the hope of finding notions which 
assist in presenting a theory of sy n d eres is  which gives it meaningful purpose.
mind, and therefore I have hope: The steadfast love of the Lord never ceases, his mercies never come 
to an end; they are new every morning.”
223 We should recall at this point that St Bonaventure located the content of general principles 
in the innate conscience, linking synderesis to the will as the natural disposition for the good. Here it 
should be understood that I am examining synderesis as a habitus of the practical intellect, but also 
fully acknowledging the will’s intimate relationship with the intellect in providing its desire for the 
good and the dynamism necessary to obtaining that end. Cf. Brian V. Johnstone, “The Structures of
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In discussing the content of sy n d eresis , we suddenly become aware of the lack of 
detail provided by the Scholastics.224 By and large, the Scholastic tradition limited 
itself to repeating the definition of sy n d eresis  as some kind of power or h ab itu s  of 
general, first moral principles, or of the universal moral law.225 Although occasionally 
some medieval writers make mention of additional examples of specific content,226 
the most quoted first moral principle is: G o o d  is to b e  d o n e ; e v il  is to  b e  a v o id e d ,  
presented sometimes as only half of the saying, either in the positive or the 
negative.227 As this is the most frequently articulated principle relating to the nature 
and content of sy n d eres is , it offers us a starting point to our investigation.
3.1 Context or Content?
The most detailed account of this first moral principle is contained in St 
Thomas’s comments on natural law. Here he declares that all the precepts of the
998natural law, which are the universal first principles of sy n d eres is , are based upon
Practical Reason,” The Thomist 50 (1986): 417-47. In addition, it should be noted that many of the 
comments would also apply to Bonaventure’s notion of innate conscience.
224 D’ Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 49: “It is vexing to find that St Thomas 
leaves us rather uncertain about the content of synderesis.”
225 For example, Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q. 71, a .l, sol.: “synderesis est 
specialis vis animae, in qua secundum Augustinum universalia juris descripta sunt (emphasis in text)”; 
Aquinas, De Verdate, q. 16, a.l, resp. “ita etiam in ea [i.e. anima humana] est quidam habitus naturalis 
primorum principiorum operabilium, quae sunt universalia principia iuris naturalis; qui quidem habitus 
ad synderesim pertinet (own parenthesis)”; Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, dist. 39, qq.1-2, resp.: 
“[Synderesis] non potest aliud poni quam habitus principiorum, qui semper est rectus.”
226 For example, in addition to the principle to seek good and avoid evil, St Albert the Great 
locates the Decalogue and other general principles in synderesis. See Albert the Great, D e Bono, tract. 
V, q.l, a .l, sol. Jean Porter, drawing from Lottin’s research, also shows that Roland of Cremona, 
writing between 1229 and 1230, clearly understands precepts to be part of synderesis, when he says 
that “synderesis directs that marriage should be contracted” (Porter’s translation). Cf. Jean Porter, 
Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition fo r  Christian Ethics (Ottawa, Ontario: Novalis; 
Grand Rapids, MI, and Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 83-84, 91; Odon Lottin, Le  
droit naturel chez saint Thomas d ’Aquin et ses prédécesseurs, 2nd ed. (Bruges: Beyaert, 1931), 115: 
“quia sinderesis dicit quod contrahendum est matrimonium.” I shall return to the question of precepts at 
the end of this question.
227 Albert the Great, Summa de Creaturis, II, q.71, a.l, sol.: “Omne bonum faciendum”; 
Aquinas, In IISententiarum, dist. 24, q.2, a.3, sol.: “malum non esse faciendum”; idem, Summa 
Theologica, Ia Ilae, q. 94, a.2, resp.: “Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est 
faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.
228 Cf. Aquinas, In II  Sententiarum, dist. 24, q.2, a.3, ad 3; idem, De Verdate, q. 16, a. 1, resp.: 
“[synderesis est] habitus naturalis primorum principiorum operabilium, quae sunt universalia principia 
iuris naturalis.” There is a certain fluid use of precept and principle in Aquinas. As we can see,
214
the first precept, namely g o o d  is  to b e  d on e  a n d  pu rsu ed , a n d  ev il is to  b e  a v o id e d ? 29 
In this way this idea is presented as the source of all others, in that all precepts of the 
natural law take the shape of something to be done or to be avoided.230 But is the first 
practical precept actually the source of anything, or is it some kind of philosophical 
construct, or base common denominator arrived at after reflecting upon fundamental 
moral principles? In other words, does sy n d eresis  hold real or formal status in moral 
theory, and moral reasoning? The answer to this question depends upon the analysis 
of the material offered in particular by St Thomas. If the problem is approached from 
the angle of analytical philosophy, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the 
necessary logical relationships whereby we pass from the universal to the
'J'X 1 •particular. This method struggled to find sufficient meaningful content at the 
universal level to justify a logical progression to particular moral rules.232 Indeed,
elsewhere he talks of the first principles of natural law, while in Summa Theologica  la Ilae, q.94, a.2, 
resp. he talks of precepts, only to return to talking of first common principles in la Ilae, q.94, a.4, resp. 
However, the two terms are effectively equivalent, since he states that the precepts of the natural law 
are the practical equivalent to the first principles of speculative reason. Cf. Summa Theologica  la Ilae, 
q.94, a.2, resp.: “praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se habent at rationem practicam, sicut principia 
demonstratium se habent ad rationem speculativam.” Clearly the precept would be the principle 
rephrased in command form.
229 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp.: “Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum 
legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia 
alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia ilia facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis 
naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana.”
230 Ibid. “Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia ilia 
facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit 
esse bona humana.”
231 Cf. Ibid., I, q.79, a. 12, resp.: “per prima principia procedimus ad inveniendum, et 
judicamus inventa.” Kennedy highlights the rise of discontent among Catholic philosophers starting in 
the 1930s regarding the lack of logical coherence and proof in natural law theory, in that it was “not 
obvious how the first principles of morality were founded nor how they related to the norms of moral 
action, that is, how principles, precepts and norms are to be distinguished.” This produced a variety of 
efforts to solve the content of synderesis by using the tools of analytical philosophy. One such attempt 
is Conscience and its Right to Freedom  by Eric D’Arcy. See Terence Kennedy, “Thomistic and 
Analytic Philosophers on the First Principles of Morality: A Conflict of Interpretations,” in History and  
Conscience: Studies in Honour o f  Father Sean O ’Riordan CSsR, ed. Raphael Gallagher and Brendan 
McConvery (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1989), 45-72.
232 D.J. O’Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law  (London: Macmillan, 1967), 66: “Either moral 
rules are derivable from the general precepts given in synderesis or they are not. If they are, we require 
to see the derivations, since what is provable can be proved. If they are not how are they to be 
justified?” Quoted in Kennedy, “Thomistic and Analytic Philosophers,” 54.
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Frederick Copleston notes that the first practical precept of goodness cannot act 
usefully as a major premise since it does not contain sufficient detail:
As regards deduction, Aquinas did not think that we can deduce the 
proposition that to have sexual intercourse with someone else’s wife is wrong 
from the precept that good is to be pursued and evil avoided simply by 
contemplating, as it were, this latter precept. We can no more do this than we 
can deduce from the principle of non-contradiction the proposition that a thing 
which is white all over cannot at the same time be red all over.233
Thus, among those who focus their attention on the first practical precept as 
either the only first principle, or the only first principle with any significance, in 
sy n d eres is , a common conclusion begins to surface, namely, that sy n d ere s is  has the 
role of facilitating the functioning of moral reasoning and conscience, but is not really 
involved in the actual process of practical deduction or reflection at the level of actual 
content. As such, the precept of s e e k  g ood , a v o id  ev il operates solely as a “formal
'J'XA • •principle.” The basis of the argument is to be found once again in Aquinas’s 
presentation on natural law in the P rim a  S ecu n d ae , where he compares b e in g  as the 
basis for speculative thought to the g o o d  as the foundation for practical reason. As a 
result, by analogy, Aquinas affirms that just as reflection on being is governed by the 
principle of non-contradiction, so all practical reason is directed by the principle that 
the g o o d  is  th a t w h ich  a l l  things s e e k , which formulated as a precept becomes g o o d  is 
to  b e  d o n e  a n d  p u rsu ed ; ev il is to b e  av o id ed . In this way, “just as the principle of
233 F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex; Baltimore, MD; Victoria,
Australia: Penguin, 1955), 223.
234 D’Arcy, Conscience and its Right to Freedom, 54. D’Arcy describes g o o d  is to be  done; 
evils is to be avoided  as a “purely formal principle” lfom which deduction is impossible. However, his 
analysis is careful to avoid emptying synderesis of all functional content, and therefore seeks to 
understand general principles in terms of clearly defined “primary precepts” from which major 
premises can be drawn. These precepts, however, are not deduced from the first practical precept, but 
rather are “the product of rational reflection on our natural inclinations,” and then used by synderesis 
“as the initial premisses in everyone’s moral arguments. See ibid., 55, 67, 59. Mclnemy would disagree 
with D’Arcy’s formal assessment of the first practical principle. See Ralph Mclnemy, Ethica  
Thomistica: The M oral Philosophy o f  Thomas Aquinas, rev. ed. (Washington DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1997), 43.
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contradiction is the ultimate answer to the question why the basic principles of any 
science are accepted as true, so too the first principle of the practical order is the 
ultimate reason why any precept or act is considered desirable.”235 Thus, this view of 
sy n d eres is  would consider the basic precept of goodness to be some kind of ground or 
foundation, without which practical reason would not function, but in itself does not 
form part of a particular act of moral reasoning. In effect, here its operation would 
be seen to be somewhat similar to a moral grammar, without which rational moral 
discourse would be impossible.237
I would agree that sy n d eres is  operates as the context for moral discourse. But 
does this really exhaust the role of syn d eresis , as if it were some kind of notional 
empty vessel? If so, we would have to look for another source for general moral 
principles, and consequently all moral norms. To declare the first precept of practical 
reason to be some kind of formal principle perhaps offers analytical philosophers an 
explanation of this precept and consequently of sy n d eres is . However, to reduce 
sy n d eres is  to a formal principle is to seriously underplay its nature and function. 
Terence Kennedy points out that the problem with the analytical approach is that, 
though not purposefully, those who follow it “have sundered the most important 
elements in [the medieval] ethical and moral vision,” namely, “the real and logical
233 Thomas S. Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor: Wisdom, Prudence, and the Human G ood  (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 83.
236 Ibid.: “The principle has a status in the practical order similar to that of the principle of
contradiction in the speculative order. Neither principle function as a premise in a syllogism; instead 
they are presupposed in every syllogism.” Cf. McCabe, “Aquinas on Good Sense,” 426-27:
“Synderesis, then, in its ultimate sense is the natural dispositional grasp of this ultimate practical 
principle [the good is to be wanted]; and we should remember that in neither the theoretical nor the 
practical case [the former referring to the principle of non-contradiction] is the principle a premiss of 
some syllogism, although it can be stated as a proposition. It is rather the principle in virtue of which 
there is any syllogism at all.”
237 Daniel Mark Nelson, The Priority o f  Prudence: Virtue and Natural Law in Thomas 
Aquinas and the Implications fo r  M odem  Ethics (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992), 97: “Synderesis serves the function of explaining how we begin to reason 
practically, but it does not provide content for our moral deliberations.”
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orders.” By reducing sy n d eres is  to the function of a formal principle, the analytical 
philosophers severed the relationship of sy n d eresis  with reality, which is fundamental 
to the understanding of its nature and function.
3 .2  S y n d eresis a s  O n tolog ical C on scien ce
Attempts have been made by certain writers to reclaim reality or ontology as an 
interpretive key to sy n d eres is . Josef Pieper discusses sy n d eres is  in terms of a
9TQ“primordial conscience” (U r-G ew issen ), which is grounded in reality and not 
simply logical possibility. Certainly, Pieper states that “the voice of the primordial 
conscience is the chief guiding principle and the natural presupposition of 
morality,”240 analogous to the law of identity (“that which is, is”)241 in speculative 
thought. However, Pieper points out that the difference between the two principles is 
that primordial conscience, though basic, does not act merely as an indicative 
statement, but rather as an imperative (m odus p ra ec ip ien d i) , and it is this fundamental 
command that shapes concrete moral action. It is this imperative dynamism that 
marks one of its real contributions to the moral judgements of the human person. 
Thus, sy n d eres is  does not simply act as a neutral formal condition for the possibility 
of moral reasoning; it pushes that moral reasoning forward in its search for the good 
and in acting upon it. Indeed, such was the importance of this motivational role,
23!i Kennedy, “Thomistic and Analytic Philosophers,” 51-52.
239 Pieper, Living the Truth, 153; idem, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 10-11. Cf. Twomey, Pope  
BenedictXVI, 122-23, n.3. Thus Pieper distinguishes “primordial conscience” (synderesis) from 
“situation conscience” (conscientia) along Thomistic lines. See idem, Living the Truth, 167; idem, The 
Four Cardinal Virtues, 11.
240 Pieper, Living the Truth, 175.
241 Pieper, Living the Truth, 157. It appears that Pieper prefers to use this principle rather than 
the principle of non-contradiction. They are, however, closely related.
242 Ibid., 154-57.
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driven by “a preliminary act of the will” in its natural, innate love for the good,243 that 
St Bonaventure gave over the whole of sy n d eresis  to this appetitive motor-fimction. 
While Aquinas places perception and reason before the act of the will in sy n d eres is , in 
effect, both Doctors of the Church are declaring that one cannot remove the desire for 
the good from primordial conscience, without rendering it lifeless: at best a store 
cupboard of formulated universal precepts, at worst a logical condition for moral non­
contradiction. Terence Kennedy points out that, for the medievals, the disposition to 
seek goodness and avoid evil “was regarded as the essential in c lin a tio  n atu ra lis  of a 
human being.”244 It is this natural inclination for the good, this dynamic force on an 
ontological level in its intimate relationship with reality, that transforms the 
recognition of the good into the imperative of moral action.245
243 Ibid., 155. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica la Ilae, q.17, a.l
244 Kennedy, “Thomistic and Analytic Philosophers,” 50.
245 Ibid. Indeed the separation of logic or reason from nature and ontology is seen by some to 
be a flaw in the new natural law theory offered by writers such as Grisez and Finnis. See John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; reprinted with corrections, 1996), 36: 
“In other words, for Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right (virtue) and wrong (vice) is to 
ask, not what is in accordance with human nature, but what is reasonable. And this quest will 
eventually bring one back to the underived first principles of practical reasonableness, principles which 
make no reference at all to human nature, but only to human good. From end to end of his ethical 
discourses, the primary categories for Aquinas are the ‘good’ and the ‘reasonable’ ; the ‘natural’ is, 
from the point of view of his ethics, a speculative appendage added by way of metaphysical reflection, 
not a counter with which to advance either to or from the practical prima principia p e r  se  nota” 
(emphasis and parentheses in text). Such a separation of reason from nature seems to go against 
Aquinas’s own understanding. For example, he clearly links the two when he says “the first rule of 
reason is the law of nature.” See Summa Theologica, la Ilae q.95, a.2, resp.: “Rationis autem prima 
regula est lex naturae.” Cf. ibid., q.91, a.2, ad 2. Kennedy says that Grisez’s logic reifies human 
tendencies into objective moral goods and “leads to the sundering of inclination, action and end from 
each other and from the agent.” Kennedy, “Thomistic and Analytic Philosophers,” 57-58. Porter and 
Johnstone agree with Kennedy’s concerns, and offer further useful insights. See Porter, Nature as 
Reason: A Thomistic Theory o f  Natural Law  (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, U.K.: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2005), 128; Johnstone, “‘Objectivism’, ‘Basic Human Goods’and ‘Proportionalism’,” 119, 
115: “‘Objectification’ can mean that process by which realities which were once considered to have 
inherent m oral significance are subsequently deprived of it and considered as ‘objective’ in the modem 
sense” (emphasis mine); ibid., 116: “The goods with which choices are concerned are, in fact, abstract 
ideas of goods, which exist in the mind of the subject; ideas which are ‘reasons for actions’. They are 
not the real objects which are sought as the fulfilment of desire. The real satisfaction of natural desire 
seems to be an added consideration; it is not a constitutive element of the moral theory.” Cf. Grisez,
The Way o f  the L ord  Jesus, I, 115-40, 178-204; Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, 
“Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends,” The American Journal o f  Jurisprudence 32 
(1987): 99-151, at 133.
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Thus, sy n d eres is  does not simply operate passively on a formal level; it 
operates dynamically through the nature of its very being. Here we begin to see the 
need to look through the lens of metaphysics to gain a coherent understanding of this 
fundamental human capacity. Moreover, an analysis of sy n d eres is  which involves 
metaphysics also has implications upon its content as h ab itu s , as well as its dynamic 
inclination. In other words, ontology helps us to recognise the material aspect of 
sy n d eres is ,246 by providing a description of reality that has inherent value.247 This 
requires us to move away from a modem understanding of reality that is based upon 
the subject.
According to Charles Taylor, in the process of the philosophical and cultural 
change to modernity in the West, a major shift occurred in the theory of willing and 
knowing which led to the subject being disengaged from the object.248 This meant that 
true knowledge and valuation were sought from within the subject rather than from 
our right connection to reality or the world, and to the truth and meaning contained in 
the being of that reality.249 It is a return to this ontological understanding of reality
25 0and to the truth of being, and hence to a renewed understanding of conscience, that 
certain writers have been calling. Among these authors, particular mention should be 
made of Josef Pieper and Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI.
246 Pieper, Living the Truth, 157: “So the ‘principle of identity’ of the primordial conscience is 
likewise the basic structure materially and form ally  affecting and regulating all the commands of the 
practical reason” (emphasis mine).
247 Johnstone, “‘Objectivism’, ‘Basic Human Goods’ and ‘Proportionalism’,” 119: 
“Metaphysics, I suggest, does not provide general propositions about human nature from which we can 
derive norms; but it can provide a unifying vision of the world, or horizon, within which we can 
discern the ultimate significance of actions, and indeed of the whole moral life.”
248 Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  the Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 186-88, at 187: “For the modem disengaged subject, thought and 
valuation are in the mind in a new and stronger sense, because minds are now the exclusive locus of 
such realities, which can therefore now be called ‘psychic’ in a new sense” (emphasis in text). Cf. 
Johnstone, “‘Objectivism’, ‘Basic Human Goods’ and ‘Proportionalism’,” 102-103.
249 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, 187.
250 Taylor would describe these as “theories of ontic logos,” where truth or meaning is 
contained in the object itself, rather than being applied purely by the mind. See ibid.
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The great teachers of the High Middle Ages presumed that an inherent aspect to the 
nature of all things was truth;251 a tenet that had been held since earliest Greek 
times. Thus, truth formed part of the transcendentals of metaphysics. However, 
philosophers of the Enlightenment gradually eliminated truth as a transcendental of 
being since they considered it to be a meaningless tautology.253 The ultimate reason 
for their conclusion that it added little or nothing to our understanding of the world 
around us was that the Enlightenment philosophers removed the medieval emphasis 
on the relationship between the object, the human mind and the divine mind of God; a 
relationship that was not limited solely to that of perception, but also that of the 
creative intellect to the object as a work of art.254 Pieper sums up the medieval view 
thus: “truth is predicated of every being inasmuch as it has being. And this truth is
seen as actually residing in all things, so much so that ‘truth’ may interchangeably
• • • » • stand for ‘being’,” as Aquinas had asserted in his writing. However, it is the
relationship of the object to the mind which is key. Therefore, “the truth of a being
consists in its orientation toward a knowing mind. And this cognitional relationship
between mind and reality is actualised by the mind’s ‘having’ the essential form of an
3.2.1 Josef Pieper on Truth and Being as the Foundation for Morality
251 Pieper, Living the Truth, 11. For example St Thomas declares that being and goodness, and 
truth and being are interchangeable notions. Cf. Aquinas, De Veritate q.l, a.l, sed contra 2: “ens et 
bonum convertuntur”; ibid., q.l, a.5, sed contra 1: “ens et verum convertuntur.” Thus, two maxims of 
classical Western metaphysics were omne ens est verum and omne ens est bonum. Cf. Pieper, Living 
the Truth, 13. In this way, truth and goodness are considered to be constitutive, and inseparable aspects 
of beings.
252 Pieper, Living the Truth, 11; 14 (here Pieper mentions Parmenides and Pythagoras as 
examples). Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works o f  Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984), IV, and II, 1 993b30: “as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.” Cf. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q.16, a.l, ad 3. A more immediate influence would have been the 
writings of St Augustine, where he says “verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.” See St Augustine, 
Soliloquia, II, 5, PL 32, 889. This is quoted in Aquinas, De Veritate, q.l, a .l, ad 1.
253 Pieper, Living the Truth, 19. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, 2nd edition 
(1787), trans. J.M.D Meiklejohn (London: J.M. Dent; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1934), 84-85.
254 Thus Pieper concludes that the stale tautology of the Enlightenment analysis was caused by 
the elimination of the theological aspect of the matter. See Living the Truth, 47; 76.
255 Ibid., 35 (emphasis in text); Aquinas, De Veritate, q.l, a.5, sed contra 1.
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• ♦ 956existing thing.” This relationship with the mind is further explained through the 
author’s distinction between the speculative and creative intellect, or whether the 
mind acts receptively in perception, or with creative purpose. This distinction leads to 
being able to identify the relationship between the creative mind of God and the truth 
of a thing, since God possesses the idea that is reflected in the created thing.257 We 
can see a Platonic background to this approach to the truth of being, as Pieper states 
that “truth in its most authentic meaning [...] is predicated of an objective reality 
insofar as this reality’s intrinsic form is patterned after some preceding original form 
residing in a creatively knowing mind.” Thus, since all created reality and all the 
facets of its being depend ultimately on God’s creative mind and will, this divine
256 Pieper, Living the Truth, 37. Pieper continues at 37: “Therefore, the principle of the truth of 
all existing things means specifically this: it belongs to the inherent nature of any existing thing that its 
essential form (by which a thing is what it is) is actually or potentially ‘received’ by a knowing self; 
and further, that any thing’s essence, thus ‘received’ is actually or potentially owned, even absorbed, by 
the knowing mind. All reality is actually or potentially mind-related, inasmuch as its intrinsic essence is 
actually or potentially incorporated into the knowing mind.”
257 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.16, a.l, resp.: “Et inde est quod res artificiales dicuntur 
verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem 
formae quae est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est signum intellectus veri. Et 
similiter res naturales dicuntur esse verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae 
sunt in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam lapidis naturam, secundum 
praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in 
rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium.” Cf. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, vol. 4 (la. 14-18), Knowledge in God, trans. Thomas Gomall (London: Blackfriars/Eyre & 
Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), I, q.16, a.l, resp.: “Thus man-made 
things are called true in relation to our mind; a house, for instance, is ‘true’ if it turns out like the plan 
in the architect’s mind; and speech is ‘true’ if it is the sign of true thought. Similarly natural things are 
called true when they bear a likeness to the types in the divine mind; e.g. true stone is stone that has the 
nature proper to stone as it is conceived first in the divine mind. -  We conclude, then, that truth is 
primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, by virtue of a relation to intellect as to their origin.” 
Cf. Pieper, Living the Truth, 43: “the principle of transcendental truth means primarily that all existing 
beings are ordered toward the creative knowledge of G od ’s mind” (emphasis in text).
258 Pieper, Living the Truth, 42. He acknowledges that this ontology is based on the doctrine of 
the Ideas in the western Christian context. See ibid., 46. Izquierdo Labeaga does point out, however, 
that the concept of a natural disposition for accessing principles (nous ton archdri) forms part of 
Aristotle’s thought, and also influenced the thought of Aquinas. We can therefore suggest that the 
notion in question combines Platonic and Aristotelian thinking. Cf. José Antonio Izquierdo Labeaga,
L a Vita Intellettiva: Lectio Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Studi Thomistici, no. 55 (Vatican City: Librería 
Editrice Vaticana, 1994), 253; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI, 6, 1141a 7.
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premise becomes the background to the anthropological relationship between man and 
the truth of things. 259
In addition to things made by humans (acts of the human creative mind), the 
anthropological relationship is largely concerned with the knowability of an object, 
and it is possible for us to know things “because they are already known by God.”260 
Pieper says that this is a combination of Aristotle’s approach that things are knowable 
insofar as they are real, and Plato’s notion of the “primordial light illuminating all
969that is.” Thus, rather than presenting the mere tautology of ‘things that exist are
9 6 ^  • • • 964real’, “truth adds to being the notion of intelligibility.” Hence, Pieper is affirming
259 Given the current theological debate regarding evolution and Intelligent-Design, one might 
question how Pieper’s approach with its Platonic overtones would stand up to the theory of evolution. 
Although this is something that calls for further investigation, one can say that the notion of the nature 
of things following the creative mind of God does not conflict with evolution if we bear in mind that 
theology upholds not only creatio ex nihilo (the original act of creation) but also creatio continua (the 
continued involvement of God in maintaining the world’s existence). Cf. Stephan Otto Horn and 
Siegfried Wiedenhofer, eds., Creazione ed  Evoluzione: Un Convegno con P apa Benedetto XVI a  Castel 
Gandolfo, preface by Cardinal Christoph Schonbom, trans. from German by Gianni Pulit (Bologna: 
EDB [Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna], 2007), 177. See also David Bradshaw, ‘“All Existing is the 
Action of God’: The Philosophical Theology of David Braine,” The Thomist 60 (1996): 379-416.
260 Pieper, Living the Truth, 52-53 :“The truth of all things consists in their being known by 
God and being knowable by man; all things are knowable for man, however, only because  they are 
already known by God. The lucidity which from the creative knowledge of the divine Logos  flows into 
things, together with their very being -  yes, even as their very being -  this lucidity alone makes all 
things knowable for the human mind” (emphasis in text).
261 Ibid., 53. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 9. Here Aristotle concludes that the reasoning 
about possibilities or potential is drawn from knowledge of real things in actuality. See also ibid., IX, 
10, 105 lb: “It is not because we think that you are white, that you are  white, but because you are white 
we who say this have the truth” (emphasis in text). Here Aristotle is describing the work of the 
receptive mind instead of the creative mind.
262 Pieper, Living the Truth, 53; Plato, Republic, VII, 540a. This may be Pieper’s own 
translation of Plato. H.D.P Lee translates the attitude of those being prepared to rule as those who, at 
the age of fifty after many trials and experiences, are “made to lift their mind’s eye to look at the source 
of all light, and see the Good itself,” and to use that as the pattern for ordering their lives and that of 
society. The Grube/Reeve translation says they are “compelled to lift up the radiant light of their souls 
to what itself provides light for everything.” The context implies that much time and effort is required 
to see the good clearly and to judge things wisely. This is not mentioned here by Pieper, but it does fit 
into his scheme of growth in virtue in his other writings. Cf. Plato, The Republic, trans. H.D.P. Lee 
(London: Penguin, 1955); idem, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, and revised by C.D.C Reeve, in The 
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 971-1223, at 
1154-55.
263 Influenced by writers such as Wolff and Goclenius, Kant not only declares the doctrine of 
truth of being as sterile and tautological (stated in a 1774 manuscript prior to the publication of the 
Critique; cf. Pieper, Living the Truth, 19, n.19), but also as “absurd” and “quite unbecoming the dignity 
of philosophy.” See Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, 67; 69. From Pieper’s presentation one might get 
the impression that Kant only rejects the doctrine of truth on the basis of what his Enlightenment 
predecessors have presented in their works. However, this is not so, as he specifically quotes the
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that reality is accessible and intelligible to the human mind. The author states that 
“being able to know means to exist in relation to, and be immersed in, all that is.265 It 
is this relationship which means that the mind is “ca p a x  u n iv ersi,”266 that is, being 
able to grasp the universe around us. However, this capacity is not measured by man’s 
wider experience of the world in comparison to an animal. Rather we gain access to 
the totality of the universe, through the process of abstraction, “by knowing the
• • • • Ofn
e s s e n c e  of things, [...] for this essence is universal in character.” Therefore, Pieper 
concludes that the anthropological aspect of the truth of all things is “the mind’s 
inborn ability to ‘reach the whole’,” sustained by God’s creative light illuminating the 
reality of things and our cognition of them.268
This anthropological conclusion to the truth and being of reality becomes the 
premise for Pieper’s reflection on the good and moral choice. The author states that 
“reality is the basis of the good,” which means that “to be good is to do justice to
'jr Q
objective being.” But, as truth is also the revelation of reality, if  one attempts to 
reduce morality to truth (as Goethe attempted to), one will also reach being or reality
• • 770as the foundation of morality. Thus, Pieper concludes that “all laws and moral 
principles may be reduced to reality.” In doing so, the author is proposing a
Scholastic definition of truth as “the accordance of the cognition with its object,” and so engages 
directly in an assessment of the worth of this view of truth, rather than simply the notion that the truth 
of things lies in being what they are. Rather, his objection is that he can see no “universal and secure 
criterion of every cognition,” thus making truth more of a property of perception rather than a property 
of being. From Pieper’s comments elsewhere, we can see that what is lacking in Kant’s analysis is any 
reference to the universal creative knowledge of God, and it is this that allows man’s access to 
universality (though in an incomplete and at times faulty way) and his capacity to understand it through 
universal essences. See Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, 66-69; Pieper, Living the Truth, 80, 90.
264 Pieper, Living the Truth, 53.
265 Ibid., 80.
266 Ibid. (emphasis in text).
267 Ibid., 90 (emphasis in text). On the process of abstraction in Aquinas, see Izquierdo 
Labeaga, La Vita Intellettiva, 249-303.
268 Pieper, Living the Truth, 91.
269 Ibid, 112.




morality based upon a realistic theory of cognition, which, contrary to Kant’s view, 
reaches the object. In this context, evil or wrongdoing is not simply a transgression of 
a rule, but “an ‘ontic’ contradiction”; a contradiction of being that does not 
correspond to the reality of the thing in question.272 Certain attitudes or ethical 
approaches are alien to such an ethics of being. For instance, the idea of making one’s 
conscience the ultimate source of moral norms does not fit the theory of an ethics of 
being. Rather the person is called to look “through and beyond our own moral 
judgment to the norm presented to us by the objective reality of being.”274
In addition to the condition that cognition reaches the object, and so can attain 
its truth, Pieper points out that his thesis also depends upon the condition that “willing 
and acting are determined by knowledge.”275 However, this knowledge is based in 
perception, either for its terms or content, and so, in order to avoid realist ethics being 
misunderstood in rationalist terms, Pieper emphasises that in realist ethics, reason is
understood primarily as our “essential relation to reality,” rooted in perception and
01open to divine illumination.
Josef Pieper then presents the relationship between objective reality, the 
human mind and God again, but this time in the opposite direction from his 
description of truth of things. Here the link between human knowledge and reality 
means that our knowledge depends upon reality for that which is known and thought.
273 Ibid.: “[Ethics of being] makes impossible the attitude of always referring to oneself and to 
the judgment of one’s conscience, which is considered as providing the norm in each instance.”
274 Ibid. Thus Pieper is of the opinion that objectivity (not objectivism) as fidelity to being is 
the correct moral basis for human action. Unlike moral objectivism, which tends to separate the act or 
object from the subject, Pieper’s objectivity is founded upon the relationship between man and the 
reality surrounding him.
275 Ibid., 115 and n.2. Here Pieper refers to De Veritate q.23, a.6, resp., where St Thomas says 
“Voluntas autem non habet rationem primae regulae, sed est regula recta: dirigitur enim per rationem et 
intellectum, non solum in nobis, sed in Deo.” Cf. Truth, q.23, a.6, resp.: “Now the will does not have 
the character of the first rule; it is rather a rule which has a rule, for it is directed by the reason and the 
intellect. This is true not only in us but also in God.”
276 Pieper, Living the Truth, 116.
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Thus, the  in te lle c tu a l act re fle c ts  re a lity  as im age and co p y , w ith  G od  as the 
fo u n d a tio n , th ro u g h  h is  re la tio n  to  a ll tha t is .277
I t  is  in  th is  co n te x t o f  m ora l acts connected to  re a lity  and ro o te d  in  G od, th a t 
Jo se f P ieper id e n tifie s  synderesis, o r p rim o rd ia l conscience , as “ the  suprem e 
aw areness -  transcend ing  and independent o f  a ll e ffo rts  o f  th o u g h t -  o f  th e  p rim a ry , 
basic f ir s t p rin c ip le s  o f  ac tio n , sum m ed up in  the  im p e ra tive : w e m u st lo ve  the  
good .”  P rim o rd ia l conscience is  th is  p rim a ry  m o ra l aw areness th ro u g h  its  re la tio n  
to  re a lity . T hus, re a lity , as the  con ten t o f  pe rcep tion , and a lso  as essen tia l s truc tu re  
(th a t is , the  law s o f  re a lity ), is  the m a te ria l w h ic h  p rim o rd ia l conscience conve rts  in to  
the  basic m o ra l la w  o f  a ll hum an ac tion ,279 such th a t p rim o rd ia l conscience urges us to  
act in  accord  w ith  the  tru th  and end o f  nature. T h is  im p e ra tive  is  founded  u p o n  the 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een re a lity  and the good, w h ic h  P ieper id e n tifie s  as “ n o th in g  else 
than  [th e ] goa l and end o f  the  m ovem ent o f  be ing , [ . . . ]  the  ‘p le n itu d e  o f  b e in g ’ .” 281 
T h is  is  w h y  n a tu ra l in c lin a tio n s , based on the  tru th  o f  re a lity , are seen as good .282
P ieper ends b y  res ta ting  the im portance o f  o b je c tiv ity  and re a lity  fo r  m o ra l 
reason ing , id e n tify in g  m o ra l a c tio n  as “ ‘d o ing  the tru th ’ , v e rita te m  a g e re .” 283 In  short,
277 Ibid.,123-25. Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ia e , la Ilae, q.93, a .l, ad 3: “Intellectus enim 
humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed 
dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus, ex hoc enim quod res est vel non est, opinio vera vel falsa 
est. Intellectus vero divinus est mensura rerum, quia unaquaeque res intantum habet de veritate, 
inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum. [The human intellect is measured by things, such that a 
human concept is not true on account of itself, but it is said to be true from that which is consonant 
with things, for an opinion is true or false insofar as it is from what a thing is or not. But in fact the 
divine intellect is the measure of things, since every thing has truth in it inasmuch as it imitates the 
divine intellect.]; idem, S um m a C o n tra  G e n tile s , 11,12: “Deus omnium entium est prima mensura.”
278 Pieper, L iv in g  th e  T ru th ,  147. Cf. Aquinas, D e  V e rita te  q. 16, a .l.
279 Pieper, L iv in g  th e  T ru th , 158-63. Thus, the fundamental principle of the practical intellect 
embraces all natural law, seen as the good to be done and pursued. Hence, “as to its content -  the 
natural moral law. The primordial conscience is the natural awareness of the ethical natural law.” See 
ibid., 153.
280 Ibid., 160: “Hence, the voice of the primordial conscience says: the real should move 
toward that toward which it tends by its nature to move.”
281 Ibid.
282 Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ia e , la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp.
283 Pieper, L iv in g  th e  T ru th ,  171 (emphasis in text).
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th is  m a x in  sum s up  P iepe r’ s e th ics o f  be ing  as ac tin g  acco rd in g  to  the  re a lity  o f  
th in g s . In  th is  con te x t, synderesis  and co nsc ien tia  cannot be understood  as a c tin g  
a rb itra r ily  o r im p e rio u s ly  in  iso la tio n , bu t o n ly  in  re la tio n  the  tru th  o f  one ’ s o w n  
be ing , and in  re la tio n  to  the o the r {cum  a lio  s c ie n tia ), b o th  o f  the  w o rld  and o f  the  
G od w ho  created us, redeem ed us and m akes us h o ly .
3 .2 .2  Jo s e p h  R atz in g er on  C on scien ce as th e C apacity  to  K n ow  th e  Truth
984.
Joseph R a tz in g e r has lo n g  re fle c te d  upon the  nature o f  conscience ; h is  though ts  
s p illin g  fo rth  fro m  h is  considera tions o f  subjects such as tru th  and re la tiv is m , fa ith  
and p o litic s , re s p o n s ib ility  in  the  con tex t o f  an e rro r o f  igno rance , and c u lp a b ility  in  
the  lig h t o f  acts o f  v io le n ce  against innocen t life , such as in  w a r, te rro ris m , o r the 
fie ld  o f  m e d ic in e .286 The anchor fo r a ll these re fle c tio n s , and hence fo r  h is  
understand ing  o f  synderes is  and co nsc ien tia , is  the  hum an ca p a c ity  to  k n o w  the  tru th  
o f  re a lity , fo r  R a tz inge r be lieves tha t a den ia l o f  such a ca p a c ity , opens the  w a y  to  
m any e v ils  and in ju s tic e s .287
284 It was “at the beginning of [his] academic career” that Ratzinger became aware o f the 
importance of conscience, and of the dangers of a notion of erroneous conscience, emptied o f all guilt, 
and therefore emptied of all objective truth. This issue has continued to be a significant matter ever 
since, as is evidenced by his writings. See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... 
Conscience and Truth,” in V alues in  a  T im e  o f  U p h e a va l, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press; New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2006), 75-99, at 77. This text is a slightly abbreviated 
translation of an essay presented in W ahrhe it, W erte, M a c h t. See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Wenn du 
den Frieden willst, achte das Gewissen jedes Menschen: Gewissen und Wahrheit,” in W a h rh e it, W erte, 
M a c h t :  P rü fs te in e  d e r  p lu ra l is t ic h e n  G e se llsch a ft, 2nd ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau, Basel and Vienna: 
Herder 1994), 25-62. However, the paper was originally delivered in English as a keynote address to 
an American Bishops’ workshop in 1991. See Joseph Ratzinger, “Conscience and Truth,” in O n  
C o n s c ie n c e : T w o  E ssays b y  Jo se p h  R a tz in g e r  (Philadelphia: The National Catholic Bioethics Center; 
San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984, 2007), 11-41. Given my limited knowledge of German, I have 
chosen primarily to use McNeil’s translation, as, although it is almost identical to the 1991 text, it 
contains just slightly more detail. For the note on publication history of this essay, see Ratzinger, 
V a lues in  a  T im e  o f  U p h e a v a l, 170.
285 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “What Keeps the World Together: The Prepolitical Moral 
Foundations of a Free State,” in V alues in  a  T im e  o f  U p h e a va l, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press; New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2006), 31-44, at 35.
286 For a synthesis of Ratzinger’s views on the nature of conscience, and its role in the 
contexts of Church and political authority, see Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  80-132.
287 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, T ru th  a n d  T o le ra n c e : C h r is t ia n  B e l ie f  a n d  W o r ld  R e lig io n s ,  
trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 204: “Relativism is dangerous in quite
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L ik e  P ieper, R a tz inge r presents an o n to lo g ica l e th ic , w h ic h  is  based upon  a 
ra tio n a l understand ing  o f  nature , w here acting  in  accordance w ith  the  tru th  o f  be ing
9RQ •
leads to  true  freedom . T h is  g round ing  in  o n to lo g y  (o r its  re fu sa l) n o t o n ly  a ffe c ts  
the  actions o f  the in d iv id u a l, b u t also, by extension , the n o tio n  and fu n c tio n in g  o f  
soc ie ty  and la w .290 Indeed, R a tz inger considers the  loss o f  a m e taphys ica l 
u n d e rp in n in g  to  be the ro o t cause o f  the state’ s w illin g n e s s  to  em brace th e  m a jo rity
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v ie w  o r consensus as the  basis fo r tru th  and m o ra lity . Y e t, such a fo u n d a tio n  fo r  
tru th  and m o ra ls  is  u ltim a te ly  a rb itra ry , as consensus cannot create tru th ; o n ly  “ a
, 909
com m on o rd e rin g .”
A s w e ll as be ing  tro u b le d  about the loss o f  o n to lo g y  in  e th ics , R a tz in g e r has 
lo n g  been concerned about d is to rte d  no tions o f  fa ith  and tru th , w h ic h  u ltim a te ly  re s u lt 
in  a d is to rte d  understand ing  o f  conscience. In  the con tex t o f  fa ith  and tru th  be ing  
m isunderstood , the in d iv id u a l sees “ fa ith  as a heavy lo a d , as an e xa c tin g  m o ra l
90^  • •
cha lleng e .”  W ith  such an understanding the in d iv id u a l is  n o t lik e ly  to  encourage
particular ways: for the shape of human existence at an individual level and in society. How much evil 
has been done in history in the name of good opinions and good intentions is something no one can 
overlook.”
288 Ratzinger, “What Keeps the World Together?” in V a lues in  a  T im e  o f  U p h e a v a l, 38: “The 
idea of the natural law presupposed a concept of ‘nature’ in which nature and reason interlock: nature 
itself is rational.”
289 Joseph Ratzinger, “Freedom and Liberation: The Anthropological Vision of the 1986 
Instruction L ib e r ta t is  C o n s c ie n tia ,”  in C h u rch , E cum en ism  a n d  P o lit ic s :  N e w  E ssays in  E c c le s io lo g y ,  
trans. Robert Nowell (Middlegreen, Slough: St Paul Publications, 1988), 255-75, at 274-75: “For this 
reason the person who has become at one with his or her essential nature, at one with truth itself, is 
free. The person who is at one with the truth no longer acts according to external necessities and 
compulsions; in him or her nature, desire and action have come to coincide.”
290 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Problem of Threats to Human Life,” in The E s s e n tia l P o p e  
B e n e d ic t X V I :  H is  C e n tra l W rit in g s  a n d  Speeches, ed. John F. Thornton and Susan B. Varenne, 
introduction by D. Vincent Twomey (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2007), 381-392, at 386:
“The separation of politics from any natural content of right, which is the inalienable patrimony of 
everyone’s moral conscience, deprives social life of its ethical substance and leaves it defenseless 
before the will of the strongest.”
291 Joseph Ratzinger, “Crises of Law,” in The E s s e n tia l P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  377-80, at 377-78: 
“if reason is no longer able to find the way to metaphysics as the source o f law, the state can only refer 
to the common convictions of its citizens’ values, convictions that are reflected in the democratic 
consensus. [...] The majority determines what must be regarded as true and just.”
292 Ibid., 377-78: “Truth does not create consensus, and consensus does not create truth as 
much as it does a common ordering.”
293 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 78.
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others to  b e lie ve ,294 th in k in g  th a t it  w o u ld  be “ be tte r to  spare [o th e rs ] the  bu rden  o f
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b e lie v in g . Faced w ith  th is  “ carica tu re  o f  fa ith ” , w h ic h  had taken  h o ld  in  academ ia, 
as w e ll as in  the  p u b lic  dom a in ,296 R atz inger concludes th a t the re  m ust be som eth ing  
w ro n g  w ith  n o t o n ly  th is  concept o f  fa ith , bu t also the concep t o f  conscience th a t 
depends upon  it ,  as the  tru th  is  supposed to  set us free , and som eth ing  th a t is  an 
unbearable burden  is  fa r fro m  lib e ra tin g .297 In  th is  con te x t, conscience , o r erroneous 
conscience in  p a rtic u la r, takes on the ro le  o f  sh ie ld in g  peop le  fro m  the  se e m in g ly  
“ te rr ify in g  dem ands m ade b y  tru th .” 298 Thus, conscience as th e  “ w in d o w  th a t m akes i t  
poss ib le  fo r  m an to  see the  tru th  th a t is  com m on to  us a ll” , the  tru th  th a t is  o u r 
fo u n d a tio n  and o u r susta in ing  fo rce , is  b ricke d  up in  fa vo u r o f  a n o tio n  o f  conscience 
th a t supports th e  su b je c tive  a ttem pt to  evade re a lity .299 The idea  o f  conscience be ing  
anchored in  tru th , re a lity  and be ing ,300 is  the re fo re  je ttis o n e d  as the  lo g ic a l co n c lu s io n  
o f  the  ju d g e m e n t th a t “ e ith e r tru th  does n o t e x is t at a ll, o r else i t  is  im p o ss ib le  fo r  us
294 Ibid.
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid., 78-79, at 78: “I am convinced that the t ra u m a t ic  a v e rs io n  that many people feel 
to w a rd  what they regard as ‘p r e c o n c i l ia r  ’ C a th o lic is m  has its roots in their e n c o u n te r  w ith  this kind of 




300 Ibid. Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, T u rn in g  P o in t  f o r  E u ro p e ?  The C h u rc h  in  th e  M o d e rn  W o r ld — 
A ssessm en t a n d  F o re c a s t,  trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 28-29: “But there 
is an objective connection between this [idea of a personal relationship with the Creator God] and the 
conviction that was common to almost the whole of mankind before the modem period, the conviction 
that man’s Being contains an imperative; the conviction that he does not himself in v e n t morality on the 
basis o f calculations of expediency but rather f in d s  it already present in the essence of things” 
(emphasis in text). Here Ratzinger summarises and develops upon the insights of C.S. Lewis in T he  
A b o l i t io n  o f  M a n ,  particularly related to truth, objectivity, the paradox of man’s conquest o f nature and 
the natural law, or the T a o  as Lewis calls it, using the Chinese term. Cf. Ibid., 22-28; Lewis, T he  
A b o l i t io n  o f  M a n ,  particularly 15-16, 34-48; Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  68-69. See also Smith’s 
comments on conscience discovering morality rather than inventing it, in Janet E. Smith, H u m a n a e  
V ita e : A  G e n e ra t io n  L a te r  (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 148-55, at 
152: “Let us recall that the conscience is one’s guide to moral behavior; it does not d e c id e  the 
principles of moral behavior but d isco ve rs  o r  le a rn s  them and then judges whether a particular action is 
moral or immoral” (emphasis in text). In this way, Smith challenges the modem, distorted notion of 
‘following one’s conscience’, which presumes that one’s personal conscience decides the morality of 
an act. See ibid., 151-52.
229
■1A1
to  m eet its  dem ands.”  R a tz inge r judges th a t the re su lt o f  conscience c u ttin g  its e lf 
a d r ift fro m  shared o b je c tiv e  tru th  is  no t o n ly  the “ d iv in iz a tio n  o f  s u b je c tiv ity ”  fo r 
the  in d iv id u a l, 303 w here  one ’ s o p in io n  cannot be questioned, b u t a lso re su lts  in  the 
em phasis on  so c ia l c o n fo rm ity  as the m ean va lue  betw een v y in g  s u b je c tive  v ie w s , 
keep ing  them  a t bay in  such a w ay as to  a llo w  people to  liv e  to g e th e r.304 U ltim a te ly , 
th is  leads to  a s itu a tio n  w here there is  “ no lo n g e r any need to  fe e l o b lig e d  to  lo o k  fo r  
the tru th , n o r [...] d oub t the average a ttitude  and custom ary p ra x is ”  o f  s o c ie ty ,305 since 
“ m an is  reduced to  h is  su p e rfic ia l co n v ic tio n ,” 306 such th a t a ll th a t m atte rs is  “ to  be 
conv inced  o f  one ’ s o w n  correctness and to  co n fo rm  to  o the rs.”
R a tz in g e r sees a strong  K an tia n  in flu e n ce  in  th is  a ttitu d e  tow ards conscience , 
in  th a t once i t  is  “ detached fro m  its  co n s titu tive  re la tio n sh ip  w ith  a con ten t o f  m o ra l
AAO
tru th ”  i t  is  “ reduced to  a m ere fo rm a l co n d itio n  o f  m o ra lity .”  H ere  the  com m and to  
do good and a vo id  e v il has no reference to  u n ive rsa l tru th , “ b u t w o u ld  be lin k e d  o n ly  
w ith  the  goodness o f  the  sub jec tive  in te n tio n .” 309 R a tz inge r draw s e lsew here u p o n  the 
w o rk  o f  Théo B e lm ans, to  h ig h lig h t the h is to ric a l roo ts  and m o ra l im p lic a tio n s  o f  
reduc ing  the  m o ra l act to  in te n tio n . A s noted e a rlie r,310 Peter A b e la rd  in tro d u ce d  a 
m o ra lity  o f  in te n tio n  th a t in  its  ra w  fo rm  id e n tifie d  the m o ra lity  o f  the  act p u re ly  w ith
301 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 79.
302 Ratzinger, “The Problem of Threats to Human Life,” 387: “In this conception, common to 
the entire Christian tradition, conscience is the capacity to be open to the call of truth, which is 
objective, universal, the same for all who can and must seek it. It is not isolation, but communion: cum  
s c ire  ( ‘to know together with’) in the truth concerning the good, which accompanies human beings in 
the intimacy o f their spiritual nature.”
303 Ibid.
304 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 79.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid. On the insufficiency of morality based solely on “inner conviction”, as an 
impoverished subjectivism, see Donal Harrington, “Five Ways of Loooking at Morality,” in M o r a l  
T h e o lo g y : A  R e a d e r, ed. Patrick Hannon (Dublin: Veritas, 2006), 27-49, at 41.
307 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 79.
308 Ratzinger, “The Problem of Threats to Human Life,” 387.
309 Ibid. Ratzinger continues “Concrete actions would depend for their moral qualification on 
the self-understanding of the individual, which is always culturally and circumstantially determined. In 
this conception, conscience is nothing but subjectivity elevated to the ultimate criterion of action.” See 
ibid.
310 See Chapter 3, page 120, n. 292 of this thesis.
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T i l
the in te n tio n  o f  the  sub ject. T h is  was c a re fu lly  re fin e d  b y  w rite rs  such as S a in ts 
A lb e rt the G reat and Thom as, to  g ive  due space to  c u lp a b ility , b u t in  the  la s t ce n tu ry  
th is  nuanced approach was ove rlooked  b y  ce rta in  w rite rs , le a d in g  to  a m a instream  
m isunderstand ing  o f  the  n o tio n  o f  erroneous conscience, w h ic h  was m ore  in  keep ing  
w ith  the  p re va le n t, m odem , s u b je c tiv is t fo rm  o f  conscience, in  d e fin in g  th e  goodness 
o f  the  act and o f  the  in d iv id u a l in  term s o f  good in te n tio n  and in te g rity  w ith  one ’ s 
co n v ic tio n s . B e lm ans p o in ts  ou t the in flu e n ce  o f  A n to n in -D a lm a ce  S e rtilla n g e s ’ s 
w r itin g  in  p ro v id in g  a w id e  readership w ith  an in te rp re ta tio n  o f  S t Thom as w h ic h  w as
• • t i 'y • •
c lose r to  A b e la rd ’ s o rig in a l “so lu tion  s im p lis te” , in  th a t A q u in a s ’ s d iscu ss io n  o f  
w he the r fo llo w in g  one ’ s conscience was s u ffic ie n t fo r good a c tio n  is  “ e c lip se d ”  b y  
S e rtilla n g e s ’ s em phasis on  A q u in a s ’ s ana lysis o f  w he the r one is  bound  to  fo llo w  an
TIT m
erroneous conscience. M y  read ing  o f S ertillanges w o u ld  lead  m e to  b e lie ve  th a t th is  
in flu e n tia l w rite r to o k  bonum  apprehensum  as the ke y  to  the  p ro b le m ,314 and o v e rla id
311 Théo G. Belmans, “La paradoxe de la conscience erronée d’Abélard à Karl Rahner,” R e vu e  
T ho m is te , 90 (1990): 570-86, at 570-71. Here Belmans quotes the condemnatory canons summarising 
Abelard’s view presented at the regional Council of Sens (1140/41) at the instigation of Abelard’s great 
adversary, St Bernard of Clairvaux. See DS 729-30: “Quod non peccaverunt, qui Christum ignorantes 
crucifixerunt [, et] Quod non s i t  [est] culpae adscribendum, quicquid fit per ignorantiam” (emphasis 
and parentheses in text); [“That those who crucified Christ, being ignorant, did not sin (, and) That 
whatever is done through ignorance should not be reckoned as sin.”] Cf. Ratzinger, “If You Want 
Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 96-97, n. 19. For comments on Bernard o f Clairvaux’s opposition to 
Peter Abelard, see R. W. Southern, S c h o la s tic  H u m a n is m  a n d  th e  U n if ic a t io n  o f  E u ro p e ,  vol. 2, The  
H e r o ic  A g e , with notes and additions by Lesley Smith and Benedicta Ward (Oxford and Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2001), 116-23, at 123: “It was Bernard’s power of presenting issues in a universal setting of  
spirituality which made him so difficult to answer. His eloquence and universality demoralized the 
opposition before the battle began; and [...] when the two men faced each other at the provincial 
Council at Sens, Abelard collapsed before the personality of Bernard, and was condemned. But even 
then he had his friends in the papal curia, and his condemnation was limited to a prohibition from 
public teaching. [...] This left Abelard’s works in a strange position. It was not the condemnation which 
relegated them to neglect in the future development of scholastic theology: it was rather that what was 
most valuable in his work [...] simply became merged in the general stream of scholastic thought and 
method.”
312 Belmans, “La paradoxe de la conscience erronée,” 576.
313 Ibid., 581. Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T he o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.19, aa. 5-6; A.-D. Sertillanges, L a  
p h ilo s o p h ie  m o ra le  de s a in t  T hom as d ’A q u in ,  rev. ed. (Paris: Aubier, 1946), 387-96. The relevant 
section of Sertillanges’s book seems to have been left unrevised, as it is identical to the original 1916 
edition. Belmans refers to the 1942 edition. See A.-D. Sertillanges, L a  p h ilo s o p h ie  m o ra le  de  s a in t  
T ho m a s  d ’A q u in  (Paris: Alcan, 1916), 534-46.
314 As a result, he quotes Aquinas’s Q u o d lib e tu m  III, a.27, resp. as a key text: “actus humanus 
iudicatur virtuosus vel vitiosus secundum bonum apprehensum, in quod per se voluntas fertur, et non 
secundum materialem obiectum actus”. From the previous chapter one could hardly say that this text
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th is  w ith  a K a n tia n  understand ing  o f  re a lity , such th a t the  sub jec t becom es the  p o in t 
o f  re fe rence  in  d e fin in g  re a lity  in so fa r as i t  can be perce ived . A s  a re su lt, S e rtilla n g e s  
concludes th a t “ conscience , in  good as in  bad, is  the  sole ju d g e ,” 315 since  one is  
unab le  to  reach the  la w  as such, bu t o n ly  tha t w h ic h  the  person pe rce ives as th e  la w :
316 » • •
m y  la w . T he re fo re , so lo n g  as one’ s in te n tio n  is  good, one ’ s conscience  rem ains 
u p rig h t; i t  is  o n ly  erroneous in  the case o f  acting  w ith  w ro n g  in te n t.317 T h is , o f  course, 
se rio u s ly  a ffe c ts  the  co n te x t o f  c u lp a b ility , a lm ost to  the  opposite  o f  A q u in a s ’ s v ie w , 
since, in  R a tz in g e r’ s sum m ation , th is  im p lie s  tha t “ the  o n ly  w a y  to  s in  is  to  act aga inst
Tin
one’ s conscience .”  S e rtillanges does n o t consider th is  to  be su b je c tive  m o ra ls , b u t 
ra th e r a m o ra lity  o f  the  sub ject.319 P robab ly th is  was h is  in te n tio n , b u t i t  c e rta in ly  
appears th a t he co n trib u te d  s ig n ific a n tly  to  the  p h ilo s o p h ic a l and th e o lo g ic a l 
ju s tific a tio n s  fo r  a s u b je c tiv is t understanding o f  conscience, w h ic h  w ere  th e n  m uch  
fu rth e r deve loped b y  m ore recent w rite rs .320
provides a complete presentation of Aquinas’s view. Indeed, Sertillanges does quote from other texts, 
but is clearly starting to move away from St Thomas’s understanding. For example, he declares the 
notion of being excused sin in ignorance, rather than having acted meritoriously, as a philosophically 
unjustified “half-measure” answer. (“Mais rien, philosophiquement, ne justifie cette demi-mesure.”) 
See Sertillanges, L a  p h ilo s o p h ie  m o ra le  de s a in t T hom as d ’A q u in  (1946 éd.), 390, n .l; 394.
315 Sertillanges, L a  p h ilo s o p h ie  m o ra le  de s a in t T hom as d ’A q u in  (1946 éd.), 392: “il est 
universellement vrai qu’au fond et tout bien compté, la conscience, en bien comme en mal, est le seul 
juge.”
316 Ibid., 396: Même n’ayant pas suivi la  loi, j ’ai pu suivre m a  loi, et, comme sujet moral, être 
en règle” (emphases in text) [“Though not having followed the  law, I could follow m y  law, and, as a 
moral subject, be in order.”].
317 Ibid., 388: “la lumière de nos choix, ou conscience, est correct quand elle propose une 
action propre, à réaliser une intention droite; elle est erronée dans le cas contraire” [“the light o f our 
choices, or conscience, is correct when it proposes a proper action, to realise a right intention; it is 
erroneous in the opposite case. ”]
318 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 97, n.19.
319 Sertillanges, L a  p h ilo s o p h ie  m o ra le  de s a in t  Thom as d ’A q u in  (1946 ed.), 396.
320 Belmans considers Rahner’s approach to be the summit of this Kantian revision of  
erroneous conscience. See Belmans, “La paradoxe de la conscience erronée,” 581-86. Cf. Karl Rahner, 
T h e o lo g ic a l In v e s t ig a t io n s ,  vol. 11, C o n fro n ta tio n s : I , trans. David Bourke (London: Darton, Longman 
& Todd; New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 284-85: “If after maturely searching his conscience, a 
Catholic Christian believes that in all prudence and self-criticism he has been forced to arrive at a point 
of view which deviates from the papal norm, and if he follows this in the practice of his married life, 
then [...] such a Catholic need not fear that he has incurred any subjective guilt or regard himself as in a 
state of formal disobedience to the Church’s authority. If he really succeeds in sincerely forming his 
conscience in this way, then such a Catholic has in principle no obligation to subject the judgement of 
his conscience which he has arrived at in this way to fresh questioning each time he receives the 
sacrament of penance.” In his interviews, Rahner also talked o f conscience in terms of one’s
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I t  is  th is  n o tio n  o f  erroneous conscience, detached fro m  u n ive rsa l tru th , w h ic h  
gave Joseph R a tz in g e r such concerns, and prom pted  h im  to  re fle c t fu rth e r u p o n  the 
nature  o f  conscience. H is  re fle c tio n s  led  h im  to  re a ffirm  the  S cho las tic  unde rstan d ing  
th a t conscience in  its  broadest understanding operates on d iffe re n t le ve ls : a n am n es is
T91 „
(th a t is , syn deres is ) and co nsc ien tia . O n b o th  o f  these le ve ls , R a tz in g e r o ffe rs  som e
ve ry  h e lp fu l c la rific a tio n s  and ins igh ts.
L ik e  P ieper, R a tz inge r has chosen to  use another te rm  to  describe  s y n d eres is , 
in  an a ttem p t to  revea l som eth ing o f  its  essentia l nature, since he conside rs the  te rm  
used b y  the  S cho lastics to  be “ unclear”  and “ p ro b le m a tic .” 322 A s  a re su lt, he proposes 
to  rep lace synderes is  w ith  the P la to n ic  concept o f  an am n es is  (rem em brance), w h ic h  
he considers to  be “ lin g u is tic a lly  c learer, and deeper and p u re r in  p h ilo s o p h ic a l 
te rm s,”  as w e ll as be ing  in  greater harm ony w ith  b ib lic a l th o u g h t.323 H ere  he 
h ig h lig h ts  S t P au l’ s teach ing  in  Rom ans th a t the G e n tile s  have an inna te  
understand ing  o f  G od ’ s la w , as i t  is  w ritte n  on th e ir hearts and w itnessed  to  b y  th e ir 
conscience (R om  2 :1 4 -1 5 ).324 T h is  m ig h t be m isconstrued as im p ly in g  th a t R a tz in g e r 
is  about to  p resent som e k in d  o f  na ive  im m anentism , w here som e k in d  o f  d e ta ile d  
m o ra l la w  is re a d ily  a va ila b le  to  everyone b y  nature. T h is , how eve r, is  n o t w h a t he 
in tends (indeed , th is  w o u ld  be a m isunderstand ing  o f  the n o tio n  o f  n a tu ra l la w  and o f
T9S
St P aul ), and w ith  re ference to  Saints B a s il the G reat and A u g u s tin e  he c la rifie s  h is  
p o s itio n  on an am n es is .
“convictions” and being true to one’s conscience “in a final and absolute way.” See Paul Imhof and 
Hubert Biallowons, K a r l  R a h n e r  in  D ia lo g u e : C o n v e rs a tio n s  a n d  In te rv ie w s , 1 9 6 5 -1 9 8 2 , trans. and 
edited by Harvey D. Egan (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 207, 218.
321 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 90-91: “I agree with the 
m e d ie v a l t r a d it io n  that there are tw o  leve ls  in  th is  c o n ce p t that must be clearly d is t in g u is h e d  from each 
other but re m a in  in s e p a ra b le ” (emphasis in text).
322 Ibid., 91.
323 Ibid.
324 See also Ratzinger, T ru th  a n d  T o le ra n ce , 206-207.
325 Sacchi offers some very helpful insights into the Pauline understanding of universal natural 
law, as well as the foundations for his thought. He points out that the argument is based upon two
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St B a s il states th a t, “ The love  o f  G od is  n o t based on  som e d is c ip lin e  im posed 
on  us fro m  ou ts ide , b u t as a capac ity  and indeed a necessity i t  is  a c o n s titu tiv e  e lem ent 
o f  o u r ra tio n a l b e in g .”  Indeed th rough  h is  m e d ita tio n  on  Johann ine th e o lo g y , B a s il 
understands lo ve  in  te rm s o f  keep ing  G od’ s com m andm ents (John  14 :23), and hence 
the  “ spark o f  d iv in e  lo v e ”  im p lan ted  w ith in  us as the  na tu ra l in c lin a tio n  to  desire  G od 
is  necessarily  m an ifested  in  a life  tha t fo llo w s  G od ’ s com m andm ents.327 Thus, 
th ro u g h  th is  im p la n te d  n a tu ra l in c lin a tio n , o r logos s p e rm a tik o s ,328 w e are p red isposed 
to  ca rry  o u t G o d ’ s com m andm ents, and are “ enabled”  b y  G od ’ s grace to  do so.329 
R a tz in g e r com bines B a s il’ s w ords w ith  those o f  A ugustine , w h o  states th a t w e have a 
“ basic understand ing  o f  the  good [...] im p rin te d  upon us.” 330 In  th is  w a y , R a tz in g e r is
premises: 1. Christ as universal Saviour, and 2. without sufficient knowledge o f the law that regulates 
the relationships between man and God, and between people, there can be no sin or condemnation. As 
such, St Paul declares that “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom 3:23), and so are 
subject to God’s wrath (Rom 1:18; 2:5), and to his call to repentance (Rom 2:4), and are justified by 
faith in Christ, who offered himself as a sacrifice of atonement (Rom 3:25). The presumption of 
universal sinfulness demands that all have access to an understanding of God’s law, Jews as well as 
Gentiles, for without this Paul’s words regarding God’s impartial reward and punishment would not 
make sense (Rom 2:9-11). However, Sacchi points out that for the Gentiles, this was not in the form of  
specific precept(s) as in the case of Adam or of the Law of Moses, but rather a knowledge, common to 
all, of the principles that regulate human action. Sacchi’s comments are helpful, as they point to the 
level of an a m n e s is  or s yn d e re s is  in their generality. However, St Paul’s discussion of the universal 
natural law is not presented in the form of an exhaustive treatise, and so one should be careful not to 
expect too much from the text. See Alessandro Sacchi, “La Legge Naturale nella Lettera ai Romani,” in 
F o n d a m e n ti B ib l i c i  d e lla  T e o lo g ia  M o ra le :  A t t i  D e l la  X X I I  S e tt im a n a  B ib l ic a ,  ed. Associazione Biblica 
Italiana (Brescia: Paideia, 1973), 375-89.
326 St Basil the Great, R e g u la  F u s iu s  T ra c ta ta e , interrogatio II, 1, resp., PG 31, 907: “non in 
externa disciplina situs est Dei amor, sed simul atque constituit animal illud (hominem dico)” 
(parenthesis in text). Translation in Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 91.
327 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 91-92. See Basil, R e g u la  F u s iu s  
T ra c ta ta e ,  interrogatio II, 1, resp., PG 31, 907: “scintillam divini amoris intra vos reconditam.”
328 Basil, R e g u la  F u s iu s  T ra c ta ta e , interrogatio II, 1, resp., PG 31, 907: “vis quaedam rationis 
seminis modum insita nobis fuit.” [For original Greek, see PG 31, 908: s p e rm a tik o s  t is  lo g o s  h e m in  
e n k a ta b e b e ta i]. For comments on St Basil’s anthropology, which combines Scripture with Stoic and 
Platonic concepts, including the notion of God implanting the lo g o s  s p e rm a tik o s ,  the seminal word, 
which is this inclination to love, see Augustine Holmes, A L ife  P le a s in g  to  G o d : The S p ir i tu a l i t y  o f  th e  
R u le s  o f  S t B a s i l  (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000), 68-78.
329 See Holmes’s translation from the Greek of part 1 of the Longer Rule 2: “The pupils in the 
school of God’s commandments having received this word are by God’s grace enabled to exercise it 
with care, to nourish it with knowledge, and to bring it to perfection. Cf. Holmes, A  L i fe  P le a s in g  to  
G o d , 68; Ratzinger, “IfY ou  Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 92. Clearly, St Basil considers 
God’s grace to be indispensable in the pursuit of the virtuous life. We shall return to this point in a later 
chapter.
330 Ratzinger, “IfY ou  Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 92. Cf. St Augustine, D e  
T r in i t  a te , VIII, 3 ,4 ; PL 42, 949: “Neque enim in his omnibus bonis, vel quae commemoravi, vel quae 
alia cemuntur sive cogitatur, diceremus aliud alio melius cum vere judicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa
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p o in tin g  o u t th a t b o th  desire  and understanding, w il l and in te lle c t, possess a 
fundam en ta l d riv e  fo r the  good, w h ich  is  u ltim a te ly  roo ted  in  G od, w h o  is  o u r H ig h e s t 
G ood.331
T hus, w ith  th is  g round  in  S crip tu re  and P a tris tics , R a tz in g e r is  ab le  to  p resent 
h is  d e fin itio n  o f  an am n es is  as the  “ firs t le v e l”  o r “ o n to lo g ic a l le v e l”  o f  conscience , 
w h ic h  is  “ a k in d  o f  p r im a l  re m em b ran ce  o f  the g o o d  a n d  the tru e  (w h ic h  are 
id e n tic a l).”  R a tz in g e r’ s p resen ta tion  is  n o t a d e sc rip tio n  o f  s yn deres is  as som e k in d  
o f  d riv e  and p e rce p tio n  o f  the good considered p u re ly  as som e abstract n o tio n . Instead 
he presents a d e sc rip tio n  o f  anam nesis  w h ich  is  w h o lly  ro o te d  in  G od, and d ire c te d  
to w a rd  h im , w ho  is  the  u ltim a te  G ood. A nam nesis  is  o u r basic m o ra l in c lin a tio n  b o m  
ou t o f  the  created re a lity  o f  ou r ve ry  be ing . “ There is  an in h e re n t e x is te n tia l tendency 
o f  m an, w ho  is  created in  the  im age o f  G od, to  tend to w a rd  th a t w h ic h  is  in  keep ing  
w ith  G od .”  H ere  w e can see th a t anam nesis  is  considered as b e in g  g rounded  in  ou r 
e x is te n tia l state o f  b e in g -in -re la tio n sh ip , re fle c tin g  ou r fundam en ta l re la tio n s h ip  w ith  
G od, w h o  created and sustains us; a re la tio n sh ip  o f  b e in g -fo r-G o d  th a t ex is ts  
regard less o f  w he the r the  in d iv id u a l acknow ledges it .  Thus, the  im p rin t o f  o u r o rig in  
in  G od  m eans th a t “ m an ’ s be ing  is  in  harm ony w ith  som e th in g s  b u t n o t w ith  
o the rs .”  A n a m n e s is  re ca lls  th a t o rig in , and responds fa v o u ra b ly  to  th a t w h ic h  is  in  
ha rm ony w ith  it. H ow eve r, th a t capacity  o f  re co lle c tio n  in  its  m o ra l response is  n o t 
som e k in d  o f  storehouse o f  c ry s ta lliz e d  ru les.
notio ipsius boni, secundum quod et probaremus aliquid, et aliud alii praeponeremus”; T he  T r in i ty  
(Hill’s translation, with different numbering): VIII, 2, 4: “For surely among all these good things I have 
listed and whatever others can be observed or thought of, we would not say that one is better than 
another when we make a true judgment unless we had impressed upon us some notion of good itself by 
which we approve of a thing, and also prefer one thing to another.”
331 Augustine, D e  T r in ita te ,  VIII, 3,4; PL 42, 949.




T h is  anam nesis o f  o u r o rig in , re su ltin g  fro m  the  fa c t th a t o u r b e in g  is 
c o n s titu tiv e ly  in  keep ing  w ith  G od, is  n o t a kn ow ledg e  a rtic u la te d  in  
concepts, a treasure store o f re trie vab le  contents. I t  is  an in n e r sense, a 
capac ity  fo r  re co g n itio n , in  such a w ay th a t the  one addressed recogn izes 
in  h im s e lf an echo o f  w ha t is  said to  h im . I f  he does n o t h id e  fro m  h is  o w n  
se lf, he com es to  the  in s ig h t: th is  is  the goa l to w a rd  w h ic h  m y  w h o le  b e in g  
tends, th is  is  w here I  w an t to  go.335
I t  is  th is  “ capac ity  fo r re co g n itio n ”  o r “ p rim a l kn o w le d g e ”  o f  o u r o r ig in  and
g o a l,336 th a t is  shared b y  a ll peoples, though  i t  is  d is to rte d  to  a grea te r o r lesser ex te n t
in  p a rtic u la r cases b y  “ the  arrogance o f  ‘ c iv iliz a tio n ’ .” 337 T hus, w h ile  a ll peoples
share th is  “ p rim a l know ledg e ,”  its  im pact can be great o r be severe ly stunted.
R a tz in g e r judges th a t “ the m ore a person leads a life  gu ided b y  the  ‘ fe a r o f  G o d ’ [...],
the m ore concre te  and c lea r w ill be the e ffe c t o f  th is  anam nesis.” 338
I t  is  in  th is  co n te x t o f  the  po te n tia l fo r d is to rtio n  o r o b fu sca tio n  o f  th is  p rim a l
know ledg e  o r rem em brance o f  G od ’ s ow nersh ip  o f  us, th a t w e fin d  the  ro o t purpose
o f  the  C h u rch ’ s M a g is te riu m . The teach ing a u th o rity  o f  the  C hu rch  shou ld  n o t be
understood as som e k in d  o f  v o lu n ta ris tic  im p o s itio n  o r in te rfe rin g  act o f  m isg u id e d
benevo lence .339 R ather the teach ing  a u th o rity  o f  the C hu rch  e x is ts  to  assist the
in d iv id u a l in  seeking the  tru th  th a t is  w ith in  h im  o r he r.340 T hus, the  M a g is te riu m
“ ex is ts  in  o rd e r to  serve i t  [an am n es is ],”  h e lp ing  it  to  d raw  fo rth  the tru th  and to  be
335 Ibid. (emphasis in text). This key section describing Ratzinger’s notion o f an a m n e s is  
requires comparison to the earlier text given to the American Bishops. Part o f the second last sentence 
seems to be clearer in this text: “It is, so to speak, an inner sense, a capacity to recall, so that the one 
whom it addresses, if he is not turned in on himself, hears its echo from within. He sees: That’s it! That 
is what my nature points to and seeks.” See Ratzinger, “Conscience and Truth,” 32.
336 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 93.
337 Ibid. cf. MacIntyre, T hree  R iv a l V ers ions o f  M o r a l  E n q u iry , 194.
338 Ratzinger, “IfY ou Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 9 3 .Here Ratzinger points to the 
story o f the centurion Cornelius as an example. See Acts 10, particularly 10:34, where Peter talks of  
those who fear God and do what is right as being acceptable to God.
339 Ratzinger, “IfY ou Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 93-94: “If the true essence of the 
Petrine ministry has become so incomprehensible in the modem period, this is surely because we can 
conceive of authority only on the basis o f philosophical positions that exclude all bridges between 
subject and object. In such a view, whatever does not come from the subject can only be a 
heteronomous imposition.” Ratzinger’s reference to the separation of subject and object is reminiscent 
of comments by Brian Johnstone and Charles Taylor noted earlier in this chapter.
340 Ratzinger, “IfY ou  Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 94: “The anamnesis which is 
given to us and is inherent in our being needs help from outside in order that it may become aware of 
its own self.”
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capable to  re ce iv in g  the  tru th .341 R a tz inger uses the S ocra tic  te rm  o f  “ m a ie u tic ”  
( ‘m id w ife ry ’ , th a t is , ass is ting  in  g iv in g  b irth  to  the  tru th  th a t is  a lready the re  to  be 
d iscove red ) to  describe th is  fundam enta l fu n c tio n  o f  the  M a g is te riu m .342 T h is  
d e sc rip tio n  show s the  r ig h t re la tio n sh ip  betw een conscience and M a g is te riu m , w here  
the  d ig n ity  o f  conscience is  respected, bu t recognised also as b e in g  in  need o f  “ he lp  
fro m  o u ts id e ,”  g ive n  its  lim ita tio n s  and pressures.343 A c c o rd in g ly , i t  is  the  ro le  o f  the  
M a g is te riu m  in  genera l, and o f  the teach ing  a u th o rity  o f  the pope in  p a rtic u la r, to  be 
“ the  a d v o c a te  o f  C h r is tia n  m e m o r y by h e lp in g  the  in d iv id u a l to  re c a ll h is  o r ig in  and 
d e s tin y , and hence th a t w h ic h  is  in  keep ing  w ith  th a t d iv in e  o r ig in  and d e s tin y .344 
T he re fo re  the  C hu rch  he lps n o t o n ly  in  the “ anam nesis o f  C re a tio n ” , b u t a lso  in  the  
“ anam nesis o f  fa ith ,” 345 w h ic h  deepens tha t awareness o f  o u r o r ig in  and c a llin g  
th ro u g h  o u r sacram ental id e n tity  as sons and daughters o f  G od, and he irs  to  the  
K in g d o m  (c f. G a l 3 :27 ; 4 :4 -7 ). T h is  is  in  e ffe c t “ the an am n es is  o f  the n ew  ‘ w e ’ ,”  the  
rem em brance o f  the  B o d y  o f  C h ris t.346
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid. Cf. Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  126, 137.
343 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 94. One o f Ratzinger’s major 
influences on his notion of conscience is the Venerable John Henry Newman, who emphasised the 
dignity of the individual’s conscience, but at the same time railed against the “counterfeit,” notion of 
subjectivist conscience, based upon the “right of self-will.” It is in this context that one can properly 
understand Newman’s toast where he would “drink, - to the Pope, if you please, - still, to Conscience 
first, and to the Pope afterwards,” since conscience “is the aboriginal Vicar o f Christ.” Yet, at the same 
time, despite its central importance, conscience as “the sense of right and wrong [...] is so delicate, so 
fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by 
education, so biassed by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course, that, in the struggle for existence 
amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest o f  all 
teachers, yet the least luminous; and the Church, the Pope, the Hierarchy are, in the Divine purpose the 
supply of an urgent demand,” namely, that of support and assistance in revealing the truth o f God’s 
Law. See John Henry Cardinal Newman, “Letter Addressed to the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. 
Gladstone’s Expostulation of 1874,” in C e r ta in  D if f ic u lt ie s  F e l t  b y  A n g lic a n s  in  C a th o lic  T e a c h in g , 
vol. 2 (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1894), 246-261, at 248, 250, 253-54, 261. 
Cf. Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 84-87, 93.
344 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 95 (emphasis in text).
345 Ibid., 94. We shall return to this idea briefly in the final chapter.
346 Ibid., 94-95 (emphasis in text). For further comment on the use of memory in Scripture and 
also on the divinely inspired co-remembering of the Church, where we are led by the Spirit “into all the 
truth” (John 16:13), see Cf. Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI), Jesus o f  N a z a re th : F ro m  th e  
B a p tis m  in  th e  J o rd a n  to  the  T ra n s f ig u ra t io n ,  trans. from the German by Adrian Walker (New York, 
London, Toronto, Sydney, and Auckland: Doubleday, 2007), 231-35.
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M e m o ry  “ sheds lig h t on the sense o f  the act” ; g iv in g  m ean ing  to  w h a t w e 
encoun ter here and n o w .347 The p rim a l m em ory o f  a n am n es is  g ives  sense to  the  w o rld  
around us, to  ourse lves, and to  o u r actions. There fo re , w e are ca lle d  to  aw aken o u r 
re c o lle c tio n  o f  G od and the  sense o f  ou r be ing .348 In  aw aken ing  the  aw areness o f  the  
sense o f  o u r be ing , w e fin d  the im pe ra tive  th a t is  con ta ined  w ith in  us; w e  have a 
fundam en ta l re c o g n itio n  o f  the  good.349 I t  is  th is  o n to lo g ic a l g ro u n d in g  th a t g ives 
conscience its  s o lid  p o in t o f  re ference, thus p reve n tin g  i t  b e in g  reduced to  “ a 
m echan ism  th a t produces excuses fo r one’ s conduct.”
B u ild in g  upon  the  fo u n d a tio n  o f  anam nesis , R a tz in g e r tu rn s  to  the  second 
le v e l o f  conscience : co nsc ien tia . H ere he presents the  standard  d e s c rip tio n  o f  
c o n s c ie n tia , as understood  b y  St Thom as, as an act o f  ju d g e m e n t th a t is  an a p p lic a tio n
i f  I
o f  the  basic know ledg e  o f  the  good to  the p a rtic u la r concrete s itu a tio n . T he la c k  o f  
d e ta il in  com parison  to  h is  d iscussion  o f  anam nesis  p revents m uch  com m ent. Y e t, to  
m y  m in d , w h a t is  o f  m a jo r s ign ificance  is  h is  ana lysis o f  g u ilt in  re la tio n  to  
conscience . R a tz in g e r a ffirm s  the tra d itio n a l S cho lastic p o s itio n  th a t “ an e rrin g  
conscience o b lig a te s ,”  since no one m ay act against h is  o r h e r o w n  c o n v ic tio n s  (c f.
-IC'l t t
R om  14 :23). I f  one acts in  good fa ith  one cannot have g u ilt a t the  le v e l o f  the
347 Ratzinger, Jesus o f  N a z a re th , 231.
348 Joseph Ratzinger, S a lt  o f  th e  E a r th :  C h r is t ia n ity  a n d  th e  C a th o lic  C h u rc h  a t  th e  E n d  o f  the  
M ille n n iu m ,  an interview with Peter Seewald, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1997), 41: “To a certain extent I am a Platonist. I think that a kind of memory, of recollection of God 
is, as it were, etched in man, though it needs to be awakened. Man doesn’t simply know what he is 
supposed to know, nor is he simply there, but is a man, a being on the way.” Cf. Twomey, P o p e  
B e n e d ic tX V I,  126, n. 13.
349 Although D ’Arcy’s analysis is quite different, and focused largely on the formation of 
principles and precepts, his conclusion also depends on the notion of recognition: “Aquinas does not 
mean that synderesis presents us with a number of cut-and-dried statements which we chant at will as a 
school-boy recites Newton’s three laws of motion; rather, it refers to the ability to recognize or elicit 
the truth and falsity of general ethical propositions when confronted with them.” See D ’Arcy, 
C o n s c ie n c e  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  F re e d o m , 67-68.




ju d g e m e n t, the  le v e l o f  c o n s c ie n tia .353 B u t th is  does n o t m ean to  say th a t the  
in d iv id u a l m ay n o t s t ill be g u ilty  at a “ d eeper  le v e l,”  b y  ig n o rin g  the  re v u ls io n  o f  
a n am n es is  in  the  f ir s t p lace .354 Such de libera te  neg ligence co n s titu te s  the  co n te x t fo r 
s in fu l a c tio n , and hence “ th is  is  w h y  c rim in a ls  lik e  H itle r  and S ta lin , w ho  act o u t o f  
deep persona l c o n v ic tio n , rem a in  g u ilty .” 355 In  a fe w  w o rds, R a tz in g e r has c le a rly  
sum m ed up the  co m p le x  m ed ieva l n o tio n  o f  the  b in d in g , and ye t s in fu l erroneous 
conscience , and in  d o in g  so, he has also cha llenged the com m on, exaggera ted o r 
in a p p ro p ria te  use o f  the  excusing  o r even m e rito rio u s  erroneous conscience . W ith  
regard  to  the la tte r, he also uses a lin e  fro m  Psalm  19 to  g rea t e ffe c t: “ C le a r th o u  m e 
fro m  h id d e n  fa u lts ”  (Ps 19:12). R a tz inger considers the  idea  o f  b e in g  b lin d  to  one ’ s 
ow n  g u ilt to  be strong  evidence th a t “ the th e o ry  o f  ju s tific a tio n  b y  m eans o f  an e rrin g  
conscience is  un tenab le .”  O n the  con tra ry , the loss o f  the a b ility  to  see one ’ s g u ilt is  
fa r w orse  state to  be in  than  h a v in g  recognised th a t one has sinned, since conscience 
w o u ld  no lo n g e r act as a de te rren t to  fu tu re  w ro n g d o in g .358
V in c e n t T w om ey p o in ts  ou t tha t R a tz in g e r’ s la c k  o f  fu rth e r system a tic  
in v e s tig a tio n  o f  c o n s c ie n tia  as the  le ve l o f  ju dgem en t has le ft  h is  th e o ry  open to
353 Ibid., 97: “One who fo l lo w s  th e  c o n v ic t io n  at which he has arrived, n e v e r  in c u rs  g u i l t . ”  
(emphasis in text).
354 Ibid.: “But g u i l t  may very well consist in a r r iv in g  a t  su ch  p e rv e rs e  c o n v ic t io n s  by 
trampling down the protest made by the anamnesis of one’s true being. The g u i l t  would then lie on a 
de e pe r  level, not in the act itself, not in the specific judgment pronounced by conscience, but in  that 
n e g le c t o f  m y  o w n  b e in g  that has dulled me to the voice of truth and made me deaf to what it says 
within me” (emphases in text).
355 Ibid., 97. Cf. ibid., 80-81. This view would also imply a steering away from presuming 
some kind of blanket inculpability in cases of psychiatric disorder. Aquinas admits excuse from sin in 
cases of severe mental incapacity. However, despite their clear psychological defects, probably 
Ratzinger considers the nature and complexity of the sustained campaign o f evil acts carried out by 
Hitler and Stalin to be evidence that these dictators are outwith the category of severely mentally 
incapable, and are therefore responsible, and hence culpable, to some extent for their actions.
356 Ibid., 97, 81-84. The translation uses the R e v is e d  S ta n d a rd  V e rs io n  of the Bible.
357 Ibid., 81.
358 Ibid.: “the loss  o f  th e  a b i l i t y  to  see one’s guilt, the f a l l i n g  s i le n t  o f  c o n sc ie n ce  in so many 
areas, is a m o re  d a n g e ro u s  illn e s s  o f  th e  s o u l than guilt that is re c o g n iz e d  as g u i l t ”  (emphases in text). 
The idea of a silencing of conscience at a deeper level probably relates more to Bonaventure’s or 
Albert’s notion of syn d e re s is  being overthrown p e r  a cc idens , rather than Thomas’s errors of deduction 
of c o n s c ie n tia .
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m is in te rp re ta tio n  as to  h o w  i t  fu n c tio n s , and h ow  i t  re la tes to  the  o n to lo g ic a l le v e l.359 
T o  th a t exten t, w h ile  a d m ittin g  th a t R a tz inge r’ s ana lysis has a p a rtic u la r co n te x t in  
w h ic h  a n am n es is  and the  ro le  o f  the M a g is te riu m  w ere o f  p rim a ry  in te re s t, he w o u ld
have w ished  fo r  “ greater d e ta il”  in  the descrip tion  o f  c o n s c ie n tia  and“ g rea te r a tte n tio n
• • • 
to  the  ro le  o f  the  v irtu e  o f  prudence”  in  re la tio n  to  the  la tte r. Indeed , prudence m ay
h o ld  the  ke y  to  h o w  w e can b rid g e  the gap betw een an o n to lo g ic a l d e s c rip tio n  o f  o u r
fo u n d a tio n  fo r  m o ra l reason ing  and an ana lysis roo ted  in  a n a ly tic a l p h ilo s o p h y  th a t
searches fo r  s u ffic ie n t d e ta il in  the general prem ise to  ju s tify  the  lo g ic a l tra n s itio n  to
the  p a rtic u la r s itu a tio n . W e sh a ll re tu rn  to  prudence in  the  n e x t chapter.
T h is  o v e rv ie w  o f  R a tz in g e r’ s the o ry  o f  conscience has h ig h lig h te d  its
dependence upon  o n to lo g y  as a founda tion , such th a t a ll peop le  share a com m on  th irs t
fo r  the good th ro u g h  th e ir created nature, as w e ll as a ca p a c ity  to  see the  tru th  o f
th in g s  th ro u g h  th e ir conscience. W h ile  conscience is  a capac ity  fo u n d  in  a ll, and thus
great a tte n tio n  is  p a id  to  the  na tu ra l law , R a tz inge r is  also ca re fu l to  em phasise the
va lue  o f  ou r B a p tism  and ou r life  in  C h ris t. Indeed, at p o in ts  he has re la te d  o u r
know ledg e  o f  the  tru th  w ith  ou r frie n d sh ip  w ith  C h ris t, o r id e n tifie d  the  ju d g e m e n t o f
• » * » 
conscience w ith  the  “ m in d  o f  C h ris t.”  H ow ever, one m ig h t b e g in  to  w o nde r
359 Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic tX V I,  135.
360 Ratzinger makes a vague reference to prudence and right appetite of the will in relation to 
the process of deduction in conscience, but does not pursue it. He says, “On the basis of the 
Aristotelian tradition, Thomas understands this procedure on the model o f the drawing of an inference, 
but he strongly underlines the specific character of this knowledge of what one ought to do: its  
c o n c lu s io n s  a re  n o t  in fe r r e d f ro m  kn o w le d g e  o r  th in k in g  a lo n e ” (own emphasis). In a footnote he refers 
the reader to Livio Melina’s detailed analysis of Aquinas’s understanding o f moral knowledge, which 
emphasises the intimate connection between moral science, prudence, the moral virtues and right 
appetite. Although no further comment is made, the reference highlights that Ratzinger acknowledges 
the essential involvement of prudence in the judgement of conscience. See Ratzinger, “If You Want 
Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 96; Livio Melina, L a  C onoscenza  M o r a le :  L in e e  d i  R if le s s io n e  s u l 
C o m m e n to  d i  s a n  T om m aso  a l l ’E t ic a N ic o m a c h a e a  (Rome: Città Nuova, 1987), 69-95.
361 Joseph Ratzinger, “Homily at the Mass for the Election of the Roman Pontiff,” in The  
E s s e n tia l P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  21-24, at 23: “A faith that is deeply rooted in friendship with Christ is 
adult and mature. It is this friendship that opens us up to all that is good and gives us the knowledge to 
judge true from false, and deceit from truth. [...] In Christ, truth and love coincide. To the extent that 
we draw near to Christ in our own life, truth and love merge.” Here friendship with Christ deepens our 
understanding of the good. Earlier, Raztinger had also pointed to the complement of this movement:
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w he the r R a tz in g e r’ s th e o ry , and P ieper’ s fo r  th a t m a tte r, be trays a ce rta in  n a iv e ty  in  
th a t i t  is  o v e r-o p tim is tic  w ith  regard to  the m o ra l c a p a b ilitie s  o f  the  in d iv id u a l 
conscience. I t  is  tru e  th a t an o n to lo g ica l in te rp re ta tio n  o f  conscience, co u ld  be accused 
o f  na ive  o p tim is m  i f  i t  w ere n o t tem pered w ith  an adequate acknow led gem en t o f  
hum an fra ilty , b u t I  w o u ld  consider R a tz inge r and P ieper, in  kee p in g  w ith  the  
m ed ieva ls , to  be fu lly  aw are o f  hum an fra ilty .362 Indeed, th e ir  a im  is  to  m ove  aw ay 
fro m  the  n o tio n  o f  som e k in d  o f  m ora l in capac ity  o r in c u lp a b ility , and so th e y  w ill 
n a tu ra lly  em phasise tru th , re a lity , ca p a b ility  and re s p o n s ib ility . H o w e ve r, R a tz in g e r 
and P ieper b o th  acknow ledge fra ilty , and consider th is  a lso to  be p a rt o f  the  m o ra l 
s itu a tio n  o f  each in d iv id u a l; th is  is  w h y  w e need G od ’ s he lp  in  m o ra l endeavour.
A n o th e r charge o f  o p tim ism  m ay be la id  w ith  regard  to  P ieper and R a tz in g e r’ s 
d e sc rip tio n  o f  the  p e rce p tio n  o f  tru th : does th e ir th e o ry  co n tra d ic t the  advances m ade 
b y  A q u in a s  in  h is  cons ide ra tio n  o f  the bonum  apprehen s ion ?  A lth o u g h  a t f ir s t  th is  
m ay seem to  be the  case, i f  one s im p ly  places the  ideas in  o p p o s itio n , th is  does n o t do 
ju s tic e  to  the  nuances o f  A qu inas o r to  those o f  P ieper and R a tz inge r. A q u in a s  
d iffe re n tia te d  the  p e rc e p tio n  o f  goodness f r o m  the a c tu a l goodness o f  the r e a l ity ,  b u t 
he d id  n o t go so fa r as to  sever the tw o . A s such, he rem ains a re a lis t in  h is  p h ilo s o p h y
the search for the truth by conscience leads us to Christ, at least to thinking in accord with his ways. Cf. 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “The Church’s Teaching Authority -  Faith -  Morals,” in Heinz Schumann, 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, and Hans Urs von Balthasar, P r in c ip le s  o f  C h r is t ia n  M o r a l i t y ,  trans. 
Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 64: “[Conscience] “uncovers what is constant 
and thus necessarily leads to the ‘mind of Christ’,” in effect, a knowing in tune with the Lord.”
362 While being opposed to a “purely sociological or psychological interpretation of 
conscience,” here we should recall that Ratzinger did comment on the psychological and sociological 
background to moral blindness, in addition to focusing on the influence o f sin. See Ratzinger, “Dignity 
of the Human Person,” 134-35. Pieper acknowledges the difficulty of the virtuous life, by describing it 
as “a moral standard for humanity which he [Pieper], in his own daily life, is utterly unable to meet.” 
See Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , xiii. This comment by Pieper might remind us of Kiely’s 
criticism of moral theories that propose a high moral optimism that is unreachable. However, Pieper 
balances this high moral standard with an acknowledgment that man is h o m o  v ia to r ,  someone who is 
on the way to beatitude, whose imperfections and despair are transformed by the theological virtue of 
hope, so that he is given the grace to carry on. I shall return to the virtue of hope in a later chapter. Cf. 
Josef Pieper, F a ith ,  H o p e , L o v e , trans. Richard and Clara Winston and Sr Mary Frances McCarthy (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 91-129; Kiely, P s y c h o lo g y  a n d  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , 255.
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and th e o lo g y . Thus, a lthoug h  e rro r is  possib le , th is  does n o t im p ly  th a t tru th  can 
never be a tta ined . P ieper and R a tz inge r are re a lly  saying the  sam e th in g : a lth o u g h  w e 
are capabable o f  p e rce iv in g  the tru th , w e are n o t p e rfe c t; e rro r s t ill occurs, b u t the 
ca p a c ity  fo r  e rro r does n o t de fine  o u r m o ra lity . R ather, ou r re la tio n s h ip  w ith  re a lity  in  
a ll its  face ts de fines ou r m o ra lity .
W ith  these c la rific a tio n s  in  m in d , I  w o u ld  the re fo re  suggest th a t the  approach 
ty p ifie d  b y  P ieper and R a tz inge r, as w e ll as others, such as P inckae rs ,364 is  p re c is e ly  
w h a t is  needed in  g round in g  a balanced understand ing o f  the  na tu re  o f  m o ra l a c tio n  
b y  a llo w in g  us to  g ive  appropria te  re co g n itio n  to  b o th  ou r “ a b ilitie s  a n d  
in a b ilitie s ,” 365 in  such a w ay tha t, th rough  hope and the fo rg iveness o f  C h ris t, w e m ay 
acknow ledge  the  p o te n tia l in  people fo r g ro w th  in  goodness and ho liness , h o w eve r 
lim ite d  o r d if f ic u lt  th a t road  m ay be in  the in d iv id u a l case.
3 .3  W hat K in d  o f  C ontent?
H a v in g  resto red  the lin k  betw een synderesis  and re a lity , so th a t i t  has a g ro u n d in g  in  
tru th  ra th e r than  su b je c tiv ism , w e have also re a ffirm e d  th a t i t  is  no m ere fo rm a l 
p rin c ip le , b u t a ca p a c ity  w ith  rea l in vo lve m e n t in  the m o ra l reason ing  process. The 
p resent Pope, B e n e d ic t X V I, had p re v io u s ly  de fined  it  (as an a m n e s is  ) as th e  inna te
363 See Copleston, A q u in a s ,  49-50: “But though error is possible, Aquinas did not regard this 
possibility as any valid reason for unlimited scepticism. [...] The truth that being is intelligible is 
revealed in the concrete act o f knowing anything, though its expression in the form o f an abstract 
proposition is the work of reflection. And this is for Aquinas the reason why the mind goes forward 
confidently to investigate reality.” Realist moral theology seeks to include the whole human reality in 
its moral theory, and so includes not only natural but also supernatural aspects, such as the reality of  
created status and a teleology of beatitude. See Cessario, The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s ,  
22-28.
364 Pinckaers’ analysis of freedom also demands a return to truth as moral foundation. See 
Pinckaers, “Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,” 79.
365 Ratzinger, “If You Want Peace... Conscience and Truth,” 99 (emphasis mine).
356 Although I would consider Ratzinger’s analysis of an am nes is  to be a major turning point in 
clarifying the notion of syn d e re s is , and would therefore incorporate his insights into its definition, I am 
inclined to agree with Pinckaers that it would be “very difficult [...] to replace such a classical term” 
with Ratzinger’s proposed substitution. As a result, I will continue in this thesis to refer to syn d e re s is . 
Cf. Pinckaers, “Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,” 88.
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ca p a c ity  fo r  re c o g n itio n  o f  o u r o r ig in  and ca llin g , and o f  th a t w h ic h  is  in  ha rm o n y 
w ith  th a t o rig in  and c a llin g , th a t is , w ha t is  good. H e steers c le a r o f  d e sc rib in g  
syn deres is  as som e k in d  o f  storehouse o f  ready fo rm u la te d  p recepts, and in  d o in g  so is
• • • • 'Xftl
jo in e d  b y  o th e r w rite rs , such as John F in n is . Y e t h o w  does th is  d e s c rip tio n  f i t  w ith  
the  m e d ie va ls ’ repeated reference to  synderesis  as be ing  the  lo cu s  fo r  f ir s t  p rin c ip le s  
o f  p ra c tic a l reason? In  w h a t w ay does synderesis  have a s p e c ific  m a te ria l con ten t th a t 
has re a l im p a c t upon  o u r m o ra l understand ing and judgem ents?
3 .3 .1  T h e N atu re o f  F ir s t  P rin cip les  o f  th e P ra ctica l O rder
A s w e  have observed above, the  S cholastics m ade repeated re fe rence  to  ‘ f irs t 
p rin c ip le s ’ and ‘ genera l p rin c ip le s ’ as the  founda tions fo r p a rtic u la r m o ra l judgem en ts  
o r m o ra l deductions. N everthe less, the reader is  le ft hang ing  o r con fused  because the  
exam ples o f  o th e r firs t p rin c ip le s  are fe w , o r o fte n  und isc losed , and are loca ted  so fa r 
apart in  te x ts  th a t i t  takes tim e  and e ffo rt even to  spot them . O f the  m a jo r w rite rs , 
A q u in a s  o ffe rs  a num ber o f  exam ples, a lthough  even in  h is  case th e y  are n o t lis te d  
a ltoge th e r. T hus, fo r  exam ple, in  a d d itio n  to  seeking good and a v o id in g  e v il, A q u in a s  
declares the  fo llo w in g  to  be firs t p rin c ip le s : G o d ’s p re c e p ts  a re  to  be o b eyed ,368 G o d  
is to  be lo v e d , L o v e  G o d ; love  y o u r  n e ig h b o u r, W h a t is u n la w fu l s h o u ld  n o t be
367 Finnis is concerned that to imagine syn de res is  as some kind of storehouse of “already 
crystallized moral principles,” such as those contained in the Ten Commandments, would do a serious 
injustice to Aquinas and to his theory of prudence, as it would severely reduce the role of this virtue. 
See Finnis, N a tu r a l  L a w  a n d  N a tu ra l  R ig h ts , 5 1.
368 Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.3, sol.: “praeceptis Dei obediendum fore.” Cf. 
ibid., dist. 39, q.3, a.2, sol. Timothy Potts thinks that Aquinas’s inclusion of this principle as a basic 
proposition of syn d e re s is  along with ‘seek good, avoid evil’ to be “a nasty twist” in the tale, which 
closes the door on a very lenient stance regarding an erroneous c o n s c ie n tia  which acts in good faith, by 
severely limiting the possibilities of excusing the person from sin. That the principle limits the 
possibility o f excuse in Aquinas’s theory is true, but Potts presents the addition o f obeying God’s 
commands as if it were an afterthought or some kind of cover-all principle to fill the gaps in Aquinas’s 
theory. This is misreading Aquinas, and overlooking the importance of the theological setting of his 
writings. See Potts, C o n sc ie n ce  in  M e d ie v a l P h ilo s o p h y , 60.
369 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.17, a.2, resp. Here there is a discourse on conscience being 
infallible in cases where the particular judgement of conscience replicates a universal judgement in 
syn d e re s is . He gives two examples of impossible statements for conscience: “I should not love God”
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d o n e ,371 N o  h a rm  s h o u ld  be done  and The e v il-d o e r s h o u ld  be p u n is h e d ? 12 O fte n , in  
the  m odem  ana lys is  o f  the  con ten t o r fu n c tio n  o f  synderesis , the  in c lu s io n  o f  these 
p rin c ip le s  b y  A q u in a s  is  ove rlooked , w ith  a tten tion  be ing  re s tric te d  to  g o o d  is to  be 
don e; e v il is to be avo id ed . Y e t, these exam ples o f  fundam en ta l p rin c ip le s  o r 
precepts are present in  the  te x t, and so should n o t be side-stepped. So does the 
in c lu s io n  o f  a fe w  exam ples o f  firs t p rin c ip le s  im p ly  th a t syn deres is  is  in  fa c t a 
storehouse o f  precepts fo r  the purposes o f  deduction? The m anua lis ts  p ro b a b ly  to o k  
the  exam ples as evidence fo r  seeing synderesis  m ore in  th is  w a y , and as a re s u lt, lis te d  
fu rth e r exam ples in  th e ir ow n  w o rks .374 B u t even i f  these e x tra  p rin c ip le s  are no t
and “Some evil should be done”, pointing out that there are self-evident, universal judgements about 
these matters. From this one can extract not only a reaffirmation of e v il s h o u ld  be  a v o id e d  as a first 
principle, but also G o d  s h o u ld  be lo v e d  as another first principle according to Aquinas.
370 Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.100, a.3, arg. 1, ad 1; Porter, N a tu re  as R eason,
263.
371 Aquinas, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 39, q.3, a.2, sol.: “in hoc communi principio, quod est, 
nullum illicitum esse faciendum.” This first principle is buried in the context of a description o f how 
reason can err in forming secondary principles. Thus, the example is given of heretics being mistaken 
in their belief that the swearing of oaths is never legitimate (conclusion), since they have based this 
upon the principle that any oath is unlawful (secondary principle as minor premise). Nevertheless, the 
major premise taken from syn d e re s is , (that nothing illicit should be done) is still without flaw.
372 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.95, a.2, resp.: “nulli esse malum faciendum [...] qui 
peccat, puniatur.” The latter natural principle is given as an example of a natural law which requires the 
human community to determine the appropriate mode and degree of punishment, whereas the former 
offers the basis for deriving the conclusion ‘Thou shalt not kill’ .
373 A notable exception is to be found in the work of Jean Porter, to which I shall refer in 
trying to offer some kind of concise resolution. For her full presentation on practical first principles, 
see Porter, N a tu ra l  a n d  D iv in e  L a w , 85-98; idem, N a tu re  as R eason, 248-68.
374 Principles later presented by the manualists include: St Alphonsus de Liguori, T h e o lo g ia  
M o ra lis ,  9th ed., vol. 1, ed. M. Heilig (Mechlinia: P.J. Manicq, 1852), I, tract. 1, cap. 1, 2: “D e u s  est 
c o le n d u s” [God is to be worshipped], “Q u o d  t ib i  n o n  vis, a l te r i  ne fe c e r is ” [That which you do not 
want done to you, do not do to another] (emphasis in text); Giuseppe Frassinetti, C o m p e n d io  d e ll la  
T e o lo g ia  M o ra le  d i  S. A lfo n s o  M . D e ’L ig u o r i  (Genoa: Tipographia Arcivescovile, 1890), 7: “Non fare 
agli altri ciò che non vorresti che fosse fatto a te” [Do not do to others what you would not want done 
to yourself]; Vermeersch, T h e o lo g ia  M o ra lis ,  I, (1926 ed.), 311-12: “praecepta esse implemenda, 
promissa esse servanda” [precepts should be carried out, promises should be kept]; Davis, M o r a l  a n d  
P a s to ra l T h e o lo g y , I, 64: “The judgments which we formulate are based upon certain moral principles 
of the most general character, such as that good is to be done, evil avoided, legitimate commands are to 
be obeyed, justice is to be maintained, promises are to be kept”; Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach, 
S u m m a  T h e o lo g ia e  M o ra lis ,  rev. ed., vol. 1, D e  P r in c ip i is  (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1935), 187: 
“nulli est iniuria facienda; quod tibi fieri non vis nec alteri facias; Summum Bonum est amandum” 
[injury/injustice is to be done to no one; what you would not wish to happen to you, neither do to 
another; the Highest Good is to be loved]. Frassinetti says that the precepts of the Decalogue are 
conclusions which are immediately drawn from first principles, and therefore one cannot have 
invincible ignorance of them. See Frassinetti, C o m p e n d io  d e ll la  T e o lo g ia  M o ra le ,  7-8. Frassinetti’s 
view probably owes its origin to Aquinas, who, unlike St Albert, did not consider that the Decalogue 
was part of syn d e re s is , nor as self-evident in itself, but could be drawn from first general principles
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in c lu d e d , the  existence o f  some exam ples a rticu la ted  b y  th e  m e d ieva ls  constitu tes  
s u ffic ie n t grounds to  exp lo re  the  nature o f  these p rin c ip le s . So le t us b r ie fly  lo o k  at 
these p rin c ip le s  in  o rde r to  a llo w  us to  reach a general co n c lu s io n  as to  the  na tu re  and 
fu n c tio n  o f  synderesis.
St Thom as ta lk s  o f  p ro p o s itio n s  and p rin c ip le s  in  th e  spe cu la tive  o rde r, and 
then  declares th a t “ the  precepts o f  na tu ra l la w  are to  the  p ra c tic a l reason w h a t the  f ir s t 
p rin c ip le s  o f  dem onstra tions are to  the speculative reason.”  H ence, as the re  are 
m u ltip le  fundam en ta l precepts, there is  m ore than one indem onstra b le  f ir s t p rin c ip le  
o f  p ra c tic a l reason. W e can say th a t g o o d  is to  be d on e; e v il  is to be a v o id e d  is  
considered  b y  the  A n g e lic  D o c to r to  be the m ost fundam en ta l p rin c ip le  o f  m ora ls  
p ro v id e d  b y  synderes is , b u t h is  o the r com m ents im p ly  th a t he a lso understands 
synderesis  to  co n ta in  o the r fundam en ta l p rin c ip le s ,376 w ith  m ore  sp e c ific  con ten t. 
T he re fo re , I  w o u ld  agree w ith  D ’A rc y  th a t there is  a d iffe re n ce  be tw een “ G ood  shou ld  
be done and e v il shunned”  and “ Law s shou ld  be obeyed: P rom ises shou ld  be ke p t” , as 
exam ples o f  firs t p rin c ip le s  o f  syn deres is? 11 C le a rly  the  f ir s t p r in c ip le  o f  seeking the  
good is  m uch  b roader and can encom pass the  o ther tw o  p rin c ip le s  as acts o f  goodness.
with only a minimum of reflection (as well as given immediately by God through infused faith). Cf. 
Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.100, a.3, resp.: “statim ex principiis communibus primis 
cognosci possunt modica consideratione.” Cf. Porter, N a tu ra l a n d  D iv in e  L a w , 92 .
375 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp. (English trans. from Benziger ed.) Cf. 
Leonine ed.: “praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia prima 
demonstrationum se habent ad rationem speculativam, utraque enim sunt quaedam principia per se 
nota.”
376 As Aquinas makes no reference to synderes is  or c o n s c ie n tia  in his commentary on the 
N ic h o m a c h e a n  E th ic s , little attention is paid to this work in discussions on conscience. However, his 
comments have a direct bearing here, in that he makes repeated reference to the indemonstrable first 
principles of practical reason, which he says are innate, or come to be known naturally, such that they 
cannot be ignored. This confirms Aquinas’s understanding of the existence o f multiple principles, but 
also the way in which he understood their relation to the person. Cf. Aquinas, I n  D e ce rn  L ib ro s  
E th ic o ru m  a d  N ic h o m a c h u m , II, lect. 4: “Prima autem rationis principia sunt naturaliter nobis indita, ita 
in operativis, sicut in speculativis”; V, lect. 12: “etiam in operativis sunt quaedam principia naturaliter 
cognita quasi indemonstrabilia principia, et propinqua his, ut malum esse vitandum, nulli esse injuste 
nocendum, non forandum, et similia”; V, lect. 15: “Ideo autem dictum est de ignorantia legalis justi, 
quia alteram justum, scilicet naturale quod non potest ignorari, quia naturaliter est menti humanae 
impressum”; VI, lect. 11: “cum naturaliter indita sint prima principia operabilium humanorum.” Cf. 
Melina, L a  C o n o sce nza  M o ra le ,  75.
377 D ’Arcy, C o n sc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t  to  F re e d o m , 54. Here D’Arcy is listing Vermeersch’s 
examples. Cf. Vermeersch, T h e o lo g ia  M o ra lis ,  I, (1926 ed.), 311-12.
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H ow e ve r, th e y  are n o t s im p ly  a re p e titio n  o f  the idea, e ith e r. T h e y  are fundam en ta l 
p rin c ip le s  in  th a t th e y  con ta in  an elem ent n o t d isc losed  in  the  f ir s t  p recep t w h ic h  
b rin g s  th e  b road  n o tio n  o f  goodness in to  the fie ld  o f  re a l o p e ra tio n , w h ile  s t ill 
re m a in in g  on the  le ve l o f  genera l p rin c ip le . Jean P o rte r describes f ir s t p rin c ip le s  o f  
th is  k in d  as “ m ore re s tric te d  in  th e ir scope bu t e q u a lly  fo u n d a tio n a l w ith in  th e ir 
sphere o f  o p e ra tio n .”  Thus, exam ples presented by  the m ed ieva ls  (and  subsequen tly  
by  m a n u a lis ts ) o f  a v a rie ty  o f  fundam enta l m o ra l p rin c ip le s  are n o t som e k in d  o f  
aw kw a rd  a ttem p t to  ju s tify  the m ora l deductive  process; th e y  are as in te g ra l to  the  
n o tio n  o f  synderes is  as g o o d  is to be done; e v il is to  be a v o id e d . P o rte r observes th a t i t  
w o u ld  be “ te m p tin g  to  in te rp re t these c la im s [fo r  the  existence  o f  m u ltip le  
fo u n d a tio n a l p rin c ip le s ] in  K a n tia n  term s, as i f  A qu inas w ere  saying  th a t reason 
generates these norm s th ro u g h  its  ow n autonom ous opera tions, p resum ab ly  th ro u g h  
the  canons o f  se lf-co n s is te n cy .” 379 H ow ever, to  m ake such a co n c lu s io n  w o u ld  be to  
separate m etaphysics fro m  m ora ls  once again, ro o tin g  firs t p rin c ip le s  in  the  au tonom y 
o f  p ra c tic a l reason, w h ic h  w o u ld  u ltim a te ly  lead us back to  an iso la te d  conscience and 
s u b je c tiv is t m o ra lity , in  the  fa ilu re  to  fin d  a ju s tific a tio n  fo r  o b je c tiv ity . Y e t, A q u in a s  
sees no separa tion  betw een m etaphysics and m ora ls. A s  a re s u lt, “ the  f ir s t p rin c ip le s  
o f  p ra c tic a l reason are n o th in g  o the r than  the ra tio n a l c rea tu re ’ s grasp o f  the  
in te llig ib ilit ie s  in h e re n t in  created existence.”  380 T h is  m eans th a t these p rin c ip le s  are 
n o t d e rive d  fro m  m etaphys ica l and na tu ra l p rin c ip le s .381 R ather, “ these f ir s t p rin c ip le s  
a re  m e taphys ica l and na tu ra l p rin c ip le s  o f  m o tio n  as grasped b y  the  ra tio n a l
378 See Porter, N a tu re  as R eason , 263.
379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid., 263-64. Cf. Peter Simpson, “St. Thomas on the Naturalistic Fallacy,” The  T h o m is t 51 
(1987): 51-70, at 67-68.
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crea tu re .”  H ere , on the la c k  o f  d e riva tio n  o f  the  p rin c ip le s , P o rte r and F in n is  
agree, b u t P o rte r considers F in n is ’ s c la im  tha t nature is  n o t connected to  o u r 
unde rstand ing  o f  the good to  be untenab le .384 The n a tu ra l p rin c ip le s  o f  m o tio n  w h ic h  
P o rte r re fe rs  to  are ou r na tu ra l desires, passions and in c lin a tio n s ,385 w h ic h  “ stem  fro m  
and re fle c t the  p rope r fo rm  o f  h u m a n ity ,”  w hen u n ite d  w ith  reason, and p ro v id e  the
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m e taphys ica l d ynam ic  im p u lse  w h ich  underp ins m o ra l action .
T he re fo re , o u r created hum an nature its e lf p rov ides us w ith  in te llig ib le  firs t 
p rin c ip le s  fo r  m o ra lity . A s they are no t de rived  fro m  som eth ing  else, th e y  are 
indem onstra b le  and “ se lf-e v id e n t”  (p e r  se n o ta ).3&& The tra n s la tio n  o f  p e r  se n otum  
m ay lead  to  som e co n fu s io n , as “ se lf-e v id e n t”  is  o fte n  unde rstood  now adays as 
som eth ing  th a t is  p a te n tly  obvious. H ow ever, the m ore p recise  m ean ing  o f  “ s e lf- 
e v id e n t”  is  th a t w h ic h  “ bears evidence o f  its  ow n tru th ,”  o r th a t w h ic h  is  “ e v id e n t o f  
its e lf  w ith o u t p ro o f.” 389 H ere w e get c loser to  A q u in a s ’ s unde rstand ing  o f  a p e r  se 
n otum  p rin c ip le : a p rin c ip le , whose tru th  is  ev iden t d ire c tly  fro m  the  na tu re  o f  the 
m a tte r it  is  d e scrib in g . Thus, the p rin c ip le  is “ kn o w n  th ro u g h  its e lf,” 390 w ith o u t the
382 Porter, N a tu re  as R eason , 264 (emphasis in text). Cf. ibid., 265: “Practical reason is not 
independent o f the metaphysical structures of the agent; it is on the contrary an immediate and direct 
expression o f those structures, as they are expressed in action.”
383 Finnis, N a tu ra l L a w  a n d  N a tu ra l Rights, 33-34: “They are not inferred from speculative 
principles. They are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions 
about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about the ‘function o f the human being’, 
nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception of nature. They 
are not inferred or derived from anything.” Cf. Porter, N a tu re  as R eason, 264, n. 52.
384 Cf. Porter, N a tu re  as R eason , 264, n. 52; Finnis, N a tu ra l L a w  a n d  N a tu r a l  R ig h ts ,  36: 
“And this quest will eventually bring one back to the u n d e r iv e d  first principles of practical 
reasonableness, principles which make no reference at all to human nature, but only to human good.” 
(emphasis in text).
385 Aquinas identifies five natural inclinations: to the good, to self-preservation, to sexual 
union and the rearing of offspring, to the knowledge of truth, to live in society. See his S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp. For an extensive study of the natural inclinations, see Pinckaers,
S o u rce s  o f  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s , 400-56.
386 Porter, N a tu re  as R eason , 265, 205.
387 Kennedy, “L ’ldea di Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” 163-64, n.43.
388 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp.
389 The C o m p a c t E d it io n  o f  th e  O x fo rd  E n g lis h  D ic t io n a ry ,  vol. 2, 1971 ed., s.v. “self­
evidence” and “self-evident.”
390 See Porter, N a tu re  as R eason , 263. Porter’s translation, “known through themselves,” is 
perhaps preferable to Flannery’s: “known in itself.” See Flannery, A c ts  A m id  P re c e p ts , 70.
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need o f  an in te rm e d ia ry  p rem ise. T h is  m ay seem at firs t to  be a m ore  co m p lica te d  w a y  
o f  s ta tin g  th a t a p rin c ip le  is  p a te n tly  obvious. Indeed, i f  th a t is  a ll th a t p e r  se n o tum  
m eant, then  i t  w o u ld  im p ly  th a t a ll un ive rsa l firs t p rin c ip le s  are o b v io u s  to  everyone ; a 
c la im  w h ic h  is  unsound. E xperience  te lls  us th a t no t a ll f irs t p rin c ip le s  as presented b y  
A q u in a s  and others are p a te n tly  obv ious to  everyone; indeed, som e w o u ld  s tro n g ly  
d ispu te  the  v e ra c ity  o f  som e o f  them . H ow ever, the c la im  th a t th e  p rin c ip le s  are 
u n iv e rs a lly  obv io u s  is  a m isread ing  o f  the te x t.391 A qu inas re a d ily  acknow ledges the 
fa c t th a t n o t a ll f irs t p rin c ip le s  are c lea r to  everyone, s ta ting  th a t w ith o u t kn ow ledg e  
o f  the  d e fin itio n  o f  the  sub ject in  question , the ev iden t p rin c ip le  d ra w n  d ire c tly  fro m  
the  na tu re  o f  th a t sub ject w ill n o t be understood.392 Thus, i f  an in d iv id u a l d isputes 
o ve r the  d e fin itio n  o f  the sub ject ( fo r exam ple, the nature o f  the  hum an person  o r 
G od), then  the  m o ra l p rin c ip le  conta ined in  the true  nature o f  th a t sub jec t w o u ld  n o t 
be c le a r a t a ll to  th a t person. T here fo re , w e shou ld  note  th a t A q u in a s  uses p e r  se 
n otum  in  re la tio n  to  tw o  th in g s : in  re la tio n  to  the p rin c ip le  o f  the  th in g  its e lf, and o n ly  
se co n d a rily  in  re la tio n  to  the  understand ing o f  a p a rtic u la r in d iv id u a l. A c c o rd in g ly , 
A q u in a s  d is tingu ish es a th in g  kn o w n  p e r  se secundum  se (th ro u g h  its e lf, in  its e lf)  
fro m  th in g s  kn o w n  p e r  se q u o a d  nos (th rough  them selves, in  re la tio n  to  us),393 
p o in tin g  ou t th a t som e p rin c ip le s  are com m on ly  kn o w n ,394 w h ile  o thers are o n ly
391 Kiely, P s y c h o lo g y  a n d  M o r a l  T he o lo g y , 6: “The problem with these statements [regarding 
syn d e re s is  and its first principles] is not that they are false, but that they are deceptively simple. They 
are presented as if all men, or at least all men of good will, would find such considerations more or less 
obvious.”
392 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp.: “Secundum se quidem quaelibet 
propositio dicitur per se nota, cujus praedicatum est de ratione subjecti: contingit tamen, quod ignoranti 
definitionem subjecti talis propositio non erit per se nota.”
393 Ibid., I, q.2, a .l, resp; la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp.: “dicitur autem aliquid per se notum 
d u p l ic i te r :  u n o  m o d o  secundum se; a l io  m od o  quoad nos” (emphasis in text).
394 Ibid.: “propositiones per se notae communiter omnibus.” Flannery points out that 
elsewhere Aquinas has another use of co m m u n is  which “does not mean common to everybody,” that is, 
something which is known by many or most people, but not all. This insight would have implications 
for our understanding of Aquinas’s desciption of p e r  se n o ta  first principles and precepts, which he 
describes as ‘universal’ and ‘common’. According to this insight, I would assume that ‘common’ 
would imply that there are principles that are not known by everyone. However, this fact would not
248
kn o w n  b y  the w ise .395 A lth o u g h  A q u in a s ’ s exam ples be long  to  the  spe cu la tive  o rde r, 
he presents them  as an e xp la n a tio n  o f the fo u n d a tio n  o f  the p ra c tic a l o rd e r b y  ana logy. 
T he re fo re , o u r created existence presents us w ith  firs t p rin c ip le s  th a t are in te llig ib le  to  
reason, th o u g h  n o t a ll o f  them  are in te llig ib le  to  everyone a ll o f  the  tim e  (the  p rin c ip le  
rem ains, nonetheless, as a true  and necessary fo u n d a tio n , even in  the  absence o f  
understand ing  b y  an in d iv id u a l). T h is  is  fu rth e r ju s tific a tio n  fo r  the  need o f  a 
co m m u n io  p e rs o n a ru m , to  share th a t in te llig ib ility  w ith  o the rs.396
W ith  th is  d e fin itio n  o f  the p ra c tica l firs t p rin c ip le s  o f  syn deres is  as the  ra tio n a l 
crea tu re ’ s grasp o f  the  se lf-e v id e n t o r ax io m a tic  fundam en ta l m e ta p h ys ica l-m o ra l
TQ7
m ean ing  in h e re n t in  created existence, w e can a ffirm  th a t syn deres is  does indeed 
operate m a te ria lly , and n o t s im p ly  fo rm a lly . H ow eve r, w h a t is  essen tia l to  
understand ing  the  nature  o f  these p rin c ip le s , and to  a vo id in g  the  n o tio n  o f  synderes is  
as som e k in d  o f  treasury o f  c ry s ta llize d  p rin c ip le s  (o r precepts in  th e ir  im p e ra tive
affect the universal validity of the first principle, but rather the extent to which it is known (q u o a d  nos ). 
Cf. Flannery, A c ts  A m id  P re c e p ts , 38.
395 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.94, a.2, resp.: “Quaedam vero propositiones sunt 
per se notae solis sapientibus, qui terminos propositionum intelligunt quid signifkent.” The comment 
also reflects an Aristotelian influence which regarded the fullest knowledge residing in the wise. Cf. 
Flannery, A c ts  A m id  P re c e p ts , 32. However, one should also remember that there are limits even to the 
wise (in wordly terms) and the learned, since Christ gives praise to his Father for those “infants” who, 
with little learning, were able to recognise him, Christ the true Wisdom, and his call to repentance. See 
Mt 11:25-27. In this way, p e r  se n o ta  moral principles regarding God would be rejected out of hand by 
some academics who consider his existence to be a harmful fabrication. Cf. Richard Dawkins, The  G o d  
D e lu s io n  (London: Bantam Press, 2006; Black Swan paperback, rev. ed., 2007), 241-67, 356. Dawkins, 
following Marc Hauser’s findings, would accept that every human is bom with some sort o f basic, 
universal “moral grammar”, but that it is of an accumulative, evolutionary origin, and so has nothing to 
do with God. See, ibid., 255, 258.
396 See Melina, S h a r in g  C h r is t ’s V irtues , 190-91. See also MacIntyre, T hre e  R iv a l V e rs io n s  o f  
M o r a l  E n q u ir y ,  136: “What is constant in this movement [to a mature understanding] is the core of our 
initial apprehension, that if we are to achieve an understanding of good in relation to ourselves as 
being, as animal, and as rational we shall have to engage with other members of the community in 
which our learning has to go on in such a way as to be teachable learners.”
397As we have observed, this view would be at odds with those holding a formalist view of  
syn d e re s is . Mark Nelson offers a recent example of this view, where virtue, particularly that of  
prudence is emphasised to such a degree that “prudence, rather than synderesis, determines what it 
actually means to act according to right reason in each case.” Prudence takes on this role in Nelson’s 
interpretation because natural law “plays no significant epistemic function in making practical moral 
determinations,” as it only “functions formally to account for the judgments of prudence.” This would 
be an example of what Twomey considers to be confusion of the levels of conscience. Cf. Nelson, The  
P r io r i t y  o f  P ru d e n c e ,  145; Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  136.
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fo rm ) is  th a t th e y  “ need n o t be fo rm u la te d  in  o rde r to  be grasped,” 398 o r to  be a p p lie d  
to  the  p a rtic u la r s itu a tio n , fo r  th a t m atter. F lannery p rov ides  an exam ple  o f  th is  fro m  
the  specu la tive  o rde r, w h ic h  th ro w s lig h t on w ha t is  m eant b y  th is : “ i f  a c h ild  does n o t 
kn o w  th a t a w h o le  is  la rg e r than  its  parts, i t  w ill no t kn o w  to  b reak o f f  a p iece  o f  its  
fo o d  in  o rde r to  get i t  in to  its  m ou th .”  The c h ild  does n o t need to  k n o w  th a t th is  w as 
fo rm u la te d  as the  e ig h th  com m on n o tio n  o f  E u c lid ’ s E le m e n ts  in  o rd e r to  be ab le  to  
a p p ly  i t . 399 C oncrete fo rm u la tio n s  o f  p rin c ip le s  are a secondary step to  the  in it ia l 
“ in a rtic u la te  apprehensions”  th a t support them .400 Such a rtic u la tio n  is  the  ta sk  o f  the 
p h ilo so p h e r o r the  th e o lo g ia n ,401 w ho w ill m o s tly  deal w ith  d e rive d  secondary 
p rin c ip le s , w h ic h  a p p ly  fo r  the  m ost pa rt {u t in  p lu r ib u s ) ,402 b u t w h o  w ill a lso attend 
a t p o in ts  to  fo rm u la tin g  “ p rin c ip le s  th a t arise fro m  o u r com m on h u m a n ity  and th a t 
once a rticu la te d , are recogn ized  b y  the o n to lo g ica l le v e l o f  conscience .” 403 T h is  
a rtic u la tio n  m ay h e lp  som eone to  recognise w hat they  had p re v io u s ly  m issed  th ro u g h  
hardness o f  hea rt o r o th e r lim ita tio n s , such as a p a rtia l o r te m p o ra ry  b lindne ss caused 
b y  “ c u ltu ra l degenera tion .” 404 H ow ever, a t its  ro o t, the process beg ins w ith  the  ve ry  
b e ing  o f  a pe rson ’ s existence. Thus, i t  is  here in  the  idea o f  an in it ia l m o tiv a tin g , 
in a rtic u la te  apprehension th a t w e fin d  the balance betw een unde rs tan d ing  synderes is
398 Porter, N a tu re  as R eason , 264.
399 Flannery, A c ts  A m id  P re ce p ts , 36.
400 MacIntyre describes the process of learning “p e r  in c lin a t io n e m ,  through [...] living out the 
virtues,” where understanding is gained, though not fully articulated. See MacIntyre, T hre e  R iv a l  
V e rs io n s  o f  M o r a l  E n q u ir y ,  137. Pinckaers uses the term “fontal knowledge” to describe something 
similar. See Pinckaers, S ou rce s  o f  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,  50-51.
401 Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic tX V I,  136, Porter, N a tu re  as R eason, 264. Twomey also includes 
the legislator in “a r t ic u la t in g  e th ic a l ru le s  a n d  m o ra l p r in c ip le s .” See P o p e  B e n e d ic t X V I ,  136 
(emphasis in text). However, I have omitted this function from my comment, as I would consider the 
legislator to articulate ethical rules or precepts which are on a level much closer to the particular and as 
such are subject to change or to limited application, and would be valid at most u t  in  p lu r ib u s .  Cf. 
Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.95, a.2, resp.; IaIlae, q.96, a.6, resp.; Ia Ilae, q.97, a .l, ad 1. 
The exception to this would be some of the principles contained in constitutional law.
402 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.94, a.4, resp.
403 Twomey, P o p e  B e n e d ic tX V I,  137. Such formulation may at times already be presented to 
us in Revelation. For example, see Micah 6:8: “He has told you, O mortal, what is good; and what does 
the LORD require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”.
404 MacIntyre, T h re e  R iv a l V e rs ions  o f  M o r a l  E n q u iry ,  194.
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in  te rm s o f  em pty fo rm a lis m  and conside ring  i t  as an exhaustive  c o lle c tio n  o f  c le a rly  
d e fin e d  p rin c ip le s , a ll ready to  be used as i f  fo r  a process o f  m echan ica l deduction .
3 .3 .2  S y n d eresis a s  C on ten t o r  C ontext? An A ttem pt a t R eso lu tion
W e have been w o rk in g  to  the  p o in t o f  a ffirm in g  the m a te ria l fu n c tio n  o f  synderes is , 
ra th e r than  s im p ly  reduce i t  to  a fo rm a l co n d itio n  o r co n te x t fo r  m o ra l reason ing . 
H ow eve r, in  d iscuss ing  the  idea o f  m a te ria l fu n c tio n , fre q u e n tly  the  n o tio n  is  re a d ily  
connected w ith  the  w o rd  ‘ con ten t’ , as some k in d  o f  shorthand. Y e t, h e re in  lie s  the 
p ro b le m , since, a lthoug h  i t  is  o fte n  used by p ro m in e n t w rite rs ,405 the  te rm  confuses 
the  issue. O u r understand ing  o f  content revo lves around the  idea  o f  m a tte r w h ic h  is 
h e ld  w ith in  som eth ing , e ith e r p h y s ic a lly  o r m e ta p h o rica lly . H o w e ve r, in  the  case o f  
synderes is , the  fundam en ta l m o ra l m a tte r tha t i t  deals w ith  is  n o t so m uch  con ta ined  
b y  synderes is , as i f  w ere  boxed in , b u t ra ther in te rp re ted  b y  it .  S ynd eres is  acts as b o th  
the basic p e rce p tio n  a n d  the fundam enta l m o ra l understand ing  o f  the  m a tte r th a t 
m akes up the  re a lity  o f  the  hum an co n d itio n .406 A s such, syn deres is  serves the  hum an 
person as the  capac ity  to  reach the  tru th  o f  a ll th ings. H ow eve r b lin d e d  th a t ca p a c ity  
m ay be a t tim e s , th a t capac ity  rem ains, and is  the bed rock o f  o u r a b ility  to  act and to  
g ro w  m o ra lly .
405 For example, cf. D’Arcy, C onsc ie n ce  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m , 49; Pieper, L iv in g  the  
T ru th ,  153: “The voice of the primordial conscience is -  as to its content -  the natural moral law.”
405 As a result, Pieper’s next sentence, qualifying the latter, noted just above, is more clearly in
keeping with this idea of perception: “The primordial conscience is the n a tu r a l aw a re n e ss  of the ethical 
natural law” (emphasis mine). See Pieper, L iv in g  th e  T ru th , 153.
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O ver the  course o f  th is  chapter, w e have exp lo red  issues re la ted  to  d e d u c tio n , 
e m o tio n , d isce rnm ent, tru th , re a lity  and firs t p rin c ip le s  in  o rde r to  g a in  a deeper 
unde rstand ing  o f  the  nature  o f  conscience b o th  at the le v e l o f  syn deres is  and o f  
co n s c ie n tia . O u r in v e s tig a tio n  has gathered the evidence fo r  unde rs tan d ing  conscience  
in  genera l as a capac ity  th a t a llo w s  the hum an person to  pe rce ive  the  tru th  and do the  
tru th ; a tru th  th a t in v o lv e s  the  w h o le  o f  re a lity : the  w o rld  a round  us, the  c o n d itio n  o f  
G o d -g ive n  re a lity  o f  o u r be ing , as em bodied sp irits , in  re la tio n  to  the  G od w h o  m ade 
us and redeem ed us. N onethe less, ou r in ve s tig a tio n  has a lso h ig h lig h te d  th e  need to  
bear in  m in d  the  fra g ility  o f  th a t capacity  o f  conscience and the  obstacles i t  faces in  
be ing  ab le  to  see c le a rly . T here fo re , in  o rder to  see c le a rly , w e need to  deve lop  ou r 
s k ills  o f  p e rce p tio n  and judgem en t, as w e ll as o u r desire to  do  G od ’ s w ill;  w e  need to  
deve lop  o u r m o ra l sense b y  d w e llin g  and ope ra ting  in  the r ig h t e n v iro n m e n t. I t  is  the 
task  o f  the  rem a inde r o f  th is  thesis to  discuss the  core e lem ents o f  such an e x is te n tia l 
env iro n m e n t, nam e ly , h o w  v irtu e  and grace assist conscience in  its  m ost necessary 





V irtu e  is  no lo n g e r b e lie ve d  in , its  pow er o f  a ttra c tio n  is  gone; to  resto re  it ,  
som eone w o u ld  have to  kn o w  how  to  take i t  to  m a rke t as an u n fa m ilia r fo rm  o f 
adventu re  and excess. I t  dem ands too  m uch extravagance and n a rro w ­
m indedness o f  its  be lieve rs  n o t to  have the conscience aga inst i t  tod a y . T o  be 
sure, p re c is e ly  th a t m ay constitu te  its  new  charm  fo r  unconsc ionab le  and to ta lly  
unscrupu lous peop le : - i t  is  now  w ha t i t  never w as be fo re , a v ic e .1
These com m ents b y  N ie tzsche  m ig h t no t exactly  o ffe r the  m ost p ro m is in g  s ta rt to  a 
chapte r on v irtu e  and its  connection  to  conscience. N everthe less, h is  w o rd s  m ay o ffe r 
us som e so rt o f  in -ro a d  to  an a ttitu d e  w h ich  is  s t ill ve ry  e v id e n t in  the  w o rld  today, 
nam e ly , the  ig n o rin g  o f  v irtu e  o r even the o ve rtu rn in g  o f  v irtu e  in  fa v o u r o f  v ic e . The 
w o rd  ‘ v ir tu e ’ co u ld  h a rd ly  be described cu rre n tly  as a te rm  in  fre q u e n t use.2 Indeed , 
th is  m ay be due to  its  change in  connota tions. R ather than  associate the  te rm  w ith  
s treng th  (v is ) o r exce llence  (a re te ) , as its  e tym o lo g y  suggests,3 p ro b a b ly  fo r  m any 
‘ v ir tu e ’ con ju res up ideas about som eth ing tha t is  d u ll and la c k in g  in  e xc item en t, 
som eth ing  th a t is  p ru d ish  o r repressive in  its  o u tlo o k . A c c o rd in g  to  th is  unde rstand ing , 
N ie tzsche  is  r ig h t in  d e c la rin g  v irtu e  u n a ttra c tive .4 H ow eve r, such a v ie w  is  a
1. Introduction
1 Nietzsche, The W il l  to  P o w e r, 324.
2 See Gianfranco Ravasi, R ito rn o  a lle  V ir tù : L a  R is c o p e rta  d i u n o  S tile  d i  V ita  (Milan: 
Mondadori, 2005), 11.
3 Ibid., 14.
4 Nietzsche states that his own vision of what constitutes the true nature of virtue and morals is 
more in keeping with Machiavelli’s political philosophy: the practice of sham-virtue and the 
acceptibility of vice. Thomas Hibbs says that the Machiavellian notion of virtue and prudence is not 
“subordinate” to moral rules; it is the other way around. This is clear throughout T he  P r in c e ,  since the 
guiding principles for action become reputation, personal safety or staying in power, rather than 
goodness, sincerity or truth. Thus, virtue and vice are viewed pragmatically, with one or other being 
chosen dependent upon which serves the Prince’s purpose. Cf. Niccolò Machiavelli, The P r in c e ,  rev. 
ed., trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 2003), XV (page 51): “So a prince has of necessity to be so 
prudent that he knows how to escape the evil reputation attached to those vices which could lose him 
his state, and how to avoid those vices which are not so dangerous, if he possibly can; but, if he cannot, 
he need not worry so much about the latter. And then, he must not flinch from being blamed for vices
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d is to rtio n  o f  a m uch  ric h e r re a lity , one tha t a llo w s  us to  m ove  aw ay fro m  a m o ra lity  
o f  m ere o b lig a tio n , to  a m o ra lity  o f  g ro w th  tha t p o s itiv e ly  seeks to  choose and do the 
g ood ,5 and u ltim a te ly , in  seeking u n io n  w ith  G od ou t o f  lo v e .6
C le a rly  th is  is  a s ig n ific a n t s h ift in  perspective , b u t one w h ic h  does n o t negate 
the necessity  and im portance  o f  m ora l p recepts.7 R ather, an unde rs tan d ing  and 
p ra c tice  o f  v irtu e  p laces precepts in  th e ir p roper con text: one w h ic h  recogn ises and 
apprecia tes the  ends (b o th  n a tu ra l and supernatura l) o f  hum an life  and a c tio n , g iv in g  
m ean ing , d riv e  and d ire c tio n  to  the choices a person m akes. L iv io  M e lin a  c a lls  th is  
s h ift in  pe rspective  a tra n s itio n  fro m  “ e th ics o f  the  th ird  person”  to  the  “ e th ics  o f  the
which are necessary for safeguarding the state. This is because, taking everything into account, he will 
find that some of the things that appear to be virtues will, if he practices them, ruin him, and some of 
the things that appear to be vices will bring him security and prosperity”; Nietzsche, The  W il l  to  P o w e r,  
304: “A great moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor”; Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r ,  119.
Aquinas points out that virtue relates to two aspects of choice: right appreciation of the end 
and that which leads to it, that is, preference of (or predisposition to) that which is in keeping with the 
end, with moral virtue being concerned with the former, and prudence being concerned with the latter. 
See Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.56, a.4, ad 4: “in electione d u o  sunt, scilicet in te n t io  finis, 
quae pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et p ra e a c c e p tio  ejus quod est ad fmem, quod pertinet ad 
prudentiam; ut dicitur in 6. Ethic, (cap. 2. e t 5 .)\ quod autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa 
passiones animae, hoc contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis, et concupiscibilis: et ideo virtutes 
morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili, et concupiscibili: sed prudentia est in ratione” (emphasis in 
text).
6 Aquinas says that man’s end and his desire for that end are transformed through the 
theological virtues; faith directing man’s reason to a supernatural end, and hope and charity directing 
his will to desire spiritual union with God, and to see it as attainable. See ibid., Ia Ilae, q.62, a.3, resp. 
and ad 3.
7 Hibbs has identified a potential inadequacy in some presentations o f virtue ethics. In the 
interest of rekindling interest in the role virtue in the moral life, some have underplayed the importance 
of precepts in St Thomas’s moral theory, which has implications for moral theory in general. Without 
proper attention to precepts virtue ethics remains vague and relative. Cf. Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r,  9- 
10, n .l 1. Here, Hibbs recommends Mclnemy’s E th ic a  T h o m is tic a  as an example of a text which 
balances virtue and precept, and criticises Daniel Nelson’s P r io r i t y  o f  P ru d e n c e  for its particular lack 
of balance. Porter agrees that virtue without precept would be incomplete. See Porter, M o r a l  A c t io n  
a n d  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,  3: “once these approaches [rule-orientated and virtue-orientated] have been 
brought together, it becomes apparent that each is incomplete and distorted without the other.” For a 
similar view, see Robert B. Louden, “On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics,” A m e r ic a n  P h ilo s o p h ic a l 
Q u a r te r ly  21 (1984): 227-236, at 235: “It is important now to see the ethics of virtue and the ethics of  
rules as adding up, rather than as cancelling each other out.” On the need for rules in the pursuit of 
excellence, see also MacIntyre, A f te r  V ir tu e , 190. James Keenan thus presents a restricted vision of 
virtue ethics when he says, “Virtue ethicists [...] are not primarily interested in particular actions. We 
do not ask ‘Is this action right?’ ‘What are the circumstances around an action?’ or ‘What are the 
consequences of an action?’ We are simply interested in persons.” Such introductory remarks 
emphasising solely the character development of the person are surely incomplete as a description of 
virtue ethics. See James F. Keenan, “Virtue Ethics,” in C h r is t ia n  E th ic s :  A n  In t ro d u c t io n ,  ed. Bernard 
Hoose (London and New York: Cassell, 1998), 84-94, at 84.
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f ir s t person .”  T h ird  person e th ics are determ ined b y  “ c o n fo rm ity  w ith  a le g a l ru le ,”  
and so the  d r iv in g  pe rspective  is  th a t o f  “ the observer (a  ju d g e  o r con fe sso r), w ho  
eva lu tes the ex te rn a l act accord ing  to  its  co n fo rm ity  to  the  ru le .” 9 In  con tras t, e th ics  o f  
the  fir s t person are “ ro o te d  w ith in  the perspective  o f  the  sub ject, w ho  in  h is  a c tin g  is  
ca lle d  upon  to  re a lize  acts th a t are exce llen t, th a t d ire c t h im  to  h is  o w n  fu lf illm e n t.” 10 
In  th is  w a y , v irtu e  p lays  a s ig n ific a n t ro le  in  shaping the  q u a lity  o f  the  m o ra l a c t11 b y
i 'j
d ispos ing  the  person  to  a r ig h t understand ing o f  the  end o f  a c tio n , and in  a c tin g  in  
accordance w ith  th is  good end the  person flo u rish e s  o r deve lops m o ra lly ,13 ra th e r than  
re m a in in g  stunted b y  c o n tin u in g  to  fo llo w  com m ands b lin d ly . O n the  o th e r hand, one 
shou ld  be w a ry  o f  any k in d  o f  se lf-cen tred  d e fin itio n  o f  v irtu e , w here  so m uch  is  
m ade o f  its  ro le  in  the  deve lopm ent o f  the person th a t the  consequent e ffe c t o f  the  
a c tio n  on others is  d isregarded. A c c o rd in g ly , K ennedy w arns us th a t a “ v irtu e  is  n o t 
s im p ly  a su b je c tive  flo u ris h in g  o f  the agent. I t  is  the  agent’ s ca p a c ity  fo r  a c tio n  th a t
8 Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V ir tu e s , 38-40.
9 Ibid., 39.
10 Ibid. Melina’s shift to first person ethics reflects a shift found in V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r,  which 
states that the moral object can only be understood as the “proximate end of a deliberate decision which 
determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.” As such, the object can only be truly 
understood from “ th e  p e rs p e c t iv e  o f  the  a c t in g  pe rso n .'”  Cf. Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V ir tu e s , 40; 
V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r, 78 (emphasis in text), A A S  85 (1993), 1196.
11 Here Melina is focusing on the impact of virtue of the act. It is true that a good object, such 
as charitable work, is made a good act by a virtuous intention, when carried out in an appropriate 
manner or circumstance. The same object coupled with a vicious intention loses its goodness, just as 
the same object coupled with the intention of grudging compliance loses its merit. However, although I 
cannot imagine that Melina is expressing a consequentialist approach, his terminology regarding ends 
is confused. Melina’s description mixes the notions of “intrinsic finality,” teleology and virtue together 
in such a way that it seems that the virtuous end forms an intrinsic part of the object. Here I think the 
lack of clarity could lead to a confusion between the subjective and objective ends of the moral act, in 
such a way that the text could be misread as reducing finality simply to the end desired by the subject
(f in is  o p e ra n d s ), rather than also including the end proper to the action carried out ( f in is  o p e r is  or 
object). Cf. Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V irtu e s , 39; Janet Smith, “Can Virtue Be in the Service o f Bad 
Acts? A  Response to Philippa Foot,” N e w  S c h o la s tic ism  58 (1984): 357-73, at 372; Martin 
Rhonheimer, “Intrinsically Evil Acts and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a Central Teaching of 
V e r ita t is  s p le n d o r ,” in “ V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r” a n d  the  R e n e w a l o f  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , ed. J.A. DiNoia and 
Romanus Cessario (Princeton, NJ: Scepter; Huntington: Our Sunday Visitor; Chicago, IL: Midwest 
Theological Forum, 1999), 161-93, at 182.
12 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae q.57, a.5, resp.; Ia Ilae q.58, a.5, resp.; Ha Ilae q.47,
a.6, resp.
13 Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V irtues , 40.
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b rin g s  about consequences in  the rea l w o rld .” 14 T h is  leads K enned y to  advocate 
A ris to tle ’ s d e fin itio n  o f  v irtu e  as “ a d isp o s itio n  th a t renders its  possessor and h is  
a c tiv ity  good ,” 15 since th is  o ffe rs  a “ u n ifie d  and com prehensive  v is io n  o f  m o ra lity ,” 16 
w here due a tte n tio n  to  agent, a c tion  and consequences is  g ive n  to  each aspect and to  
the  w h o le .
These in it ia l com m ents shou ld  lead us to  recognise th a t v irtu e  n o t o n ly  o ffe rs  
e th ics  an in te rp re tiv e  ke y  w ith  w h ich  to  exam ine the  elem ents o f  m o ra lity  in  a p o s itiv e  
lig h t, b u t, m ore  im p o rta n tly , i t  is  cen tra l to  the  u n d e rly in g  na tu re  o f  a pe rson ’ s 
m o tiv a tio n  and deve lopm ent in  choosing the g ood .17 In  e ffe c t, v irtu e  is  n o t s im p ly  
about choos ing  the  good in  in d iv id u a l cases, b u t about p u ttin g  in to  p ra c tice  a re a l 
“ s tra tegy”  fo r  d o in g  good. T h is  has obv ious im p lic a tio n s  fo r  the  m o ra l conscience , 
in  th a t v irtu e  p ro v id e s  the  environm en t fo r  b o th  the  fu n c tio n in g  and the  re fin e m e n t o f  
o u r m o ra l ca p a c ity  fo r  re fle c tio n  and judgem en t. I t  is  the  basic tene t o f  th is  thes is  th a t 
conscience requ ires , and indeed possesses, a co n te x t o r e n v iro n m e n t fro m  w ith in  
w h ic h  i t  operates: a graced life  w ith  the p o te n tia l fo r v irtu o u s  acts. W ith o u t due 
re c o g n itio n  o f  conscience ’ s p rope r con text w e ru n  the  r is k  o f  d e fin in g  and e m p lo y in g  
conscience in  a s u b je c tiv is t m anner, w ith  the d e liv e ry  o f  s e lfis h  o r a rb itra ry  dec is ions 
as a consequence. T he re fo re , the nature o f  conscience shou ld  n o t be in te rp re te d
14 Kennedy, D o e rs  o f  th e  W ord , II, 138-39.
15 Cf. Ibid., 139; Aristotle, N ic h o m a c h e a n  E th ic s , II, 6, 1106a 15. The edition o f Kennedy’s 
translation is unspecified. The Irwin translation is similar: “It should be said, then, that every virtue 
causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well.” Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ic a ,  la Ilae, q.55, a.3, resp.: “virtus est, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus ejus bonum 
reddit”; Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V irtues , 52: “Virtue concerns not only the subjective aspect of  
interiority, not only the objective aspect of execution: it renders good at one and the same time both the 
one who acts and his deeds.”
16 Kennedy, D o e rs  o f  th e  W ord , II, 139.
17 Jean Porter points out that the matter of primary importance is not so much the capacity to 
use the language of virtue to talk about morality, but the understanding of the person that leads him or 
her to act intelligently and morally. This implies that a person may not be able to present an elaborate 
explanation for deeds of virtue, yet the fact remains that the person has understood them as such. See 
Porter, M o r a l  A c t io n  a n d  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,  137-38.
18 Vincent Leclercq, “La morale des vertus dans la formation des futurs prêtres,” S e m in a r iu m  
46 (2006): 895-921, at 898: “mettre en oeuvre une véritable stratégie du bien.”
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w ith o u t re ference to  its  con text. In  th is  ve in , V in c e n t T w o m e y  a ffirm s  th a t 
“ conscience, w ha te ve r i t  is , cannot be understood in  is o la tio n ; i t  is  p a rt o f  a system  o f  
th o u g h t and life , pe rsona l and com m unal, cen tra l to  w h ic h  is  v irtu e  as the  co n te x t o f  
a ll m o ra l d iscou rse .” 19
T ha t h a v in g  been sa id , h o w  do conscience and p a rtic u la r v irtu e s  re la te  to  each 
o ther?  D oes the  fu n c tio n  id e n tifie d  by  the te rm  ‘ conscience’ o ve rla p  w ith  the  fu n c tio n  
o f  the  v irtu e  o f  prudence th a t there is  no d iffe re n ce  be tw een t the  tw o ?  B e fo re  
respond ing  to  these questions it  is  necessary fo r  us to  lo o k  fu rth e r a t the  na tu re  o f  
v irtu e . P inckaers p o in ts  ou t th a t “ the study o f  the v irtu e s  p ro v id e d  in  th e  secu nd a  
secundae  [o f  S t T hom as’ s S um m a ]  was [...] ce rta in ly  the  m ost com p le te  in  C h ris tia n
A A
tra d itio n .”  I  w o u ld  the re fo re  propose to  fo llo w  St Thom as’ s v irtu e  th e o ry , th o u g h  to  
supp lem ent th is  w ith  the  in s ig h ts  o f o ther w rite rs  as the  occasion arises. A q u in a s ’ s 
understand ing  o f  v irtu e  is  an approach w h ich , though  b u ilt upon  A ris to te lia n  lin e s ,21 
fu lly  inco rpo ra te s  the  C h ris tia n  fa ith  in  such a w ay th a t u ltim a te  s e lf- fu lfilm e n t is  to  
be fo u n d  beyond ourse lves in  G od,22 and th a t ch a rity , o r lo ve , is  g ive n  p rim a c y  ove r 
the  w h o le  o f  the  m o ra l life  in  th a t i t  shapes a ll v irtu e .23 In  th is  w a y , v irtu e  e th ics  does 
n o t s im p ly  rem a in  in  the rea lm  o f  m o ra l p h ilo so p h y , b u t tru ly  becom es m o ra l 
th e o lo g y ,24 in  th a t v irtu e  and grace m eet.
19 Twomey, “A Discourse on Thomas More’s Great Matter: Conscience,” 161.
20 Pinckaers, S o u rce s  o f  C h r is t ia n  E th ics , 228.
21 Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r,  18-19; Pinckaers, S ources o f  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,  228.
22 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Hae, q.l, aa. 6 and 8.
3 For example, see ibid., la I lae q.62, a.4: “charitas est mater omnium virtutum, et radix, 
inquantum est omnium forma.”
24 Cessario, The M o r a l  V irtu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 6: “In the final analysis, Aquinas 
understands the practice of virtue as nothing less than the full realization of evangelical glory in this 
life. He held that the theology of the virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the beatitudes and the fruits of 
the Spirit together form a single instruction on Christian perfection.”
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In  o rde r to  es tab lish  h o w  conscience relates to  v irtu e , beyond w h a t has a lready been 
stated in  the in tro d u c to ry  rem arks above, w e have to  b u ild  up a p ic tu re  o f  w h a t 
constitu tes  v irtu e . H ere i t  is  no t m y in te n tio n  to  p ro v id e  an exhaustive  ana lys is  o f  
v irtu e  in  genera l, n o r o f  p a rtic u la r fo rm s, such as the ca rd in a l o r th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s . 
Indeed , each o f  these stud ies w o u ld  p ro v id e  m ore than  s u ffic ie n t m a te ria l fo r  a thesis 
in  them selves, and the w o rk  has a lready been covered e x te n s ive ly  b y  w rite rs  such as
— • o ^  * 'yft os
Jo se f P ieper, G érard  G ille m a n , Servais P inckaers, R om anus C essario  and Jean
OQ
P orte r, to  nam e b u t a fe w . R ather, the purpose here is  to  h ig h lig h t e lem ents w h ic h  
are com m on to  a ll v irtu e s , so th a t th is  can be used, in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  a s tudy o f  ke y  
v irtu e s , to  discuss h o w  conscience is supported and nou rished  b y  a v irtu o u s  
env ironm en t. The firs t com m on elem ent to  v irtu e s  is h ab itu s .
2. Constitutive Elements of Virtue
25 Pieper is still acknowledged as providing a major modem point o f reference for an 
understanding of virtue, particularly with regard to the cardinal virtues, but also for theological virtues. 
His major studies of these virtues are to be found in The F o u r  C a rd in a l V ir tu e s  and F a ith ,  H o p e , L o v e .
26 Cf. Gérard Gilleman, L e  p r im a t  de la  c h a r ité  en th é o lo g ie  m o ra le :  e ssa i m é th o d o lo g iq u e  
(Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Brussels: L ’Édition Universelle; Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1952); idem, The  
P r im a c y  o f  C h a r i ty  in  M o r a l  T he o lo g y , trans. from the 2nd French ed. (1954) by William F. Ryan and 
André Vachon (London: Bums and Oates, 1959). Vincent Leclercq offers a very informative article on 
Gilleman and the influence on his doctoral director, René Carpentier. Both were concerned with the 
separation of morals (obligation) in manualistic moral theology from the spiritual life (perfection), and 
in returning to the Fathers and Aquinas for evidence, they proposed that greater attention to charity 
would heal the rift. See Vincent Leclerq, “Le P r im a t  de la  c h a r ité  de Gilleman et la C o n s c ie n c e  de 
Carpentier: Le renouveau théologal de la vie morale,” S tu d ia  M o r a l ia  44 (2006): 353-75. For an 
example of a modem text which draws upon Gilleman’s insights on love combined with virtue theory, 
see Daniel J. Harrington and James F. Keenan, Jesus a n d  V ir tu e  E th ic s : B u i ld in g  B r id g e s  b e tw e e n  N e w  
T estam en t S tu d ie s  a n d  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y  (Lanham, MD and Chicago, IL: Sheed & Ward, 2002), 
especially 77-90.
27 Pinckaers offers us a sense of how Aquinas understood virtue in the Christian life, and how 
its place in moral theology has significantly diminished over the centuries, as well as the fact that its 
intimate relationship with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the beatitudes and the fruits of the Holy Spirit 
was lost through their relegation to asceticism or mystical theology. See Pinckaers, S o u rce s  o f  
C h r is t ia n  E th ic s , 178-80, 225-231, as well as throughout the book.
28 Cessario’s The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s  presents an account of virtue firmly 
seated in the context of faith in the operative power of grace. Cessario therefore approaches the matter 
with “optimism about what the grace of Christ can accomplish in the life of the individual.” Ibid., 7.
29 Porter offers a very informative summary of Aquinas’s understanding of virtue in general 
and particular virtues, as well as proposals for a reformulation for the present day. See Porter, M o r a l  
A c t io n s  a n d  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,  125-200; idem, The R e co ve ry  o f  V ir tu e , 99-179.
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T he cho ices w e  m ake w ith  regard to  ou r actions are de te rm ined  b y  the  fa c u ltie s  o f  o u r 
reason and w ill.  These fa cu ltie s  are “ inde te rm ina te ,”  th a t is  open to  the  p o s s ib ility  o f
TO
choosing  good o r e v il. H ow ever, as w e have observed e a rlie r, these fa c u ltie s  are a lso 
in tim a te ly  connected to  a va rie ty  o f  o the r hum an capac itie s , fra iltie s  and 
c ircum stances, such as the passions, m em ory, te m p ta tio n  o r s in , w h ic h  e ith e r h e lp  o r 
h in d e r the cho ice  o f  the  good in  the p a rticu la r s itu a tio n . T he re fo re , in  o rd e r to  rem a in  
in  keep ing  w ith  fundam en ta l desire fo r the good p ro v id e d  b y  synderes is , w e  re q u ire  
assistance, b o th  n a tu ra l and d iv in e . M uch  o f  th is  assistance fa lls  in to  the  ca tego ry  o f  
v irtu e . A s  w e observed in  chapter three, St B onaven ture  described  the  ro le  o f  
synderesis  as a “ b ias”  (p o nd u s ), n a tu ra lly  in c lin in g  the w ill to  the  good. In  a s im ila r 
ve in , w e co u ld  describe  v irtu e  as a bias th a t w e igh ts  o u r ope ra tive  pow ers in  such as 
w a y  as to  fa c ilita te  the  cho ice  o f  the good in  the p a rtic u la r c ircum stance .32 A s  the  end 
o f  eve ry  hum an person is  ordered to  seeking the good and to  h is  o r he r p e rfe c tio n ,33 
th is  w e ig h tin g  to  the  good on the p a rt o f  v irtu e  is  n o t som e so rt o f  d is to rtio n  o f  the  
na tu re  o f  o u r hum an fa cu ltie s , bu t ra the r d irected  tow ards th e ir p e rfe c tio n .34 In  th is
2.1 Virtue as Habitus
30 Mario Pangallo, 'H a b itu s  ’ e V ita  M o ra le :  F e n o m e n o lo g ia  e F o n d a z io n e  O n to lo g ic a  (Naples 
and Rome: LER  [Libreria Editrice Redenzione], 1988), 52. Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, 
q.55, a. 1 : “potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed 
se habent indeterminatae ad multa.
31 Bonaventure, I n  I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist.39, a. 2, q. 1, resp.: “quemadmodum ab ipsa creatione 
animae in te lle c tu s  habet lu m e n , quod est sibi naturale iudicatorium, dirigens ipsum intellectum in 
cognoscendis, sic a ffe c tu s  habet naturale quoddamp o n d u s , dirigens ipsum in appetendis. [...] Dico 
enim quod synderesis dicit illud quod stimulat ad bonum” (emphasis in text).
32 Pangallo, ‘H a b itu s  ’ e V ita  M o ra le , 52: “è importante che la potenza operativa sia aiutata da 
qualcosa, da un ‘peso’, per così dire, che la faccia pendere con più facilità dalla parte del bene: e questo 
‘peso’ è la virtù [“it is important that the operative power is helped by something, by a ‘bias’, so to 
speak, that it might incline with greater facility to the side of good: and this ‘bias’ is virtue”].
33 Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q .l, aa. 5 and 7.
34 St Thomas Aquinas, Q ua es tio n e s  D is p u ta ta e  de V ir tu t ib u s , in O p e ra  O m n ia ,  vol. 8 (New 
York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949; reprint of 1852-1873 Parma ed.), Q u a e s tio  D is p u ta ta  de  V ir tu t ib u s  
in  C o m m u n i, q.l [unica], a .l, resp.: “virtus enim, secundum suum nomen, potestatis perfectionem 
demonstrat.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, D is p u te d  Q u estions  o n  V ir tu e : Q u a e s tio  D is p u ta ta  de V ir tu t ib u s  in  
C o m m u n i, Q u a e s tio  D is p u ta ta  de V ir tu tib u s  C a rd in a lib u s ,  trans, and preface by Ralph Mclnerny 
(South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999), D is p u te d  Q u e s tio n  o n  th e  V ir tu e s  in  G e n e ra l,  a .l, resp.: 
“Virtue, according to its name, points to the perfection of a power.”
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th e y  are b e tte r adapted to  the  ca rry in g  ou t o f  the  tasks fa c in g  them . G ille m a n ’ s
com m ents are h e lp fu l here:
T h is  [v ir tu e ] is  the re fo re  n o t a ‘ th in g ’ g lued  on  to  a fa c u lty . I t  is  a ‘ q u a l i t a s a 
w a y  o f  b e ing  th is  fa c u lty , a fu n c tio n a l a ttitu d e , ju s t as the  fa c u lty  its e lf, is  n o t a 
th in g  b u t a fu n c tio n  o f  ou r s p iritu a l and te n d e n tia l be ing . In  o u r v irtu o u s  
a c tiv ity , the  v irtu e  does n o t the re fo re  e lic it an act d iffe re n t fro m  th a t o f  the  
fa c u lty ; i t  is  the  fa c u lty  bettered b y  the  v irtu o u s  q u a lity  th a t e lic its  the  a c t.35
way the virtues work to overcome the indeterminate nature of the faculties, so that
T he re fo re  v irtu e  can be described as a p o s itive  q u a litita tiv e  change in  a fa c u lty  
w hose be tte rm en t in  tu rn  e ffects  the p e rfe c tio n  o f  an a c tio n .36 A q u in a s  says th a t th is  
good q u a lity  deve lops and in te n s ifie s  w ith  the re p e titio n  o f  acts th a t are in  keep ing  
w ith  the  q u a lity , in  such a w ay th a t the q u a lita tive  s h ift becom es a h a b itu s , th a t is , a 
state o r stab le , lo n g -la s tin g  d isp o s itio n  th a t is  d if f ic u lt  to  change.38 I t  is  the  d u ra b ility
35 Gilleman, L e  p r im a t  de la  c h a r ité  en th é o lo g ie  m o ra le  (1952 éd.), 28: Celle-ci [la vertu] 
n’est donc pas une ‘chose’ collée sur une faculté. Elle est une ‘ q u a li ta s ’ , une manière d’être de cette 
faculté, une attitude fonctionelle, de la même façon que la faculté elle-même n’est pas une chose, mais 
une fonction de notre être spirituel et tendanciel. Dans notre activité vertueuse, la vertu n’élicite donc 
pas un acte différent de celui de la faculté; c ’est la faculté améliorée par la qualité vertueuse qui élicite 
l’acte.” Cf. idem, T he  P r im a c y  o f  C h a r i ty  in  M o r a l  T h e o lo g y , 15. The English translation is mostly 
accurate here, though the sense of the last clause of the second sentence is clouded with an additional 
‘which’, and the word te n d a n c ie l is omitted. Cf. Pangallo, ‘H a b itu s  ’ e V ita  M o ra le ,  35: “Ph a b itu s  
pertiene alia ‘natura’ del soggetto e non è qualcosa di totalemente accidentale (nel senso di ‘per 
accidens’)” [“the h a b itu s  relates to the ‘nature’ of the subject and is not something totally accidental (in 
the sense o f ‘per accidens’)”].
36 Gilleman, T he  P r im a c y  o f  C h a r i ty  in  M o r a l  T he o lo g y , 15: “Our action is creative: it leaves 
in the faculty an ontological trace, a quality growing with the repetition of the same act. This quality 
which fosters the perfection of action -  h a b itu s  o p e ra tiv u s  bonus  -  is virtue.”
37 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.51, aa. 2 and 3; la Ilae, q.52; la Ilae, q.63, a.2. The 
exception to this is virtue infused by divine intervention. In this case, Aquinas states that human acts do 
not cause the development of these virtues. See ibid., Ia Ilae, q.63, a.2, resp.
38 Aquinas draws his interpretation of h a b itu s  from Aristotle’s hex is . Cf. Aristotle, 
N ic h o m a c h e a n  E th ic s ,  II, 6, 1106b 36; idem, M e ta p h y s ic s , V, 19, 1022b 1-3: “We call a disposition the 
arrangement o f that which has parts, in respect either of place or of capacity or of kind”; Cessario, The  
M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 7, 34, 38. Accordingly, Aquinas defines h a b itu s  as a disposition. 
See Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae q.49, a.4, resp.: “ h a b itu s  est d is p o s it io ”  (emphasis in text). 
However, he is also careful to distinguish h a b itu s , in effect a stable disposition, from simply a passing 
disposition which can be easily changed. See ibid., Ia Ilae, q.49, a.2, ad 3 : “ista differentia, d if f ic i le  
m o b ile , non diversificat habitum ab aliis speciebus qualitatis, sed a dispositione: [...] ex quo patet, quod 
nomen h a b itu s  diutumitatem quamdam importât, non autem nomen dispositionis” (emphasis in text). 
See Pangallo, ‘H a b itu s  ' e V ita  M o ra le ,  38-39. The depth of influence of h a b itu s  implies they almost 
form part of the person’s nature, and as a result they are only lost with difficulty, through acts contrary 
to its disposition (whether virtuous or vicious), or through lengthy cessation of acting in accord with its 
attitude. Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.53, a .l, ad 1: “habitus similitudinem habet naturae;
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o f  the  v irtu o u s  h a b itu s  th a t b rings  about the o rd e rin g  o f  the fa c u ltie s  so th a t th e y  use 
th e ir p o w e r fre e ly  fo r  the  good.
A s  a h a b itu s  w o rks  in  coopera tion  w ith  free  w ill,  one shou ld  n o t see h a b itu s , 
o r v irtu e  in  p a rtic u la r, as s im p ly  an unconscious, ing ra in e d  h a b it, b ro u g h t abou t so le ly  
b y  re p e titio u s  a c tio n .40 I t  is  true  tha t re p e titio n  o f  acts conducive  to  the  deve lop m e n t 
o f  a v irtu e  {h a b itu s ) is  necessary in  the case o f  acqu ired  v irtu e s , as w e have observed. 
H ow eve r, C essario cau tions th a t one shou ld  n o t reduce th e ir deve lop m e n t to  th is  
a lone. H e p o in ts  o u t th a t A qu inas couples re p e titio n  w ith  r ig h t reason th a t is  a lso in  
tune w ith  the  D iv in e  L a w .41 B y  means o f  reason th a t has been e n lig h te n e d  b y  the  
D iv in e  L a w  a person judges a ce rta in  act to  be good o r bad, and th e re fo re  co n duc ive  
o r d e trim e n ta l to  the  b u ild in g  up o f  a v irtu o u s  character.42 In  th is  w a y  an act is  ju d g e d  
w he ther i t  is  w o rth y  o f  repeating . T h is  means th a t v irtu e  as an o p e ra tio n a l h a b itu s  is  
ru le d  b y  hum an reason and D iv in e  L a w ;43 the  d isp o s itio n  to  act in  a ce rta in  w a y  is
deficit tamen ab ipsa”; ibid., Ia Ilae, q.53, a .l, ad 1: “habitus saltern difficile removetur”; ibid., Ia Ilae, 
q.53, aa.2-3.
39 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.55, a .l, resp.: “potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt 
propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminatae ad multa: 
determinantur autem ad actus per habitus [...]; et ideo v ir tu te s  h u m a n a e  h a b itu s  s u n f  ’ (emphasis in 
text). See also Ia Ilae, q.55, a .l, ad 2.
40 Cessario, The M o r a l  V irtu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 34-35, 99-100. To that extent, modern- 
day use of ‘habit’ is far from equivalent to h a b itu s . Drawing upon an insight made by Anthony Kenny, 
Herbert McCabe states that “a h a b itu s  makes it easier to do what you want to do whereas a habit makes 
it harder not to do what you don’t want to do; nevertheless you do not do something out o f a h a b itu s  
like, say justice, because it is easier but because it is what you really want to do.” See McCabe, “Virtue 
and Truth,” 167.
41 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.63, a.2, resp.: “virtus hominis perficit ipsum ad 
bonum [...] oportet quod bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulum consideretur. Quae quidem est 
d u p le x , [...], scilicet: r a t io  h u m a n a , et le x  d iv in a ” (emphasis in text).
42 Aquinas, D is p u te d  Q u e s tio n  on  the  V irtu e s  in  G e n e ra l, a.2, ad 10: “For virtue is ordered by 
reason to the good or fitting act”; idem, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  C o m m u n i, q .l, a.2, ad 10: “Nam virtus 
ordinatur ad actum bonum, qui est actus debitus, et ordinatus secundum rationem; [...] et hoc modo 
virtuti opponitur peccatum, quod proprie nominat actum inordinatum.” This comment was made by 
Vincent de Castro Novo in the absence of Thomas’s response to some of the objections.
43 Aquinas points out that Divine Law is the superior rule, and so human reason in its 
judgements is subject to it. Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.63, a.2, resp. This would imply a 
defined notion of the good which contains a particular teleology, namely that which leads to beatitude. 
Cf. Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.3, a.8. In this way, as commented on previously, Porter critcises the incomplete 
teleology presented in MacIntyre’s A fte r  V ir tu e , which substitutes the objective good corresponding to 
our nature with the narrative unity of a human life as the organising principle of human life. Cf. Porter, 
The R e c o v e ry  o f  V ir tu e , 83: “Aquinas, on the other hand insists that in order for a human life to be truly 
successful, it is not enough' to be structured around some goal. The goal chosen must be the correct
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the re fo re  shaped b y  r ig h t judgem en t. U pon fu rth e r re fle c tio n , how e ve r, w e b e g in  to  
rea lise  th a t p ra c tic a l reason is  in  its e lf in  need o f  deve lopm ent o r p e rfe c tio n  so th a t i t  
can ju d g e  r ig h tly , and th is  is  achieved la rg e ly  th ro u g h  a v irtu e , nam e ly  p rudence , the 
key in te lle c tu a l v irtu e  in  the p ra c tica l rea lm , to  w h ic h  w e sha ll re tu rn  s h o rtly .44
T he re fo re , p ro v id e d  th a t w e do no t m is in te rp re t h a b itu s  as som e k in d  o f  b lin d  
obedience, th a t is , s im p ly  a process o f  h a b itua tion  th a t leads to  m echan ica l re p e titio n  
o f  acts in  accord  w ith  C h ris tia n  life ,45 hab itu s  helps us in  tw o  w ays in  o u r 
understand ing  o f  v irtu e  and the m o ra l life . F irs tly , the  n o tio n  o f  h a b itu s  presupposes 
“ a concep tio n  o f  the  hum an person [th a t is ] open to  deve lopm ent and m o d ific a tio n  
fro m  b o th  n a tu ra l and d iv in e  causes.” 46 W h ile  ta k in g  in to  accoun t the  s trugg les o f  
each in d iv id u a l th ro u g h  b io lo g ic a l and p sych o lo g ica l m ake-up and in  the  face o f  
te m p ta tio n , such a dynam ic  understanding o f  the hum an person  p reven ts  us fro m  
re duc ing  m o ra lity , and even v irtu e , to  m ere com pliance  w ith  o b lig a tio n , to  som e k in d  
o f  b e h a v io u rism , free  fro m  re sp o n s ib ility , m e rit o r b lam e, o r to  som e so rt o f  
e v o lu tio n a ry  th e o ry  o f  se lf-in te re s t, so c ia lly  c o n tro lle d  fo r m u tu a l g a in .47 Instead  o f  
these, a m o ra lity  o f  v irtu e  b u ilt on the n o tio n  o f  h ab itu s  a llo w s  us to  m a in ta in  c re d ib le  
hope in  the  p o s s ib ility  o f  becom ing be tte r peop le ,48 h o lie r peop le ,49 m ore  C h ris t-lik e
goal”; MacIntyre, A fte r  V ir tu e , 162, at 219: “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good 
life for man.” Porter suggests that MacIntyre changed his mind subsequently, as evidenced in his later 
writing. Cf. Porter, The R e co ve ry  o f  V ir tu e , 195, n. 15; Alasdair MacIntyre, W hose J u s t ic e ?  W h ic h  
R a t io n a lity ?  (London: Duckworth, 1988), 402; idem, T hree  R iv a l V e rs ions  o f  M o r a l  E n q u ir y ,  63.
44 Aquinas, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  C o m m u n i, q .l, a.6, resp.: “ita oportet quod ratio practica 
perficiatur aliquo habitu ad hoc quod recte dijudicet de bono humano secundum singula agenda. Et 
haec virtus dicitur prudentia”; idem, D is p u te d  Q u e s tio n  o n  the  V irtu e s  in  G e n e ra l,  a.6, resp. “so too 
practical reason is perfected by a habit in order that it might rightly judge the human good with respect 
to all the things that must be done. This virtue is called prudence.”
45 Cessario, The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 35-36.
46 Ibid., 36.
47 For an example of this view, see Matt Ridley, The O r ig in s  o f  V ir tu e , (London: Penguin, 
1997), 147: “The virtuous are virtuous for no other reason than that it enables them to join forces with 
others who are virtuous, to mutual benefit.”
48 Cessario, The M o r a l  V irtues  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 40: “Christian theology, supported by 
the New Testament’s assertion of the radical power that grace holds out to the human person, supposes 
that such a virtuous transformation of the self can occur in many circumstances. H a b itu s  provides the
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peop le .50 Such a d e sc rip tio n  m ay sound na ive  o r fo o lis h ly  o p tim is tic , b u t to  re je c t the 
p o s s ib ility  o f  g ro w th  in  goodness and ho liness w o u ld  be tan tam oun t to  b e com ing  
de fe a tis t in  o u r m o ra ls , and also e ffe c tiv e ly  to  d e c la rin g  the H o ly  S p ir it in o p e ra tiv e  in  
o u r live s .
S econd ly, h a b itu s  o ffe rs  us an understand ing o f  h o w  w e  g ro w  in  fre e d o m  in  
o u r m o ra l a c tio n .51 H a b itu s  n o t o n ly  creates a fa c ility  in  d o in g  ce rta in  acts, b u t a 
g rea te r desire  to  do them . The m ore ou r w il l is  desirous o f  w h a t reason com m ands, 
the  fre e r w e  are, in  th a t coopera tion  w ith  the  r ig h t o r ju s t act is  n o t s im p ly
CO
accom p lished  th ro u g h  coe rc ion , b u t th rough  a re c o g n itio n  o f  its  tru th , and a 
co rrespond ing  desire  th a t the act shou ld  be done. I t  is  p re c ise ly  the  s tre n g th  o f  th is  
free  cho ice  w h ic h  a lte rs  the character o f  an ac tion , in  th a t i t  is  ca rrie d  o u t p ro m p tly , 
e a s ily  and jo y fu lly .54 The v irtu e s , as p a rtic u la r fo rm s o f  h a b itu s , a ll assist the
metaphysical basis for elaborating a moral theology confident enough of itself to give serious attention 
to this kind of personal transformation.”
49 Melina points out “the novelty of the approach” of the C a te ch ism  o f  th e  C a th o lic  C h u rc h ,  
which, finally recovers the centrality of a “vocation to holiness” as the key notion to Christian morality. 
Cf. Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V irtues , 165-77, at 166; C C C , nos. 1691-98; Twomey, “Moral Renewal 
Through Renewed Moral Reasoning,” 229. In this way, rather than shying away from it through fear, 
apathy or pessimism, we recognise the reality and impact of the “dignity” of our Christian calling, the 
fact that we are “called to be saints.” Cf. 1 Cor 1:2; C C C , nos. 1691,1695; St Leo the Great, S e rm o  
X X I  in  N a t iv ita te  D o m in i  I ,  3, PL 54, 192C: “Agnosce, o Christiane, dignitatem tuam, et divinae 
consors factus naturae, noli in veterem vilitatem degeneri conversationem redire.”
50 Cf. St Ambrose, I n  P s a lm u m  X X X V I  E n a r ra t io ,  65, PL 14, 1001: “cum de virtute loquimur, 
ipse [Christus] est.” Cessario paraphrases this as: “When we speak about virtue, we speak about 
Christ.” See Cessario, T he  M o r a l  V irtu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 150.
51 Clearly, the notion of freedom related to h a b itu s , and hence virtue, is a freedom for 
excellence, as opposed to a nominalist freedom of indifference. See Pinckaers, S o u rce s  o f  C h r is t ia n  
E th ic s ,  2 2 5 ,2 4 6 .
52 McCabe, “Virtue and Truth,” 167: “The one with the virtue of justice acts not because he 
finds it easier to be just, but because his will, his love, is set on justice.”
53 Ibid.: “The one who lacks the virtue of justice may, indeed, do what is just, but he will do 
so, not from love o f justice, but from, for example, fear of retribution, human or divine. He is, to this 
extent, less free. Freedom, as I understand it, has two conditions: first, a free act is one which in the 
same circumstances might have been different, and secondly, it has its origin in the agent and not in 
some coercive power.” Cf. MacIntyre, A fte r  V ir tu e , 150: “The genuinely virtuous agent [...] acts on the 
basis o f true and rational judgment.”
54 Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.50, a .l, resp.: “corpus disponitur, et habilitatur 
ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae”; ibid., Ia Ilae, q.65, a.3, arg.2: “Qui habet habitum 
virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt virtutis, et ei secundum se placent: unde et s ig n u m  h a b itu s  est 
d e le c ta tio , q u a e  f i t  in  o p e re , ut dicitur in 2. Ethicorum” (emphasis in text); idem, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  
C o m m u n i, q .l, a .l, resp.; “facile [...] inpromptu [...] delectabiter, perfecta operatio compleatur”; 
Cessario, The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 7 ,4 7 .
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in d iv id u a l to  u n ite  the  w ill to  reason, as w e ll as re fin e  the  unde rstan d ing  o f  reason in  
the  f ir s t p lace . T h is  im p lie s  th a t the v irtu e s  are n o t o n ly  cen tra l to  the  fo rm a tio n  o f  the  
m eans to  o u r n a tu ra l and supernatura l ends o f  happiness and bea titud e , b u t as h a b itu s  
they  a lso fo rm  p a rt o f  the co n d itio n  o f  happiness its e lf in  the  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  the  
person to  a c tin g  w ith  exce llence  and w ith  jo y  in  accordance w ith  G o d ’ s w il l  re fle c te d  
in  h is  nature  and in  R e ve la tio n .55
2 .2  O ther E lem en ts  o f  Virtue
2 .2 .1  T h e O rigin  o f  V irtue
T here is  a re c ip ro c a l re la tio n sh ip  betw een acts and v irtu e  in  th a t m o ra l cha racte r and 
persona l in te g rity  are b o th  fo rm ed  and revealed b y  a v irtu o u s  life . B u t w here  do the  
v irtu e s  fin d  th e ir  o rig in ?  In  answ ering th is  question  w e e s tab lish  the  f ir s t fo rm  o f  
c la s s ific a tio n  in  th a t w e can d iv id e  v irtu e s  in to  tw o  types: acqu ired  and in fused . 
In d iv id u a l v irtu e s  in  th e ir p e rfe c tio n  are e ith e r acqu ired th ro u g h  hum an e ffo rt, o r 
in fu se d  in  us b y  G od  as pure g ift. O ur na tu ra l appetites operate as the  basis o r seedbed 
fo r  acqu ired  v ir tu e .56 Y e t an in c lin a tio n  fo r ju s tic e  o r p rudence is  fa r fro m  the 
pe rfected  a b ility , and so acqu ired v irtu e  needs to  develop th ro u g h  the  re p e titio n  o f  
v irtu o u s  a c tiv ity . H ow eve r, g iven  o u r w ounded nature, th ro u g h  o rig in a l s in , the  
o rdered desire  fo r  v irtu e  is  lo s t and so the deve lopm ent and m a in tenance o f  v irtu e
55 MacIntyre, A fte r V ir tu e , 184, 149: “but the exercise of the virtues is not in this sense a  
means to the end of the good for man. For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life 
lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life. [...] To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act 
against inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation o f virtues” (emphasis in text). 
Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.108, a.2: “virtutes perficiunt nos ad prosequendum debito 
modo inclinationes naturales, quae pertinent ad jus naturale.”
56 Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.63, a .l, resp.: “virtus est homini naturalis 
secundum quamdam inchoationem” [“virtue is natural to man according to a certain beginning”]. In 
other words, the beginnings of virtue are innate; Cessario, The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s ,  
98.
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rem ains a constan t s trugg le  fo r  us.57 In  con trast, in fused  v irtu e s  “ are e n tire ly  fro m  
w ith o u t,”  in  th a t th e y  are bestow ed upon us fu lly  and fre e ly  b y  G od. A q u in a s  draw s 
upon  S t A u g u s tin e ’ s d e fin itio n  o f  v irtu e  to  express the sp e c ific  na tu re  o f  in fu se d  
v irtu e s , s ta tin g  th a t th e y  are q u a litie s  o f  the m in d  “ w h ich  G od  w o rks  in  us w ith o u t 
us.” 59 Thus, the  graces o f  in fused  v irtu e s  are g ive n  to  us as p e rfe c te d  d is p o s itio n s .60 
H ow eve r, the  fa c t th a t acqu ired  v irtu e  is  n o t obta ined w ith o u t e ffo rt on  o u r p a rt {non  
sine n ob is  a g e n tib u s ), does n o t m ean th a t G od is  no t in v o lv e d  in  the  o r ig in  o f  these 
v irtu e s  as w e ll. G od is  opera tive  in  a ll th in g s , and the re fo re  supports a ll o u r good 
actions as the  ro o t C ause.61
2 .2 .2  F u rth er  C la ssifica tion s o f  V irtue
The d is tin c tio n  betw een in fused  and acqu ired  v irtu e  can be fu rth e r su b d iv id e d  
acco rd ing  to  fu n c tio n . A c c o rd in g ly , v irtu e s  are id e n tifie d  as in te lle c tu a l,62 m o ra l,63 o r
57 Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.85, a.3, resp.: “ipsa destitutio v u ln e ra t io  n a tu ra e  
dicitur” (emphasis in text); Cessario, The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s ,  96-98.
58 Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.63, a .l, resp.: “praeter virtutes theologicas, quae 
sunt totaliter ab extrinseco”; Porter, The R e co ve ry  o f  V ir tu e , 169.
59 Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.55, a.4, arg.l and ad 6: “Q u a m  D e u s  in  n o b is  
s in e  n o b is  o p e ra tu r "  (emphasis in text); Augustine, D e  L ib e ro  A r b i t r io ,  II, 19, PL 32, 1267-68; idem, 
O n  F re e  C h o ic e  o f  th e  W ill,  trans. with introduction and notes by Thomas Williams (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1993), II, 19 (page 67).
60 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.63, a .l, resp.The fact that we are graced with 
perfected infused dispositions does not mean that they are necessarily acted upon. See ibid., Ha Ilae 
q.47, a. 14, ad 3. Equally such infusion with grace has to be with our consent, or at least without our 
refusal. Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.55, a.4, ad 6.
61 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.55, a.4, ad 6: “quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in 
nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus; ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate, et natura.” See Bernard 
Lonergan’s comments on Aquinas’s use of the Aristotelian doctrine of premotion with regard to God’s 
action in our will and in our virtuous choices and actions. Such premotion, however, does not take 
away our free-will. Thus, habitual grace is “operative and cooperative.” Cf. C o lle c te d  W o rks  o f  
B e rn a rd  L o n e rg a n ,  vol. 1, G ra c e  a n d  F re e d o m : O p e ra tiv e  G ra c e  in  the  T h o u g h t o f  S t  T ho m a s  A q u in a s ,  
ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University o f Toronto 
Press, 2000), 58-64, at 64, 73-75, 101-104; Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.9, a.6, ad 3. See also 
O’Meara’s comments on the lack of due acknowledgement by many writers of the supernatural basis of 
Aquinas’s virtue theory. O’Meara says that failure to note this presents a distorted understanding of 
Aquinas, and also presents grace as some kind of added extra, rather than the source and summit of 
virtue. Thomas O’Meara, “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” T h e o lo g ic a l S tu d ie s  58 
(1997): 254-85, at 258: “Aquinas’s theological ethic of virtues flows fully and necessarily from a 
divine presence called grace.”
62 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, q.57.
63 Ibid., Ia Ilae, qq.58-60.
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th e o lo g ic a l in  na tu re ,64 w ith  the la tte r be ing  in fused  b y  G od. The ke y  v irtu e s  w h ic h  
shape o u r ac tions  are the  ca rd ina l v irtu e s  o f  prudence, ju s tic e , tem perance and 
fo rtitu d e .65 These v irtu e s , a long  w ith  th e ir subordinates are based u p o n  o u r hum an 
nature  and c a p a b ilitie s  and so lo o k  to  achieve the hum an good  o f  happ iness, b u t the  
th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s  o f  fa ith , hope and lo ve  lo o k  beyond the  end o f  the  hum an good, 
s h iftin g  o u r pe rspective  to  o u r supernatura l end and ou r e te rna l good o f  b e a titu d e .66 In  
d ire c tin g  the  reason and the w ill,  the  v irtu e s  p ro v id e  the  e x is te n tia l co n te x t o r 
e n v iro n m e n t fo r  the  w o rk in g s  o f  conscience, shaping its  ju d g e m e n t o f  the  good. I t  is  
fo r  th is  reason th a t, w ith  p a rtic u la r re ference to  the  ca rd in a l and th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s , 
V e rita tis  S p le n d o r  a ffirm s  th a t o u r conscience is  fo rm ed  b y  the  v irtu e s  in  such a w a y  
th a t i t  a tta ins a grea te r a ffin ity  fo r  w ha t is  good and tru e .67
2 .2 .3  C on n ection  o r  C om petition  am on g  V irtues?
C lass ica l v irtu e  th e o ry  de fined  v irtu e s  concerned w ith  m o ra lity  to  be u n ite d , equa l, 
and o b se rv in g  o f  the  m ean.68 D ra w in g  fro m  the c lassica l w rite rs , the  C h u rch  Fathers
64 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.62.
65 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.61. James Keenan has proposed a revised list o f cardinal virtues (prudence, 
justice, fidelity and self-care), since he considers the original list to be “deceptively simple and 
inadequate,” principally because they lack sufficient reference to the relational quality of the human 
person, and because the virtues shift their order of priority according to the case in hand, rather than 
conform to a fixed hierarchy, as in the classical theory. I do not find Keenan’s argument convincing.
To suggest the replacement of fortitude and temperance with fidelity and self-care because the former 
terms lack sufficient reference to relationship seems to be misguided, as the “fundamental” 
anthropology of the cardinal virtues would lose any reference to affective virtue, necessary for ordering 
the passions. Moreover, Keenan presents the three relational virtues in his revised list as separate, 
competing virtues. However, I find it difficult to see how fidelity and self-care are not simply examples 
of justice. In fidelity an individual is given that which is his/her own through actions that give due 
respect to the other and express the bond of honesty and mutual trust between individuals. In self-care 
one recognises the right to safety and well-being. Thus, these seem to be examples of justice, rather 
than separate categories. Cf. James F. Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” T h e o lo g ic a l S tu d ie s  56 
(1995): 709-29, at 714 and 718; Harrington and Keenan, Jesus a n d  V ir tu e  E th ic s ,  123-26; James F. 
Keenan, M o r a l  W isd o m : Lessons  a n d  Texts f r o m  th e  C a th o lic  T ra d it io n  (Lanham, Boulder, New York, 
Toronto, and Oxford: Sheed & Ward/Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 139-57.
66 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.62, a.2, resp.
67 See V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r, 64; A A S  85 (1993), 1183.
68 Aristotle, N ic h o m a c h e a n  E th ic s ,  II, 1106a 26, 1107a 1, 1107a 15 and X , 1178a 16-19. Cf. 
Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ia Ilae, qq.64-66. Perhaps ‘connected’ is better than ‘unity’in describing 
the relationship among the virtues, as it reflects the distinction made by Aristotle that the virtues are
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presented the  d o c trin e  o f  the  connection  o f  v irtu e s  w ith  g reat con fid e n ce . T hus, Pope 
S t G rego ry  the  G reat declared in  h is  M o r a l ia  th a t “ one v irtu e  w ith o u t th e  o thers is  
e ith e r a b so lu te ly  n o th in g  o r im p e rfe c t.” 69 S im ila rly , S t A u g u s tin e  sta ted th a t the 
v irtu e s  o f  the  hum an m in d  are inseparab le .70 A s w e can see fro m  h is  w r itin g , S t 
Thom as re a ffirm s  the  c lass ica l and p a tris tic  v ie w , though  w ith  ce rta in  re fin e m e n ts .71 
H ow eve r, in  recen t tim es, w ith  the re v iv a l o f  in te res t in  v irtu e , som e have questioned  
the v e ra c ity  o f  the  v ie w  th a t the v irtu e s  are connected. Indeed , som e au thors w o u ld  
contend th a t ce rta in  v irtu e s  are n o t o n ly  d isconnected, b u t com e in to  d ire c t c o n flic t
79
w ith  one another.
T w o  m a in  fo c a l p o in ts  fo r  a p a rtia l o r to ta l re je c tio n  o f  the  co n n e c tio n  o f  
v irtu e s  conce rn  the  h ie ra rch ica l structu re  o f  c lassica l th e o ry  and the  apparen t 
o p p o s itio n  o f  ce rta in  v irtu e s . James Keenan states th a t “ T hom as’ s s truc tu re  in s is ts  on 
a h ie ra rc h ic a l u n ifo rm ity  th a t does n o t an tic ip ta te  o r a d m it c o n flic t.” 73 The c ritic is m  
here is  th a t such r ig id  s tructu re  fa ils  to  represent the re a lity  o f  v irtu o u s  liv in g , as th is  
is  fa r m ore  tu rb u le n t in  p rac tice , in  th a t the v irtu e s  jo s tle  fo r  p o s itio n  depend ing  upon 
the c ircum stance . In  th is  w ay, accord ing  to  th is  v ie w , prudence n o t o n ly  has to  de fin e  
the goa l o f  each v irtu e , b u t also has the task o f  g iv in g  appropria te  o rd e r o r p r io r ity  to
connected but different in purpose, in contrast to the view of Socrates, who believed in the unity and 
identity of virtues. See notes by Terence Irwin in the Hackett edition of the N ic h o m a c h a e c m  E th ic s , 
pages 254-55.
69 Cf. Gregory the Great, M o r a l ia  in  Jo b , XXII, 1,2, PL 7 6 ,212 : “Una itaque virtus sine aliis, 
aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta”; Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae 65, a .l, s.c.
70 Cf. Augustine, D e  T r in ita te ,  VI, 4, PL 42, 927: “[Virtutes] nullo modo tamen separantur ab 
invicem”; Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae 65, a .l, s.c.
71 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.65, a .l, resp. and ad 1. In his first reply (ad 1), St 
Thomas deals with the matter of certain virtues not being common to all, such as magnificence and 
magnanimity. His solution is to describe a fully virtuous person who does not yet display them as 
having them in “proximate potentiality” { in  p o te n t ia  p ro p in q u a ) .  Cessario describes this capacity for 
developing as yet unsused virtues as having the virtue in  p re p a ra t io n e  a n im a e . Cf. Cessario, T he  M o r a l  
V irtu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 140-41.
72 Cf. For a review and bibliography of different authors who hold that virtues stand in 
conflict, see William Spohn, “The Return of Virtue Ethics,” T h e o lo g ic a l S tu d ie s  53 (1992): 60-75 at 
70-74; and Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 718-22.
73 Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 718.
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the v irtu e s .74 A s  fa r as I  can see, Keenan’ s understand ing  o f  v irtu e  as presented b y  
A q u in a s  appears to  be ve ry  com partm enta lised, in  th a t he says th a t “ the re  are no 
shared g rounds am ong [the  v irtu e s ] by  w h ic h  the c la im s o f  one ano the r co u ld  
a p p ro p ria te ly  cha llenge  o r co n tra d ic t the c la im s o f  the o th e r.” 75 T hus, Keenan 
presents a v e ry  r ig id  in te rp re ta tio n  o f  A q u in a s ’ s v irtu e  th e o ry , w here  each v irtu e  is  
sub jec t to  a s tr ic t o rder, and devo id  o f  any ove rlap  in  a c tiv ity .76 M y  o w n  re a d in g  o f  
A q u in a s  w o u ld  lead m e to  a descrip tion  o f a v irtu e  the o ry  w ith  s truc tu re  and o rder, 
bu t I  w o u ld  n o t agree th a t a c lea r-cu t separation betw een v irtu e s  is  in  ev idence . T rue , 
a ce rta in  v irtu e  is  a v irtu e  o f  a p a rtic u la r aspect o f  hum an liv in g , be i t  fa irness  in  one ’ s 
actions, o r the  deve lopm ent o f  an even tem per. I f  th is  w ere n o t the  case, then  w e 
w o u ld  e ith e r have no v irtu e s  in  re a lity  o r no w ay o f  d e scrib in g  th e m  in  any s p e c ific  
w ay. H o w e ve r, such c la s s ific a tio n  does no t m ean th a t A qu inas saw  no  o ve rla p , and 
hence no coope ra tio n , betw een the v irtu e s .77 Such a v ie w  w o u ld  deny th e  coheren t 
m ode l he w as try in g  to  p rom ote . Indeed, S t Thom as states th a t as w e ll as each h a v in g  
its  o w n  s p e c ific  ro le , the  v irtu e s  “ o v e rflo w ”  (re d u n d a n t) in to  each o the r, such th a t one
TO t________________________________________ _
capac ity  strengthens another. In  th is  w ay, the v irtu e s  are presented b y  Thom as as n o t 
o n ly  connected, b u t a lso coopera ting , w ith  prudence lead ing  the  w a y .79
I t  is  th e  question  o f  coopera tion  th a t fo rm s the core o f  the  second argum ent 
aga inst the  co n n e c tio n  o f  v irtu e s . R ather than accepting  the n o tio n  o f  a h a rm o n y in  the
74 Ibid., 722.
75 Ibid., 718.
76 Ibid.: “The components of the human and the act are so distinctively divided that the claims 
of one do not overlap into the claims of another.”
77 Ibid., 722: “Thus the virtues are related to one another not in some inherent way, as they 
seem to be in the classical list of the cardinal virtues. Nor do they complement one another per se.”
78 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.61, a.4, ad 1: “Vel potest dici, quod istae quotuor 
virtutes denominantur ab invicem, per redundantiam quamdam.” [“And it may also be said that these 
four virtues are qualified (or defined) by each other by a kind of overflow”]. In this passage the 
description of overflow is a cascade from one virtue to another, starting with prudence. However, in 
other passages, Aquinas describes a cyclical process of prudence and moral virtues correcting or 
ordering each other. Therefore, one might suggest that the virtues overflow into each other, rather than 
simply “onto one another.” Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.58, a.5.
79 Cf. Aquinas, Ia Ilae, q.61, a.4, ad 1; Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r , 103-4.
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v irtu o u s  life , m any authors w o u ld  describe a s itu a tio n  o f  c o n flic t, h o ld in g  th a t the 
v irtu e s  oppose each o th e r.80 F o r exam ple, S tan ley H auerw as considers the  com pe ting  
dem ands in  o u r re la tio n sh ip s  w ith  others, the “ c o n flic t o f  lo y a ltie s  and ro le s ”  in  o u r 
live s , to  be evidence aga inst the u n ity  o f  v irtu e .81 O thers focus th e ir a tte n tio n  m ore 
s p e c ific a lly  on  the  c o n flic t betw een ju s tic e  and ch a rity  (o r its  cognates, such as 
benevo lence, m e rcy  o r kindness). W illia m  Frankena sees the  p o te n tia l fo r  c o n flic t 
betw een the  p rin c ip le s  o f  beneficence and ju s tic e , bo th  on a pe rsona l le v e l and a t the 
le ve l o f  so c ia l p o lic y , in  such a w ay th a t there is  no fo rm u la  w h ic h  w ill reso lve  o r
• * 89
preven t th e ir o p p o s itio n .
T h is  pe rce ived  c o n flic t betw een ju s tic e  and c h a rity  has c o n trib u te d  
s ig n ific a n tly  to  the  shape o f  m odem  m ora l d iscourse, le a d in g  W illia m  S pohn to  
observe th a t “ there  is  a tension  betw een lo ve  and ju s tic e  tha t p lagues m uch  o f  m odem  
e th ics .” 83 H o w e ve r, the  experience o f  fin d in g  i t  d if f ic u lt  to  re co n c ile  strong  
d isp o s itio n s  o f  m ercy and ju s tic e  o r the n o tio n  th a t one v irtu e  m ig h t “ tem pe r”
80 Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 718.
81 According to Hauerwas, it is the narrative of our lives that give the order and unity to the 
virtues, rather than some inherent, pre-existent order. Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, A  C o m m u n ity  o f  
C h a ra c te r :  T o w a rd  a  C o n s tru c t iv e  C h r is t ia n  S o c ia l E th ic  (Notre Dame, IN and London: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981), 143-45, at 144; Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 722. Porter bases her 
reflection on the challenges of life on Hauerwas’s comments. She concludes that the conflicting 
loyalties to particular aims and obligations will lead at times to a clash, “creating tension and 
disharmony in the life o f even the best of us.” Cf. Porter, The R e co ve ry  o f  V ir tu e , 168. Hauerwas seems 
to wholly underestimate the complexity of Aquinas’s moral theory when he reduces it to a bald 
description o f the unity o f virtues, which makes no reference even to imperfect virtue. See Hauerwas, A  
C o m m u n ity  o f  C h a ra c te r ,  136: “Aristotle and Aquinas are right to think that moral growth is dependent 
on the development of character sufficient to claim one’s behavior as one’s own. But they were 
incorrect to assume that the development of such a self is b u t  the reflection of the prior unity of the 
virtues” (emphasis mine). This description seems to be a surprisingly sweeping oversimplification.
82 William Frankena, E th ic s , 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 52: “I see 
no way out of this. It does seem to me that the two principles may come into conflict, both at the level 
of individual action and at that of social policy, and I know of no formula that will always tell us how 
to solve such conflicts.” Cf. A.D.M. Walder, “Virtue and Character,” P h ilo s o p h y  64 (1989): 349-62, at 
356: “Justice and kindness are, beyond a certain point, incompatible as traits of character because they 
presuppose personal qualities which do not as a matter of fact cohere well together in a single 
personality.
83 Spohn, “The Return of Virtue Ethics,” 71-72, at 72.
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ano the r,84 are n o t enough to  suggest th a t v irtu o u s  d isp o s itio n s  c o n flic t “ in  
p rin c ip le .” 85 I t  is  m ore  lik e ly  th a t the fo rm e r s itu a tio n  o f  c o n flic t represents the 
experience o f  im p e rfe c t v irtu e , w here the in d iv id u a l has no t y e t reached a h a rm o n y  o f  
d isp o s itio n s  o r a deve loped sense o f  prudence,86 and the la tte r d e s c rip tio n  o f  one 
v irtu e  te m p e rin g  another e xe m p lifie s  a coopera tion  o f  v irtu e s  th a t is  ap t to  the 
c ircum stances, ra th e r than  ev idenc in g  any sta rk  c o n flic t.87 Jean P o rte r a lso  suggests 
th a t i t  is  p a rt o f  o u r hum an e a rth ly  co n d itio n  th a t w e are p rone  to  te n s io n , d isha rm ony  
and re g re t, b o th  fro m  o u r s in , as St Thom as observes, and fro m  the  re a lity  o f  liv in g  
the  shared life  o f  co m m u n ity  based upon hum an goods.88 T h is  is  w h y  u ltim a te ly  the  
fu ll u n ity  o f  v irtu e  is  fo u n d  outside v irtu e s  focused on hum an goods and goa ls, 
nam e ly  in  the  th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e  o f  c h a rity ,89 fu e lle d  b y  a life  o f  grace .90 T h e re fo re , 
the d o c trin e  o f  the  connectio n  o f  v irtu e s  conveys to  us the tru th  th a t the  m o ra l person 
s trives  fo r  in te g rity  o f  life  and th a t m o ra l ac tio n  flo u rish e s  in  in te g r ity  o f  life .
84 Cf. George W. Rainbolt, “Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect Virtue” A m e r ic a n  
P h ilo s o p h ic a l Q u a r te r ly  37 (1990): 169-73, at 169. Rainbolt comments that some consider the 
tempering of justice with mercy as tampering with justice. Moreover, his use o f ‘imperfect’ in relation 
to virtue differs radically from Aquinas’s and is rooted in Kant’s notion of perfect and imperfect duties 
and obligations, with the latter being limited in its obligation. Cf. ibid., 171-72; Immanuel Kant, T he  
M e ta p h y s ic a l P r in c ip le s  o f  V ir tu e  (1797), part 1, The M e ta p h ys ics  o f  M o ra ls ,  in E th ic a l  P h ilo s o p h y ,  
trans. James W. Ellington with introduction by Warner A. Wick (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 
1983), 48, 70, 82-107, 108-11, at 48: “Imperfect duties are, therefore, merely duties o f virtue”; Spohn, 
“The Return of Virtue Ethics,” 71.
85 Spohn, “The Return of Virtue Ethics,” 70. Cf. ibid., 71: “It is not clear that because the 
merciful act tempers the specific demands of strict justice, it necessarily follow that the two virtues 
conflict in principle.” On the contrary, Spohn notes that the two virtues depend upon each other: 
“Charity may surpass justice but cannot substitute for it. On the other hand, justice specifies the duties 
that flow from the order of love.” Ibid., 74. Porter would propose that “true moral rectitude is 
necessarily grounded in the orientation of the whole personality that charity creates; and yet, charity 
cannot be exercised, or even exist, unless the moral rules generated by right reason are observed.” Jean 
Porter, uD e  O rd in e  C a r i ta t is : Charity, Friendship, and Justice in Thomas Aquinas’ S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ia e ,”  T he  T h o m is t  53 (1989): 197-213, at 213.
86 Thomas Osborne argues that modem criticism of Aquinas’s view on the connection of 
virtues is too simplistic in its presentation, and so overlooks his comments on imperfect virtue, where 
the virtues are indeed disconnected. See Thomas M. Osbome, Jr., “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in 
Aquinas,” T he  T h o m is t 71 (2007): 39-64, at 39. Cessario presents a similar case. See Cessario, The  
M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l E th ic s , 142-44. We shall return to the issue of imperfect virtue shortly.
87 Spohn, “The Return of Virtue Ethics,” 74: “Time, place, circumstances, degrees of  
proximity and need all help to determine specific duties.”
88 Porter, T he  R e c o v e ry  o f  V ir tu e , 168; Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.19, a.6, ad 3.
89 Porter, T he  R e c o v e ry  o f  V ir tu e , 169.
90 O’Meara, “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” 268, 257.
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H ow e ve r, the  cha llenge o f  s triv in g  fo r  tha t in te g rity  also m akes us fu lly  aw are o f  o u r 
need o f  G o d ’ s h e lp .91
3. C o n sc ien ce  an d  P articu la r V irtues
H a v in g  b r ie fly  o u tlin e d  ce rta in  elem ents th a t are fundam en ta l to  the  na tu re  and 
fu n c tio n  o f  v irtu e , w e tu rn  o u r a tte n tio n  n ow  to  the re la tio n sh ip  be tw een  conscience 
and in d iv id u a l v irtu e s  o r types o f  v irtu e . The se lection  o f  in d iv id u a l v irtu e s  w ill be 
necessarily  lim ite d . H ow eve r, the a im  is  to  h ig h lig h t those v irtu e s  w h ic h  h o ld  a 
specia l in flu e n c e  on  conscien tious judgem en t. W ith  th a t in  m in d , p a rtic u la r a tte n tio n  
w ill be g ive n  to  the  ca rd in a l v irtu e  o f  prudence, as its  fu n c tio n  and the  na tu re  o f  its  
re la tio n sh ip  to  conscience is  n o t o n ly  v ita l to  the fo rm a tio n  and o p e ra tio n  o f  
conscience, b u t is  a lso fundam enta l to  ou r understand ing o f  h o w  concience  and v irtu e  
w o rk  toge the r in  general.
3.1 P ru d en ce
I f  now adays ‘ v ir tu e ’ as a te rm  is  sub ject to  m isunderstand ing  and perhaps d isd a in , one 
co u ld  say th a t ‘ p rudence ’ is  even m ore susceptib le  to  m isuse in  con tem pora ry 
language. Indeed , P ieper p o in ts  ou t th a t the m eaning o f  ‘p rudence ’ has been so 
ra d ic a lly  a lte re d  th a t the  m odem  understanding o f  prudence becom es an obstacle  to  
re co g n is in g  th a t i t  co u ld  p o ss ib ly  be connected to  ju s tic e , fo rtitu d e  o r tem perance .92 
F o r exam ple , i f  prudence w ere understood as “ the slyness w h ic h  p e rm its  the  cun n in g  
and ‘ sh rew d ’ ta c tic ia n  to  evade any dangerous ris k  to  h is  pe rson ,”  th is  co w a rd ly
91 Cessario, The M o r a l  V ir tu e s  a n d  T h e o lo g ic a l Ethics, 144: “The doctrine of the connection 
o f the moral virtues makes practical sense only when we consider the transformation divine grace 
accomplishes in the person of the believer.”
92 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 3.
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in te rp re ta tio n  w o u ld  c e rta in ly  co n tra d ic t the v irtu e  o f  fo rtitu d e .93 T h is  detachm ent o f  
p rudence fro m  the o the r v irtu e s  arises fro m  a con tem pora ry  separa tion  o f  goodness 
and prudence ,94 w h ic h  runs counter to  c lassica l C h ris tia n  e th ics . P rudence is  thus 
equated w ith  “ ca u tio n ,” 95 reduced to  some k in d  o f  “ tim o ro u s , sm a ll-m in d e d  s e lf- 
p rese rva tio n ,”  re fle c tin g  “ a ra the r se lfish  concern about o n s e lf,” 96 o r understood  in  
te rm s o f  a co ld , ca lcu la tin g  o u tlo o k  based p u re ly  upon the  u t ility  o f  th e  act ( bonum
07
u tile )  ra th e r than  its  goodness o r n o b ility  ( bonum  hon estu m ). Y e t, in  the  c lass ica l 
v ie w  som eone can o n ly  be p ruden t i f  he o r she is  good at the  same tim e ,98 and no 
o the r v irtu e  can be ach ieved w ith o u t the in vo lve m e n t o f  p rudence , since prudence is  
“ the cause  o f  the  o the r v irtu e s  be ing  v irtu e s .” 99
I f  v irtu e  is  a “ pe rfected  a b ility ,”  then prudence is  “ the  pe rfe c te d  a b ility  to  
m ake r ig h t d e c is io n s ,”  to  o rde r hum an im pulses and in c lin a tio n s  and to  p u r ify  
n a tu ra lly  good  p re d isp o s itio n s , so th a t they m ig h t becom e v irtu e s .100 T he re fo re  
prudence “ in fo rm s ”  the  o the r v irtu e s  b y  g iv in g  them  th e ir essen tia l “ standard”  o r
93 Ibid., 123.
94 Ibid., 5: “To the contemporary mind, then, the concept of the good rather excludes than 
includes prudence. Modem man [...] will often call lies and cowardice prudent, truthfulness and 
courageous sacrifice imprudent.” As observed earlier, this approach abounded in Machiavelli’s 
philosophy.
95 Cf. Smith, “Can Virtue Be in the Service of Bad Acts?”, 372: “And certainly what modems 
take to be prudence is not a virtue at all, since modems take prudence to be a kind of caution, or a kind 
of calculation which would keep one out of trouble, occasionally at the cost o f compromising one’s 
principles, or at least would mean shying away from taking the risks necessary to achieve certain 
important goods.”
96 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , 4.
97 Ibid., 4, 123. According to Hibbs, as well as Machiavelli’s influence, a debased notion of 
prudence also arises partially from Kantian ethics, where there is a tendency to “segregate prudence 
from moral reasoning and to relegate it to the realm of the calculation of means to personal happiness, 
understood in terms of the personal preference of a life plan.” See Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r, 105-106.
A later post-Enlightenment form of cold calculation found in Butler saw conscience as the 
dispassionate adjudicator “between prudential self-love and estimable benevolence.” Here prudence is 
seen to shift even closer to a notion of caution motivated purely by selfish preservation. See Andrew, 
C o n s c ie n c e  a n d  its  C r it ic s , 13.
98 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , 5. Indeed, prudence results in good acts and a good 
disposition of the person. Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.57, a.5, ad 1: “prudentia autem est 
necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus.” It follows, therefore, that 
every sin or vice is opposed to prudence. Cf. Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ila Ilae, q.55, a.2, ad 3; Ha 
Ilae, q.l 19, a.3, ad 3; Ila Ilae, q.141, a .l, ad 2.
99 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 6 (emphasis in text). Cf. Aquinas, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  
C o m m u n i, q .l, a.6, resp.; idem, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ila Ilae, q.51, a.2, resp.
100 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 6-7.
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“ m easure”  o f  goodness, as w e ll as th e ir end .101 P ieper thus sum s up prudence as the 
“ cause, ro o t, m o the r, m easure, precept, gu ide , and p ro to typ e  o f  a ll e th ic a l v irtu e s ; i t  
acts in  a ll o f  them , p e rfe c tin g  them  to  th e ir true  nature ; a ll p a rtic ip a te  in  it ,  and b y  
v irtu e  o f  th is  p a rtic ip a tio n  they are v irtu e s .” 102
The p rim a c y  o f  prudence103 in  the o rde r o f  acqu ired v irtu e  is  ro o te d  in  the  fa c t 
th a t i t  d ire c ts  the  c o g n itio n  o f  re a lity  and com m ands acts in  the  lig h t o f  th a t re a lity , 
th a t is  in  the  lig h t o f  tru th .104 In  o the r w ords, i t  is  fro m  th is  c o g n itio n  o f  tru th  tha t 
good acts are “ b o m .” 105 T here fo re , prudence attunes hum an reason to  an aw areness o f  
re a lity , thus a llo w in g  i t  to  m ake the  cho ice  fo r  the good. T h is  m eans th a t prudence is  
tru ly  r ig h t reason conce rn ing  a c tio n  { re c ta  ra t io  a g ib il iu m ) 106 in  its  c o g n itiv e
101 Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 7, 123; Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a ,  la Ilae, q.64, 
a.3, resp.; idem, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  C o m m u n i, q .l, a.13, resp.; idem, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.47, 
a.6, resp. In this way prudence rules the moral virtues so that they act in accordance with right reason. 
Cf. idem, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ila Ilae, q.47, a.7, ad 3. See also idem D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  C o m m u n i, q .l, 
a.9, resp.: “virtus appetitivae partis nihil est aliud quam quaedam dispositio, sive forma, sigillata et 
impressa in vi appetitiva a ratione.”
102 Pieper, T he  F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 8. Cf. St Thomas Aquinas [S. Tommaso d’Aquino], 
C o m m e n to  a l le  S entenze  d i  P ie tro  L o m b a rd o  e Testo In te g ra le  d ì P ie tro  L o m b a rd o ,  voi. 6, L ib r o  Terzo, 
D is t in z io n i 2 3 -4 0 : L e  V ir tù  in  C r is to  e le  V ir tù  n e i F e d e li,  Latin-Italian ed., trans. Lorenzo Perotto 
(Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2000), dist. 33, q.2, a.5, sol.: “Unde Antonius dicit (in Vitis 
Patrum 4,42), quod discretio quae ad prudentiam pertinet, est genitrix et custos et moderatrix virtutum. 
Et hoc sic patet” (parenthesis in text).
103 Aquinas, I n  I I I  S e n te n ti a rum , dist. 33, q.2, a.5, sol.: “prudentia inter alias virtutes 
cardinales principalior est.” Such primacy does not contradict the primacy of charity over all virtues, in 
that prudence holds directive primacy in the reason, and charity holds sway in the will. The two are 
therefore not in competition. Cf. idem, I n  111 S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 27, q.2, a.3, ad 3: “quod prudentia 
principalis est in virtutibus moralibus, inquantum est directiva omnium; et ideo ad rationem pertinet: 
sed caritas est principalis per modum imperantis et coniungentis fini et informantis; quod pertinet ad 
voluntatem.”
104 Aquinas, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  in  C o m m u n i, q .l, a.9, resp.: “natn bonum hominis inquantum est 
homo, est ut ratio sit perfecta in cognitione veritatis, et inferiores appetitus regulentur secundum 
regulam rationis.” Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , 9 ,2 5 . Pieper says that truth for Thomas 
simply means reality, both natural and supernatural. See The F o u r  C a rd in a l V ir tu e s , 9.
105 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 25 . Hibbs also comes to the same conclusion that the 
good life is the practice of truthfulness. See V ir tu e ’s  S p le n d o r, 222-227. Cf. Aquinas, I n  I I I  
S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 33, q.2, a.5, sol.: “Omnis autem naturae inclinatio praeexigit aliquam cognitionem 
quae et finem praestituat, et in finem inclinet, et ea quibus ad finem pervenitur provideat: haec enim 
sine cognitione fieri non possunt’’ [“But every inclination of nature demands in advance that there be a 
cognition which might pre-establish the end, incline towards the end and provide the means to reach 
the end: indeed these cannot be achieved without cognition”].
106 Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q. 57, a.4, resp.: “est enim prudentia re c ta  r a t io  
a g ib i l iu m ” (emphasis in text); Ha Ilae, q.47, a.2, resp.: “ad prudentiam non pertinet nisi applicatio 
rationis rectae ad ea, de quibus est consilium”; idem, Ha Ilae, q.51, a.6, arg.2: “prudentia est re c ta  r a t io  
a g ib il iu m '”  (emphasis in text). Pieper says prudence is “perfected practical reason.” See T he  F o u r
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fu n c tio n s  o f  seeing and ju d g in g  the tru th  and in  its  p re s c rip tiv e  fu n c tio n  o f  d ire c tin g  
w ha t is  chosen to  be done. Thus, prudence operates a dua l ro le  in  the  p ra c tic a l sphere: 
pe rcep tive  and p recep tive , w ith  th is  la tte r im pe ra tive  ro le  be ing  its  u ltim a te  g o a l.107
3 .1 .1  P ru d en ce  a s  P ercep tion  o f  th e Truth  —  N o R oom  f o r  E r r o r  o r  U ncertain ty?
W ith  its  em phasis on  prudence as a pe rfected  a b ility  o f  reason, capable o f  p e rc e iv in g  
the  tru th  and com m and ing  acts in  keep ing  w ith  it ,  one m ig h t be tem p ted  to  d isca rd  
A q u in a s ’ s v irtu e  th e o ry  as im p ra c tica l o r una tta inab le ; detached fro m  th e  re a lity  w e 
experience . A q u in a s  bases h is  m ora ls upon an awareness o f  the  tru th  o f  the  th in g  in  
q u e s tio n ,108 and about the tru th  o f  the re a lity  o f  ourselves, as created b y  G od. T h is  
access to  tru th  p rov ides the bedrock o f  o b je c tiv ity  fo r m o ra lity . H o w e ve r, T hom as’ s 
p rem ise o f  access o r pe rcep tion  o f  tru th  does no t im p ly  th a t he igno res  hum an 
lim ita tio n . W e have a lready observed in  p rev ious chapters th a t S t Thom as is  o n ly  too  
aw are o f  the  obstacles stand ing in  the w ay o f  a person’ s access to  the  tru th : p o o r 
reason ing , ham pered b y  passion, tem p ta tion , s in , ignorance o r p h y s ic a l c o n d itio n . In  
a d d itio n  to  th is , in  h is  w r itin g  on v irtu e  he com m ents on tw o  fu rth e r lim ita tio n s  on  ou r 
p e rce p tio n  o r a p p lica tio n  o f  tru th : im prudence and u nce rta in ty .
T he m echanism  fo r tra n s fo rm in g  true  (o r rea l) know ledg e  in to  a p ruden t 
de c is io n  com es v ia  the stages o f  d e lib e ra tio n , judgem en t and d e c is io n , and the  e rro rs  
th a t o ccu r a long  the w ay are occasions o f  im prudence .109 Im prudence can be the  re su lt
C a rd in a l V ir tu e s , 11 .This ability does not arrive ready-made but must be developed in order to reach a 
right disposition in the assessment of reality.
107 Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , 12; Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.48, 
resp; ibid., Ila Ilae q.47, a.3, resp..
108 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.64, a.3, resp.: “Bonum autem virtutis intellectualis 
est v e ru m : speculativae quidem virtutis ve ru m  absolute, [...] practicae autem virtutis v e ru m  secundum 
conformitatem ad appetitum rectum” (emphasis in text); ibid., Ia Ilae, q.64, a.3, ad 2: “mensura, et 
regula intellectualis virtutis non est aliquod aliud genus virtutis, sed ipsa res.”
109 Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r,  79-80: “Disorder can occur in each of the stages of practical 
reasoning -  intention, deliberation, judgement and execution. Any sort of disorder involves not simply
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o f  a c tin g  o u t o f  im pu lse  th ro u g h  rash judgem en t, o r arise  fro m  though tlessness, 
irre so lu te  inconstan cy in  fa ilin g  to  act upon w hat was de libe ra te d  and ju d g e d .110 I f  the  
im prudence  is  m ore de libe ra te  in  its  fo rm , then the in d iv id u a l’ s ju d g e m e n t and a c tio n  
is  d is to rte d  s in fu lly  b y  prudence o f  the  fle sh  (p ru d e n tia  c a rn is ) , w here  one m is judges 
and m isuses the  cares o f  the fle sh , such th a t they becom e an end in  them se lves,111 o r 
b y  cu n n in g  (a s tu tia ), le ad ing  to  d e ce itfu l p ractices o f  g u ile  o r fra u d .112 A c c o rd in g  to  
Thom as, these v ices a long  w ith  a ll fo rm s o f  fa lse  prudence , are ro o te d  in  
covetousness.113
A s  w e ll as observ ing  the im p a c t im prudence has upon  o u r p e rce p tio n  o f  the  
tru th , A q u in a s  a lso p o in ts  o u t th a t ou r ce rta in ty  about the tru th  is  a lso  lim ite d . T o  the 
c la im  th a t “ c e rta in ty  o f  the  tru th  belongs to  prudence”  St Thom as q u a lifie s  th is  b y  
s ta tin g  th a t w e do n o t have the same le ve l o f  ce rta in ty  about a ll th in g s .114 T he re fo re , 
the  le v e l o f  ce rta in ty  fo u n d  in  prudence is d im in ished  b y  the  m atte rs i t  is  concerned 
w ith , n am e ly  “ co n tin g e n t s ingu la rs” , o r p a rtic u la r concrete issues, w ith  a ll th e ir 
v a rie ty .115 Indeed the ve ry  existence o f  p ra c tica l reason, and hence prudence in  its
disordered passion or weakness of will but also error in intellect, which is imprudence: ‘there is no sin 
without a defect, resulting from imprudence, in some act of reason directing’ (STII-II 53 ,2).”
110 The vices of p re c ip i ta t io ,  in c o n s id e ra t io ,  and in c o n s ta n tia  constitute the derailment of the 
corresponding stages of deliberation, judgement and decision. Cf. Pieper, The  F o u r  C a r d in a l V irtu e s , 
13; Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r, 106; Aquinas, S um m a T he o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.53, aa.3-5. In the case of 
precipitous or rash judgement, St Thomas says that the individual fails to think according to these 
steps: memory of the past {m e m o ria } , intelligence in thinking about the present { in te l l ig e n t ia ) ,  
shrewdness or quick-wittedness in deliberating upon the future (s o le r t ia ), reasoning in comparing 
things { ra t io c in a t io ) ,  and docility in accepting the judgements of others more senior in understanding 
(id o c ilita s ). See Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.53, a.3, resp.
111 See Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.55, aa.1-2. Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l  
V irtu e s , 19; Hibbs, V ir tu e ’s S p le n d o r, 106-108; Porter, M o r a l  A c t io n  a n d  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s ,  146.
112 See Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.55, aa.3-5. Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a r d in a l  
V irtu e s , 19-20.
113 See Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.55, a.8, resp.
114 Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.47, a.9, arg. 2: “certitudo veritatis pertinet ad prudentiam, cum sit virtus 
intellectualis”; ibid. Ha Ilae, q.47, a.9, ad 2: ‘“Certitudo non est similiter quaerenda in omnibus, [...]’ ; 
quia vero materia prudentiae sunt singularia contingentia, circa quae sunt operationes humanae, non 
potest certitudo prudentiae tanta esse, quod omnino solicitudo tollatur.” Cf. Aristotle, N ic h o m a c h e a n  
E th ic s , I, 2, 1094b 12-15; 1,7, 1098a 26.
115 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.47, a.15, resp.: “ea quae sunt ad finem in rebus 
humanis non sunt determinata, sed multipliciter diversificantur secundum diversitatem personarum, et 
negotiorum.”
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pe rfec ted  state, is  to  de libe ra te  (co n s iliu m ) the nature o f  p a rtic u la r p ro b le m s, in  an 
a ttem p t to  a p p ly  the  appropria te  u n ive rsa l m ora l p rin c ip le s ,116 as w e ll as choose the
117 •
app rop ria te  m eans. Such p o s s ib ility  fo r va rie ty  in  p a rtic u la r cases is  bound  to  lead
to  som e degree o f  u n ce rta in ty , and hence g ive  rise  to  som e m easure o f  a n x ie ty  o r
118 • concern  (s o llic itu d o ), as w e cannot kn o w  a ll the va riab les o r take  in to  accoun t a ll
the consequences o f  o u r actions. T h is  unce rta in ty  as to  w h e th e r the  a c tio n  de libe ra te d
and chosen is  r ig h t and true  is  w hat P ieper ca lls  “ the  d is tre ss in g  th o rn  th a t
accom panies a ll hum an prudence.” 119 H ow ever, the existence o f  such u n c e rta in ty  has
a p o s itiv e  side, in  th a t i t  shou ld  cau tion  us fro m  becom ing  p ro u d  o r o v e r-c o n fid e n t in
o u r se lf-re lia n ce . R ather, i t  shou ld  lead us to  greater h u m ility  and d o c ility , s ince “ no
one is  s e lf-s u ffic ie n t in  m atters o f  prudence.” 120 The dow n -s ide  to  the  exis tence  o f
u n ce rta in ty  in  p ru d e n tia l judgem en t is  th a t i t  can leave one open to  scrupu lous m o ra l
p a ra lys is ; d o in g  n o th in g  fo r  fea r o f  w rongdo in g , o r be ing  unab le  to  le t go o f  past acts,
191
a fra id  th a t the  w ro n g  cho ice  was m ade.
F rom  th is  w e can see th a t A qu inas re a d ily  acknow ledged  the cha llenges 
peop le  face in  p e rce iv in g  the  tru th , be ing  ce rta in  about i t  and a c tin g  upon  it ,  and 
in co rp o ra te d  th is  in to  h is  v irtu e  theo ry. H ow ever, the  acknow ledgem en t o f  lim ita tio n  
in  p e rce p tio n  o r ce rta in ty  shou ld  n o t negate the necessity o f  m a in ta in in g  tru th  and 
re a lism  as the  basis fo r  m ora ls , as i t  is  p rec ise ly  the purpose o f  th e  p ra c tice  o f  v irtu e , 
in  p a rtic u la r the  deve lopm ent o f  prudence, to  o ffe r the in d iv id u a l the  d is p o s itio n  to
116 Ibid., Ha JIae, q.49, a.5, ad 2; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.47, a.3, resp.
117 Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.47, a.2, ad 3: “ad prudentiam non pertinet nisi applicatio rationis rectae ad 
ea, de quibus est consilium: et hujusmodi sunt, in quibus non sunt viae determinatae perveniendi ad 
finem, ut dicitur in 3. Ethic, (cap . 3 ) ”  (emphasis in text).
' 18 Ibid. Ila Ilae, q.47, a.9, ad 2: “non potest certitudo prudentiae tanta esse, quod omnino 
solicitudo tollatur” [“the certainty of prudence cannot be so great as to remove all anxiety 
completely”]. Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues, 18.
119 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues, 210-11, n.29.
120 Ibid., 16; Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ila Ilae, q.49, a.3, ad 3: “nullus in his quae subsunt 
prudentiae, sibi quantum ad omnia sufficit.”
121 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues, 210-11, n.29. The balance between the certitude of  
blind arrogance and the complete uncertainty of scruples is, of course, moral certainty.
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and p a rticu la rs . M o reove r, u n ce rta in ty  is fu rth e r reduced th ro u g h  c o m b in in g  
prudence w ith  experience , m em ory, understanding, q u ic k -w itte d  o b je c tiv ity  (s o le r t ia ), 
fo re s ig h t (p ro v id e n tia ), an open-m indedness to  the advice  o f  o thers (d o c ilita s )  and an 
openness to  the  p ro m p tin g s  o f  the  H o ly  S p ir it.123
T he existence o f  e rro r and unce rta in ty  also h ig h lig h ts  th a t v irtu e  th e o ry  is  fa r 
fro m  a ready-m ade s o lu tio n  to  the challenges o f  the m o ra l life . T he  pa th  o f  v irtu e  is  
one o f  g ro w th , f ille d  w ith  p a rtia l successes, ham pered, to o , b y  tr ip s  and fa lls  a long  the 
w ay. T he re fo re , the  w ay o f  v irtu e , the w ay to  p e rfe c tio n ,124 necessa rily  in c lu d e s  
im p e rfe c tio n . I f  th is  w ere n o t the case, w e w o u ld  have no w a y  o f  reach ing  
p e rfe c tio n .125 A c c o rd in g ly , A qu inas presents com m ents on  the  n o tio n  o f  im p e rfe c t 
v irtu e .
reason more correctly, enabling him or her to see the truth on the level of universals
122 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ila Ilae, q.49, a.5, ad 2: “ideo quamvis in quibusdam aliis 
virtutibus intellectualibus sit certior ratio, quam in prudentia; tamen ad prudentiam maxime requiritur, 
quod sit homo bene ratiocinativus, ut possit bene applicare universalia principia ad particularia, quae 
sunt varia, et incerta” [“therefore although the reason may be more certain in some (certain) other 
intellectual virtues than in prudence, nevertheless, most of all prudence requires that man be a good 
reasoner, that he might rightly apply the universal principles to particulars, which are various and 
uncertain”]; ibid., Ila Ilae, q.51, a .l, ad 2: “virtus humana est perfectio secundum modum hominis, qui 
non potest per certitudinem comprehendere veritatem rerum simplicium intuitu simplici, et praecipue in 
agibilibus, quae sunt contingentia.” Thus, virtue makes up for the lack of certainty in understanding the 
truth of things, since we cannot simply intuit the truth with certainty.
123 Ibid., Ha Ilae, q. 48 [this provides a full list]; ibid., Ha Ilae, q. 49, aa.1-8; ibid., Ha Ilae, 
q.52, a.2, resp. Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues , 16-18, 22. In addition to these aids to virtue, 
Aquinas identifies three secondary virtues which perfect aspects of the function of prudence, namely, 
e u b u lia , synes is  and g n o m e . E u b u lia  concerns the perfection of right counsel or deliberation about the 
means, similar to the Aristotelian virtue e u s toch ia . Synesis  perfects right judgement regarding issues 
relating to common law, while g n o m e  judges rightly in exceptional matters not covered by common 
juridical law by means of the principles of natural law. Cf. Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.57, 
a.6; Ila Ilae, q.51, aa.1-4; Baylor, A c t io n  a n d  P e rso n , 60-64; Peter Mel Murphy, “Prudence and 
Conscience in the Light of V e r ita tis  S p le n d o r  (54-64): A Study on the Necessity of Eubulia, Synesis 
and Gnome for the Formation of a True and Correct Conscience” (extract from doctoral diss.,
Pontificia Università Urbaniana, Rome, 2002), 24-73.
124 Melina, S h a r in g  in  C h r is t ’s V irtu e s , 91.
125 Porter points out that perfected being relates to something being “what it ought to be.” 
M u ta t is  m u ta n d is ,  one could say that perfected virtue relates to a faculty being what it ought to be. This 
may help us to understand how virtue as perfected ability can be both gained and lost, albeit with 
difficulty. Perfection as a concept is often connected to the idea of completion or completeness. The 
idea of perfection as completeness is more apt to virtue, as this describes a person having reached what 
can truly be called virtue, without implying that this is irreversible. If, however, perfection is 
understood as irreversible completion, then the notion of virtue as perfected ability would not fit with 
human experience, given the impact of sin or vice on a virtuous life, and would therefore appear to be
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S t Thom as notes th a t hab itu s  g rad u a lly  (p a u la t im ) deve lop  in to  stab le 
* • 126
d isp o s itio n s . In  the same w ay, acquired v irtu e s , as opposed to  those w h ic h  are 
in fused  in  us b y  the  grace o f  G od, are developed th ro u g h  tim e  and e xpe rience .127 
G ood deeds ca rrie d  o u t be fo re  the estab lishm ent o f  v irtu e  are b om  o u t o f  n a tu ra l 
in c lin a tio n s , o r (s o c ia l) custom  o r h a b itu a tio n .128 T h is  basis fo r  the  good a c tio n  
re s tric ts  the  q u a lity  o f  the  act, in  tha t w ith o u t v irtu e  to  o rde r the  p ra c tic a l reason and 
the  w ill,  the  desire  o r com p u ls io n  to  do the good deed is  hand icapped, and th e re fo re  
cannot be done w e ll, o r to  the best possib le  le ve l. A qu inas lik e n s  th is  s itu a tio n  to  a 
b lin d  horse g a llo p in g  in to  danger, as i t  can ne ithe r see w h a t needs to  be avo ided , n o r 
kn o w  w here  i t  is  go ing . M o ra l v irtu e s  in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  prudence, on  the  o th e r
* 1 TO » »
hand, in c lin e  the  person “ to  do the good deed w e ll,”  in  th a t the  end is  seen c le a rly ,
ii|
and the  m eans to  th a t good end are chosen and acted upon  a p p ro p ria te ly . T h is  
m eans th a t, u n lik e  the b lin d  horse, w ith  v irtu e  w e ru n  in  the  r ig h t d ire c tio n , w ith  the  
r ig h t in te n tio n . I t  is  in  th is  con tex t th a t A qu inas a ffirm s  th a t the  v irtu e s  are connected 
w hen  p e rfe c t, in  they  th a t cooperate to  pe rfec t the a c t.132 T hus, S t Thom as describes 
good acts la c k in g  in  stab le v irtu e , o r fa ilin g  to  com e fro m  a life  o f  in te g r ity ,133 to  be
an unattainable goal. This misapprehension may account for some fear of the notions of virtue and 
perfection in some quarters. See Porter, The R e co ve ry  o f  V ir tu e , 37.
126 Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.54, a.4, ad 1: “[habitus] primo imperfecte incipit 
esse in subjecto, et paulatim perficitur.”
127 Ibid., Ha Ilae q.47, a. 14, ad 3. As observed earlier, in this reply Aquinas also points out that 
the fact that God provides the h a b itu s  in the case of infused virtue does not mean that it is necessarily 
employed by the individual, as in the case of young children or those with mental incapacity.
128 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.65, a .l, resp.: “Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus (ut temperantia, vel 
fortitudo) nihil aliud est, quam aliqua inclinado in nobis existens ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum 
faciendum, sive talis inclinatio sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine.”
129 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.58, a.4, ad 3: “Huiusmodi enim inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest 
esse periculosior, nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad 
debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius 
currit.”
130 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.65, a.l resp. “Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in bonum 
opus bene agendum.”
131 Cf. Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.65, a.l resp.; ibid., la Ilae, q.58, a.4, ad 3.
132 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.65, a. 1 resp.: “sequitur, virtutes morales esse connexas.”
133 In this context someone who is virtuous in one aspect of life, while lacking virtue in 
another does so through disconnected, imperfect virtue, that is, simply inclination or custom. See ibid., 
la Ilae, q.65, a .l resp.: “ e t h o c  m o d o  a c c ip ie n d o  v ir tu te s  m ora les , n o n  s u n t co n n e x a e : videmus enim
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‘ im p e rfe c t v irtu e s ’ . Such good deeds la ck in g  in  prudence and m o ra l v irtu e  m ay be 
sporad ic o r d isconnected , and im p e rfe c t in  th e ir nature, b u t th e y  are fa r fro m  b e ing  
w o rth less  o r w ro n g .134 Indeed, such im p e rfe c t expressions o f  v irtu e  are the  ve ry  
b e g in n in g  o f  v irtu e , the  ve ry  rou te  by w h ich  the in d iv id u a l advances in  goodness, 
s lo w ly  try in g  to  p iece  toge the r a coherent v irtu o u s  life , one o f  tru e  in te g rity . Such a 
passage to  v irtu e  is  fa r fro m  s tra ig h tfo rw a rd . Indeed, fo r exam ple , P iepe r p o in ts  o u t 
th a t the  g a in in g  o f  prudence is  in  its e lf a bonum  a rd u u m . U ltim a te ly , h o w e ve r, the  
s trugg le  fo r stab le v irtu e  is  beyond our ow n strength , cha llenged  as w e  are b y  
concup iscence and sin . Indeed, s in  d isrup ts o u r progress and m akes us re tre a t fro m  the
pa th  o f  v irtu e , b lu n tin g  the  fa cu ltie s  w e have been h o n in g .137 T hus, w e are le d  to  seek
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G od ’ s fo rg iveness and h e lp  in  s triv in g  to  do good.
aliquem ex naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad opera liberalitatis, qui 
tamen non est promptus ad opera castitatis” (emphasis in text). Cf. ibid., Ha Ilae, q.144, a .l, resp.; ibid., 
Ha Ilae, q.155, a .l, resp. Cf. Porter, M o r a l  A c t io n  a n d  C h r is t ia n  E th ic s , 146.
134 See Aquinas, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.144, a .l, resp.: “omne illud, quod repugnat 
perfectioni, e tia m s i s i t  b o n um , deficit a ratione virtutis” [“anything that is incompatible with perfection, 
even i f  i t  be  g o o d ,  runs short of the condition of a virtue”] (emphasis mine). In cases, however, where 
the perceived good deed is in fact morally wrong rather than simply not being the the best possible 
action or lacking due connection to a life of integrity, this would be a case of false prudence (vice). See 
ibid., Ha Ilae, q.47, a. 13, resp. Earlier comments on ignorance and sin would apply to such a case.
135 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.58, a.4, ad 3: “naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam inchoatio 
virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta” [“the natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of  
beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue”].
136 In his writing Pieper implies that he has struggled with the virtuous life himself. Jon 
Vickery casts further light upon this in his article on Pieper and the Nazis, in which he explores 
Pieper’s struggle to keep his integrity in a situation of danger. While other German Catholic 
philosophers and theologians of the time were willing to use Aquinas’s presentation of grace building 
on nature as a justification for National Socialism and their v ö lk is c h  ethos, Pieper found in the same 
author the greatest arguments against their ideology. V ö lk is c h  ideology taught that Germany had a 
calling by Providence to vanquish evil from the world, and so anything that watered down German 
blood would be a hindrance to its salvific role. The article then presents Pieper’s history o f trying to 
survive the war (including his cooperation with the Nazi party to get a job) and his enduring rejection 
of Nazism. The result was that, although his actions lacked heroism, he did offer some resistance and 
guidance through his writings. Vickery concludes that Pieper’s own self-confessed failings to maintain 
the high standards enshrined in the virtues shows the truth o f his own teaching, namely, that prudence 
is a b o n u m  a rd u u m , “ a steep good.” Cf. Jon Vickery, “Searching for Josef Pieper,” T h e o lo g ic a l S tu d ie s  
66 (2005): 622-37, at 637; Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , xiii, 16.
137 For example, Aquinas, S um m a T he o lo g ic a , Ila Ilae, q.51, a .l, ad 3: “in nullo peccatore, 
inquantum hujusmodi, invenitur eubulia: omne enim peccatum est contra bonam consiliationem” [“in 
no sinner as such can e u b u lia  be found, for all sin is against the taking good counsel (deliberating 
well)”].
138 Osborne points out that “acquired virtue depends on grace for its full development,” that is, 
its perfection. This, however, does not mean that imperfect virtue cannot be acquired without grace.
See Osborne, “Perfect and Imperfect Virtues in Aquinas,” 40.
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H ere w e reach the p o in t o f  acknow ledg ing  the ro le  o f  grace in  v irtu o u s  a c tio n , 
to  w h ic h  w e sh a ll tu rn  o u r a tte n tio n  sh o rtly . A t th is  stage, how eve r, w e can conc lude  
th a t the  v irtu e s  assist g re a tly  in  m ora l endeavour b y  h e lp in g  the  person to  see th e  tru th  
m ore  c le a rly  and to  choose to  act upon it. P rudence exercises a fundam en ta l ro le  in  
the p e rfe c tio n  o f  m o ra l a c tio n  th rough  percep tion  o f  the tru th  and in  com m and ing  to  
act in  accordance w ith  it .  B u t how  does i t  re la te  to  conscience? I f ,  as R a tz in g e r says, 
conscience is  a lso the capac ity  to  know  the tru th , are prudence and conscience in  fa c t 
one and the  same th in g ?
3 .1 .2  C o n sc ien ce  a n d  P ru d en ce
Thus w e are le d  in to  the  cha lleng ing  p rob lem  o f  h o w  conscience and prudence re la te  
to  each o the r. A lth o u g h  m any o the r great C h ris tia n  th in k e rs  have used b o th
1 TO
conscience and prudence in  th e ir w ritin g , I  w ill con tinue  to  base m y  re fle c tio n s  on 
A q u in a s ’ s ana lys is , as i t  is  b y  fa r the m ost de ta iled . N onethe less, th is  does n o t m ean 
th a t the  A n g e lic  D o c to r’ s in vestiga tio ns  p ro v id e  a s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  answ er, as 
p ru d e n t ia  and co n s c ie n tia  never appear in  the same question . A s  a re su lt, D ’A rc y  
observes th a t “ even the  m ost en thusiastic T hom ists a d m it th a t St. Thom as fa ile d  to  
g ive  an adequate account o f  the  connection  betw een p ra c tic a l w isd o m  [p rudence ] and 
conscience .” 140 T h is  has sparked a long -s tand ing  debate am ong scho la rs, w h ic h  at 
tim es has becom e som ew hat heated in  its  exchange.141 The question  has been 
approached in  a num ber o f  w ays. F o r instance, m uch is  m ade b y  som e o f  the
139 For example, St Gregory the Great, applies the metaphor of a house to conscience and the 
cardinal virtues. Conscience, in losing its state of tranquillity, is likened to a house being torn down, 
and the four cardinal virtues are described as the four comers of a house, keeping the building o f the 
mind solid. C o n s c ie n t ia  and p ru d e n t ia  are in close proximity in this passage, such that one could infer 
that prudence helps maintain the tranquil state of one’s conscience. This, however, is a passing 
reference and so cannot shed much light on the complicated relationship between the two. Cf. St 
Gregory the Great, M o r a i iu m  L ib r i ,  s ive  E x p o s it io  in  L ib ru m  B. J o b , II, 49, 76, PL 75, 592.
140 D’Arcy, C o n s c ie n c e  a n d  its  R ig h t to  F re e d o m , 135.
141 For fuller detail o f the history of the debate, see Murphy, “Prudence and Conscience in the 
Light of V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r ,"  56-73.
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in fre q u e n cy  o f  use o f  the  te rm  co nsc ien tia  in  com parison  to  p ru d e n t ia  in  the  S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ic a , g ive n  the  h is to ry  o f  greater use in  A q u in a s ’ s e a rlie r w o rks . Jo se f P iepe r 
states tha t c o n s c ie n tia  is  the focus o f  A q u in a s ’ s a tte n tio n  in  o n ly  one a rtic le  (S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ic a , I ,  q .79 , a. 13), w h ile  p ru d e n tia  is  the sub ject o f  ten  questions m ade up o f  
f if ty -s ix  a rtic le s .142 A lth o u g h  P ieper s lig h tly  exaggerates the  la c k  o f  use o f  
c o n s c ie n tia ,142 one cannot deny th a t there is  an ev iden t rise  in  the  use o f  p r u d e n t ia  and 
a re d u c tio n  in  the  use o f  co nsc ien tia  com pared to  h is  p re v io u s  w r it in g .144 W h y, 
the re fo re , shou ld  th is  be the  case? Does the re la tiv e  absence im p ly  th a t A q u in a s  
d e lib e ra te ly  rep laced  conscience w ith  prudence, as he considered  them  to  be d ire c tly  
equ iva le n t, re n d e rin g  the  n o tio n  o f  conscience e ffe c tiv e ly  re d u n d a n t,145 o r is  i t  the 
case th a t w h ile  one n o tio n  is  g iven  fa r greater em phasis, b o th  conscience  and 
prudence s t ill have th e ir p a rt to  p la y  in  the m o ra l process?146 I t  is  beyond  d o u b t th a t in  
A q u in a s ’ s m o ra l w r itin g  w e fin d  a confluence o r “ a c o n ju n c tio n  betw een, on  th e  one 
hand, the v irtu e  o f  prudence, analyzed th ro u g h  the resources o f  the  A ris to te lia n  
tra d itio n , w ith  the  c o n trib u tio n  o f the m onastic tra d itio n  o f  d isce rnm ent, and on  the
142 Pieper, L iv in g  th e  T ru th , 167.
143 As was observed in chapter three, conscientia appears also in the S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a  in la 
Ilae, q.19, aa. 5-6 and la Ilae q.96, a.4.
144 For example, we can get a rough idea of Aquinas’s use if we search through his 
C o m m e n ta ry  o n  th e  Sentences. This shows that p ru d e n t ia  appears in 50 articles o f the four books, 
either in passing or as the main topic under discussion, while c o n s c ie n tia  appears in 54 articles, mostly 
in reference to ‘conscience’, though with some meaning ‘consciousness’ . This search indicates that St 
Thomas’s use of the terms is about equal in his early work, while p ru d e n t ia  clearly receives far greater 
attention by the time he came to write his S um m a T h e o lo g ic a . This word search was made possible by 
the website dedicated to St Thomas’s works. See http://www.corDusthomisticum.org/iopera.html. 
accessed 14 February 2008.
145 Cf. Ralph Mclnemy, “Prudence and Conscience,” The T h o m is t 38 (1974): 291-305, at 299.
146 Another much weaker reason for the relative absence of c o n s c ie n tia  in the S u m m a  is 
derived by Peter Murphy from a comment by Dennis Billy, who suggests that certain themes are absent 
in parts of the S u m m a  to avoid unnecessary repetition. Murphy takes this as a possible argument to 
explain why conscience is missing from the treatise on the virtues in the S e cu n d a  S ecundae . Although 
Aquinas talks o f the avoidance of unneccessary repetition in the prologue of the P r im a  P a rs ,  it seems 
quite improbable to me that this would explain the reduced use of the key term c o n s c ie n tia , given the 
frequency of cross referencing and repetition of other key definitions found throughout the S u m m a , 
often concluding with the phrase, “ s ic u t  s u p ra  d ic tu m  est.”  Cf. Murphy, “Prudence and Conscience in 
the Light of V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r ,” 57. Dennis J. Billy, “Aquinas on the Content of Synderesis,” S tu d ia  
M o r a l ia  29 (1991): 61-83, at 73; Aquinas, In  111S en ten tia rum , dist. 34, q. 1, a.2, arg.5; idem, S u m m a  
T h e o lo g ic a ,  la Ilae q.55, a.3, resp.; ibid., Ila Ilae, q.47, a .l, ad 1.
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other, the  d o c trin e  o f  conscience fro m  St. Paul and the C hurch  Fathers, e sp e c ia lly  o f  
St. Jerom e.” 147 P inckaers p o in ts  ou t tha t the ro le  assigned to  conscience w ill “ depend
* 148
on its  re la tio n  to  the o the r elem ents o f  the system .”  I f ,  w h ile  d ra w in g  fro m  m any 
d iffe re n t C h ris tia n  and c lass ica l sources, the  system  presented b y  A q u in a s  is  p r im a rily  
a v irtu e -b a se d  e th ic ,149 th is  w ill have an e ffe c t on how  conscience is  p e rce ive d  and 
p laced  in  the  schem e o f  h is  m ora l th e o ry .150 Such a conc lu s io n , how eve r, does n o t 
necessarily  im p ly  th a t A qu inas considered co nsc ien tia  to  be a co m p le te ly  redundan t 
n o tio n , as w e sh a ll see. Thus, the question  o f  the re la tio n sh ip  betw een conscience  and 
prudence is  roo ted  in  w he ther co nscien tia  and p ru d e n t ia  are synonym ous o r n o t.151 
A c c o rd in g ly , scho la rs have presented argum ents fo r  and aga inst th e ir equ iva lence .
Jo se f P iepe r is  c ite d  as a p rim e  exam ple o f  som eone h o ld in g  the  f ir s t o p in io n , 
in  th a t he says “ the  w o rd  ‘ conscience’ is  in tim a te ly  re la ted  to  and w e ll-n ig h  
in te rchangeab le  w ith  the  w o rd  ‘ prudence’ .” 152 P ieper’ s v ie w  o f  equ iva le nce  re lie s  
h e a v ily  upon  a p a rtic u la r conc lus ion  de rived  b y  som e p ro m in e n t D o m in ic a n  scho lars. 
In  re a c tio n  to  the m in im a lis m  o f  casu istry , d u rin g  the 1920s to  the  1940s the  F rench  
D o m in ica n  S choo l sought to  re locate  the ope ra tion  o f  conscience w ith in  the  v irtu e  o f
147 Pinckaers, “Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,” 80.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 85-86.
150 Crowe suggests that prudence took over from conscience in Aquinas’s later moral theory as 
a consequence of his desire to use a more iully Aristotelian framework, See Crowe, “St. Thomas and 
S yn d e res is ,”  245. MacIntyre rejects Crowe’s view as being oversimplistic. See W hose J u s t ic e ?  W h ic h  
R a tio n a lity ? ,  188: “But more generally it is important to understand Aquinas as at every stage [...] 
integrating Neoplatonic and Augustinian elements with Aristotelian rather than discarding one in favor 
of the other.” Crowe is right in pointing out Aquinas’s preference, but MacIntyre’s comment rightly 
indicates that such a preference was far from exclusive.
151 Cf. Mclnemy, “Prudence and Conscience,” 300.
152 Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtues, l l . l t  must be noted that this discussion relates to the 
specific use of c o n s c ie n tia , or what Pieper calls ‘situation conscience’, rather than conscience in 
general, incorporating the different levels of syn d e re s is  and c o n s c ie n tia . Cf. Mclnemy, “Prudence and 
Conscience,” 292. Having referred to Pieper, Bernard Häring also comes to the same conclusion as 
him. While not using the term syn de res is  at this point, Häring likewise separates the functions of 
syn d e re s is  and c o n s c ie n tia , declaring that c o n s c ie n tia  and prudence are identical. See Häring, F re e  a n d  
F a ith fu l  in  C h r is t ,  I, 254-55: “To the degree that a decision of conscience is the certain voice of a 
sincere conscience, it is neither more nor less than the verdict of prudence. As to the content, the 
dictates of conscience correspond exactly to the prudential judgment. However, the existential inner 
awareness o f the calling, and the urgency to do the good, come from the whole moral condition and 
wholeness of conscience.”
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prudence, such th a t the  tw o  no tions w ere seen to  be e ith e r in tim a te ly  connected  o r
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id e n tic a l in  th e ir  ope ra tion . G arrigou-Lagrange and M e rke lb a ch  proposed  an 
equ iva lence  o f  te rm s. Thus, G arrigou-Lagrange cam e to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  th a t “ r ig h t  
a n d  c e rta in  conscience  is  none o ther than a n  a c t o f  p ru d e n c e , w h ic h  counse ls, ju d g e s  
p ra c tic a lly  and com m ands”  r ig h tly  on account o f  its  re la ted  v irtu e s  e u b u lia , synesis  
and g n o m e .154 S im ila rly , M e rke lbach  declared th a t “ the ju d g e m e n t o f  conscience  is  an 
act com m anded b y  p rudence .” 155 In  o ther w ords, the act o f  conscience is  a p a rtic u la r 
occasion o f  the  use o f  prudence. O n the le v e l o f  p a rtic u la r acts, th e re fo re , conscience 
is  a v irtu o u s  act, n a m e ly  an act o f  prudence. A lth o u g h  the  D o m in ica n s  n e ve r m ade the 
suggestion , th is  in te rp re ta tio n  a lm ost renders the te rm  ‘ c o n s c ie n tia ’ obso le te , in  tha t, 
acco rd ing  to  th is  v ie w  the  w ho le  act o f  co g n itio n , d e lib e ra tio n , ju d g e m e n t and the 
com m and to  act co u ld  te c h n ic a lly  be exp la ined  w ith o u t i t . 156 Such an understand ing
153 Cf. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, “Du caractère métaphysique de la théologie morale de 
saint Thomas, en particulier dans les rapports de la prudence et de la conscience,” R e vu e  T h o m is te  30 
(1925): 341-55; B.-H. Merkelbach, “Quelle place assigne au traité de la conscience?” R e vu e  des  
S c iences  P h ilo s o p h iq u e s  e t T h é o lo g iq u e s  12 (1923): 170-83; St Thomas Aquinas [Saint Thomas 
D’Aquin], S om m e th é o lo g iq u e : L a  p ru d e n c e , 2 a  2ae, Q u e s tion s  4 7 -5 6 , 2nd éd., French trans., notes 
and appendices by T.-H. Deman (Paris, Tournai, and Rome: Desclée & Cie, 1949), 376-527 [hereafter 
cited as: Deman, L a  p ru d e n c e ]; Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ia e  M o r a l is ,  2nd 
rev. éd., vol. 2, D e  V ir tu t ib u s  M o ra lib u s  (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1935). Kennedy’s summary note 
slightly distorts the conclusions of the Dominican school, suggesting that they proposed that Aquinas 
left conscience to one side to replace it with prudence as the capacity of practical perception. I can find 
no evidence that they came to this conclusion, but rather that they explained conscience within the 
context of prudence, either declaring them to be equivalent or intimately related. Cf. Kennedy, “L ’ldea 
di Coscienza Morale Secondo S. Tommaso,” 170, n.57.
154 Garrigou-Lagrange, “Du caractère métaphysique de la théologie morale de saint Thomas,” 
346: “la co n sc ie n ce  d ro ite  e t c e rta in e  n’est autre qu’un a c te  de la  p ru d e n c e , qui conseille, qui juge 
pratiquement et qui commande” (emphasis in text). Garrigou-Lagrange and Merkelbach are the 
primary sources for Pieper’s view. Cf. Pieper, The F o u r  C a rd in a l V irtu e s , 209, n.8; L iv in g  th e  T ru th ,  
167, n .l.
155 Merkelbach, “Quelle place assigne au traité de la conscience?”, 178: “Le jugement de la 
conscience est un acte commandé par la prudence, mais préparé et posé par les vertus qui s’y 
rattachent: V e u b u lia  ou le bon conseil, la synesis  ou le bon sens, la g o m e  ou le sens de l’exception.”
See also ibid., 180: “Sicut ergo praeceptum est actus proprius et praecipuus ipsius prudentiae, ita 
judicium conscientiae (quod ex consilio praerequisito est efformatum, et secundum quod est 
praecipiendum) est actus proprius vel praecipuus virtutum adnexarum quibus prudentia utitur ad suum 
proprium finem”; idem, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ia e  M o ra lis ,  II, 42: “Conscientia recta autem est aliquis actus 
prudentiae” [“Moreover, right conscience is some act of prudence”].
156 Hence, Pieper states that the “living unity [...] of synderesis and prudence is nothing less 
than the thing we commonly call ‘conscience’.” In this way, c o n s c ie n tia  as the particular act of 
judgment is completely replaced by prudence, leaving conscience as simply a popular shorthand for the 
combination of prudence with its ontological moral basis. Pieper, The F o u r  C a r d in a l V ir tu e s , 11.
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o f n o tio n a l equ iva lence  o f  the act o f  conscience and the  act o f  p rudence is  s t ill h e ld  to  
th is  day, perhaps m ost p ro m in e n tly  b y  Théo B e lm ans.157
I t  shou ld  com e as no surprise th a t some scholars have dec la red  p rudence  and 
conscience to  be synonym ous, since there are s trik in g  s im ila ritie s  in  A q u in a s ’ s 
d e sc rip tio n  o f  th e ir fu n c tio n . F o r exam ple, the judgem en ts o f  p rudence  and 
conscience are b o th  d e fined  as an a p p lica tio n  o f  u n ive rsa l p rin c ip le s  to  the  p a rtic u la r
i co
s itu a tio n , and bo th , as a resu lt, depend upon synderesis  fo r  th e ir  access to  the 
u n ive rsa l p rin c ip le s  o f  the  p ra c tica l o rd e r.159 H ow eve r, others have conc lude d  th a t the 
d iffe re n ce s  presented b y  A qu inas ind ica te  th a t there is  a c tu a lly  a d iffe re n ce  be tw een 
the tw o . C onsequen tly , n o t a ll m em bers o f  the F rench D o m in ica n  S choo l agreed w ith  
the v ie w s  o f  G a rrigou -Lag range  o r M e rke lbach . Some m a in ta in e d  ins tead  th a t 
prudence and conscience w ere inseparable, though  th e ir fu n c tio n s  w ere  d is tin c t. The 
basis o f  th is  o p in io n  can be traced back to  the w o rk  o f  H e n ri N o b le , w h o  saw  in  
A qu inas a d is tin c tio n  betw een the ju d ic iu m  co nsc ien tiae  and ju d ic iu m  l ib e r i  a r b it r i i ,
157 Théo G. Belmans, ‘“ Le jugement prudential’ chez saint Thomas: Réponse à R. Mclnemy,” 
R evue  T h o m is te  91 (1991): 414-20, at 419-20: “je n’ai trouvé aucune trace, ni dans mon expérience à 
moi ni dans les exposés de saint Thomas, de l’existence d’un ‘jugement prudentiel’ ré e lm e n t d is t in c t  du 
jugement de conscience proprement dit. Cette idée relève d’une morale casuiste qu’on espérait 
définitivement périmée” (emphasis in text).
158 For example, relating to conscience, cf. Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q. 17, a .l, resp.: “Nomen 
enim conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid”; idem, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 39, q.3, 
a.l, ad 3: “in applicatione universalis principii ad particulare opus.” Concerning prudence, cf. idem, 
S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , Ha Ilae, q.47, a.2, ad 3: “ad prudentiam non pertinet nisi applicatio rationis rectae” ; 
ibid., Ha Ilae, q.49, a.3, resp.: “ad prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis, sed etiam 
applicatio ad opus [...]: operationes sunt in singularibus; et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat 
universalia principia rationis, et congnoscat singularia, circa quae sunt operationes”; ibid., Ha Ilae, 
q.49, a.5, ad 2: “ad prudentiam maxime requiritur, quod sit homo bene ratiocinativus, ut possit bene 
applicare universalia principia ad particularia.” In addition, Mclnemy observes, that according to 
Aquinas, “both can be elucidated by appeal to the practical syllogism,” and “both involve deliberation.” 
However, he declares these similarités to be “superficial.” Cf. Mclnemy, “Prudence and Conscience,” 
300; Melina, L a  C o n o sce n za  M o ra le ,  210.
159 For example, relating to conscience, see Aquinas, S um m a T h e o lo g ic a ,  I, q.79, a. 13, ad 3. 
With regard to prudence, see ibid., Ha Ilae, q.47, a.6, ad 3: “synderesis movet prudentiam”; ibid., Ia 
Ilae, q.63, a.l resp.; idem, D e  V e rita te , q.16, a.2, ad 5: “actus synderesis non est actus virtutis 
simpliciter, sed praeambulum ad actum virtutis, sicut naturalia sunt praeambula virtutibus gratuitis et 
acquisitis.”
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o r the  ju d g m e n t o f  a c tio n , as N o b le  also ca lls  i t . 160 N o b le  states th a t these judgem en ts  
oppose each o th e r in  the  case o f  s in  o r v ice , b u t cooperate in  the  case o f  an act o f  
v ir tu e .161 T h is  coope ra tio n  means tha t m a te ria lly  there  is  no d iffe re n c e  o r o p p o s itio n  
betw een the  tw o  judgem en ts , since the act approved b y  the  ju d g e m e n t o f  conscience 
is  the  same as th a t w h ic h  is  chosen b y  the  judgem en t o f  the  lib e ru m  a r b i t r iu m } 62 
H ow eve r, N o b le  notes th a t fo rm a lly  “ a d iffe re n ce  persists betw een the  characters o f
i ¿jo ,
the tw o  ju d g e m e n ts ,”  since the ju d g m e n t o f conscience be longs to  the  c o g n itiv e  
o rder, as an im p a rtia l judgem en t o f  r ig h t and w rong , w h ile  the  ju d g e m e n t o f  lib e ru m  
a rb it r iu m  is  the  a p p lic a tio n  o f th a t co g n itio n  to  the w ill (a p p lic a t io  c o g n itio n is  a d  
a ffe c tio n e m ).164 In  th is  w ay N o b le  sums up the  d iffe re n ce  as seeing and w a n tin g , and 
i t  is  th is  w a n tin g  w h ic h  he says is under the in flu e n ce  o f  v irtu e s  and v ic e s .165
N o b le ’ s T h o m is tic  d is tin c tio n  fo rm s the basis o f  the  a rgum en t aga inst 
equ iva lence  betw een acts o f  conscience and prudence. The second e lem en t in  the  
a rgum ent is  A q u in a s ’ s d e fin itio n  o f  the ju d g m e n t o f  lib e ru m  a rb it r iu m  as ju d ic iu m
160 H.-D. Noble, “Le syllogisme moral,” R evue des S ciences P h ilo s o p h iq u e s  e t T h é o lo g iq u e s  
10 (1921): 560-64, 563-64; idem, L a  consc ience  m o ra le  [published in 1923], 52-56.
161 Ibid., 563: “Dans le cas du péché, cette opposition est flagrante. [...] Dans le cas de la vertu, 
l’opposition semble ne pas exister.”
162 Noble, “Le syllogisme moral,” 563.
163 Ibid. “Et pourtant, formellement, une différence persiste entre le caractères de ces deux 
jugements.”
164 Ibid., 564; cf. Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q.17, a .l, ad 4: “differunt judicium conscientiae et 
liberi arbitrii, quia judicium conscientiae consistit in pura cognitione, judicium autem liberi arbitrii in 
applicatione cognitionis ad affectionem: quod quidem judicium est judicium electionis.” Murphy 
inaccurately sums up Noble’s distinction as a direct contrast between prudence and conscience, where 
conscience acts “devoid of affectivity - p e r  m odum  c o g n it io n is ,'”  while prudence acts “ p e r  m o d u m  
in c l in a t io n is .” This term in relation to prudence is completely missing from Noble’s text. Cf. Murphy, 
“Prudence and Conscience in the Light of V e rita tis  S p le n d o r,”  59. It appears that Murphy has taken the 
phrase p e r  m o d u m  in c lin a t io n is  from Mclnemy or Billy and applied it to Noble’s, perhaps for the 
purposes of presenting a neat summary. This, however, confuses the issue and obscures the historical 
chain of analysis. Cf. Ralph Mclnemy, “The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: Comments on 
Belmans,” D o c to r  C o m m u n is  43 (1990): 234-49, at 244; Dennis J. Billy, “Aquinas on the Relations of  
Prudence,” S tu d ia  M o r a l ia  33 (1995): 235-64, at 255-57; Murphy, “Prudence and Conscience in the 
Light of V e r ita t is  S p le n d o r ,”  67.
165 Noble, “Le syllogisme moral,” 564: “Dans le jugement de conscience, la raison nous fait 
v o ir  ce qui est bon ou mal moralment. Dans le jugement d’action, elle nous le fait v o u lo ir ,  s ’employant 
non plus seulment à connaître, mais à connaître ce qu’il faut pratiquer, sous l’impulsion de l’intention 
volontaire vertueuse ou vicieuse qui active son discernement et imprègne sa décision” (emphases in 
text). This text is repeated in Noble’s L a  consc ience  m o ra le , 56.
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e le c tio n is .166 Just as the  ju d ic iu m  lib e r i a r b i t r i i  is  d is tin c t fro m  the  ju d ic iu m  
co n s c ie n tia e , so the  ju d ic iu m  e lec tio n is  is  also d is tin c t, g ive n  the  equ iva le nce  o f  
m ean ing  in  A q u in a s . Thus, Labourde tte  ta lks  o f  the “ c lea r d is tin c tio n ”  be tw een  the
1 fil • • •
tw o . H ere, acco rd in g  to  th is  v ie w , w e fin a lly  com e to  the p o in t o f  d is tin g u is h in g  the 
act o f  conscience fro m  prudence opera tive  in  the m o ra l act, s ince A q u in a s  declares the 
ju d ic iu m  e le c tio n is  to  be d irected  b y  prudence and the m o ra l v irtu e s , i f  the  ch o ice  is
1 /Q
r ig h t and good. In  th is  w ay i t  is  proposed tha t the ju dgem en t o f  conscience d iffe rs  
fro m  the  ju d g e m e n t o f  prudence, w ith  the la tte r be ing  in v o lv e d  in  the  a c tiv ity  o f  the 
lib e ru m  a rb it r iu m  as th a t w h ic h  assists the in d iv id u a l in  d e s irin g  to  act u p o n  w h a t is  
kn o w n  as g o o d .169 Thus, M c ln e m y  says th a t prudence is  in v o lv e d  in  the  o rd e rin g  o f  
the  appe tite  so as to  recognise “ the g o o d  as g o o d ,"  ra ther than  s im p ly  re la tin g  to  i t  
c o g n itiv e ly , as the  good as true , th a t is  kn o w in g  the  good “ unde r the  gu ise  o f  tru th .” 170 
I  accept th a t prudence is  in v o lve d  in  assisting the in d iv id u a l in  choos ing  the 
good, and thus, w here  it  is  la ck in g  one can see h o w  the ju d ic iu m  e le c tio n is , d is to rte d  
o r le d  astray b y  im prudence o r another v ic e ,171 m ig h t choose the  w ro n g  m eans fo r  a
166 Cf. Aquinas, Aquinas, I n  I IS e n te n t ia ru m ,  dist. 24, q.2, a.4, ad 2: “ipsum iudicium 
electionis liberi arbitrii est” ; idem, D e  V e rita te , q. 16, a. 1 ad 15 ibid., q.17, a .l, ad 4.
167 Michel Labourdette, “Théologie morale,” R evue  T hom is te  50 (1950): 192-230, at 213: “la 
nette distinction entre le jugement de la conscience et le jugement d’élection que prend en charge la 
prudence.”
168 Aquinas, I n  D e ce m  L ib ro s  E th ic o ru m  a d  N ic h o m a c h u m , VI, lect. 11 : “quia electio recta, 
quae requiritur ad operationem virtutis, non est sine prudentia nec virtute moralia. Quia virtus moralis 
omat ad fïnem, prudentia autem dirigit circa ea quae sunt ad finem”; idem, I n  I I I  S e n te n tia ru m , dist. 33, 
q.2, a.4, qc.4, arg 2: “eligere videtur esse actus prudentiae”; ibid., dist. 33, q.2, a.4, qc.4 ad 2: “eligere 
est actus prudentiae quantum ad id quod est de cognitione in electione”; idem, S u m m a  T h e o lo g ic a ,  Ha 
Ilae, q.54, a.2, resp.: “Electio autem recta eorum quae sunt ad fmem ad prudentiam pertinet”; ibid., Ha 
Ilae q.47, a .l, ad 2.
169 Delhaye, T he  C h r is t ia n  C onsc ience , 170-171, at 171: “It is then not unfaithful to St. 
Thomas if we say that the ju d ic iu m  p ru d e n t ia e  intervenes in the ju d ic iu m  l ib e r i i  a r b i t r i i  which is 
distinct from the ju d ic iu m  consc ie n tiae .'’ ’ J u d ic iu m  p ru d e n t ia e  as a term seems to be highly infrequent 
in Aquinas’s writings, but can be found in S um m a T h e o lo g ic a , la Ilae, q.58, a.5, ad 3 and I n  D e c e m  
L ib ro s  E th ic o ru m  a d  N ic h o m a c h u m ,  II, lect. 11.
170 Mclnemy, “Prudence and Conscience,” 302 (emphasis in text). I would prefer to see this as 
“the good as desirable” rather than “the good as good,”as the good is not only “the object of appetite,” 
but of the practical reason, too. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that one does not yet relate to the good 
as good when at the cognitive level one judges by an act of conscience, before moving on to the act of 
choice. See ibid. The same passage is found in Mclnemy’s E th ic a  T h o m is tic a , 106-107.
171 Aquinas, D e  V e rita te , q. 17, a .l, ad 4.
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good  purpose, o r re je c t w ha t w e kn o w  to  be rig h t, because the  w ro n g  ac t seems m ore
i n'y
desirab le  in  the  sho rt te rm . H ow ever, I  do n o t agree tha t th is  is  s u ffic ie n t evidence 
to  argue th a t p rudence is  n o t in vo lv e d  in  the ju d ic iu m  c o n s c ie n tia e  as w e ll. T o  do so 
w o u ld  d is to rt the  sense o f  the  tex ts  and to  d is to rt the nature o f  p rudence b y  fo cu s in g  
o n ly  on one o f  its  fu n c tio n s . I t  seems th a t in  the desire to  p ro ve  th a t p rudence and 
conscience are d iffe re n t, ce rta in  scholars have understated the  le v e l o f  o ve rla p  th a t 
e x is ts  betw een the  tw o .
I  w o u ld  suggest th a t th is  is la rg e ly  caused b y  an excessive  re lia n ce  on  D e  
V e rita te , q .17 , a . l,  ad 4, coup led  w ith  a m isread ing  o f the im p lic a tio n s  o f  its  con ten t. 
The passage c le a rly  describes the existence o f  tw o  judgem en ts: o f  conscience  and o f
1 7T
free  cho ice . The passage describes h ow  the ju d ic iu m  l ib e r i  a r b i t r i i  can go astray 
such th a t one errs in  cho ice . A c c o rd in g ly , b y  re fe rrin g  to  o th e r te x ts , M c ln e m y  and 
o thers p resent the  case fo r prudence be ing  in v o lv e d  in  the ju d ic iu m  l ib e r i  a r b i t r i i  to  
assist in  o rd e rin g  the  cho ice  to  the r ig h t end. H ow ever, the p ro b le m  seems to  be th a t 
in s u ffic ie n t a tte n tio n  is  g iven  to  the fa c t th a t the ju d ic iu m  c o n s c ie n tia e  is  a lso  fa llib le . 
In  d o in g  so, the  im press ion  is  g iven  th a t ju d ic iu m  c o n s c ie n tia e  and ju d ic iu m  
p ru d e n tia e  are d iffe re n t because prudence is  no t re q u ire d  in  the  d ispassionate 
ju d g e m e n t o f  consc ience .174 I t  is  c lea r th a t M c ln e m y  is  fu lly  aw are th a t conscience
1 7S
can e rr, ye t th is  does n o t fig u re  m uch in  h is  sp e c ific  ana lys is  o f  w h y  prudence
172 Noble, “Le syllogisme moral,” 563.
173 In fact, the passage also refers to another judgement, namely, ju d ic iu m  syn d e re s is , but this 
is passed over in articles, as it does not pertain to the argument. See Aquinas, D e  V e r ita te , q.17, a .l, ad 
4.
174 Cf. also Noble, “Le syllogisme moral,” 564: “Elle se prononce en une sentence sereine, 
impassible.”
175 Mclnemy, “Prudence and Conscience,” 303-304.
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cannot be re la te d  to  conscience .176 H ere it  m ay be use fu l to  p lace  M c ln e m y ’ s te x t 
be fo re  us:
I f  w e lo o k  back n o w  on  the w ay in  w h ich  St. Thom as con trasted  the  ju d g m e n t 
o f  conscience and the ju d g m e n t o f  cho ice , tw o  obse rva tions sp rin g  
im m e d ia te ly  to  m in d . C onscience was said to  be p u re ly  c o g n itiv e , w h ic h  
m eans th a t, fo r  i t  to  fu n c tio n , fo r the ju d g m e n t o f  conscience  to  be m ade, a ll 
th a t is  re q u ire d  is  a co g n itive  o rd in a tio n  to  the good. F u rth e rm o re , in  h is  
illu s tra tio n  o f  h o w  the ju d g m e n t o f  cho ice  can be p e rve rted  w h ile  th a t o f  
conscience is n o t, A qu inas is p o rtra y in g  the type  o f  m an A ris to tle  ca lls  
in c o n tin e n t, th a t is , the  m o ra lly  w eak m an. He know s w h a t he o u g h t to  do , h is  
conscience is  a ll rig h t, b u t h is  know ledge o f  the  good is  n o t com p lem ented  b y  
an e ffe c tiv e  a p p e titive  d isp o s itio n  to  the good as good. T h a t is  w h y , in  the  
crunch , in  choosing  (w h ic h  is  a m e ld  o f m in d  and app e tite ), he goes w ro n g .177
The p ro b le m  here is th a t too  m uch store has been set upon  th is  one passage o f  
A q u inas. B e lm ans is  r ig h t in  dec la ring  th is  passage to  be s im p ly  a d iscu ss io n  o f  a
1 78
p e rve rs io n  o f  the  w ill,  w h ic h  strays fro m  reason and the re fo re  fro m  conscience . The 
passage o n ly  deals w ith  the s itu a tio n  in  w h ich  conscience has ju d g e d  r ig h tly , and 
m akes no com m ent on  a s itu a tio n  o f  erroneous conscience. A s  a re s u lt, no co n c lu s io n  
about w h e th e r prudence is  in v o lv e d  in  conscience can be le g itim a te ly  d e rive d  fro m  it ,  
ju s t as the  fa c t th a t o the r tex ts  support the re la tio n sh ip  betw een prudence and cho ice
1 7Q
does n o t exc lude  the re la tio n sh ip  betw een prudence and conscience . I  have 
ded ica ted a s ig n ific a n t p o rtio n  o f  th is  thesis to  the na tu re  o f  the  fa llib ility  o f  
conscience in  an a ttem p t to  h ig h lig h t its  need to  reduce such e rro r th ro u g h  v irtu e  and 
grace. T he fa c t th a t c o n sc ien tia  in  D e  V erita te  is  described as a c o g n itiv e  act o f  
ju d g m e n t does n o t exclude  the  p o s s ib ility  o f  e rro r o r its  need fo r  im p ro ve m e n t, no r
176 Ibid., 304-305: “ It is such consideration that prevent me from suggesting that, at least in the 
case o f  the virtuous man, conscience and prudence effectively coalesce because there w ould no longer 
be any need to speak o f  a purely cognitive assessment o f  how principles apply in the concrete.”
177 M clnerny, “ Prudence and Conscience,”  303.
178 Belm ans, ‘“ L ejugem ent prudential’ chez Saint Thomas,”  419 .
179 In this w ay M clnerny’ s claim  that prudence is in no w ay related to conscience and is only 
“the cognitive component o f  our present choices”  lacks sufficient evidence. M oreover, his statement 
that “ conscience is no more a function o f  our moral character than is m oral philosophy or ethics”  seems 
an astonishingly detached notion o f  conscience; one which I cannot support. See M clnerny, “ Prudence 
and Conscience,”  305.
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ju s t ify  the  d o w n p la y in g  o f  the  im portance o f  tha t im p ro ve m e n t.180 T h e re fo re , as w e ll 
as re la tin g  the  good end and chosen means to  the w il l , 181 prudence , as the  pe rfec ted  
a b ility  o f  p ra c tic a l reason, firs t o f a ll has a co g n itive  task  le a d in g  to  a p a rtic u la r 
p recep t o r com m and b y  m eans o f  d e lib e ra tio n .182 A c c o rd in g ly , I  w o u ld  cons ide r 
prudence n o t o n ly  re la ted  to  the ju d ic iu m  lib e ru m  a r b it r i i ,  b u t a lso th e  ju d ic iu m  
co n s c ie n tia e . H ere the ove rlap  betw een prudence and conscience  is  n o t s im p ly
i o4
som e “ s u p e rfic ia l”  s im ila rity , as, w hen com paring  c o n s iliu m  and e le c tio , A q u in a s  
states th a t co n s iliu m  o r d e lib e ra tio n  “ belongs m ore p ro p e rly  to  prudence”  than
180 M cln e m y ’ s passing comment on the correction o f  conscience is quite surprising, given  the 
level o f  A q u in as’ s attention to the problem o f  error. Ibid., 303-304: “ M oreover, i f  the judgm ent o f  
conscience is erroneous, discussion, knowledge, m aybe even the fifty drachma course, can be 
efficacious in correcting it.”  This comment seems to limit the formation o f  conscience m erely to the 
reception o f  correct information in such a w ay that the issue o f  disposition is excluded. A s  w e have 
already noted, error occurs in conscience not only through an error o f  reasoning or facts, but also 
through the effects o f  disordered passions. Thus, formation o f  conscience does not sim ply involve 
information, but also the formation o f  the right environment for reasoning, w hich necessarily involves 
not only prudence, but also the moral virtues. It is strange, therefore, that M cln em y rejects the idea that 
erroneous conscience can be caused by m alice or vice, since Aquinas says that it can be deliberately 
caused b y  negligence. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.; idem, In II  
Sententiarum, dist. 39, q.3, a.2, ad 5; idem, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q .19 , a.6, resp.; M clnem y, 
“Prudence and Conscience,”  305.
181 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.56, a.3, resp.: “ subjectum prudentiae est intellectus 
practicus in ordine ad voluntatem rectam.” Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.66, a.3, ad 3.
182 Aquinas, In Decern Libros Ethicorum ad Nichomachum, II, lect. 8: “ prudentia, quae non est 
circa omnem cognitionem  veri, sed specialiter circa actum rationis qui est praecipere” ; idem, 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, in Opera Omnia, vol. 8 (New Y ork: M usurgia Publishers, 1949; 
reprint o f  1852-1873 Parma ed.), Quaestio Disputata de Virtutibus Cardinalibus, q .l  [unica], a . l ,  resp.: 
“ Sed per prudentiam fit ratio bene praeceptiva, ut ibidem dicitur. Unde m anifestum est quod ad 
prudentiam pertinet id quod est praecipuum in cognitione dirigente.”  C f. idem, Disputed Questions on 
Virtue: Quaestio Disputata de Virtutibus in Communi, Quaestio Disputata de Virtutibus Cardinalibus, 
trans. and preface b y  Ralph M clnem y (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’ s Press, 1999), Disputed 
Question on the Cardinal Virtues, a .l ,  resp.: “ But it is through prudence that reason is able to com m and 
w ell, as is said in that same place; so it is clear that what is most important in directive know ledge 
pertains to prudence” ; idem, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q.47, a .l ,  resp.: “ V isio  autem non est virtutis 
appetitivae, sed cognoscitivae. Unde manifestum est quod prudentia directe pertinet ad vim  
cognoscitivam ” ; ibid., Ila Ilae, q.48, resp. (talking o f  the integral parts o f  prudence relating to 
capacities o f  cognition and command) “ quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam secundum id 
quod est cognoscitiva; scilicet: memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia: tria vero alia pertinent 
ad earn secundum quod est praeceptiva, applicando cognitionem ad opus: scilicet: providentia, 
circumspectio et cautio” (emphases in text).
183 Apart from  giving primacy to synderesis, Aquinas says that conscience is formed b y  other 
habitus. I w ould suggest that these include the virtues, especially prudence. See idem, Summa 
Theologica, I, q.79, a.13, ad 3: “ Habitus autem, ex quibus conscientia informatur, etsi m ulti sunt...”
184 C f. M cln em y, “ Prudence and Conscience,”  300.
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cho ice , and th a t co n s iliu m  “ is  found  in  conscience” , to o , in  one o f  its  fu n c tio n s , 
nam e ly, the  in v e s tig a tio n  o f  w ha t shou ld  be done.186
I  have a ttem pted here to  show  w h y  a rgu ing  th a t prudence a ffe c ts  cho ice  
shou ld  n o t p rec lude  its  p rev ious in vo lve m e n t in  conscience. A s  such, I  w o u ld  disagree 
w ith  those w ho  conside r th a t prudence and conscience have n o th in g  to  do w ith  each
1 87
o the r, and I  w o u ld  propose th a t there is  some elem ent o f  o ve rla p  be tw een th e  tw o . I  
w o u ld  suggest th a t the  area o f  ove rlap  is  th a t o f  d e lib e ra tio n , ju d g e m e n t and 
com m and; in  e ffe c t, the  antecedent ju d ic iu m  co nsc ien tiae  and th e  ju d ic iu m  
p ru d e n t ia e , s tr ic tly  speaking .188 St Thom as states th a t antecedent conscience  is  an act 
o f  ju d g e m e n t, w h ic h  is  the  conc lu s io n  o f  a d e lib e ra tio n  ove r the  r ig h t course  o f  a c tio n  
b y  a p p lic a tio n  o f  un ive rsa l p rin c ip le s , w here the person is  p rodded , u rged  o r bound  to  
ca rry  i t  o u t ( in s tig a re , v e l inducere , v e l l ig a r e ) .m  In  the case o f  p rudence , a fte r the
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185 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.47, a .l, ad 2: “ quorum duorum consilium  m agis 
proprie pertinet ad prudentiam.”  He goes on in the same reply to affirm that choice can also be 
attributed to prudence, since choice is directed by what has been counselled.
186 Aquinas, De Vertitate, q .17, a.3, ad 2: “ consilium invenitur in conscientia quantum ad 
unum modum applicationis; cum scilicet inquiritur de agendo.”
1871 am using the idea o f  an overlap for two reasons: firstly, to state that the functions o f  
conscience and prudence involve elements which do not coincide, and secondly, to distinguish m y 
view  from  those w ho consider a portion o f  the operations o f  prudence and conscience to be identical 
(as opposed to the less refined theory o f  complete equivalence). The operations are not identical, as the 
impetus behind the tw o is not the same. M oreover, I would take the lack o f  coincidence in certain 
elements o f  their operation, such as the sense o f  remorse in conscience, to mean that conscience is not 
com pletely understood or “ enclosed within the virtue o f  prudence,”  contrary to D em an’ s view . See 
M elina, L a Conoscenza Morale, 2 11 ; Elders, “ St. Thomas Aquinas’ Doctrine o f  C on science,”  133; 
Deman, La prudence, 504: “ et elle [la conscience] sera comprise alors, [...] à l ’ intérieur de la vertu de 
prudence.”  “ E nclosed”  is E lders’ translation o f  comprise.
188 A s  I observed earlier, Aquinas uses judicium prudentiae very sparingly. It m ay be the case 
that the broader use o f  judicium prudentiae in some articles may obscure the difference between 
prudence as an act o f  judgem ent and prudence as a disposition. I shall return to this shortly.
189 Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 17, a .l ,  resp. Cf. ibid., q .17, a.2 ad 1: “ conscientia dicitur esse 
naturale judicatorium , in quantum est conclusio quaedam ex naturali judicatorio deducta.”  M any 
authors focus upon De Veritate, q .17, a .l ,  ad 4 in their description o f  conscience, such that the act o f  
conscience is presented as an act o f  judgem ent “ in the abstract” , without any command. This leads 
some to describe the function o f  conscience in terms o f  some kind o f  neutral “ philosophizing”  w hich 
requires prudence to bring the judgem ent into action. I would not disagree with the idea that prudence 
is involved in choice or in commanding the choice into action. However, the earlier text in De Veritate, 
q .17  lists a range o f  activities w hich present conscience as a far more involved capacity, one w hich 
prods, urges, binds, excuses and accuses. I would suggest that this list should not be overlooked. A s  a 
result, I w ould understand the activities o f  prodding, urging and binding to be some sort o f  prescriptive 
force w hich belies the description o f  conscience as simply some kind o f  cold  or neutral calculation. Cf.
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in it ia l c o g n itio n , the  three ke y  acts o f  prudence are counsel (o r d e lib e ra tio n ), p ra c tic a l 
ju d g e m e n t and com m and,190 w here th is  v irtu e  o f  r ig h t reason a pp lies  u n ive rsa l 
p rin c ip le s  to  the  co n tin g e n t circum stances o f  a p a rtic u la r p ro b le m .191
T hus, b o th  conscience and prudence con ta in  the a c tiv itie s  o f  d e lib e ra tio n , 
ju d g e m e n t and present som e k in d  o f  im petus to  act. H ow eve r, I  w o u ld  n o t go so fa r as 
to  say th a t the  evidence o f  an ove rlap  in  a c tiv ity  means th a t conscience  and prudence
1Q?
are s im p ly  “ tw o  ve rs ions o f  the  same d o c trin e ,”  and th e re fo re  e q u iva le n t. There  are 
tw o  reasons fo r  th is  conc lus ion . The firs t re lates to  the  e lem ents o f  a c tiv ity  w h ic h  do 
n o t co in c id e , and the second concerns the area o f  s im ila r a c tiv ity .
P inckaers p o in ts  o u t th a t conscience n o t o n ly  lo o ks  fo rw a rd  to  fu tu re  actions, 
b u t a lso backw ard  to  those a lready ca rried  ou t. In  th is  w a y  consequent conscience 
w ith  its  ju d g e m e n t o f  accusation  o r defence, b rings a sense o f  rem orse  o r o f  be ing  
excused (o r perhaps jo y o u s  sa tis fa c tio n ) accord ing to  the  q u a lity  o f  the  a c tio n .193 
P rudence, in  con trast, “ a fte r ha v in g  de libera ted  on the  a c tio n  to  be ca rrie d  o u t and 
perhaps c a llin g  to  m in d  past experience, is  d ire c tly  concerned w ith  the  present 
m om en t o f  the  a c tio n ,194 because i t  is  th rough  the dec is ion  th a t i t  b rin g s  the  a c tio n  in to  
be ing  in  a p a rtic u la r w a y .” 195 T here fo re , prudence is  n o t in v o lv e d  in  consequent 
conscience , b u t prudence also goes beyond the action  o f  conscience as a ju d g e m e n t in
Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  89; M clnem y, “Prudence and Conscience,”  304-305; 
Elders, “ St. Thom as Aquinas’ Doctrine o f  Conscience,”  127; Aquinas, De Ventate, q .17 , a .l ,  resp.
190 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q.47, a.2, ad 3; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.49, a.6, arg.3: 
“principalis actus prudentiae est praecipere, secundarii autem iudicare et consiliari” ; Réginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange, “ L a prudence: sa place dans l ’ organisme des vertus,”  Revue Thomiste 31 (1926): 
4 11-2 6 , at 4 14 -16 .
191 Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 98.
192 M elina, La Conoscenza Morale, 211  (commenting on a v iew  he disagrees with): “ due 
differenti versioni della stessa dottrina.”
193 Cf. Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  90; Aquinas, De Ventate, q .17 , a .l ,
resp.
194 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.49, a.4, resp.: “ prudentis est rectam  aestimationem 
habere de operandis.”  This definition clearly shows the forward-looking outlook o f  prudence, related to 
that w hich is to be done now, rather than to some kind o f  theorising. C f. ibid, Ha Ilae, q.47, a .l ,  ad 2: 
“ ea, quae sunt praesentialiter agenda.”
195 Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  90.
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its  ro le  as a u r ig a  v ir tu tu m , d riv e r o r chario tee r o f the v irtu e s ,196 m ean ing  th a t i t  steers 
o r d ire c ts  the  o th e r v irtu e s  tow ards th e ir true  end: d isce rn in g  and choo s in g  the  good  in  
its  p a rtic u la r fo rm s .197 The judgem en t o f  conscience ben e fits  fro m  th is  s tee ring  o f  a 
true  course in  th a t its  ju d g e m e n t is  less im pa ired  b y  d iso rdered  pass ion  o r o ve rth ro w n  
b y  a s in fu l cho ice  to  re je c t the  ju d g e m e n t.198 H ere, the re fo re , w e  are d e a lin g  w ith  the 
ro le  o f  p rudence as d is p o s itio n  ra the r than as a p a rtic u la r ju d g e m e n t.
T hus, there  are areas o f  a c tiv ity  w h ich  are p rope r to  p rudence and conscience 
separa te ly. H o w e ve r, o the r elem ents o f th e ir action  co in c id e , n a m e ly , the  a p p lic a tio n  
o f  u n ive rs a l m o ra l p rin c ip le s  to  the p a rticu la r s itu a tio n . Y e t th e  co in c id e n ce  is  n o t a 
s tra ig h tfo rw a rd  equ iva lence , such th a t the tw o  judgem ents are synonym ous, as th e ir 
ope ra tio n  is  “ loca ted  on  tw o  d iffe re n t le ve ls .” 199 R ather, i t  is  an o ve rla p  o f  o p e ra tio n  
in  w h ic h  the  antecedent ju dgem en t o f  conscience is  ra ised b y  p rudence  to  a new  le ve l 
in  its  q u a lity  o f  reason ing  and m o tiv a tio n .200 P inckaers and M e lin a  p o in t o u t th a t 
A q u in a s  w as h e ir to  tw o  tra d itio n s  w h ich  he s k illfu lly  com b in e d : one in  w h ic h  
“ conscience w as bound to  the idea  o f  o b lig a tio n  w ith  regard to  the  la w ,”  and the  o the r 
w h ic h  sought exce llence  th ro u g h  m ora l v irtu e .201 C onscience pursues th e  a c tio n  in  
te rm s o f  o b lig a tio n , w h ile  prudence as a v irtu e  seeks the  p e rfe c tio n  o f  the  act.202 
T he re fo re , the  in v o lv e m e n t o f  prudence in  conscien tious ju d g e m e n t ra ises i t  beyond  a
196 C f. Aquinas, In II Sententiarum, dist. 41, q .l, a .l, arg. 3: “ secundum Bem ardum  (In Cant, 
serm. 49), prudentia est auriga virtutum”  (parenthesis in text); CCC, no. 1806.
197 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.
198 C f. N oble, La conscience morale, 233: “ C et enrichissement de notre esprit dans la 
connaissance des lois morales et de leur applications n ’est encore qu’une part de la perfection totale de 
la conscience vertueuse: elle garantit dans notre intelligence la direction de la vie m orale et son 
discernement pratique.”
199 Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  90.
200 Thus w e find in the Catechism, “ It is prudence that im m ediately guides the judgem ent o f  
conscience.”  C f. CCC, no. 1806.
201 Ibid., 89-90; M elina, La Conoscenza Morale, 210. Aquinas com bines law  and virtue in 
such a w ay that law  is “ at the service o f  virtue.”  See Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  90. 
The combination o f  law and virtue in St Thom as’ s theory means that conscience and prudence are 
com bined together, rather than prudence making conscience a redundant notion.
202 Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  90. This might explain A quinas’ s particular 
concerns in his study o f  conscience for the limits o f  its obligation and binding quality.
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m o ra lity  o f  the  bare m in im u m  so th a t the person seeks the  best p oss ib le  s o lu tio n ,203 
th a t is  m ost ap t fo r  the circum stances, ra ther than se ttlin g  fo r  any one o f  the  le g itim a te  
o p tio n s .204 T h is  s h ift is  achieved th rough  prudence ’ s s k ille d  ca p a c ity  fo r  p ra c tic a l 
reason ing  in  d e lib e ra tin g  the  concrete circum stances,205 and th ro u g h  its  d is p o s itio n  to  
s triv e  fo r  p e rfe c tio n . In  th is  w ay th ro u g h  prudence, “ the pe rfe c te d  a b ility  to  m ake 
dec is ions in  accordance w ith  re a lity ”  in  a ll its  p a rtic u la rity , the  in d iv id u a l is  le d  to  
“ e th ic a l m a tu rity .” 206
3.2 Conscience and Moral Virtues
The p reced ing  section  on  prudence and conscience has led  us, h o p e fu lly , to  a c le a re r 
understand ing  o f  the  re la tio n sh ip  betw een the tw o , w here  b o th  are roo te d  in  a 
p e rce p tio n  o f  the  tru th , bu t a t d iffe re n t leve ls, in  such a w ay th a t p rudence re fin e s  the 
ju d g e m e n t o f  conscience so tha t i t  is  fu lly  attuned to  the  here and n o w . I t  is  c lea r, 
th e re fo re  th a t prudence ho lds a fundam enta l ro le  in  the v irtu o u s  life .207 H o w e ve r, its  
ow n  capacities  fo r p e rce p tio n  and d ire c tio n  are n o t im p e rv io u s  to  a ttack. Indeed , its  
tasks o f  d e lib e ra tio n , ju d g e m e n t and com m and can a ll be d is ru p te d  th ro u g h  d iso rde red  
passion  in  such a w ay th a t its  re fin e d  capacity  fo r a p p lica tio n  o f  the  u n ive rsa l to  the
203 D elhaye, The Christian Conscience, 172: “ Prudence’ s task is to exam ine and choose in 
order to decide what is de facto  the best path.”  Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.47, a,2, ad 
3: “ in quibus non sunt viae determinatae perveniendi ad fmem.”  In other words, prudence com es into 
play when there is no fixed w ay o f  arriving at the good. This does not mean, how ever, that it operates 
without reference to objective morality. Rather, it means that prudence seeks to find and apply what is 
right and most appropriate, instead o f  subjectively inventing what it deems to be right. This is because 
prudence is about prescribing the means and not the ends. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, 
q.47, a.8, resp; ibid., Ha Ilae q.47, a. 15, resp. Moreover, finding the best path through prudence m ay 
also require revision o f  one’ s judgem ent. Such revision is in keeping with the mental m odels theory o f  
deduction and also o f  the general defeasible nature o f  the practical syllogism .
204 Here we see the reverse o f  the model found in casuistry. C f. Pieper, The Four Cardinal 
Virtues, 26-31; Pinckaers, “ Conscience, Truth, and Prudence,”  90.
205 Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 171.
206 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 31.
207 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.57, a.5, resp.
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p a rtic u la r w o u ld  fa lte r o r be destroyed.208 The fa c t th a t p rudence can be p o te n tia lly  
d e ra ile d  m eans th a t i t  requ ires support fro m  the v irtu e s  th a t i t  in  tu rn  d ire c ts . In  o th e r 
w o rds, prudence cannot operate w ith o u t the support o f  the  m o ra l v irtu e s , and the 
m o ra l v irtu e s  cannot fu n c tio n  w ith o u t prudence.209 M c ln e m y  co ined  a te rm  fo r  th is  
m u tu a l suppo rt betw een prudence and m ora l v irtu e , nam e ly, the  “ v irtu o u s  c irc le .” 210
911
W h ile  prudence, as an in te lle c tu a l v irtu e  concerned w ith  a c tio n , resides in  
the reason, the  m o ra l v irtu e s  operate in  the appetite  o f  w ill.212 T hus, m o ra l v irtu e  
a ffe c ts  the  w ill b y  o rd e rin g  the desire. In  do ing  so, i t  n o t o n ly  he lps the  w ill to  choose 
the  good, b u t a lso he lps us to  see w h y  w e shou ld  lo ve  th is  p a rtic u la r good, ra th e r than  
s im p ly  obey it .  T h is  o rd e rin g  o f the end in to  a p o s itiv e  desire  fo r  the  good then  a ffe c ts
'j i o
prudence in  its  cho ice  o f  means appropria te  to  th a t end. T hus, th ro u g h  the  in flu e n c e  
o f  m o ra l v irtu e , p ruden t a c tio n  is  roo ted  in  lo ve  o f  the good  ra th e r than  s la v ish  
obed ience .214 T h is  a lso im p lie s  th a t th rough  th is  m u tua l co o p e ra tio n  am ong v irtu e s , 
the  o p e ra tio n  o f  conscience is  also shaped b y  a lo ve  o f  the  good a t a p a rtic u la r le v e l.
208 Cf. Aquinas [S. Tom m aso d ’Aquino], Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro Lombardo e Testo 
Integrale di Pietro Lombardo, voi. 3, Libro Secondo, Distinzioni 1-20: La Creazione, Gli Angeli e  i 
Demoni, Gli Esseri Corporei e L ’Uomo, Latin-Italian ed., trans. Carm elo Pandolfi and Roberto C o gg i 
(Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2000), dist. 5, q .l, a .l ,  sol.: “ delectado corrumpit 
existim ationem  prudentiae” ; idem, Summa Theologica, Ia lla e  58, a.5, resp.; ibid., Ila  Ilae, q. 53, a.6, 
resp.; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, V I, 5, 1 140b 14-15.
209 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.58, a.5, ad 3: “prudentia non solum est bene 
consiliativa, sed etiam bene judicativa et bene praeceptiva: quod esse non potest, nisi removeatur 
impedimentum passionum corrumpentium judicium , et praeceptum prudentiae: et hoc per virtutem 
m oralem .”
210 M clnem y, “ Prudence and Conscience,”  302. This is perhaps a more apt description than 
calling it a “ vicious circle.”  See Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 134-38. D elhaye 
calls it “ reciprocal causality.”  See Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 175.
211 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.58, a.3, ad 1.
212 Idem, In IIISententiarum, dist. 33, q .l, a .l ,  qc.2, sol.; idem, Summa Theologica, q.58, a.5, 
resp.; ibid., q.59, a.4, resp.: “ virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae, ordinando ipsam in 
bonum rationis.”
213 Idem, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.59, a .l ,  ad 1; ibid., Ia Ilae, q.66, a.3, arg 3: “ virtus 
moralis facit rectam intentionem finis.”
214 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 34: “ O nly one who previously and sim ultaneously 
loves and wants the good can be prudent; but only one who is previously prudent can do good. Since, 
how ever, love o f  the good in its turn grows by doing good, the foundations o f  prudence are sunk deeper 
and firm er to the extent that prudence bears fruit in action” (emphases in text).
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M o ra l v irtu e s  can re la te  to  passions, o r to  o u r ac tions  o r a c tiv itie s  
(o p e ra tio n e s ).215 The fo rm e r can be e xe m p lifie d  in  the  ca rd in a l v irtu e s  o f  fo rtitu d e  
and tem perance ,216 w h ile  the  o the r ca rd ina l v iru te , ju s tic e , o ffe rs  us a ke y  exam p le  o f  
the la tte r.217 T he re fo re , s ta rtin g  w ith  ju s tice , w e sha ll n ow  lo o k  b r ie fly  a t the  w o rk in g s  
o f  a ll these v irtu e s  in  re la tio n  to  conscience.
3.2.1 Justice
• • • • * 2 1 8  
S t Thom as A q u in a s  considered ju s tic e  to  be the c h ie f o f  a ll m o ra l v irtu e s . Indeed,
ju s tic e  ho lds  th is  p lace o f  honou r am ong the m o ra l v irtu e s  because i t  is  fundam en ta l
to  the  w a y  in  w h ic h  w e deal w ith  others. A s  a re su lt, p rom p ted  b y  C ice ro , A q u in a s
says th a t “ the sp lendou r o f  v irtu e  is  greatest in  [ju s tic e ].” 219 H ib b s  suggests th a t th is
“ e x a lta tio n  o f  the v irtu e  o f  ju s tic e  underm ines the o b je c tio n  th a t v irtu e  th e o ry  is
in s u ffic ie n tly  so c ia l.” 220 Indeed, some w rite rs  have fo rc ib ly  advanced the  n o tio n  th a t
001
v irtu e  th e o ry , w he the r in  p a rt o r as a w ho le , is  d e fic ie n t because o f  a la c k  o f  
a tte n tio n  to  the  soc ia l o r re la tio n a l e lem ent o f  m ora ls, o r because i t  is  “ trapped  in  an
215 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.60 aa.2 and 3.
216 Cf. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.61, a.2, resp.; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.123, aa.1-12; ibid., Ila Ilae, q. 14 1, aa. 1- 
8; ibid., Ila Ilae, q. 143; Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 115-41 and 143-206.
217 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la Ilae, q.60, a.3, resp.
218 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae, q.66, a.4, resp.: “justitia inter omnes virtutes morales 
praecellit, tamquam propinquior rationi”  [“justice excels among all the m oral virtues, for it is closer to 
reason” ].
219 Ibid., Ila  Ilae, q.58, a.3, resp.: “ et, ut Tullius dicit, in I de O fficiis  (in tit. De Justitia), ex 
justitia praecipue viri boni nominantur; unde, sicut ibidem dicit, in ea virtutis splendor est m axim us” 
(emphasis in text). C f. Hibbs, Virtue's Splendor, 124; Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 64, 66. Hibbs 
cites the text incorrectly as Ila Ilae, q.53, a.3.
220 Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 124.
221 Although supportive o f  virtue theory, Keenan’ s criticism  o f  the traditional cardinal virtues 
is curious nonetheless. O n the one hand he claims that the classical list is inadequate in its relational 
focus, as “justice is the only relational virtue.”  This critique is peculiar in that Keenan feels obliged to 
increase the number o f  relational virtues in the cardinal quartet, while at the same time he downplays 
the importance o f  the cardinal virtues. He states that they only provide the “ bare essentials for right 
human living”  and “ [do not] exhaust the entire domain o f  virtue.”  I f  this be the case, I see no reason 
w h y one should fee l com pelled to cram more relational virtues into the list, when one can look  beyond 
the cardinal virtues for more exam ples o f  virtues with relational focus. Therefore, I w ould suggest that 
the criticism  is unjustified, since Aquinas already gives an exalted position to the relational virtue o f  
justice, as w ell as tying justice to a number o f  other social or relational virtues o f  a human or 
theological nature. See Keenan, “ Proposing Cardinal Virtues,”  714 , 719.
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id e a lize d  v is io n  o f  s e lf-s u ffic ie n c y .” 222 T h is  c r itic is m  seems to  be un founded , 
p ro v id e d  th a t C h ris tia n  v irtu e  theo ry  is  v iew ed  in  its  e n tire ty , since i t  is  c le a r th a t r ig h t 
re la tio n s  w ith  o thers is  an essentia l pa rt o f  the theo ry . Indeed , i f  the  v irtu o u s  person 
w ere tru ly  s e lf-s u ffic ie n t, there  w o u ld  be no need to  have a care fo r  ano the r,223 o r fo r  
g iv in g  th a t in d iv id u a l h is  o r her due. M oreove r, i f  th is  w ere the  case, n o t o n ly  w o u ld  
ju s tic e  be irre le v a n t, b u t a lso g ra titude , tru th , lib e ra lity , a ffa b ility  and e p ik e ia : the  
v irtu e s  connected to  ju s tic e  th a t fu rth e r q u a lify  the  na tu re  o f  o u r ju s t and hum an
994
re la tio n sh ip s . I t  shou ld  a lso be noted th a t ju s tic e  shou ld  n o t be unde rstood  as a 
v irtu e  th a t stands a lone, b u t ra the r as a v irtu e  th a t is  fundam en ta l to  the  na tu re  o f  a ll
• 99S • •
m o ra l action . S t Thom as says tha t a ll v irtu e s  re la te  to  ju s tic e  in s o fa r as th e y  d ire c t
• • ♦ 99 • ♦
the in d iv id u a l to  the  com m on good. In  th is  w ay, i f  the na tu re  o f  ju s tic e  and the  
ex ten t o f  its  in flu e n c e  are p ro p e rly  understood, i t  co u ld  h a rd ly  be sa id  th a t v irtu e  
th e o ry  is  d e fic ie n t in  its  re la tio n a l ou tlo o k .
222 Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 120-124. Cf. Jerome B. Schneewind, “ The M isfortunes o f  
Virtue,”  in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and M ichael Slote (N ew  York: O xford  U niversity Press, 
2001), 178-200, at 187, 199-200. Schneewind argues that “ classical virtue theory is o f  little or no use” 
as it gives insufficient attention to the basic needs o f  humanity and is ill-equipped to deal w ith the 
challenges o f  com m unity living. Acordingly, he proposes that m odem  legal theory is more useful than 
virtue. One m ight argue, how ever, that law and virtue are not m utually exclusive, as w as com m ented 
upon earlier. C f. Benjam in J. Brown, “ The Integration o f  Law  and Virtue: O bedience in A quinas’ s 
M oral Theology,”  Irish Theological Quarterly 67 (2002): 333-351, at 351 : “ W ithout virtue, law  tends 
to becom e pharisaic; but without law, virtue tends to becom e self-absorbed.”  A ccordin gly, to the 
criticism  o f  an idealized self-sufficiency in virtue theory, one might also add the criticism  o f  excessive 
attention to one’ s self-improvement. This is an element o f  virtue theory, but w ould only be worthy o f  
criticism  i f  it becam e an end in itself.
223 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 54-63, at 56: “ Justice, therefore, ‘consists in livin g one 
with another’ .”  C f. Aquinas, In Decern Libros Ethicorum a d Nichomachum, VIII, lect. 9: “justifia 
consistit in com m unicatione” ; idem, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.57, a. 1, resp: “justitiae proprium est 
inter alias virtutes, ut ordinet hominem in his, quae sunt ad alterum: importât enim aequalitatem 
quamdam” [“ It is proper to justice, when compared to the other virtues, to order man in those things 
w hich relate to another: for it brings with it a certain equality” ]. Prompted b y Aquinas, Pinckaers 
argues that the virtue o f  justice is rooted in the inclination to live in society with others, w hich proceeds 
from an innate sense o f  the other. C f. Servais Pinckaers, “ Rediscovering V irtue,”  trans. Sr M ary 
Thom as N oble, The Thomist 60 (1996): 361-78, at 370.
224 Cf. Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 124-25; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, qq.106, 109, 
114, 1 1 7  and 120.
225 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 59; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, l ia  Ilae, q.58, a.5, 
resp.; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.79, a .l ,  resp.
226 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.: “ et secundum hoc actus omnium 
virtutum possunt ad justitiam  pertinere, secundum quod ordinat hominem ad bonum com m une.”
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Fundam enta l to  the v irtu e  o f  ju s tice , and to  a ll fo rm s o f  ju s tic e , is  th e  n o tio n  o f  
“suum  c u iq u e ,”  g iv in g  to  each th a t w h ich  is  h is  o r he r o w n .227 Such a d u ty  to  g ive  
w h a t is  due, as w e ll as the  rig h t to  one’ s due, in c lu d in g  one ’ s in a lie n a b le  rig h ts , 
u ltim a te ly  depends upon  o u r d ig n ity  as hum an persons, created b y  G od .228 The 
s ta rtin g  p o in t o f  suum  cu ique  means th a t the p rim a ry  pe rspective  o f  ju s tic e  is  
o u tw a rd -lo o k in g : “ o rie n te d  d ire c tly  tow a rd  the good o f  o thers, and the  good  o f  the 
co m m u n ity  as a w h o le , and n o t tow a rd  the good o f  the  in d iv id u a l.” 229 B u t h o w  do w e 
k n o w  w h a t is  due to  the  other? The question  show s the  lin k  be tw een ju s tic e  and
prudence, s ta rtin g  at the  the  le v e l o f  percep tion . A s  w e have seen, the  v irtu e  o f
• » • • • 
prudence concerns the  transposing  o f  “ the tru th  o f  rea l th in g s  [...] in to  a d e c is io n .”
H a v in g  ju d g e d  the  tru th  o f  som eth ing as good, som eth ing  as due to  ano the r, ju s tic e
1
then  “ e ffec ts  th is  good” , and the re fo re  “ does the  tru th .”  C onsequen tly , in ju s tic e  is  a 
loss o f  con tac t w ith  the  tru th , o r m ore accu ra te ly  a de lib e ra te  suppression  (an 
im p riso n m e n t) o f  the  tru th , as St Paul describes i t  (c f. R om  1:18).
T h is  n o tio n  o f  ju s tic e  as be ing  roo ted  in  d o in g  the  tru th  o r e ffe c tin g  th e  good 
th a t is  due to  the  o th e r m eans th a t ju s tic e  as a v irtu e  d iffe rs  s ig n ific a n tly  fro m  a 
m odem  le g a l concep t o f  ju s tic e . P inckaers p o in ts  ou t th a t the  le g a l idea  o f  ju s tic e  is  
based upon “ a balance o f  ‘ egoism s’ ,”  w here the  la w  supp lies the  fra m e w o rk  o f
227 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 44. Although the idea predates him, this motto w as 
coined by Cicero. See Ravasi, Ritorno alle Virtu, 54. C f. Pinckaers, “ R ediscovering V irtue,”  369: “ Its 
[justice] proper activity is not receiving, but rather giving to others what is due to them.”
228 Cf. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 50-52; Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 
Compendium o f  the Social Doctrine o f  the Church (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), 
nos. 35, 3 7 ,4 0 , 108. For a very informative article on the nature and proliferation o f  human rights 
discourse in m odem  times, see Martin M cKeever, “ The U se o f  Human Rights Discourse as C ategory o f  
Ethical Argum entation in Contem porary Culture,”  Studia Moralia 38 (2000): 103-25. M cK eever points 
out that the claim  o f  inalienable rights based on human dignity fails to articulate the source o f  that 
dignity, thus w eakening its normative status. See ibid., 115-21.
229 Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 124.
230 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 52.
231 Ibid., 66-67.
232 Ibid., 52.
233 Ibid., 35. Pieper draws upon Romans 1:18 to say that “ truth is held captive in the fetters o f  
injustice.”  The G reek participle katechonton implies a restraining o f  the truth b y  injustice.
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e q u a lity  o f  rig h ts  w ith  an a im  o f  try in g  to  sa tis fy  the  needs o f  in d iv id u a ls .234 A n  
understand ing  o f  ju s tic e  based upon a v ie w  o f  soc ie ty  as “ a c o lle c tio n  o f  ego ism s”  
ra the r than  co m m u n ity  m eans tha t, no m atte r h o w  s k ille d  the  le g is la to r m ay be, the  
law s enacted w ill serve o n ly  to  produce “ a m u ltip le  and re in fo rc e d  ‘ e g o ism ’ ,”  w h ic h  
fa ils  to  s ig n ific a n tly  im p ro ve  the  character o f  the in d iv id u a ls  o f  th a t so c ie ty .235 Justice  
as a v irtu e , on  the  o the r hand, is  no t s im p ly  a fo rm  o f  respect o r “ the  desire  n o t to  
in frin g e  on  o th e rs ’ rig h ts .”  R ather, P inckaers sees i t  as “ the  b e g in n in g  o f  a ce rta in  
k in d  o f  lo ve , an esteem  fo r  another th a t in c lin e s  us to  g ive  the  o th e r h is  o r h e r due.” 237 
I t  is  th is  understand ing  o f  ju s tic e  as roo ted  in  the tru th  and in  an openness to  the  o th e r 
th a t is  o f  tru e  se rv ice  to  ou r judgem en ts o f  conscience.
3.2.2 Conscience and Justice
F rom  o u r b r ie f observa tions above, i t  is  clear th a t any d iscuss ion  on  ju s tic e  is  “ dogged 
b y  d iffe re n t and s h iftin g  senses in  w h ich  th is  w o rd  is  used ( ‘ju s tic e ’ as a state o f  
a ffa irs , ‘ju s tic e ’ as a standard, ‘ju s tic e ’ as a q u a lity  o f  cha rac te r).” 238 H o w e ve r, 
M cK e e ve r rem inds us th a t the  n o tio n  o f  h ab itu s  is  cen tra l to  A q u in a s ’ s use o f  the  
te rm , so th a t fo r  Thom as “ ‘ju s tic e ’ re fers to  a q u a lity  o f  a p o w e r (the  w ill)  and th a t 
o the r usages are d e rive d  fro m  th is  p rim a ry  sense.”  T he re fo re  in  lo o k in g  at th e  ro le
234 Pinckaers, “ Rediscovering Virtue,”  370.
235 Ibid., 368-69.
236 Ibid., 369. Thus, the language o f  rights is secondary to duty in the virtuous perception o f  
justice. I f  this order is turned round so that rights become more important or fundamental than duty, 
one risks an im poverishm ent o f  human relationships in community, since one’ s prim ary focus becom es 
mine instead o f  yours. Indeed it is only with an outward-looking perspective that one can reach the next 
level o f  “ service, love, altruism, sacrifice and gratuity.”  M cK eever points out that, while not denying 
human rights, the G ospel “ wishes to go beyond the very idea o f  rights.”  Therefore, “ theological ethics 
can and should recognise the validity o f  human rights discourse, but it cannot accept that human 
relations be reduced to this level.”  See M cKeever, “ The Use o f  Human Rights D iscourse,”  123-24.
237 Pinckaers, R ediscovering Virtue,”  369.
238 Martin M cK eever, “ Health and Craft as Adumbrations o f  Justice: Suggestive A n alogies 




o f  ju s tic e  as a v irtu e  in  its  re c ip ro ca l re la tio n sh ip  to  conscience ,240 w e need to  bear in  
m in d  th a t ju s tic e  is  a h a b itu s  o r d isp o s itio n  o f  the w ill to  seek r ig h t re la tio n s  w ith  
others. I f  w e do so, w e shou ld  a vo id  reduc ing  the in vo lve m e n t o f  ju s tic e  in  conscience 
to  s im p ly  a c o ld  c a lc u la tio n  o f  rig h ts  o r duties. Thus, ra the r than  s im p ly  b e in g  a m o ra l 
o r le g a l standard th a t is  w h o lly  detached fro m  the  in d iv id u a l, ju s tic e  as the  d is p o s itio n  
o f  a lo ve  o f  r ig h t a c tio n  and rig h t re la tio n  fo rm s p a rt o f  the  d yn a m ic , v irtu o u s  
e n v iro n m e n t in  w h ic h  conscience bo th  develops and m akes its  judgem en ts . 
A c k n o w le d g in g  th a t ju s tic e  in vo lve s  a p o s itive  d is p o s itio n  tow a rds the  o th e r a llo w s  us 
to  in co rp o ra te  care, re s p o n s ib ility  and love  in to  ou r understand ing  o f  ju s tic e  and in to  
the  shaping o f  o u r judgem en ts, in  such a w ay th a t these q u a litie s  are n o t seen as 
c o n flic tin g  opposites, b u t com plem enta ry elem ents o f  a tru ly  hum an ju s tic e .241
R obe rt Spaem ann has proposed an e th ic  o f  re s p o n s ib ility  o p e ra tive  in  one ’ s 
conscience as a s o lu tio n  to  e th ica l sub je c tiv ism  o r c o ld  le g a l p o s itiv is m .242 A c tin g
240 It is conscience that m oves us to seek right relations with others and to g iv e  w hat is due to 
them. Such an attitude develops into the virtuous disposition o f  justice. H ow ever, once the virtue has 
been acquired it becom es the environment or disposition by which w e becom e more sensitive to the 
needs and rights o f  others. Thus, conscience forms and is informed b y  justice. In this w ay, a reciprocal 
relationship exists between conscience and justice. One should note, however, that this dynam ic 
reciprocity applies to all the virtues with regard to conscience, and forms the basis o f  the possibility  o f  
developm ent and moral growth in conscience.
241 Pinckaers, Rediscovering Virtue,”  370: “ Virtue forms a love o f  justice in us and through 
this it opens the w ay to charity.”  Pinckaers considers that the shift in understanding o f  the relationship 
between the individual and society, with its resultant effect on the notion o f  justice, has led to the 
perception o f  justice and charity being in conflict. C f. Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 39: 
“ Since the tw o were now  m oving in opposite directions, the one giving and the other taking, these 
virtues could no longer operate harmoniously.”
242 Robert Spaemann, “ Conscience and Responsibility in Christian Ethics,”  in Crisis o f  
Conscience, ed. John M . Haas (N ew  York: Crossroad, 1996), 111-34 , at 118-120. Cf. Rom ano 
Guardini, Learning the Virtues That Lead You to God, trans. Stella Lange (M anchester, N ew  
Hampshire: Sophia Institute Press, 1998; revised reprint o f  The Virtues: On Forms o f  Moral L ife , 
Henry Regnery, 1967), 49. Palumbieri also points to responsibility in conscience, rooted in our being 
and divine vocation, as the antidote to arbitrary choice, and Hans Jonas also sees it as the necessary 
restraint in our technological age. See Sabino Palumbieri, “ L ’Antropologia, R adice dell’E tica nel 
Compendio della Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa," Studia Moralia 43 (2005): 49-96, at 60-61; Hans 
Jonas, The Imperative o f  Responsibility: In Search o f  an Ethics fo r  the Technological Age, trans. Hans 
Jonas and David Herr (Chicago and London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1984), x, 79 -177. Care and 
responsibility have not alw ays been considered to be part o f  justice. Carol G illigan  proposed that moral 
reasoning was defined b y the psychological differences rooted in gender, w ith males fo llow in g an 
ethics o f  justice and rights, w hile fem ales followed an ethics o f  care and responsibility. Subsequent 
em pirical psychological studies have shown this to be false. The conclusion o f  Sidney Callahan was 
that, “ M en and wom en, girls and boys, do not actually reason differently; wom en are as principled and
299
fro m  a sense o f  re s p o n s ib ility , grounded in  the com m andm ent to  lo v e  G od  and 
n e ighb ou r, m eans th a t one ’ s decisions and actions are no lo n g e r m o tiva te d  b y  a 
c o n flic t be tw een s e lf-in te re s t and lega l o b lig a tio n s , du ties and co n s tra in ts .243 R a ther 
than  focused on  s im p ly  co m p ly in g  w ith  the la w , ou r en larged sense o f  ju s tic e  m akes 
us aw are o f  o u r “ re s p o n s ib ility  fo r one another,”  a re s p o n s ib ility  th a t is  “ a c tive ”  in  its  
awareness o r d is p o s itio n .244 In  th is  w ay, w e recognise th a t w e  are each o th e r’ s keeper 
(c f. G en 4 :9 ), responsib le  f o r  and accountable to  one another and to  G od .245 I t  is  th is  
re c o g n itio n  o f  the  “ au then tic  requirem ents o f  ju s tic e  as w e ll as a g rea te r readiness to  
act a c c o rd in g ly ,”  w h ic h  Pope B ened ic t considers to  be an im p o rta n t p a rt o f  a true  
fo rm a tio n  o f  conscience , fa c ilita te d  th rough  the teach ing  o f  the  C h u rch .246
justice oriented as men.”  Therefore, rather than seeing justice and rights and care and responsibility as 
tw o conflicting m odels or ‘ vo ices’ , they should been seen as part and parcel o f  a fuller notion o f  
justice, one w hich applies to all, and which in different contexts different elements w ill com e to the 
fore. C f. C arol G illigan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Cam bridge, M A , and London: Harvard University Press, 1982), 24-105, at 69: “ This confrontation 
reveals tw o m odes o f  judging, tw o different constructions o f  the moral domain” ; Callahan, In Good  
Conscience, 196; Spohn, “ The Return o f  Virtue Ethics,”  68-70.
243 Spaemann, “ Conscience and Responsibility,”  118. Aquinas observes that jo y  results from  
the act o f  justice. Joy w ould not immediately flow  from grudging com pliance w ith obligation, but 
would certainly result from a more positive attitude o f  a desire for justice . C f. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, la  Ilae, q.59, a.5, resp.: “ ad actum justitiae sequitur gaudium.” This desire for justice, 
described as hunger and thirst, is reflected in the Beatitudes. C f. M t 5:6.
244 Spaemann, “ Conscience and Responsibility,”  118.
245 Ibid., 117 . W hile all forms o f  justice (commutative, distributive and legal or general 
justice) relate to conscience through their concern with “ the human good,”  one m ight suggest that 
distributive justice, w ith its particular concern for the bonum commune and the dignitas o f  the 
individual, m ight show most clearly the link between prudence, justice and responsible conscience. 
Here the just conscience o f  the individual is called not only to recognise and give what is due directly 
to other individuals (commutative justice), but also to recognise and accept the broader supportive 
responsibilities o f  livin g in community. C f. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 68, 73-74, 81-103.
246 Benedict X V I, E ncyclical Letter Deus Caritas Est (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2006), 
28 (a): “ Rather, the Church wishes to help form consciences in political life  and to stimulate greater 
insight into the authentic requirements o f  justice as w ell as greater readiness to act accordingly, even 
when this m ight involve conflict with situations o f  personal interest. B uilding a just social and c iv il 
order, wherein each person receives what is his due or her due, is an essential task w hich every 
generation must take up anew” ; AAS 98 (2006), 239: “N ovitque bene non esse munus E cclesiae ut 
ipsamet huic doctrinae politico modo vigorem tribuat: consulere intendit formationi conscientiae in re 
politica et contendere ut augescant sive perceptio verorum iustitiae postulatorum, sive sim ul dispositio 
ad hoc modo agendum, etiam cum hoc contrarium est singulorum lucri”  (emphasis mine). Here the 
Pope is referring to conscience being helped in awakening its sense o f  justice. Such a living, 
responsible conscience is essential to vibrant political life, in that it prevents society being reduced to 
com pliance w ith the mind o f  the ruler, or being crippled by individuals largely operating out o f  self- 
interest.
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F o r Spaem ann, C h ris t’ s dec la ra tion  “ I  c a ll yo u  frie n d s ”  (John 15 :15) p ro v id e s  
the dec is ive  s h ift in  a ttitu d e  w ith  regard to  re s p o n s ib ility , s ince w e  becom e sharers in  
the  “ m aste r’ s business” , tha t is , lo ve .247 In  th is  w ay o u r in te n tio n  becom es u n ite d  
w ith  the  F a th e r’ s in  o u r desire to  liv e  u p rig h tly  and lo v in g ly . O nce aga in , w e see 
v irtu e  and grace m e rg in g  w ith  one another, g iv in g  us a fu lle r  unde rstand ing  o f  the  
m eaning and ro le  o f  the  v irtu e s  in  conscience and the m o ra l life . T hus, ju s tic e  b lends 
w ith  lo v e  and m e rcy  th ro u g h  one’ s care fo r  the o ther. W e sh a ll re tu rn  to  the  im p a c t o f  
grace on v irtu e  in  the  fin a l section  o f  th is  chapter. H ow eve r, w e canno t conc lude  o u r 
b r ie f re fle c tio n  on  m o ra l v irtu e  and conscience w ith o u t firs t tu rn in g  o u r a tte n tio n  to  
tem perance and fo rtitu d e .
3.2.3 Temperance and Fortitude
In  c o n fro n tin g  the  tw o  fin a l ca rd ina l v irtu e s , w e are perhaps in  danger o f  passing  them  
b y  on  account o f  the  fa c t th a t te m p e ra n tia  and fo r t itu d o  have an “ o ld -fa sh io n e d  r in g ”
948
about them . Y e t to  do so w o u ld  be to  o ve rlo o k  th e ir pe renn ia l s ig n ifica n ce . Indeed , 
P o rte r observes:
A s  lo n g  as peop le  fee l th a t they m ust s trugg le  w ith  urges fo r  m ore  fo o d  
and d rin k  than  is  good fo r them , sexual p leasure w ith  o th e r p e o p le ’ s 
husbands o r w ive s , and fears th a t w o u ld  lead them  aw ay fro m  the  b o ld  
a c tiv itie s  th a t prudence o r d u ty  som etim es dem ands, there  w ill be a p lace  
fo r  som e concepts ro u g h ly  equ iva le n t to  tem perance and fo rtitu d e .249
247 Ibid., 118.
248 Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 111 . Surprisingly, here Porter writes ‘fortitudine”  instead 
o f fortitudo. In addition, one should note that, like prudence, the term ‘tem perance’ has been subject to 
changes in m eaning and usage, particularly from the late eighteenth century in connection to 
movements prom oting moderation or total abstinence from alcohol for the purposes o f  social reform  
and the reduction o f  dom estic violence. In terms o f  describing a cardinal virtue, this history does not 
render the w ord‘tem perance’ obsolete. However, like prudence, it does require clarification when used.
249 Ibid.
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T he re fo re , even though  som e m ay p re fe r d iffe re n t te rm s, such as “ s e lf-re tra in t 
and courage,” 250 tem perance and fo rtitu d e  w ill a lw ays m a in ta in  a c ru c ia l ro le  in  the 
s trugg le  be tw een p o w e rfu l em o tion  and m o ra l action . A s th e y  d ire c tly  re la te  to  the  
em otions, tem perance and fo rtitu d e  are a ffe c tive  v irtu e s , d isposed to  the  o rd e rin g  o f  
the  passions so th a t the  reason, and hence conscience, is  able to  ju d g e  r ig h tly .251 T hey 
operate in  the  w ill w ith  the purpose o f  rem ov ing  the obstacles th a t h o ld  the  w il l  back
'y c'y
fro m  fo llo w in g  reason, and thus a im  at ha rm ony o f desire, d e c is io n  and ope ra tion . 
The passions id e n tifie d  by A qu inas as be ing  ordered by  tem perance are co n cu p isc ib le  
em otions o r desires, w h ile  fo rtitu d e  is  concerned w ith  the c o n tro l o f  fe a r and a u d a c ity  
(reckless d a rin g ).253
O ne can appear tem perate o r courageous w h ile  la c k in g  the  re sp e c tive  v irtu e s . 
F o llo w in g  A ris to tle , A qu inas declares th a t there is a d iffe re n ce  be tw een the  v irtu e s  o f  
tem perance and fo rtitu d e  and the a ttitudes o f  continence (o r s e lf-c o n tro l) and b ra ve ry
251 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.61, a.2, resp.: “ circa passiones; [...] necesse est esse 
duas virtutes: ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, considerata repugnantia 
ipsarum ad rationem” [“ concerning passions; [...] two virtues are needed: for it is necessary to put the 
order o f  reason into the passions, given their resistance to reason” ]. Pieper points out that the 
etym ology o f  temperance highlights its connections with reason and order. The G reek sophrosyne 
indicates a state o f  being in sound mind, in the broad sense o f  reason being directed rightly. H e also 
points to 1 C or 12:24 as an exam ple o f  the use o f  temperare to describe creating an ordered unity or 
harmony in the body. Here temperavit is used to translate synekerasen, w hich means “ blended 
together” . H ow ever, temperare did also refer to moderation and self-control. Therefore temperance 
relates to the ordering o f  the passions to the benefit o f  reason, through moderation or self-control. C f. 
Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 146.
252 For exam ple, cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q. 123, a.3, resp.: “ ad virtutem 
fortitudinis pertinet rem overe impedimentum, quo retrahitur voluntas a sequela rationis.”
253 C f. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.61, a.2, resp.; ibid., Ila  Ilae, q.123, a.3, resp.: “ fortitudo principaliter est 
circa timores d iffilicium  rerum, quae retrahere possunt voluntatem a sequela rationis [...] fortitudo est 
circa timores, et audacias, quasi cohibitiva timorum, et audaciarum moderativa” ; ibid., Ila Ilae, q. 141, 
a.3, ad 2, “ ideo temperantia proprie est circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores” ; Porter, The 
Recovery o f  Virtue, 1 1 1 . Porter also lists anger, along with fear and desire, as a passion w hich is 
addressed by temperance and fortitude, although her references to the Summa do not m ention anger 
specifically. Nevertheless, in other passages Aquinas lists meekness or mildness as a virtue w hich 
forms part o f  temperance, and it is this which is concerned with anger and revenge. C f. Porter, The 
Recovery o f  Virtue, 103; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae, q.60, a.4, resp.; ibid., Ila  Ilae, q .14 3, art. 
unicus, resp.: “ tertius autem motus est irae tendens in vindictam, quern refraenat mansuetudo, sive 
dem entia” (em phasis in text).
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“ b y  resem blance”  (s im ilitu d in a r ie  d ic u n tu r fo r te s ) .254 The d iffe re n c e  be tw een the 
v irtu e s  and the  la tte r circum stances is  a m atte r o f  desire  and th e  q u e s tio n  o f  
p e rfe c tio n . V irtu e  is  a d isp o s itio n  w hereby w e act in  pe rfe c te d  a b ility . The 
tem perate  in d iv id u a l acts in  a ca lm  state, w here desire  has been “ tam ed b y  reason”  (o  
ra t io n s  e d o m itu s ), w h ile  the con tinen t person m ay succeed in  a c tin g  p ro p e rly , though  
s t ill in  a state o f  s tru g g lin g  w ith  deep-seated, and pressing e v il desires.256 S im ila rly , 
the tru ly  brave person does no t s im p ly  act ou t o f  ignorance o r des ire  fo r  ga in , b u t 
responds on the  basis o f  a la s tin g , courageous d isp o s itio n , w h ic h  fu lly  recogn ises the 
danger and leads to  a c tio n  in  steadfastness o r aggression a pp rop ria te  to  the  s itu a tio n ,
254 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q.155, a .l ,  resp.: “ hoc autem m odo continentia 
habet aliquid de ratione virtutis, [...] non tamen attingit ad perfectam rationem virtutis m oralis; ibid., Ila 
Ilae, q.123, a .l ,  ad 2: “ exercentes actum fortitudinis praeter virtutem.”  Here, fo llow ing Aristotle, 
Aquinas outlines five  w ays o f  being brave “ by resemblance” : acting in ignorance o f  the danger; acting 
in hope based on learned skill in facing dangerous situations; acting on the im pulse o f  a strong passion, 
such as sorrow or anger; acting out o f  the desire for temporal gain, or to avoid some disadvantage, such 
as blam e, pain or loss. C f. also Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VII, 1-10, 1 145a 1 5 - 1 152a 35; IV , 9,
1 128b 35: “ Continence is not a virtue either. It is a sort o f  m ixed state” ; III, 8, 1 116 a  1 6 - 1 11 7 a  29; 
Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 112. One should also note that Aquinas distinguishes tw o m eanings o f  
continence: one related to chastity, and one related to the ordinary control o f  desires. C f. Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q. 155, a .l ,  resp.
255 It should be noted that Aquinas’ s comments on the perfection regarding virtue are placed 
within the context o f  levels o f  perfection. In all cardinal virtues, Aquinas identifies three degrees o f  
perfection: political, purgatorial and the mystical level o f  those o f  purified souls. (He also identifies 
another type o f  virtue: exem plary virtue, where the ideal is found in God.) Thus, to have attained 
political, or social, fortitude still leaves the w ay open to further growth through prayer and grace. C f. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.61, a.5 (title): “ dividantur convenienter in virtutes políticas, et 
purgatorias, et purgati animi, et exemplares” ; Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 136-41.
256 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q .155, a.4, resp.: “ unde continentia com paratur ad 
temperantiam, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum.” Looking at the question o f  tem perance from another 
angle, Gondreau says that it is the positive desire that distinguishes continence from  temperance. 
Continence is doing the good without the affective desire for it, while temperance is doing the good 
with the affective desire for it. This would also imply that the virtuous judgem ents o f  conscience would 
not sim ply be a com pliance with the good out o f  sporadic or laborious continence, but a stable desire 
for the good, reflective o f  judgem ents made in stable temperance. C f. Paul Gondreau, “ The Passions 
and the M oral L ife ,”  The Thomist 71 (2007): 419-50, at 436-37. This comment should not lead us to 
disparage the efforts made in continence. The fact that the good was achieved in a situation o f  struggle 
is still a m ajor step along the w ay o f  virtue. It is for this reason that continence is annexed to 
temperance b y  St Thom as. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q.143, art. unicus, resp.
Therefore, perhaps Gondreau’ s definition should be further refined to describe continence as doing the 
good without the stable  affective desire for it. In continence there is a desire for the good, but it is not 
stable. That is w hy som eone is “ quick to repent”  when he or she commits a sin out o f  a lack o f  self- 
control, in contrast to sinning in a state o f  intemperance. C f. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 164; 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q .156, a.3, resp.: “ incontinens statim poenitet.”
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th ro u g h  c o n tro l o f  fe a r and c le a r-th in k in g  in  such a w ay th a t d a rin g  and anger do n o t 
o ve rw h e lm  the  d e c is io n .257
T hus, w e can see tha t tem perance and fo rtitu d e  a id  us in  d e a lin g  w ith  o u r 
desires and fears, b u t in  a m anner th a t goes w e ll beyond the m o d e ra tio n  o f  o u r in ta ke  
o f  fo o d  and d rin k ,258 and is  fa r fro m  s im p ly  the in c u lc a tio n  o f  a b lin d  fearlessness,259 
caused b y  d e lu s io n  o r d isregard  fo r the va lue  o f  one’ s life .260 M o re o ve r, in  keep ing  
w ith  the  co n n e c tio n  o f  v irtu e s , they  requ ire  prudence and ju s tic e  fo r  th e ir  r ig h t 
d is p o s itio n , s ince i t  is  th is  know ledge  o f  the true  and ju s t th a t p reven ts  us fro m  
re s tra in in g  o r endangering  ourse lves unnecessarily .261
A s  w e  observed in  the  p rev ious chapter, in  the sec tion  on  conscience  and 
e m o tio n , one m ay kn o w  w ha t to  do, b u t m ay no t have the e m o tio n a l reso lve  to  ca rry  i t  
ou t. A ris to tle  observed tha t, despite kn o w in g  tha t the a c tio n  is  w ro n g , an in c o n tin e n t 
person pe rs is ts  in  a c tin g  because the desire fo r  pleasure is  to o  s tro n g .262 T hus, reason
257 Aquinas admits that the brave person, i f  called to fight w ill require “ moderate anger”  to 
fuel the aggression needed to respond to the danger. Here, again we are aware o f  A quinas’ s positive 
outlook towards the passions, by which he realised that, i f  they are ordered, they are an integral part o f  
our moral action. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q. 123, a. 10, ad 1 and 2. H ow ever, w hile 
aggression m ay form part o f  fortitude, the main focus o f  this virtue is endurance, in facing the 
difficulty, rather than running aw ay from it. Endurance is the main focus o f  fortitude, since it is more 
difficult than aggression. For this reason patience and perseverance are numbered among the virtues 
that form  parts o f  fortitude. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q .123, a.6, resp.: (drawing from 
Aristotle) ‘“ fortitudo est m agis circa timores reprimendos quam circa audacias m oderandas’ : difficilius 
enim est timorem reprimere, quam audaciam moderari”  ; ibid., Ila Ilae, q .123, a.6, ad 1: “ sustinere est 
d ifficilius, quam aggredi” ; ibid., Ila  Ilae, q. 128, art. unicus; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, III, 9,
1 1 17a 30-35; Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 128-31. Such moderate anger could also be called 
righteous or just anger, given its right relationship to reason. Cf. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 
130.
258 C f. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 145-46.
259 A quinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q.126, a .l ,  resp.
260 C f. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 126-127.
261 C f. ibid., 125: “ So we cannot simply say that only the prudent man can be brave. W e have 
further to see that a ‘ fortitude’ w hich is not subservient to justice is just as false and unreal as a 
‘ fortitude’ w hich is not informed by prudence.”  Sim ilarly an act resem bling temperance w hich is not 
related to the “ order o f  reason” or to truth w ill not bring a peace to the spirit (“quies animf'). C f. ibid., 
147-52, 154-155. In this w ay “hyperasceticism ” is as dangerous as greed.
262 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VII, 9, 1 151b  24-30, 1 152a 5-7. Aristotle also includes a 
com parison between the incontinent and intemperate person. The intemperate person is in an even 
worse situation, since he thinks the wrong that he does is right. Thus, there is not even the elem ent o f  
awareness o f  evil evident in the incontinent person.
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is  n o t enough to  ensure rig h t action . O ur reason and w ill need to  w o rk  in  ha rm ony 
fo r  the  good. T he re fo re , conscience p rom pts us to  acquire  the  v irtu e  o f  tem perance to  
tam e in o rd in a te  desire , w h ich  w o u ld  o the rw ise  c lo u d  o u r v is io n  o f  the  good  o r m ake 
us g ive  in  to  te m p ta tio n . The re c ip ro ca l re la tio n sh ip  betw een conscience and v irtu e  
im p lie s  th a t once w e have acquired tem perance, ou r conscience is  he lped  b y  i t  to  
deve lop  fu rth e r. E vidence  o f  th is  g ro w th  is  seen in  the q u a lity  o f  o u r ju d g e m e n ts  and 
actions. Tem perance assists ou r judgem ents o f  conscience b y  m a in ta in in g  a c lea r 
pe rspective  on  re a lity , and the m o ra l act is also assisted in  co m in g  to  fru it io n  th ro u g h  
the in flu e n ce  o f  tem perance on  free  w il l ’ s acceptance o f  the ju d g e m e n t o f  conscience.
S im ila rly , fo rtitu d e  strengthens conscience by  h e lp in g  i t  to  h o ld  o n to  the  tru th
• 'yfi 4
desp ite  the  d isadvantage, rid ic u le  o r danger th a t m ay com e one ’ s w a y . A ss is te d  by  
prudence, one ’ s conscience m ay ju d g e  the p a rtic u la r circum stances to  be u n ju s t. The 
cho ice  then  presented to  us is  w he ther to  speak up o r keep s ile n t.265 F o rtitu d e  g ives us 
the streng th  o f  characte r th a t is  able to  stand up fo r  w ha t is  r ig h t and to  p ro te c t o thers 
w hen th e y  are in  danger. F o rtitu d e  enables us to  m ake ourse lves vu ln e ra b le 266 fo r  the 
sake o f  the  tru th , fo r  the sake o f  the good, fo r  the  sake o f o th e rs ’ good. C le a rly , the 
“ u ltim a te  express ion ”  o f  fo rtitu d e  is  m artydom ,267 where one ’ s endurance is  p u t to  the 
m ost extrem e test, th a t o f  g iv in g  one’ s life . H ow ever, m a rty rd o m  is  “ n o t to  be
263 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.58, a.5, resp.; C .S. L ew is, The Abolition o f
Man, 19.
264 C f. T w om ey, “ A  Discourse on Thomas M ore’ s Great Matter: Conscience,”  165-66.
265 V incent T w om ey observes that even in democratic countries, where right to free speech is 
enshrined in law , “ few  are ever w illing to exercise free speech due to fear o f  intimidation and 
reprisals.”  See ibid., 166.
266 C f. Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 117 .
267 T w om ey, “ A  Discourse on Thomas M ore’ s Great Matter: Conscience,”  166. C f. Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.124, aa.1-5.
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sough t,”  ra th e r, i t  is  to  be “ accepted”  w hen there is  no o the r o p tio n ,268 in  the  defence 
o f  tru th  o r ju s tic e  o r one’ s fa ith .269
Such h e ro ic  fo rtitu d e  w o u ld  be hard to  sustain una ided. Indeed , i t  w o u ld  be 
im p o ss ib le  fo r  the  C h ris tia n  w ith o u t the H o ly  S p ir it’ s g ifts  o f  fo rtitu d e  and hope.270 
M a rty rd o m  is  c le a rly  an extrem e case, b u t i t  presents us w ith  an exam p le  o f  h o w  the 
v irtu o u s  life  o f  the  C h ris tia n  also em braces G od ’ s he lp . H o w e ve r, a m ore  com m on 
exam ple  o f  the  need o f  G od ’ s he lp  in  v irtu o u s  life  arises o u t o f  o u r fa ilin g s  in  v irtu e . 
W e need G o d ’ s h e lp  to  overcom e the burden o f  sin . Thus, th ro u g h  repentance and 
G od ’ s grace w e are ra ised up again and supported in  o u r e ffo rts  to  liv e  a v irtu o u s
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life . T h is  need o f  G od ’ s assistance h ig h lig h ts  the necessary lin k  be tw een v irtu e  and 
grace, w h ic h  leads us to  exam ine the  purpose o f  the th e o lo g ica l v irtu e s , and to  re fle c t 
upon  the  ro le  o f  the  H o ly  S p ir it in  conscience and the m o ra l life .
3.3 Grace in Virtuous Living
I t  is  the  concern  o f  som e authors th a t m ost o f  the  attem pts to  reco ve r A q u in a s ’ s m o ra l 
th e o lo g y , in c lu d in g  m any presenta tions o f  v irtu e  e th ics, have fa ile d  to  express the 
co m p le x , in te g ra te d  nature  o f  h is  though t. Just as the fie ld s  ana lysed b y  A ris to tle  w ere 
w ritte n  as pa rts  o f  a w h o le , so one section  o f  A q u in a s ’ s th o u g h t m ust be unde rstood  in  
the  lig h t o f  o thers. Thus, H ib b s  concludes th a t the “ com ple te  re co ve ry  o f  A q u in a s ’ s 
e th ica l te a ch in g  m ust, then , reckon  w ith  h is  th e o lo g ic a lly  in fo rm e d  accoun t o f  the  
v irtu e s , w ith  the  w ay nature is  restored and elevated b y  supe rna tu ra l g race .” 272
268 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 133: “ The readiness to m eet the supreme test b y  dying 
in patient enduance so that the good may be realized does not exclude the w illingness to fight and to 
attack.”
269 T w om ey, “ A  Discourse on Thomas M ore’ s Great Matter: Conscience,”  166.
270 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 141.
271 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.156, a.3, a d 2; ibid., Ill, q.85, a .l ;  ibid., Ill, 
q.89, aa.1-6 (on the recovery o f  virtue by means o f  penance).
272 Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 10.
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B eyond  the  m a tte r o f  g iv in g  a fa ith fu l p resen ta tion  o f  S t T hom as’ s th o u g h t, in  m o ra l 
th e o lo g y  to d a y  there  is  need o f  a greater re co g n itio n  o f  the ro le  o f  grace in  the  v irtu e s  
and in  the  m o ra l life  in  genera l.273 The ac tio n  o f  grace shou ld  n o t be conside red  as 
som e k in d  o f  aw kw ard  a d d itio n  to  m o ra l theory , b u t ra th e r as the  p o w e r o f  G od 
su s ta in ing  and tra n s fo rm in g  ou r live s  in  ho liness.274 In  th is  w a y  o u r n a tu ra l s triv in g  
fo r  v irtu e  is  b ro u g h t to  new  he igh ts , w ith o u t d isca rd ing  the  necess ity  o f  o u r ow n
'jn c
e ffo rt. T hus, H e n ri de Lubac concludes th a t “ the superna tu ra l does n o t m e re ly  
e le v a te  na tu re  [...]; i t  does n o t m ere ly  penetrate nature to  h e lp  i t  p ro lo n g  its  
m om en tum  [...] and b rin g  i t  to  a successfu l conc lus ion . I t  tra n s fo rm s  i t . ” 276
W h ile  one co u ld  lo o k  at grace as tha t w h ich  “ closes the  gap”  betw een the 
precepts o f  the  n a tu ra l la w  and weakness o f  ou r v irtu o u s  response, caused b y  s in ’ s 
im p a c t upon  o u r m o ra l pe rcep tion , th is  w o u ld  o ve rlo o k  the  tra n s fo rm in g  ro le  o f  
grace w h ic h  m akes us in to  a “ new  crea tion ”  (c f. 2 C o r 5 :1 7 ; R ev 2 1 :5 ).278 G race, 
th e re fo re , n o t o n ly  heals and restores, bu t also changes o u r liv e s , open in g  us up to  a 
new  w a y  o f  liv in g . W ith in  the con tex t o f  the  life  o f  v irtu e , i t  is  th e  task  o f  the  in fu se d  
v irtu e s , in  p a rtic u la r the  th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s , to  b rin g  us to  o u r fu lle r  unde rstand ing  o f 
w h a t i t  m eans to  be hum an, and o f  the va lue  judgem en ts th a t susta in  th a t.279 T hus, as
273 Such recognition is to be found in the Catechism o f  the Catholic Church, since the treatise 
on grace is relocated in the moral section rather than presented in its usual dogm atic setting. This is 
done to m ake it clear that “ Christian morality stands in the space o f  grace,”  and as such one cannot 
understand morals properly without due reference to grace. Cf. CCC, nos. 1949-2029. C f. Joseph 
Ratzinger and Christoph Schönbom , Kleine Hinführung zum Katechismus der katholischen Kirche 
(M unich, Zurich and Vienna: V erlag Neue Stadt, 1993), 32: “Denn so w ird ganz deutlich, daß 
christliche M oral im Raum der Gnade steht.”
274 This means that the “real ground” o f  virtue is a “ graced anthropology,”  both habitual and 
actual. C f. O ’M eara, “ Virtues in the Theology o f  Thomas Aquinas,”  256, 262.
275 Henri de Lubac, A B rief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. B r. Richard A m andez 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 86-87.
276 Ibid., 81.
277 Hibbs, Virtue ’s Splendor, 206.
278 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 81.
279 Ibid., 88: “ I f  the three theological virtues o f  faith, hope and charity do not carry out with 
their divine pow er their m ission o f  informing, purifying, deepening and bringing to their fulfillm ent 
m an’ s authentic human values, it is much to be feared that they them selves w ill be im poverished, w ill 
wither aw ay and becom e denatured.”
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nature  is  n o t bypassed, b u t transfo rm ed  b y  grace, so the ca rd in a l v irtu e s  and the  rest 
o f  o u r n a tu ra l c a p a b ilitie s  are n o t cast aside b y  the  th e o lo g ica l v irtu e s , b u t are b ro u g h t
• o on ,
to  th e ir fu lfilm e n t instead. Such an e leva tio n  and tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  o u r m o ra l 
c a p a b ility  and understand ing , how ever incom p le te  in  th is  life ,281 has obv ious  
consequences on  o u r m o ra l sense and the judgem en ts o f  o u r conscience . W e w ill 
the re fo re  lo o k  b r ie fly  n o w  at the im pact o f  the in fused  v irtu e s  on  o u r m o ra l life .
3.3.1 Graced Virtue-A Change in Perspective for Conscience 
D ue a tte n tio n  to  the  in fu se d  v irtu e s , p a rtic u la rly  the th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s , ensures th a t 
w e m ove aw ay d e fin itiv e ly  fro m  any m o ra lity  o f  o b lig a tio n , s ince o u r m o tiv a tio n  is  
n o w  centred upon  a lo ve  o f  G od and o u r u ltim a te  end, w h ic h  shapes ou r 
understand ing  o f  o u r liv e s , o f  the re a lity  around us, and o f  o u r ac tions . T he  in fu se d  
v irtu e s , ro o te d  in  the  graced g if t  o f  fa ith ,283 open us up to  “ a n ew  aspect o f  re a lity , one 
th a t w o u ld  o the rw ise  rem a in  inaccessib le ,” 284 and also n o u rish  us in  such a w a y  th a t
w e are “ d ra w n  beyond  the  boundaries o f  s e lf-g iv in g  w e had a lw ays accepted as fix e d
* « •
in to  a re a lm  b rig h te r and broader than  a nyth ing  h ith e rto  expe rienced .”  In  o the r
280 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 87. St Thomas points out that G od  not only gives us faith, 
hope and charity as infused virtues; grace also infuses the cardinal virtues, changing their purpose, and 
ordering the acts o f  the person “to celestial glory.”  C f. Aquinas, Quaestio Disputata de Virtutibus 
Cardinalibus, q .l [unica], a.4, resp.: “ Sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod sunt gratuitae et infusae, 
[...], perficiunt hominem in vita praesenti in ordine ad caelestem gloriam.”  C f. idem, Disputed Question 
on the Cardinal Virtues, a.4, resp.
281 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 88.
282 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.65, a.5, resp.; ibid., Ia Ilae, q.63, a.4, ad 1. A  
m orality o f  obligation can still flourish in the context o f  a study o f  the theological virtues, as can be 
seen in the manualistic tradition. This is w hy the motivation o f  the love o f  G od  and the desire for 
eternal beatitude in his presence needs to take primary place, as this m oves us aw ay from  the context o f  
reluctantly obeying the arbitrary commands o f  a distant God.
283 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae, q.62, a.4, resp.; ibid., Ia Ilae, q.63, a.3, resp.
284 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 82.
285 D avid  W alsh, Guarded by Mystery: Meaning in a Postmodern Age (W ashington, D C : 
Catholic U niversity o f  Am erica Press, 1999), 65-66. Here W alsh’ s discussion on the w a y  o f  perfection, 
that is a fidelity to the moral order, does not refer to the infused virtues. H ow ever, his description aptly 
fits their influence. M oreover, the description o f  moral progress he gives is entitled “ G row th o f  Soul,”
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w ords, i f  v irtu e  is  ‘pe rfected  a b ility ’ , then in fused  v irtu e  as a g if t  o f  g race ,286 pushes 
us beyond  th a t w h ic h  w e w o u ld  achieve b y  nature alone. T h is  p u sh in g  o f  hum an 
boundaries a llo w s  us to  taste som eth ing o f  the jo y  o f  e terna l happ iness,287 o u r tru e  end
TOO
to  w h ic h  w e are ca lle d . H ow eve r, A qu inas po in ts  o u t th a t o u r aw areness o f  e te rna l 
happiness as o u r fin a l end and m o ra l m o tiv a tio n  w o u ld  n o t be po ss ib le  w ith o u t G od ’ s 
he lp  (inon ta m e n  absque a d ju to r io  d iv in o ).289 W e need G od ’ s grace to  p e rce ive  th a t 
w h ic h  “ no  eye has seen, n o r ear heard, n o r hum an heart co n ce ived ”  (1 C o r 2 :9 ).290 
T he re fo re , G od  he lps the in te lle c t and the w ill so th a t th e y  can d ire c t us to  o u r
901 . . .
superna tu ra l end. The in te lle c t is  thus en ligh tened b y  fa ith , and the  w il l  is  spurred 
on  b y  hope and transfo rm ed  b y  lo ve .292 I t  is  the re la tio n sh ip  w ith  G od  and o u r 
unde rstand ing  o f  o u r end th ro u g h  these th e o lo g ica l v irtu e s  th a t reshapes a ll o u r m o ra l 
a c tio n  b y  chang in g  o u r perspective  on life .293 O ur perspective  becom es one th a t is 
focused u p o n  o u r u n io n  w ith  G od, w ho is  “ know n , lo ved  and des ired ”  th ro u g h  the
as a deliberate attempt to m ove aw ay from focusing on obligation. See ibid., 65, 67. C f. Pieper, Faith, 
Hope, Love, 99: “ Theological virtue is an ennobling o f  man’ s nature that entirely surpasses what he 
‘ can b e ’ o f  him self. Theological virtue is the steadfast orientation toward a fulfillm ent and a beatitude 
that are not ‘ o w ed ’ to man.”
286 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 100.
287 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.62, a .l, resp.; Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 99: 
“ Theological virtue is [...] a real, grace-filled participation in the divine nature, w hich com es to man 
through Christ (2 Pet 1:4).”
288 Cf. M t 25:34.
289 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q. 62, a .l ,  resp.: “unde oportet, quod superaddantur 
homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatudinem supematuralem [...] et 
hujusm odi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae.”  Prompted by other texts o f  Aquinas, Pieper points 
out that the w ill is also involved in belief, because the believer “wants to believe.”  C f. Pieper, Faith, 
Hope, Love, 37 (emphasis in text); Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.5, a.2, resp.: “ intellectus 
credentis assentit rei creditae, non quia ipsam videat vel secundum se, ve l per resolutionem  ad prima 
principia per se visa, sed [...] propter imperium voluntatis moventis intellectum .”
290 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.62, a.3, resp.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 T w om ey, “ A  Discourse on Thomas M ore’ s Great Matter: Conscience,”  175, n. 57: “ it was 
Aquinas who placed the treatise on the Beatitudes at the very start o f  his discussion on virtue. There is 
no discussion o f  m orality without first determining our final end, eternal happiness, union w ith God, 
eternal beatitudes. The new Catechism o f  the Catholic Church has restored it to that position after 
centuries o f  displacem ent that seems to have begun in the sixteenth century.”  C f. CCC, nos. 17  lb - 
1729, and no. 1813: “ The theological virtues are the foundation o f  Christian moral activity; they 
animate it and give  it its special character.”
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th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s .294 B r ie fly , the re fo re , le t us exam ine fu rth e r the  im p a c t o f  each o f  
the  th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s  on  m o ra l action , and hence upon o u r conscience .
3.3.2 The Virtue o f Faith
“ F a ith  is  the  fundam en ta l act o f  C h ris tia n  existence.” 295 F a ith  in fo rm s  reason to  
recogn ise  the  fu lle r  tru th  o f  re a lity .296 Indeed fa ith  does n o t s im p ly  in fo rm  reason; i t  
“ p u rifie s  reason,”  lib e ra tin g  i t  fro m  its  “ b lin d  spots”  enab lin g  i t  to  see w h a t is  tru e , 
good and ju s t.297 Y e t fa ith  is  n o t o n ly  “ in fo rm a tiv e ,”  in  th a t i t  o ffe rs  d o g m a tic  con ten t 
to  w h ic h  w e g ive  o u r assent, i t  is  also “ p e rfo rm a tive ,”  in  th a t i t  “ m akes th in g s  happen 
and is  life -c h a n g in g ”  th ro u g h  G od becom ing  “ tru ly  present”  to  the  b e lie v e r th ro u g h
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fa ith  in  R e ve la tio n . Indeed, prom pted  b y  A qu inas, th is  experience  o f  the
294 Cf. G iovanni Kostko, Beatitudine e Vita Cristiana nella Summa Theologiae di S. Tommaso 
d'Aquino (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2005), 289 (talking o f  the effect o f  the theological 
virtues): “ A  causa della loro specifica funzione, D io si fa presente n ell’uom o com e realtà personale 
conosciuta, amata, desiderata, realizzando in lui ima certa immanenza, che diviene causa prim a e 
ragione form ale di tutto l ’ agire umano” [“ On account o f  their specific function, G od  is m ade present in 
man as a personal reality that is known, loved and desired, by realising in him  (man) a certain 
immanence, w hich becom es the prime cause and formal reason o f  all human action ” ]. M oreover, 
K ostko points out that the theological virtues realise a certain immanence o f  m an’ s final end, a taste o f  
what is to com e, w hich orders us to desire beatitude. C f. Kostko, Beatitudine e Vita Cristiana, 289, n. 
12. The incompleteness o f  this experience, particularly in the virtue o f  faith, leads to a “ m ental unrest” , 
w hich troubles us w ith doubts, but also spurs us on to desire a fulness o f  union w ith God, w ith whom  
w e find our com plete rest. C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 51-52; Aquinas, De Veritate, q .14 , a .l ,  ad 5; 
St Augustine, Confessiones, 1, 1, PL  32, 661: “ fecisti nos ad te, et inquietimi est cor nostrum, donee 
requiescat in te.”
295 Joseph Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis o f  Cultures, introduction b y  M arcello Pera, 
trans. B rian M cN eil (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 77.
296 John Paul II, E ncyclical Letter Faith and Reason [Fides et Ratio] (London: Catholic Truth 
Society, 1998), 42:“ Faith asks that its object be understood with the help o f  reason; and at the summit 
o f  its searching reason acknowledges that it cannot do without what faith presents” ; AAS 91 (1999), 38: 
“ fides postulai ut obiectum  suum auxilio rationis conprehendatur: ratio, culm en investigationis 
attingens, necessarium  ducit quidquid fides ostendit.”
297 Deus Caritas Est, 28 (a) [Vatican English trans.]; AAS 98 (2006), 239: “ Sed sim ul ea 
[fides] est vis purificans eandem rationem.”  C f. Kostko, Beatitudine e Vita Cristiana, 292: “ L a  virtù 
della fede rifinisce l ’ intelletto” [“The virtue o f  faith refines the intellect” ]; 295: “ [Tramite la fede, la 
ragione] ottiene la  purificazione dall’errore”  [“ (Through faith, reason) obtains purification from  error” ]
298 Spe Salvi, 2. C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 84-85, at 85: “For the b eliever there is once 
more the experience that he, in accepting the m essage o f  the self-revealing God, actually partakes o f  
the divine life therein announced. [...] Divine revelation is not an announcement o f  a report on reality 
but the ‘ im parting’ o f  the reality itself.”  See also M aurice Blondel, “ W hat is Faith?”  Communio 14 
(1987): 162-92 [translation o f  brochure by F. M allet (Maurice Blondel), Qu ’est-ce que la fo i?  (Paris: 
Librairie Bloud, 1908, trans. T. Gerard Connolly], at 190-91: “Understood as it should be, faith then is 
not sim ply an object to be believed. [...] It consists essentially in the synthesis, d ivin ely form ed within 
the person and hum anly referred to God, o f  a supernatural gift and o f  an intellectual and m oral process.
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im m anence o f  G od, accom panied b y  the firs t traces o f  bea titud e , is  sum m ed up  b y  
D a n ie l B o u rg e o is  as the  in c h o a tio  v itae  a e te rn a e , the “ in a u g u ra tio n ”  o r b e g in n in g  o f  
e te rna l life .299 Thus, s tim u la te d  by  th is  experience o f  fa ith , o u r reason and w il l  are 
engaged in  respond ing  to  w ha t fa ith  presents; w e choose to  respond b y  le a d in g  “ a life  
w o rth y  o f  [o u r] c a llin g ”  (E ph  4 :1 ), a life  in  keeping w ith  o u r u ltim a te  g o a l,300 ra th e r 
than  seeking  to  d is tra c t o r deceive ourselves th rough  bas ing  o u r liv e s  on  passing 
co m fo rts  o r sensual p leasure (c f. T it  3 :3 ,8 ; 1 C or 15 :32-34 ). T h is  im p lie s  th a t o u r
• T01 » • • •
conscience is  shaped b y  fa ith , in  th a t fa ith  relates us in  a new  and ra d ic a l w a y  to  
G od. T h is  re la tio n sh ip  co lou rs  a ll ou r actions in  such a w a y  th a t w e choose to  fo llo w  a 
p a rtic u la r course o f  a c tio n  n o t s im p ly  because i t  is  in  accordance w ith  G o d ’ s la w ,
Q A ’’)
in c lu d in g  the  tru th  and la w  o f  ou r ve ry  created and redeem ed na tu re , and th a t w h ic h  
is  a rtic u la te d  b y  the  C hurch , b u t because fo llo w in g  G od ’ s la w  is  an exp ress ion  o f  o u r
TOT
desire  to  serve h im  and to  be one w ith  h im  (John 17:20-26).
A ll this operates in such a w ay that by adhering to the revealed  there is referral and attachment o f  s e lf  
to the One Revealing. [...] It is rather a gift o f  G od to the human being and o f  the human being to G od 
for tim e and for eternity (emphasis in text).”
299 D aniel Bourgeois, ‘“ Inchoatio V itae Aeternae’ : L a  dimension eschatologique de la vertu 
théologale de foi chez saint Thomas d ’Aquin,”  Sapienza 27 (1974): 272-314, at 313: “ M ais la fo i n ’ a 
pas pour seule fonction de remédier à la fmitude de notre intelligence. E lle  est surtout le véritable 
principe de notre ordination à la vision. [...] nous pouvons reconnâitre dans la fo i l ’ inauguration de la 
vie etem elle”  [“B ut faith does not have for its sole function the rem edying o f  the fm itude o f  our 
intelligence. It is above all the real principle o f  our ordering to the (beatific) vision. [...] w e can 
recognise in faith the inauguration o f  eternal life” ]. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.4, a .l ,  
resp.: “ Fides est habitus mentis, quo inchoatur vita aetema in nobis, faciens intellectum  assentire non 
apparentibus.”
300 C f. Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis o f  Cultures, 77; Joseph M urphy, Christ our Joy: 
The Theological Vision o f  Pope Benedict XVI (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 62. In presenting 
our last end to us, the foundation for our actions, the virtue o f  faith is therefore the first o f  the virtues. 
C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, l ia  Ilae, q.4, a.7, resp.
301 C f. Ratzinger, “ The Church’ s Teaching Authority -  Faith -  M orals,”  53, talking o f  the 
distinctive quality o f  Christian morality: “ It is impossible to distill out what is specifically  Christian by 
excluding everything that has com e about through contact with other m ilieux. Christianity’ s originality 
consists rather in the new  total form  into which human searching and striving have been forged under 
the guidance o f  faith in the G od o f  Abraham, the G od o f  Jesus Christ.”
302 C f. CCC, no. 1729: “The beatitude o f  heaven sets the standards fo r  discernment in the use 
o f  earthly goods in keeping with the law o f  G od ’ (emphasis in text); no. 1814; Pieper, Faith, Hope, 
Love, 78-81.
303 Here I am emphasising//¿/av qua, the faith o f  the individual b y  w hich  he or she relates to 
God. H ow ever, this living faith o f  the subject, by which we live and act m orally in response to our 
relationship w ith God, is sustained by the faith which the Church believes and professes: the common, 
objective faith {fides quae creditur). This content o f  belief, as articulated by the Church, contains
311
F a ith  estab lishes an understand ing  about G od and a re la tio n s h ip  w ith  h im  w h ic h  
underp ins the  w ay w e are to  liv e  as h is  ch ild re n .304 H ow eve r, fa ith  g ives rise  to  hope, 
since i t  is  “ the  substance o f  th in g s  hoped fo r.” 305 G enuine hope m ust be d is tin g u ish e d  
fro m  “ n a ive  o p tim is m ,”  w h ic h  lacks any g round ing  o r p ro o f in  re a lity , and also fro m  
any fo rm  o f  “ id e o lo g ic a l o p tim ism ,”  w h ich  serves to  p ro m o te  som e k in d  o f  
una tta in ab le , e a rth ly  u to p ia  th ro u g h  absolute progress o r re v o lu tio n , w h ic h  u ltim a te ly  
serves o n ly  to  in ju re  in d iv id u a ls  o r deprive  them  o f  th e ir d ig n ity .306 T rue  hope is 
roo ted  in  G od .307 Indeed, G od is bo th  the “ fo u n d a tio n ”  and the  su m m it o f  a ll hope 
(w h ic h  Pope B e ned ic t ca lls  the “ great hope” ), since he “ encom passes the  w h o le  o f  
re a lity  and [...] can bestow  upon  us w ha t w e, by  ourse lves, cannot a tta in .” 308 The lo ve  
o f  G od m ade v is ib le  th ro u g h  Jesus C h ris t (John 3 :16 ; C o l 1 :15 ) becom es the  reason 
fo r o u r perseverance in  life , in  s tru g g lin g  to  do good desp ite  the  cha llenges and
3.3.3 The Virtue o f  H ope
elements pertaining to both faith and morals, to which w e are called to give our assent and allegiance 
0obsequium). W e shall return to this in the final chapter. Thus, the virtue o f  faith contains both 
objective and subjective elements. C f. C f. Second Vatican Council, D ogm atic Constitution on the 
Church Lumen Gentium, 25; AAS 57 (1965), 29-30. English text in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar 
and Post Conciliar Documents, general ed. Austin Flannery, trans. Colm an O ’N eill (Dublin:
Dom inican Publications, 1977), 379.
304 C f. CCC, no. 1813.
305 C f. Heb 11 :1 ; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae q.4, a. 1, arg. 1: “Fides est substantia 
sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium” (emphasis in text). The N R S V  translates this 
statement as: “ N ow  faith is the assurance o f things hoped for, the conviction o f  things not seen.”  The 
V ulgate, used by Aquinas, translates hypostasis as substantia. This seems to be better than ‘ assurance’ , 
since the notions o f  assurance, evidence or conviction relate better to elenchos in the subsequent 
clause. Thus, faith concerns both a reality and an assurance o f  that reality, as w ell as a personal 
conviction in response to it. C f. Spe Salvi, 1 for a discussion o f  the m eaning o f  hypostasis and elenchos 
in this passage. Follow ing Pope Benedict’s analysis, the passage translates as “ Faith is the reality o f  
things hoped for; the p roof o f  things unseen.”  Cf. Spe Salvi, 7; Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis o f  
Cultures, 82; Joseph Ratzinger, “ On Hope,”  trans. Esther Tillman, Communio 12 (1985): 71-84, at 77; 
B londel, “ W hat is Faith?” , 192; Bourgeois, “ Tnchoatio Vitae Aeternae’ ,”  272, 275.
06 M urphy, Christ our Joy, 66; Ratzinger, Church, Ecumenism and Politics, 2 1 1 :  “ The loss o f  
transcendence evokes the flight to utopia [...] Robbed o f  their real greatness they [human beings] can 
only find escape in illusory hopes” ; Twom ey, Pope Benedict XVI, 52-53, 115 ; E ric V oegelin, The New 
Science o f  Politics: An Introduction (Chicago and London: University o f  C hicago Press, 1952), 107-32; 
Spe Salvi, 16-23.
307 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae q .17, a .l, resp.: “ actus autem spei, [...], attingit ad
Deum .”
m  Spe Salvi, 31.
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su ffe rin g s  associated w ith  the  im pe rfec tions  o f  the  w o rld  and ou rse lves.309 S t Thom as 
says th a t the  essence o f  hope consists in  reach ing  G od th ro u g h  le a n in g  o n  h is  he lp  
( in n ite n s ) in  o rd e r to  o b ta in  o u r u ltim a te  good: e terna l life , e te rna l happiness w ith  
h im .310
H o w , the re fo re , does the  v irtu e  o f  hope he lp  the  o p e ra tio n  o f  o u r conscience? 
Perhaps w e  co u ld  answ er th is  b y  com paring  a life  liv e d  in  hope to  th a t o f  one w h ic h  
has cast a ll hope aside. In  chapter 2 o f  the B o o k  o f  W isd o m  w e fin d  re fle c tio n s  on 
those w ho  cons ide r death to  lead o n ly  ashes and o b liv io n  ( w .  1 -5 ), and so p u t no store 
in  the  p rom ise  o f  a happy fin a l end (v . 16). R ather than  choosing  em p ty  despa ir, the
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“ u n g o d ly ”  (W is  1 :16) choose to  f i l l  th e ir em ptiness w ith  “ re v e lry ” , p leasures and
in ju s tic e , oppressing the  righ teous po o r m an, even to  the  p o in t o f  death ( w .  6 -20 ).
The rig h te o u s  one m akes them  fee l uncom fo rtab le , even g u ilty , in  th a t h is  w a y  o f
liv in g  causes them  re lu c ta n tly  to  th in k  about the re a lity  o f  th e ir  o w n  d isso lu te  w a y  o f
life  (v v . 14 -15), and fo r  th is  they  w ish  h is  death. In  e ffe c t, the  passage describes h o w
despa ir leads to  g iv in g  up on  a life  w e ll- liv e d . The passage concludes:
T hus th e y  reasoned, b u t w ere led  astray, fo r  th e ir w ickedness m ade them  
b lin d , and th e y  d id  n o t kn o w  the secret purposes o f  G od, n o r hoped fo r  the 
wages o f  ho liness, n o r d iscerned the p rize  fo r  b lam eless sou ls; fo r  G od  created 
us fo r  in c o rru p tio n , and m ade us in  the im age o f  h is  o w n  e te rn ity , b u t th ro u g h  
the  d e v il’ s envy  death entered the w o rld , and those w ho  b e lo n g  to  h is  
com pany experience i t ”  (w .  21-24).
F rom  th is  w e co u ld  say tha t w ickedness b lin d s  us and m ake us lose  hope o f  
w h a t is  b e tte r, w h a t is  g o d ly . H ow ever, we m ig h t also say th a t lo s in g  hope can lead  us
309 Spe Salvi, 31.
310 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae q.17, a.2, resp.: spes de qua loquimur attingit Deum  
innitens eius auxilio ad consequendum bonum speratum. [...] Hoc autem bonum  est vita aetema, quae 
in fruitione ipsius D ei consistit, [...]. Et ideo proprium et principale obiectum  spei est beatitudo aetema. 
C f. CCC, no. 1817
311 C f. Spe Salvi, 27: “ In this sense it is true that anyone who does not know  God, even though 
he m ay entertain all kinds o f  hopes, is ultimately without hope.”  “ U ngodly”  is therefore an appropriate 
term for those who have lost all hope to the point that it has corrupted their lives.
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to  g iv in g  up  on  w h a t is  good o r h o ly ; i t  can the re fo re  destroy  ou r co m m itm e n t to  
v irtu e  and ho liness. In  con trast to  th is , hope helps us to  “ keep on  w a lk in g ,”  desp ite  the
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cha llenges ahead. In  one o f  h is  serm ons, St A u g u s tin e  o ffe rs  us a w o n d e rfu l 
e xh o rta tio n  to  “ keep on  w a lk in g ,”  w h ich  sums up the pow e r o f  hope and th e  im p a c t i t  
has upon o u r live s . Instead o f  g iv in g  up in  the face o f  the arduous jo u rn e y  o f  life , w e 
are ca rrie d  a long  b y  the  h o p e -fille d  p roc lam a tion  o f  the E aster A lle lu ia . T hus, in  
C h ris tia n  hope, w e are p rom pted  to  “ m ake progress in  goodness,”  s ince hope 
re in fo rce s  the  d riv e  to  do good found  in  conscience.
A u g u s tin e ’ s serm on like n s  us to  tra ve lle rs  o r w ayfa re rs  (v ia to re s ) ; a m o tif  w e
fin d  re c u rrin g  in  w r itin g  o f  S t Thom as A qu inas and in  Jose f P ieper in  th e ir  accounts
01-1
o f  the  v irtu e  o f  hope. P ieper po in ts  ou t tha t “ the concept o f  the  status v ia to r is  is  one 
the  basic concepts o f  eve ry  C h ris tia n  ru le  o f  life ,”  th a t is , the  idea  th a t o u r e a rth ly  life  
is  a “ p ilg rim a g e ”  shapes o u r understand ing o f  ourse lves and o u r ac tio n s .314 O u r status  
v ia to r is , o u r c o n d itio n  o f  be ing  on the w ay, id e n tifie s  tha t w e are in  a state o f  “ n o t-
312 St Augustine, Sermons, in The Works o f  Saint Augustine: A Translation fo r  the 21s' 
Century, part 3, vol.7: Sermons 230-272B, trans, and notes by Edmund H ill, ed. John E. R otelle 
(Brooklyn, N ew  York: N ew  C ity  Press, 1993), 256, 3 (pages 169-70): “B ut even here, am ong the 
dangers, am ong the trials and temptations o f  this life, both b y  others and b y  us let alleluia be sung. [...] 
G od be praised there, and G od be praised here; [...] here in hope, there in hope realised; here on the 
w ay, there at home [in eternity]. So now, my dear brothers and sisters, let us sing, not to delight our 
leisure, but to ease our toil. In the w ay travelers are in the habit o f  singing; sing, but keep on w alking. 
[...] W hat’ s ‘keep on w alkin g’ ? M ake some progress, make progress in goodness. [...] Y o u , i f  y o u ’re 
m aking progress, are w alking; but make progress in goodness, progress in right faith, progress in good 
habits and behavior. Sing and keep on walking. D on’t stray o ff  the road, don’t go back, don’t stay 
where you are.”  C f. St Augustine, Sermo 256, 3, P L  38, 1192-93: “ Sed etiam hie inter pericula, inter 
tentationes, et ab aliis, et a nobis cantetur Alleluia. [...] Ibi laudes Deo, et hie laudes D eo: [...] hie in 
spe, ibi in re; hie in via, illic in patria. M odo ergo, fratres mei, cantemus, non ad delectationem  quietis, 
sed ad solatium laboris. Q uom odo so lent cantare viatores; canta, sed ambula [...]. Quid est, ambula? 
Profice, in bono profice. [...] Tu si proficis, ambulas: sed in bono profice, in recta fide profice, in bonis 
moribus profice: canta, et ambula. N oli errare, noli redire, noli remanere.”
313 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q. 17, a.2, ad 1; Ila Ilae, q. 18, a.2, ad 1; Ila Ilae 
q. 18, a.3, resp.: “ sed in viatoribus, sive sint in vita ista, sive in purgatorio, potest esse spes; quia 
utrobique apprehendunt beatitudinem ut futurum possibile”  [“But hope can be in travellers, whether 
they be in this life  or in purgatory, because in either case they perceive beatitude as a future possible 
thing” ]; Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 91-98.
314 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 91. Similarly, Häring’ s reflections on hope lead him  to conclude 
that Christian ethics “ is a pilgrim  ethics.”  See Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, I, 253.
314
f
y e t-e x is tin g -b e in g ” , re fle c tin g  a crea tu re ly  nature  th a t stre tches fo rw a rd  to  
“ fu lfillm e n t beyond tim e ”  w ith  G od.316 T here fore  the status v ia to r is  is  to  be com pared 
w ith  the  sta tus  c o m p re h e n s io n s , the state o f  hav ing  grasped th is  fu lln e s s , w here
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becom ing  a rrive s  at com p le te  be ing. Thus, “ to  have encom passed th is  g o a l, to  be a
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co m p reh en so r, m eans to  possess bea titude .”  In  con trast, o u r e a rth ly  life  is  
in co m p le te ; indeed, w ith o u t the  p o s s ib ility  o f  reach ing  com p le te  fu lln e ss  th ro u g h  
G od ’ s grace, w e shou ld  be considered as “ absurd be ings -  an a b e rra tio n  in  the  
e v o lu tio n  o f  the  species,”  since w e w o u ld  be seeking th a t w h ic h  is  beyond  o u r
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reach. T h is  is  w h y  G od ’ s grace and ou r hope in  th a t tru th  are so im p o rta n t. O u r 
understand ing  o f  ou r incom pleteness, ou r strugg le  to w a rd  bea titud e , is  g ive n  m ean ing , 
since a ll o u r fra iltie s  are p laced w ith in  the con tex t o f  the  escha to lo g ica l hope o f  
w holeness o f  heaven, w hen  G od “ w ill w ip e  aw ay every tea r”  (R ev 2 1 :4 ). A s  w e  have 
observed in  W isd o m  2 :1 -2 4 , w ith o u t hope, o u r e ffo rts  fo r  goodness seem p o in tle ss ; 
ou r fa ilin g s  beyond re p a ir. B u t grace transfo rm s ou r liv e s , g iv in g  them  d ire c tio n  and 
hope, so th a t o u r w eakness and sins do no t crush us, to  the  p o in t o f  despa ir o r to  a 
sense o f  no th ingness. R ather w e are ca lled  to  m ake progress to w a rd  G od  and to  
“ m ake progress in  goodness.”  Thus, the C h ris tia n  v irtu e  o f  hope is  essen tia l to  o u r
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co m m itm e n t to  liv in g  a m o ra l life , and fundam enta l to  fo rm in g  o u r conscience , th a t
315 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 98.
316 Ibid., 95.
317 Ibid., 94, 96. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae q. 18, a.2, ad 1. Pieper points out 
that the notions o f  comprehensor and status comprehensoris were drawn b y  theology from  P aul’ s 
discourse on pressing on to the goal o f  heaven, which in this life he had not yet obtained. C f. Phil 3:12- 
13, for exam ple Phil 3:13 [Vulgate]: “ Fratres, ego me non arbitror comprehendisse” ; Pieper, Faith, 
Hope, Love, 92.
318 C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 92; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q .15 , a.10.
319 Ratzinger, “ O n Hope,”  75. See ibid.: “ The anthropological problem  o f  hope therefore 
consists in the human need for something that goes beyond all human ability.”
320 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 97-98.
321 Häring highlights the connection between the eschatological desire for G od, for the return 
o f  the Lord, and the formation o f  conscience in his discussion on vigilant conscience and vigilant 
prudence. Here, in the light o f  escatological hope, “ conscience is sensitive [to] the L ord ’ s calling and 
trustful o f  his grace,”  while vigilant prudence applies that sensitivity to G o d ’ s w ays to correct appraisal
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its  judgem en ts  m ay be m ore in  tune w ith  G od ’ s w ays, and re fle c tiv e  o f  the  g oa l fo r  
w h ic h  w e are s triv in g .
The fo rm a tio n  o f  conscience is fa r fro m  an iso la te d  a c tiv ity . W e need th e  h e lp  
o f  others to  deepen o u r understand ing, and deve lop o u r r ig h t d isp o s itio n s . W e d ra w  
in s ig h t fro m  w h a t is  good in  soc ie ty  at a ll leve ls , bu t above a ll, the  C a th o lic  C h ris tia n , 
liv in g  in  c o m m u n io , lo o ks  to  the C hurch fo r  assistance in  the  fo rm a tio n  o f  
conscience. The conscience o f  the in d iv id u a l flo u rish e s  in  the  co n te x t o f  v irtu e  and 
grace, b u t the  in d iv id u a l is  p rom pted  to  pursue a life  o f  v irtu e  and grace th ro u g h  the  
exam ple  o f  the  b e lie v in g  com m un ity , and unde rp in n in g  th a t w a y  o f  life  is  the  
co m m u n ity ’ s fa ith - fille d  hope.323 In  th is  w ay, a p rim a ry  task  o f  a ll m em bers o f  the  
C hu rch  is  to  be bearers o f  hope, so th a t people are spe s a lv i: saved in  hope (R om  
8 :24 ) and hea led b y  hope. H ope spurs us on to  ho liness, b u t a lso banishes fe a r and 
lif ts  us up fro m  o u r sense o f  inadequacy (c f. Lu ke  5 :8 -1 0 ). I t  is  th e re fo re  an essentia l 
p a rt o f  the  C h u rch ’ s m iss io n  to  p ro c la im  and convey the  re a lity  o f  G o d ’ s lo v in g , 
fo rg iv in g  and sus ta in ing  presence to  a ll people , b u t p a rtic u la rly  to  those w ho  
s trugg le  w ith  the  cha llenges o f  life  o r su ffe r fro m  a deep sense o f  m o ra l fa ilu re .325 The 
fundam en ta l tene t o f  v irtu e  th e o ry  is  the p o s s ib ility  o f  g ro w th , b u t th is  g ro w th  is  o n ly  
tru ly  poss ib le  w ith  G od ’ s grace and m ercy.326 T h rough  the  g if t  o f  hope, G od  reaches
o f  reality and right judgem ent o f  what is needed to be done. See Häring, Free and Faithful in Christ, I, 
254.
322 C f. L iv io  M elina, “ M oral Conscience and ‘Com m unio’ : Tow ard a Response to the 
Challenge o f  Ethical Pluralism ,”  trans. Robert Slesinski, Communio 20 (1993): 673-86. C f. Ratzinger, 
“ Bishops, Theologians, and M orality,”  55-56, 62-64, at 63: “ The right o f  conscience [to respect] is 
[also] the obligation o f  the formation o f  conscience. [...] For us this means that the C hurch’ s 
magisterium bears the responsibility for correct formation.”
323 Spe Salvi, 14-15.
324 Ratzinger, “ I f  Y o u  W ant P eace... Conscience and Truth,”  99 (talking o f  the need for 
expiation and forgiveness to wash o f f  the guilt o f  conscience): “ This is the real novelty o f  Christianity: 
the Logos, the Truth in person, is also this expiation, the transforming forgiveness that transcends all 
our own abilities and inabilities”  (emphasis in text).
325 C f. 1 Pt 5:7: “ Cast all you anxiety on him, because he cares for you.”
326 Cf.Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 70. James Keenan describes the 
w ay o f  virtue as the “ call to grow, the call to m ove forward as disciples”  o f  Christ, w hich he says is
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ou t tow ards us to  o ffe r h is  m ercy, fo rg iveness and peace. T hus, hope b rin g s  lig h t to  
the darkness o f  s in , and p rom pts the conscience th ro u g h  tru s t and repentance to  seek 
to  fo llo w  G od ’ s w ays ever m ore c lose ly.
3.3.4 The Virtue of Love (Charity)
O ur com m ents on the  th e o lo g ica l v irtu e s  so fa r in d ica te  a change o f  p e rspective  th a t 
a ffe c ts  o u r acqu ired  v irtu e s , chang ing ou r m o tiv a tio n  o r even the  a c tio n  chosen as w e 
are fu rth e r a ttuned to  the  “ th in g s  o f  G od” . Such a change o f  pe rspective , as w e have 
seen is  roo ted  in  fa ith , sustained b y  hope, bu t reaches its  tru e  fru itio n  in  the  v irtu e  o f  
lo ve  o r c h a rity . Such is  the  im portance  o f  ch a rity  th a t P ieper asserts th a t “ th e  h ighest 
and m ost fr u it fu l ach ievem ents o f  the C h ris tia n  life ”  depend n o t o n ly  u p o n  prudence, 
b u t upon  its  “ fe lic ito u s  c o lla b o ra tio n ”  w ith  c h a rity .328 B u t w h a t is  th is  v irtu e  o f  lo ve  
o r ch a rity? 329
O ur f ir s t p ro b le m  is  the  w o rd  ‘ lo v e ’ its e lf. In  c o n fro n tin g  the  w o rd  ‘ lo v e ’ w e 
are faced  w ith  such a bread th  o f  m eaning, th a t i t  m ay even seem im p o ss ib le  to  p in  i t  
dow n. Indeed, h o w  can the  same w o rd  describe a lik in g  fo r  fo o d  o r m us ic , as w e ll as
“ heard in the Christian conscience.”  See Keenan, Moral Wisdom, 30. Discipleship (sequela Christi) is a 
key concept for K laus Dem m er, who supervised Keenan’ s doctoral thesis. This influence is therefore 
still evident in his current work. C f. Keenan’ s section on Demmer in Jesus and Virtue Ethics, 55-58.
327 Com paring infused virtues to those which are acquired, Aquinas notes that the virtuous act 
remains the same materialiter, but formaliter change ow ing to its connection to a different end or 
motivation. H ow ever, focusing on our supernatural end may also change the act chosen, in that 
something considered excessive (superjluum) according to an earthly standard m ay be appropriate 
according to a heavenly measure. St Thomas gives the examples o f  someone choosing to fast or be put 
to death in order to defend the faith. C f. Aquinas, In IIISententiarum, dist. 33, q . l ,  a.2, qc.4, ad 2: 
“ quam vis sit idem actus virtutis acquisitae et infusae materialiter, non tamen est idem actus formaliter: 
quia per virtutem acquisitam collimitantur circumstantiae secundum proportionem ad bonum civile , sed 
per virtutem infusam secundum proportionem ad bonum aetemae gloriae [...] unde etiam aliquid 
superfluum secundum virtutem civilem  est moderatum secundum virtutum infusam, sicut quod homo 
ieiunet, et se voluntarie morti offerat propter defensionem fidei” ; idem, Summa Theologica, la  TIae, 
q .61, a.5, resp.; Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 111 .
328 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 37.
329 Our prim ary focus here is love as a theological virtue. Pieper accepts that a theologian may 
use caritas or charity to express the theological virtue o f  love o f  G od and neighbour, in contrast to all 
other uses o f  love. H ow ever, he observes that any attempt at popular use o f  such a precision runs into 
difficulty given the current application o f  the word ‘charity’ to “ organized care for those in need.”  In 
the context o f  this thesis, how ever, it still seems necessary to use ‘ charity’ to enable us to m ake the 
distinctions between it and other forms o f  love. Cf. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 150.
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the  re la tio n sh ip s  betw een frie n d s , fa m ily  o r husband and w ife , and s t ill a lso d e fin e  the  
na tu re  o f  G od (1 Jn 4 :16)?  The Greeks and Rom ans had severa l w o rds  to  describe  
d iffe re n t fo rm s  o f  lo ve : in  G reek eros, p h i l ia ,  s to rg e , a g a p e , and in  L a tin  a m o r,
-5 O 1
d ile c tio , a ffe c tio , p ie ta s , p ass io , c a rita s , and even stud ium . H o w e ve r, a ll these 
te rm s e x is t to  describe  n o t a ttitudes in  th e ir ow n  rig h t, b u t face ts o f  the sam e th in g , 
expressing  w h a t pleases us (a ffe c tio ) , w hat we se lect o r e le c t as good (d ile c t io ) ,  w h a t 
sa tis fie s  o u r appe tite , b o th  in  term s o f  the senses and in te lle c t (a m o r ) ,  o r w h a t is  so 
‘ dear to  us ’ (c a ru s )  th a t w e are w illin g  to  pay a h ig h  p rice  fo r  i t  (the  s e lf-s a c rific e  o f  
c a r ita s ) .334 T hus, w e b e g in  to  rea lise  tha t at, its  ro o t, “ ‘ lo v e ’ is  a s ing le  re a lity , b u t 
w ith  d iffe re n t d im ens ions,”  and th a t a t d iffe re n t tim e s , one d im e s io n  m ay be 
em phasised o ve r ano the r.335 H ow ever, basic to  a ll these d im ensions is  th a t lo v e  is  an 
act o f  the  w ill,  o f  w a n tin g , th a t b o th  a ffirm s  som eth ing o r som eone as good, as w e ll 
and dem ands encoun ter w ith  th is  good.336 Indeed lo ve  is , in  fa c t, the  “ p rim a l act [ . . . ]o f  
the  w ill, ” 337 the  assent o f  o u r ve ry  be ing. T h is  is  the  fundam en ta l e lem ent o u t o f
330 Cf. Deus Caritas Est, 2, AAS 98 (2006), 219; Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 145-46.
331 Cf. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 152-58; Deus Caritas Est, 3, AAS 98 (2006), 219 .
332 For Pieper’ s description o f  these different aspects, see Faith, Hope, Love, 152-58.
333 C f. Aquinas, In IIISententiarum, dist. 27, q .l ,  a .l ,  sol: “ amor ad appetitum pertinet” ; ibid., 
q.2, a .l ,  sol.: “ amor est quaedam quietatio [...]; unde sicut appetitus invenitur in parte sensitiva et 
intellectiva, ita et amor.”  C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 153: “ In the purely sensual realm, dilectio 
naturally has no place, whereas the word amor, as Thomas says, embraces the sensual and the mental, 
and even the spiritual and supernatural elements.”
334 It should also be noted that given the common element to the terms, the distinctions 
between the terms was blurred in use. Hence, the Vulgate uses amor, dilectio, caritas, diligere and 
amare as interchangeable translations o f  agapé, agapein. C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 155.
335 Deus Caritas Est, 8, AAS 98 (2006), 224. Indeed, the Pope cautions against com pletely 
separating the facets o f  love, since to describe love as purely one form, such as the receiving, 
possessive love o f  eros, or the self-giving, oblative love o f  agapé, is to create a caricature o f  love, “ or 
at least an im poverished form  o f  love.”  See ibid., 7-8, at 7: “ Anyone who wishes to g ive love m ust also 
receive love as a g ift” ; AAS 98 (2006), 224: “ Quicumque amorem donare vult, ilium tamquam donum 
ipse recipiat oportet.”  C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 152-58.
336 C f. Pieper thus says that love “ combines affirmation and demand in a unity ."Faith, Hope, 
Love, 192. Pieper’ s fundamental thread in his analysis o f  love is the affirm ation ‘ H ow  good  it is that 
you/this exist[s]!’ For exam ple, cf. ibid., 173, 193, 198-99.
337 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 167. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.20, a .l ,  resp.:
“ Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cujuslibet appetitivae virtutis est amor”  [“ L ove is the first m ovem ent 
o f  the w ill and o f  every appetitive faculty” ]; ibid., I, q.60, prol. C f. Gillem an, The Primacy o f  Charity 
in Moral Theology, 155.
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w h ic h  a c tio n  and v irtu e  deve lop , since i t  is  the p r in c ip iu m  and m o tiv a tin g  fo rc e  o f  o u r 
sp e c ific  de c is io n s .338
W h ile  o u r in te lle c t is  fundam enta l to  o u r hum an na tu re , i t  is  o u r w il l  th a t 
com pels us to  act. T he re fo re , lo ve , as the firs t act o f  the  w ill,  is  an essen tia l p a rt o f  
o u r hum an nature , and the re fo re  “ strikes at the  ro o t o f  the  w h o le  s tru c tu re  o f  [o u r] 
ex is tence .” 340 In  th is  w a y , lo ve  is  “ no th ing  bu t o u r s p iritu a l be ing  in s o fa r as i t  is  
a c tive ; [...] n o th in g  b u t the  exercise o f  our be ing , o f  o u r fo rm  o f  b e in g .” 341 L o ve  
de fines o u r state o f  be ing , as ou r appetite  can be draw n to  good o r bad.342 T h e re fo re , 
“ fo r the  person as a w h o le  to  be ‘ r ig h t’ and good,”  and hence v irtu o u s , the  pe rson ’ s 
lo ve  “ m ust be ‘ in  o rd e r’ .” 343 A s w ith  a ll v irtu e s , p a rt o f  th a t o rd e rin g  is  v irtu o u s  
in te n tio n . L o ve  o f  the  good orders our acts r ig h tly . H ow eve r, o u r u ltim a te  good  is  
G od. H ence, S t A u g u s tin e  saw  love  o f G od as the u ltim a te  in te n tio n  th a t d e fines  o u r 
good acts.344 W e lo ve  p ro p te r  D e u m , because o f  G od.345 G od fo rm s  the  b e g in n in g  and 
end o f  o u r lo v e , as w e w ere created in  h is  lo ve , and i t  is  lo ve  th a t leads us to  h im .346
338 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 166. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.60, p ro f: “ omnis 
actus appetitivae virtutis ex  amore, seu dilectione d eriva ta ” ; Aquinas, Quaestio Disputata de Cantate, 
in Opera Omnia, voi. 8 (N ew  York: Musurgia Publishers, 1949; reprint o f  1852-1873 Parma ed.), q .l  
[unica], a.2, resp.: “ amor est principium omnium voluntariarum affectionum .”
339 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 166: “ Rather, in the great tradition o f  European thinking about 
man it has alw ays been held that just as the immediate certainties o f  seeing are the foundation and 
prerequisite o f  all intellectual activity, so also love is the primal act o f  w illin g that permeates all 
w illing-to-do from  its very source.”
340 Ibid., 166.
341 Gillem an, The Primacy o f  Charity in Moral Theology, 131 : “ The m ystery o f  love can be 
reduced to the m ystery o f  being and unity. St Thomas teaches that love is the fundamental activity o f  
being. In us, love is nothing but our spiritual being insofar as it is active; there is continuity betw een 
being and action ju st as between first and second act. L ove is nothing but the exercise o f  our being, o f  
our form o f  being.”
342 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.20, a .l, resp.
343 Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 167.
344 Juan José Pérez-Soba, “ L a Carità e le Virtù nel Dinamismo M orale,”  in La 'Sequela 
Christi Dimensione Morale e Spirituale dell 'Esperienza Cristiana, ed. L ivio  M elina and O livier 
Bonnewijn (Rome: Lateran U niversity Press, 2003)135-59, at 143.
345 C f. ibid.; Augustine, De Trinitate, V ili ,  8, PL 42, 959: “ E x una igitur eademque charitate 
Deum  proxim um que diligim us: sed Deum propter Deum, nos autem et proxim um  propter D eum ” 
[“ Therefore, w e love G od and neighbour out o f  one and the same love, but w e love G od because o f  
God, and ourselves and our neighbour because o f  G od.” ] .
346 C f. 1 Jn 4:19: “ W e love because he first loved us” ; Deus Caritas Est, 17, AAS 98 (2006),
231.
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A ll o f  th is  leads A u g u s tin e  to  conclude th a t v irtu e  is  roo ted  in  lo ve , such th a t v irtu e  is
' l  AH . ,
the  “ o rd o  a m o r is t  The nature o f  v irtu e  is  thus tra n s fo rm e d  b y  a fu lle r
understand ing  o f  its  basis, since v irtu e  n o t o n ly  leads to  the  happy life ,  b u t to  the
• • • • • » 
blessed life  w ith  G od th ro u g h  its  u n d e rly in g  in te n tio n . H ow eve r, such an in te n tio n
needs to  be p u rifie d  i f  w e are to  tru ly  g ro w  in  v irtu e , and g ro w  c lose r to  G o d .349
A u g u s tin e ’ s understand ing  o f  ou r lo ve  o r desire  as h a v in g  its  fo u n d a tio n  and
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goa l in  G od p ro v id e s  the  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  the va rious m ed ieva l re fle c tio n s  on  lo ve . 
Y e t, i t  is  in  the  w r itin g  o f  S t Thom as tha t the fu lle s t expression  o f  the  re la tio n s h ip
TCI
betw een lo ve  and v irtu e , and love  as a th e o lo g ica l v irtu e  is  reached. S t Thom as 
observes th a t G od ’ s co n tin u a l g ifts  o f  lo ve  lead us to  respond to  h im  in  lo v e , and, 
couched in  A ris to te lia n  te rm s, A qu inas thus de fines G od ’ s a c tio n  and o u r response in  
te rm s o f  frie n d s h ip .352 T h is  frie n d sh ip  is  an in te ra c tio n  o f  m u tu a l sh a rin g  and
347 See St Augustine, De Civitate Dei, X V , 22, P L  41, 467: “ Unde mihi videtur, quod defm itio 
brevis et vera virtutis, Ordo est amoris: propter quod in sancto Cantico canticorum cantat sponsa 
Christi, civitas D ei, Ordinate in me charitatem (Cantic. II, 4)” (emphasis in text). C f. Pieper, Faith, 
Hope, Love, 167; Pérez-Soba, “ L a Carità e le Virtù,”  141.
348 Pérez-Soba, “L a  Carità e le Virtù,”  143.
349 Ibid., 142.
350 Hence Peter Lom bard almost repeats Augustine’ s formula regarding propter Deum. G iven 
the lasting influence o f  Lom bard’ s Sentences, the definition sets the fram ework for understanding the 
theological virtue o f  caritas. See Peter Lombard, Liber Sententiarum, III, d. 27, cap. 2 ,1: “ Caritas est 
dilectio qua diligitur Deus propter se, et proximus propter Deum vel in D eo.” C f. Pérez-Soba, “ L a 
Carità e le V irtù,”  145.
351 C f. Pérez-Soba, “ L a Carità e le Virtù,”  148.
352 Thom as Franklin O ’Meara, Thomas Aquinas, Theologian (Notre Dam e, IN and London: 
U niversity o f  Notre Dam e Press, 1997), 123: “L ove moves through the hundreds o f  articles o f  the ST, 
from  L ove creating to L ove redeeming. B om  o f  goodness, the Creator’ s love drew a universe out o f  
nothingness, and love led the W ord o f  God to become a human being. [...] For Aquinas G o d ’ s love for 
us brought a kind o f  friendship; that is friendship explains how G od view s and relates to people.”  C f. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q.23, a .l, resp.: “ charitas amicitia quaedam est hom inis ad 
D eum .” W hile St Thom as frames his argument in Aristotelian terms, V oegelin  observes that Aristotle 
argued that “ friendship between G od and man was impossible because o f  their radical inequality.”  St 
Thom as’ s account o f  the revealed truth o f  mutual friendship with God, achieved b y  grace, “ w hich 
imposes a supernatural form  on the nature o f  man,”  is therefore described by V oegelin  as “ the specific 
difference o f  Christian truth,”  in comparison to earlier, partial truths. C f. V oegelin, The New Science o f  
Politics, 77-78; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VIII, 7, 1 158b 2 9 -1159a 13.
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co m m u n ica tio n , and the  k in d  o f  lo ve  tha t is  based on th is  co m m u n ica tio n  betw een 
us and G od is  c a r ita s .354
C h a rity  is  a specia l k in d  o f  love , and hence a spec ia l v irtu e , s ince  it  
s p e c ific a lly  has the  d iv in e  good as its  ob jec t.355 H a v in g  G od d ire c tly  as its  o b je c t, i t  
surpasses o u r n a tu ra l fa cu ltie s , and so is  in fused  in  us as a g ra tu ito u s  g if t  o f  the 
H o ly  S p irit. L o ve  o f  ne ighb ou r and ourselves also fo rm  p a rt o f  the  o b je c t o f  ch a rity , 
as the  fin a l o b je c t is  the  same. Hence, w e lo ve  o u r ne ig h b o u r th a t he o r she m ay be
T CQ (
in  G od (u l in  D e o  s it). Indeed, i t  is  th is  com m on, u ltim a te  good  th a t m o tiva te s  ou r 
lo ve  fo r  a ll peop le  and o u r acts o f  beneficence tow ards th e m .360 M o re o ve r, i t  is  
th ro u g h  the  s im p le , eve ryday acts o f  kindness and he lp fu ln ess, sum m ed up  in  St 
P a u l’ s lis t  o f  a ttitu d e s  tow ards others (1 C o r 13 :4 -8 ), th a t the  desire  fo r  the  u ltim a te  
good fo r  o u r n e ig h b o u r is  in d ire c tly  expressed. L o ve  o f  se lf, i f  w e ll-o rd e re d  and n o t
'lf/y
excessive, is  a lso v irtu o u s , since w e are to  lo ve  the  “ th in g s  o f  G od ,”  w h ic h  inc ludes 
ourse lves and o u r bod ies created b y  h im .
353 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q.23, a .l, resp.: “ sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad 
rationem am icitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio [...]: cum ergo sit aliqua com m unicatio 
hominis ad Deum, secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hanc 
communicationem oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari” ; O ’Meara, Thomas Aquinas, Theologian, 123.
354 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.23, a .l ,  resp.: “ amor autem super hanc 
communicationem fundatus est charitas.”
355 Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.23, a.4, resp.: “ ideo amor charitatis, qui est amor hujus boni [beatitudinis]; 
est specialis amor: unde et charitas est specialis virtus”  (emphasis in text).
356 Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.24, a.2, resp.: “ charitas est amicitia quaedam hom inis ad Deum , fundata 
super com m unicatione beatitudinis aetemae: haec autem communicatio non est secundum dona 
naturalia, sed secundum dona gratuita: [...] unde et ipsa charitas facultatem naturae excedit.”
357 Ibid., Ha Ilae, q.24, a.2, resp.: “  [...] sed per infusionem Spiritus Sancii, qui est amor Patris, 
et Filii, cujus participatio in nobis est ipsa charitas creata.”
358 Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.25, a .l ,  resp.; Ila Ilae, q.25, a.4, resp. C f. L ev  19:18; M k 12:28-34.
359 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila Ilae, q.25, a .l ,  resp.
360 Ibid., Ila Ilae, q.25, a .l ad 2.; Ila Ilae, q.31, a.2, resp.: Sim ilarly, one m ay also include
alm sgiving and fraternal correction as part o f  our charity toward our neighbour. C f. Ibid., Ila  Ilae, q.32, 
a .l ,  resp.; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.33, a .l ,  resp.; Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 171.
361 C f. Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 193.
362 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.77, a.4, ad 1; O ’M eara, Thomas Aquinas, 
Theologian, 123.
363 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q.25, a.4, resp.: “ ad ea quae sunt Dei: inter quae 
etiam est ipse hom o” ; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.25, a.5, resp.
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A q u in a s  describes ch a rity  as a com m un ica tion  o r sharing  w ith  G od. W h a t do 
w e share w ith  h im ?  W e share in  h is  d iv in e  na tu re ,364 in  such a w a y  th a t w e  are 
transfo rm ed  b y  h im , even d e ifie d  b y  h im .365 Thus, w e p a rtic ip a te  in  G o d ’ s goodness 
and w isd o m , b u t a lso  in  h is  cha ritab le , s e lf-g iv in g  lo ve , expressed in  p a rtic u la r b y  o u r 
lo ve  o f  n e ig h b o u r.366 H ow eve r, in  th is  sharing o r p a rtic ip a tio n  w e a lso  ach ieve  a unio  
a ffe c tu s .367 I t  is  th is  u n io n  in  m u tua l s e lf-g iv in g  lo ve  w h ic h  tra n s fo rm s o u r actions, 
and th e re fo re  a ll the  o the r v irtu e s , s h iftin g  th e ir perspective  and fo r tify in g  the  w il l  to  
act in  accordance w ith  G od ’ s w ill.  Hence the change o f  pe rspective  ga ined  th ro u g h  
the  th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s  reaches its  fu llness  in  the v irtu e  o f  c h a rity , w h ic h  em pow ers 
u n ifie s  and pe rfe c ts  a ll acqu ired  v irtu e . In  th is  w ay c h a rity  operates as th e  “fo r m a  
v ir tu tu m .” 369 C h a rity  becom es the o rgan is ing  p rin c ip le  fo r  the  pe rson ’ s a c tio n s  and 
v irtu o u s  d isp o s itio n s , n o t in  such a w ay th a t the  in d iv id u a l v irtu e s  lose  th e ir
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s p e c ific ity , b u t ra th e r in  such a w ay th a t they are u n ite d  in  one u ltim a te  g o a l: lo ve .
364 C f. ibid., Ia Ilae, q.62, a .l ,  resp.; Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 170.
365 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae, q .l 12, a .l ,  resp.: “ Sic enim necesse est quod solus 
Deus deificet, com m unicando consortium divinae naturae per quamdam sim ilitudinis participationem ” ; 
Gillem an, The Primacy o f  Charity in Moral Theology, 154. Gilleman, Pieper and Porter all emphasise 
that w e are not lost in this transformation; it is still w e who act. C f. Gillem an, The Primacy o f  Charity 
in Moral Theology, 155; Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, 220; Porter, The Recovery o f  Virtue, 17 1 .
366 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q.23, a.2, ad 1. C f. O ’ M eara, Thomas Aquinas, 
Theologian, 123.
367 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.27, a.2, resp.: “ importât enim quamdam 
unionem secundum affectus amantis ad amatum [...]; sic ergo in dilectione, secundum quod est actus 
charitatis, includitur quidem benevolentia; sed dilectio, sive amor addit unionem affectus" (emphasis 
mine); Pérez-Soba, “ L a Carità e le Virtù,”  149.
368 C f. O ’ M eara, Thomas Aquinas, Theologian, 123: “ L ove is faith’ s affection and virtue’ s 
empowerment” ; K ennedy, Doers o f  the Word, 1 , 228: “ The acquired virtues remain inadequately 
defined as virtue i f  they are not motivated and informed b y  charity as love o f  G od and neighbour.”  Cf. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae q.65, a.2
369 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae q.62, a.4: “ charitas est mater omnium virtutum, et 
radix, inquantum est omnium forma” ; ibid., Ha Ilae, q.23, a.8, resp.: “[charitas] dicitur form a omnium 
virtutum”  (emphasis in text). From among others, Aquinas drew this idea from  St A m brose (or at least 
from a w ork then attributed to him), as he refers to him in his argument. See ibid., Ha Ilae, q.23, a.8, 
sed contra. The passage he draws from m ay be “ Dum enim charitatem, quae mater om nium  bonorum 
est, non sectantur, non sciunt sicut oportet. U t ergo scientia fructum habere possit, charitati se debet 
subjicere.”  See St Am brose [now attrib. to Ambrosiaster], Commentaria in Epistolam B. Pauli ad  
Corinthos Primam, V III, 1, PL  17, 226. For further comment on charity as the form o f  all virtue, cf. 
Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 20; Leclercq, “ L a morale des vertus,”  901; Gillem an, Le primat de la charité, 
47-55; Gillem an, The Primacy o f  Charity in Moral Theology, 35-45.
370 C f. G illem an, The Primacy o f  Charity in Moral Theology, 166-170, at 170: “ In brief, since 
every partial end is em inently contained in the ultimate and general end o f  charity, it is easy to turn
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C h a rity  is  thus the  fo rm  o f  a “ m ore e xce llen t w ay”  o f  life ,371 in  w h ic h , th ro u g h  o u r 
m e rito rio u s  ac tions , w e as v ia to res  m ake progress in  g e ttin g  c lose r to  G od. T h is  is  
m ade po ss ib le  th ro u g h  c h a rity ’ s capac ity  to  u n ite  ou r w ills  and m inds to  G o d ’ s (m ens
372D e o  u n itu r ).
I f  the  th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e  o f  ch a rity  un ites ou r m inds to  G od ’ s, th is  has a d ire c t 
e ffe c t upon  the  fu n c tio n  o f  conscience. O u r pe rcep tion  and ju d g e m e n t is  fu rth e r 
a ttuned to  the  tru th , and attuned to  the m in d  o f  C h ris t. In  th is  w a y  c h a rity  presents us 
w ith  a new  m o tiv a tio n , a m o tiv a tio n  w e rece ive  fro m  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the  life  o f  the  
G od w ho  is  lo ve . W e are to ld  by  h im ,“ G o and do lik e w is e ”  (L k  10 :37 ). T hus, ou r 
u n io n  w ith  G od  ca lls  us to  see “ w ith  the eyes o f  C h ris t.” 373 U n ite d  w ith  C h ris t, m y  
desire  to  do good, to  he lp  m y ne ighbour becom es second na tu re , m ore  a le rt, less 
h es itan t, less fe a rfu l, less sporadic. A  life  w here ch a rity  b lossom s is  thus  b ro u g h t to  
deeper cons is tency  in  ac tion , since th ro u g h  ou r u n io n  w ith  C h ris t w e have a new  
m o tiv a tio n : “ the  lo ve  o f  C h ris t urges us on”  (2  C o r 5 :14 ). W e sh a ll d iscuss fu rth e r the 
e ffe c ts  o f  o u r u n io n  and im ita tio n  o f  C h ris t in  the fin a l chapter.
4. Conclusion -  Coming into the Light: Connatural Conscience
O ur s tudy  o f  the  v irtu e s  in  re la tio n  to  conscience has h ig h lig h te d  the  ro le  o f  the
v irtu e s  in  d isp o s in g  the  person to  the tru th , and in  d e s irin g  to  act u p o n  th a t tru th .
objects o f  virtue into objects o f  love. Our entire terrestrial community life can be made charitable.”  See 
also ibid., 184: “ supernatural finality does not suppress natural finality, but rather deepens it and leads 
it into contact w ith G od.”
371 C f. 1 C or 12:31; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.24, a.4, resp.: “ et ideo Apostolus 
charitatem viam  nominat, dicens I. ad Cor. 12.: Adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro”
(emphasis in text).
372 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.24, a.4, resp.: “ in hac autem via tanto m agis 
procedimus, quanto D eo m agis propinquamus; cui non appropinquatur passibus corporis, sed affectibus 
mentis. Hanc autem propinquitatem facit charitas: quia per ipsam mens D eo unitur.”  C f. K ostko, 
Beatitudine e Vita Cristiana, 308.
373 Deus Caritas Est, 18; AAS 98 (2006), 232: “ Christi oculis inspicio.”  The verb used here 
highlights that to see with the eyes o f  Christ means that w e do not stop at the level o f  appearances and 
exterior need.
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Prudence a ffe c ts  o u r in te lle c t and w ill in  assessing the  s itu a tio n  c le a rly , ju d g in g  the  
app rop ria te  a c tio n  and in c lin in g  the in d iv id u a l to  choose it. In  d o in g  so, the  ju d g e m e n t 
o f  conscience is  be tte r a ttuned to  the needs o f  the  s itu a tio n , and m oved  to  choose the 
best o p tio n  fo r  ac tion . The m o ra l v irtu e s  also assist conscience b y  o rd e rin g  o u r w il l  to  
desire  the  good  e v id e n t in  the p a rtic u la r action . G race lif ts  the  ju d g e m e n t o f  
conscience fu rth e r b y  in fu s in g  the  acqu ired  v irtu e s  and shap ing  o u r o u tlo o k  th ro u g h  
the g reat th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s  o f  fa ith , hope and love . In  th is  w a y  a c o n n a tu ra lity , a 
sym pathy be tw een the person and the  true  good is  ach ieved ,374 w here  choo s in g  the 
good a pp rop ria te  to  the  circum stance becom es tru ly  “ second na tu re ,” 375 such th a t in  
d o in g  so w e w a lk  in  the  lig h t o f  tru th , in  the lig h t o f  C h ris t (John  3 :2 1).376
O ve r the  course o f  th is  study o f  v irtu e  and conscience w e have a lso  d iscove red  
th a t grace p la ys  a fundam en ta l ro le  in  c rea ting  the  p o s s ib ility  fo r  v irtu e , chang in g  its  
pe rspective  and in  m a k in g  v irtu e  m ore e ffe c tive  in  its  fu n c tio n .377 T hus, the  assistance
374 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.45, a.2, resp.: “hujusmodi autem com passio, sive 
connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per charitatem, quae quidem unit nos D eo”  [“N o w  such sym pathy or 
connaturality for divine things comes about through charity, which unites us to G od” ]. F ollow ing 
Aquinas, Hibbs points out that goodness (or graced, virtuous living) in the person leads to our 
perception more readily matching up with reality. C f. Hibbs, Virtue’s Splendor, 130: “ For the good 
person, ‘the true and apparent goods are the same thing’ .”  C f. Aquinas, In Decem Libros Ethicorum ad  
Nichomachum, IX , lect. 4: “ D icit ergo primo, quod virtuosus maxime vult sibiipsi bona et vera  et 
apparentia. Eadem  enim  sunt apud ipsum vera et apparentia bona. V ult enim sibi bona virtutis, quae 
sunt vera hom inis bona.”
375 Aquinas, De Virtutibus in Communi, q .l ,  a.9, resp.: “ ita quod ista dispositio superinducta, 
est quasi quaedam form a per modum naturae tendens in unum. Et propter hoc dicitur, quod consuetudo 
est altera natura”  (emphasis mine). Cf. idem, Disputed Question on the Virtues in General, a.9, resp.: 
“ This superim posed disposition is like a form tending to one in the manner o f  nature.That is w hy is it 
said that custom  is second nature.”
376 C f. Veritatis Splendor, 64: “ Such a connaturality is rooted in and develops through the 
virtuous attitudes o f  the individual himself: prudence and the other cardinal virtues, and even before 
these the theological virtues o f  faith, hope and charity. This is the meaning o f  Jesus’ saying: ‘ H e who 
does what is true com es to the light’ (Jn 3:21)” ; AAS 85 (1993), 1183: “Eiusm odi connaturalitas 
radicesit et eresit rectis in propositis ipsius hominis: prudentia ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus, et vel 
in primis virtutibus theologalibus fidei spei et caritatis” ; Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 40.
377 For exam ple M cCabe says that prudence “ cannot be exercised effectively  w ithout the 
infused virtues.”  See M cC abe, “ Virtue and Truth,”  169.
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o ffe re d  to  conscience b y  the v irtu e s  is  never com p le te ly  w ith o u t grace ,378 and such 
assistance reaches its  fu lln e ss  in  the con tex t o f  w here grace abounds.379
There  is  a danger, how ever, tha t w e m ig h t im ag ine  th a t th is  co n te x t o f  grace 
and g ro w th  in  in fu se d  v irtu e  is  fa r rem oved fro m  the re a lity  o f  o rd in a ry  life . Y e t the 
v irtu e s  o f  fa ith , hope and lo ve  “ are no t e n ig m a tica lly  conveyed”  to  us,380 lik e  som e 
b o lt fro m  the  b lue . R ather, they  “ flo w  fro m  the ve ry  hea rt o f  o rd in a ry  C h ris tia n  
liv in g  and the  sacram enta l life  o f  the pa rish .”  I t  is  the re fo re  in  the  co n te x t o f  “ o u r 
o rd in a ry  p rac tices  and places, [th a t] fa ith , hope, and love  becom e im bued  (se t up a 
hom e) in  the  depths o f  ou r consciences.”  Such an o rd in a ry  life  presents us w ith  
m any experiences, m ix in g  jo y  w ith  sorrow . A s V in c e n t T w o m e y re m in d s  us, o rd in a ry  
life  a lso in c lu d e s  “ dram a and tragedy (the passion and cross)”  w h ic h  m any peop le
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face w ith  “ re a l he ro ism  (re su rre c tio n )” . Such hero ism  is  a s ig n  n o t o n ly  o f  g ro w th
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in  v irtu e , b u t a lso a g ro w th  in  ho liness. I t  is  the re fo re  to  th is  life  o f  ho lin e ss  and its  
im p a c t upon  conscience th a t w e tu rn  ou r a tte n tio n  in  the fin a l chapter.
378 Thus Pieper affirms that “ in the Christian era there is no such thing as ‘purely natural 
virtue’ without actual reference to the order o f  grace.”  See Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 134.
379 Taking into account the origin o f  acts in the natural inclination o f  synderesis, Aquinas still 
says that a m eritorious act cannot be performed on the basis o f  “purely natural gifts”  alone. Indeed, to 
“ impute this to natural capability alone is the Pelagian impiety.” See Aquinas, De Veritate, q .16 , a .l ,  ad 
12: “N on autem sequitur ex hoc quod in opus meritorium homo ex puris naturalibus possit: hoc enim 
naturali facultati imputare solummodo, Pelagianae impietatis est” ; idem, Truth, q .16 , a .l ,  ad 12.
380 C f. James Keating and David M. M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness: The Ordering o f  M oral- 
M ystical L iv in g ,”  Communio 28 (2001): 820-42, at 835.
381 O ’M eara and Bouchard identify this transitory understanding o f  grace as a “ B aroque” 
theology o f  grace, w hich downplayed the “pervasive”  qualify o f  grace in human existence (where grace 
interacts w ith human nature and its capacities “ in an organic w ay” ) and em phasised the intervention o f  
actual grace in a m ore m echanistic manner, reflecting the mechanistic sacramental theology o f  the 
time. C f. O ’M eara, “ Virtues in the Theology o f  Thomas Aquinas,”  271; Charles E. Bouchard, 
“ R ecovering the G ifts o f  the H oly Spirit in M oral T heology,”  Theological Studies 63 (2002): 539-558, 
at 545-46.
382 K eating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness,”  835.
383 Ibid., 836. In this w ay, ordinary life within the Church supports the anamnesis o f  faith, or 
the Christian m em ory, which refers to our conscience as informed by our baptismal identify. C f. 
Ratzinger, “ I f  Y o u  W ant P eace... Conscience and Truth,”  94-95.
384 Tw om ey, “ M oral Renewal,”  228-229, n. 51.
385 Ibid. See also Pope Benedict’ s comments on everyday action and suffering as a setting for 
learning and practising hope, a hope which sustains the saints and martyrs. C f. Spe Salvi, 35-40.
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Chapter Six
Conscience and the Call to Holiness
1. Introduction
O ur la s t chap te r le d  us to  conclude th a t conscience flo u rish e s  in  the  co n te x t o f  v irtu e , 
b u t th a t the  v irtu e s  them selves o n ly  reach th e ir fu ll p o te n tia l in  the  co n te x t o f  grace, 
w h ic h  fu rth e r shapes these v irtu e s , and hence fu rth e r re fin e s  the  judgem en ts  o f  
consc ience .1 I t  is  the re fo re  appropria te  in  th is  fin a l chapter to  e xp lo re  e lem ents o f  th is  
co n te x t o f  grace, w h ic h  is  none o the r than the  liv e d  expression  o f  the  u n iv e rs a l c a ll to  
ho liness .2 In  w h a t w ays do w e liv e  ou t ou r c a ll to  ho liness and h o w  do these p ractices 
a ffe c t o u r m o ra l liv in g , b o th  in  the  fo rm a tio n  o f  v irtu e  and o f  o u r conscience? O nce 
again, g iv e n  the  lim ita tio n s  o f  th is  thesis, the  aspects d iscussed in  th is  chap te r w il l  n o t 
be dea lt w ith  in  any extensive  w ay. H ow ever, in  an a ttem pt to  a vo id  th e  sym ptom s o f  
fra g m e n ta tio n  (w h ic h  has a ffected  m o ra l theo log y, and w as d iscussed a t the  ou tse t o f  
th is  th e s is ), i t  is  necessary to  in c lu d e  at least some in d ic a tio n s  o f  the  k e y  e lem ents o f  
the  life  o f  h o lin e ss ,4 in  an a ttem pt to  p ro v id e  a cohesive  th e o ry  o f  C h ris tia n  
conscience, re fle c tin g  a life  o f  m o ra l and sp ritu a l in te g rity .5
1 Thom as Hibbs, “Imitatio Christi and the Foundation o f  A quinas’ s Ethics,”  Communio 18 
(1991): 556-573, at 569; “ The full import o f  the natural virtues, their pow er to inform  and aid in the 
perfection o f  human nature, can be had only from the perspective o f  grace.”
2 C f. Lumen Gentium, 39-42; AAS 57 (1965), 44-49. English text in Vatican Council II: The 
Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents (Flannery ed.), 396-402; CCC, no. 2013; L iv io  M elina, “ The 
C all to H oliness in the Catechism o f  the Catholic Church: The M orality and Spirituality o f  ‘L ife  in 
Christ’ ,”  trans. Robert Slesinski, Communio 21 (1994): 437-49.
3 C f. K eating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness,”  821. This question o f  how  w e live out our 
m oral-spiritual life  is important, in that it grounds our shaping o f  conscience and the Christian theory o f  
virtue ethics in the context o f  real life and real practice. This prevents our analysis o f  concepts 
remaining at an abstract level, since our focus is on development “ within a habitat,”  that is, within a life 
o f  holiness w ith its “ relationships, duties, and rule o f  living.”  Cf. ibid., 822.
4 C f. D avid  L. Schindler, “ Catholicity and the State o f  Contemporary Theology: The N eed for 
an O nto-logic o f  H oliness,”  Communio 14 (1987): 426-50, at 449: “ it seem s to me, [...] that the 
fragmentation in contemporary theology in fact signals a lack o f  holiness, that it can and must be 
redressed therefore only b y  a recovery o f  holiness.”
5 K eating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness,”  821.
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In  recen t decades, g ro w in g  in te res t has been p a id  to  the  ta sk  o f  re in te g ra tin g  
s p ir itu a lity  and m o ra lity . W h ile  S crip tu re , and p a tris tic  and e a rly  m e d ie va l w r itin g  
he ld  d o g m a tic , m o ra l and s p iritu a l them es toge the r fo r  the purposes o f  p re p a rin g  us 
“ fo r  a lo v in g  u n io n  w ith  G od,”  fro m  the M id d le  Ages onw ards, “ s p ir itu a l d o c trin e  
[becam e] less and less an in te g ra l p a rt o f  specu la tive  th e o lo g y ,”  s ince “ the  d ire c t goa l 
o f  th e o lo g iz in g  [w as] no lon g e r con tem p la tio n .” 6 S tephen R obson h ig h lig h ts  the  ro le  
o f  P eter A b e la rd  in  the  e a rly  stages o f  the separation o f  s p ir itu a lity  fro m  dog m a tic  and 
m o ra l issues. H is  desire  w as to  synthesize reason and fa ith , b u t h is  approach le d  
instead to  d iv o rc in g  th e o lo g y  fro m  s p ir itu a lity  th ro u g h  its  ra tio n a lis t th ru s t.7 B y  the 
la te  M id d le  A ges th is  separation resu lted  in  s p iritu a l m atters b e in g  d iscussed unde r 
separate ca tegories o f  m ys tica l th e o lo g y  and ascetica l th e o lo g y ,8 w h ile  a fu lly  d is tin c t 
m o ra l th e o lo g y  g rew  ou t o f  the m anuals fo r  confessors, in ve n te d  to  p ro v id e  gu idance 
fo r  the  con fessor and p ra c tica l so lu tions  to  pasto ra l p ro b le m s.9 E v e n tu a lly , the
6 R och K ereszty, “ Theology and Spirituality: The Task o f  Synthesis,”  Communio 10 (1983): 
314-332, at 3 16 -17  and 319. Cf. Stephen Robson, ‘With the Spirit and Power o f  Elijah' (Lk 1:17): The 
Prophetic-Reforming Spirituality o f  Bernard o f  Clairvaux as Evidenced Particularly in his Letters, 
Analecta Gregoriana, no. 293 (Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2004), 380: “ During 
the first m illennium  up to the age o f  Bernard, theology, morality and spirituality w ere all seen as part o f  
the same unified approach to the Christian life. Theory and practice were not separate categories, but 
were united in the com m on goal o f  seeking and follow ing Christ.”
7 Robson, ‘With the Spirit and Power o f  Elijah ’, 380. Robson’ s com m ent on theology requires 
the corrective o f  identifying the pastoral manuals as the theological form that filled  the gap concerning 
sin and practical solutions. C f. Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 257. Robson also states that the 
rationalism o f  the eighteenth century Enlightenment “ completed the divorce,”  leaving theology largely 
detached from  the practical concerns o f  ordinary people, and spirituality as some kind o f  “ faddish, 
superficial and unbalanced” exercise. See ibid. For fhrther comments on the Enlightenm ent and the 
separation betw een “ faith and reason, spirituality and morality, prayer and conscience,”  see Dennis J. 
B illy  and James F. Keating, Conscience and Prayer: The Spirit o f  Catholic Moral Theology 
(C ollegeville, M N : M ichael Glazier/Liturgical Press, 2001), 19.
8 In their revised m edieval forms (i.e. texts which no longer referred to any speculative 
theology), m ystical theology refers to the analysis o f  the phenomena o f  the spiritual life, such as 
m ystical states or visions, w hile ascetical theology deals with the means to spiritual perfection, “ with 
an emphasis on m oral struggle, mortification and spiritual exercises”  See K ereszty, “ T h eo lo gy and 
Spirituality,”  319. C f. Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, La vie selon l ’Esprit: Essai de théologie spirituelle 
selon saint Paul et saint Thomas d ’Aquin, A M A T E C A  Manuels de Théologie catholique, vol. 17, 2 
(Luxem bourg: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1996), 34; idem, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 255.
9 C f. K ereszty, “ Theology and Spirituality,”  319-20; Bouchard, “ R ecovering the G ifts o f  the 
H oly Spirit,”  543. Bouchard reminds us that Aquinas fought against this tide o f  separation, firm ly 
locating his m oral theology in the context o f  treatises on God, creation and Jesus Christ, and Pinckaers 
reminds us that St Francis de Sales also achieved some success in providing w orks that com bined
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approaches o f  m o ra l and a sce tica l/m ystica l th e o lo g y  sta rted  to  p u ll in  opposite  
d ire c tio n s , w ith  m a n u a lis tic  m o ra l th e o lo g y  focus ing  upon (m in im u m ) o b lig a tio n , o r 
th a t w h ic h  w as needed fo r  sa lva tio n ,10 w h ile  asce tica l/m ys tica l th e o lo g y  concentra ted  
upon  the  w a y  o f  p e rfe c tio n , lead ing  to  “ a tw o-c lass system ”  in  w h ic h  the  ex tra  
burdens o f  seeking  p e rfe c tio n  w ere the preserve o f  a s p iritu a l e lite .11
P inckaers p o in ts  o u t th a t th e o lo g y  loses “ its  v ita lity  and c re a tive  p o w e r”  w hen
• • •  10 • • •
i t  is  separated fro m  s p ir itu a lity  and pasto ra l care; a d im in ish e d  state w h ic h  shou ld
g ive  us cause to  re u n ite  these elem ents. N o w , fin a lly , a fte r m any cen tu ries,
theo log ians are b e g in n in g  to  address the question  o f  re in te g ra tio n , th o u g h  the  progress
is  s lo w e r than  m ig h t have been an tic ipa ted . W h ile  in it ia l a ttem pts w ere  m ade in  the
p e rio d  fo llo w in g  the Second W o rld  W ar, lead ing  up to  the Second V a tic a n  C o u n c il,
the ta sk  in  s t ill fa r fro m  com p le te .14 H ow ever, m ore re ce n tly , in  a d d itio n  to  the  w o rk
o f  w rite rs  lik e  Servais P inckaers, a m a jo r s h ift in  em phasis has been s ig n a lle d  b y  the
m o ra l sec tion  o f  the C atech ism  o f  the C a th o lic  C h u rc h  (P a rt T h ree ). H ere , the
p resen ta tio n  o f  C h ris tia n  m o ra lity  as “ L ife  in  C h ris t,”  is  unde rp in ned  b y  th e  idea  th a t
o u r vo c a tio n  is  to  life  in  the  S p ir it:15 a com m on c a llin g  to  h o lin e ss , expressed in
dogm atic, spiritual and practical teaching in a style that was accessible to all. See Bouchard, 
“ R ecovering the G ifts o f  the H oly Spirit,”  543; Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 256.
10 Com m enting on the manualistic tradition, Philippe Delhaye says there w as little place for 
the Spirit in its structure and outlook. Somewhat prophetically, drawing upon Lumen Gentium, D elhaye 
suggests that the universal call to holiness is the w ay foward for moral theology. See Ph. D elhaye, 
“ L ’Esprit Saint et la vie morale du chrétien,”  Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 45 (1969) 432- 
443, at 433-434.
11 C f. Bouchard, “ R ecovering the Gifts o f  the H oly Spirit,”  548; Pinckaers, Sources o f  
Christian Ethics, 256-57: “ The counsels were supplementary [to the precepts] and dealt with 
superogatory [sic\ actions left to each individual’ s free initiative. B y  this very  fact, they w ere reserved 
to the chosen few  who sought perfection.”
12 Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 258.
13 Prime examples o f  this in the field o f  moral theology are Haring’ s Law o f  Christ, w hich 
sought a more scriptural and christocentric approach, and Gillem an’ s The Primacy o f  Charity in Moral 
Theology, w hich sought to bring moral theology and ascetical/mystical theology together through the 
interpretive k ey  o f  charity.
14 K ereszty, “ T heology and Spirituality,”  314.
15 CCC, no. 1699: “ L ife  in the Spirit fulfils the vocation o f  man.”
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c h a rity  and s o lid a rity , ordered to  beatitude b y  the  B ea titudes, and ro o te d  in  o u r 
b e ing  created in  G od ’ s im age and likeness.18 T here fo re , i t  is  in  re co g n is in g  th a t a ll 
C h ris tia n  m o ra l endeavour is  sustained b y  the grace o f  the  S p ir it19 w e rea lise  th a t o u r 
actions re fle c t a c a ll to  ho liness. T h is  ra d ic a lly  changes the  pe rspective  o f  m o ra l 
th e o lo g y ,21 m o v in g  i t  fro m  fo cu s in g  on a s ta tic  com p liance  w ith  o b lig a tio n , o r even 
fro m  the  d yn a m ic  o f  hum an g ro w th  in  an im persona l th e o ry  o f  v irtu e , to  th e  true
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g round  o f  v irtu e  o r pe rfec ted  a b ility : a dynam ic, personal re la tio n s h ip  w ith  G od. I t  is  
in  th is  co n te x t th a t w e recogn ise th a t the s tirrin g s  o f  conscience are in tim a te ly  lin k e d
7^
to  the  p ro m p tin g s  o f  the  H o ly  S p irit, and th a t w e are thus ca lle d  to  be d o c ile  to  h im .
F ro m  th is  p o in t o f  v ie w  m o ra lity  and m ora l th e o lo g y  re c la im  the  n o tio n  o f  the  
“ w a y  o f  p e rfe c tio n ”  as a w ay o f  life  fo r a ll, ra ther than  fo r  som e s p iritu a l e lite . M e lin a  
p o in ts  o u t th a t the  w ay o f  p e rfe c tio n  expressed in  m o ra l a c tio n  is  “ the  response to  a 
g ra tu ito u s  c a ll to  rea lise  the  im age o f  G od in  us,”  24 the  im age o f  th e  G od w h o  is  lo ve .
16 CCC, nos. 1695, 1828, 193 9,2 0 13, at 1695: ‘“ sanctified ... [and] called to be saints’ , 
Christians have becom e the temple o f  the Holy Spirit. This ‘ Spirit o f  the Son ’ teaches them to pray to 
the Father and, having becom e their life, prompts them to act so as to bear the ‘ fruit o f  the Spirit’ by 
charity in action”  (emphasis and parenthesis in text). Cf. 1 C or 6:19.
17 CCC, nos. 1716-172 4.
18 C C C , nos. 1701-1709.
19 M elina, “ The C all to Holiness,”  443: The primacy o f  grace and o f  the gospel does not annul 
m orality and does not render human effort superfluous, but rather encourages and sustains it.”
20 Ibid., 439: “ B efore there is moral action, before there is a free response o f  the Christian, 
there is the recognition o f  a gift that constitutes his [or her] very dignity. B ut this dignity is the dignity 
o f  a call: ‘ [...] called to be saints’ .”  V o n  Balthasar also recognises the call to holiness as the m eaning o f  
Christian life and o f  moral theology, but allies it with the call to mission. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
“ T heology and Holiness,”  trans. Peter Verhalen, Communio 14 (1987): 341-50, at 344-45: “ The Spirit 
that has been bestow ed on the Church is the Spirit o f  both sanctification and mission. E veryone who 
counts h im self as a member o f  the Church o f  Christ must in his particular w ay be both saint and 
witness. [...] It is at the same time clear that when Christians are called ‘ saints,’ they are all such 
prim arily through G od and his sacraments, but immediately afterwards through their lives w hich reflect 
this.”  C f. Hans Urs von Balthasar, “ Editorial: Sanctity, Crisis, Theological R enew al,”  Communio 14 
(1987): 340.
21 Tw om ey, “ M oral Renew al,”  228: “holiness [is] the ultimate object o f  m orality. [...] A ll  
m orality is finally measured b y that goal.”
22 See Gillem an, The Primacy o f  Charity in Moral Theology, 154: “ M oral doctrine should 
present each action as an inchoate personal relation with men and with G od, as an answer to a call 
adressed to me alone. This is to replace the hard mask o f  the law  with a livin g face.”
23 See Tw om ey, “ M oral Renew al,”  229.
24 M elina, “ The C all to Holiness,”  439. M elina also points out that as the w ay  o f  perfection is 
based on the understanding o f  our being made in the image o f  God, moral life described in terms o f  a 
w ay o f  perfection “ im plies a strict relationship between morality and dogmatics, on the one hand, and
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I t  is  a lso an expression  o f  o u r desire to  m ode l ourse lves on  C h ris t.25 T hus, ou r 
re la tio n s h ip  w ith  G od de fines o u r understanding o f  m o ra l a c tio n : a c a ll to  p e rfe c tio n  
(s tr iv in g  to  g ro w  in  lo ve  and o the r v irtu e s ), re fle c tiv e  o f  the  c a ll to  “ B e p e rfe c t, 
the re fo re , as y o u r heaven ly  F ather is  pe rfec t”  (M t 5 :48 ), and the  c a ll to  h o lin e ss , in  
keep ing  w ith  the  c a ll to  “ be h o ly , fo r I  the L o rd  yo u r G od am  h o ly ”  (L e v  1 9 :2 ).26 O f
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course, such a vo c a tio n  does n o t ignore  hum an fra ilty  and s in fu ln e ss , b u t n e ith e r
. . .  • • 78 . .
does i t  reduce m o ra lity  to  a de fea tis t p o s itio n  o f  the bare m in im u m . R a ther, i t  in v ite s  
us to  g ro w  in  the  co n te x t o f  grace and m ercy, in  u n io n  w ith  C h ris t and im ita tio n  o f  
h im .29
with spirituality, on the other.”  See ibid., 439 (emphasis in text). For a historical review  and discourse 
on the importance o f  ‘ image o f  G od ’ in theology, see Servais Pinckaers, “ Ethics and the Im age o f  
G od,”  trans. Sr M ary Thom as N oble and Craig Steven Titus, in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing 
Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven Titus (W ashington, D C : Catholic 
U niversity o f  A m erica Press, 2005), 130-43.
25 C f. Lumen Gentium, 40: “ The Lord Jesus, divine teacher and m odel o f  all perfection, 
preached holiness o f  life [...] to each and every one o f  his disciples without distinction: ‘Y o u , therefore, 
must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Mt. 5:48). [...] It is therefore quite clear that all 
Christians in any state or w alk o f  life are called to the fullness o f  Christian life  and to the perfection o f  
love, and b y  this holiness a more human manner o f  life is fostered also in earthly society” (trans. from 
Flannery edition); AAS 57 (1965), 44: “ Omnis perfectionis divinus M agister et Exem plar, Dom inus 
Iesus, sanctitatem vitae, [...], omnibus et singulis discipulis suis cuiuscumque conditionis praedicavit: 
‘ Estote ergo vos perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est’ (Matth. 5, 48). [...] Cunctis 
proinde perspicuum  est, omnes christifideles cuiuscumque status vel ordinis ad vitae christianae 
plenitudinem et caritatis perfectionem  vocari, qua sanctitate, in societate quoque terrena, hum anior 
vivendi modus prom ovetur.”
26 Such perfection is ultim ately the perfection o f  love, which is the union o f  the soul w ith God. 
See footnote 42 o f  this chapter.
27 The discussion o f  perfection made here should be understood as incorporating previous 
comments on perfection made in earlier chapters, with particular reference to those w ho m ight 
misunderstand the term as demanding the impossible. Keating and M cC arthy also warn that 
perfectionism  can be seen as an “ attempt to gain God through our goodness.”  H ow ever, this w ould be 
putting the cart before the horse, since it is the desire for G od which prompts the goodness. See 
K eating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness,”  837. Properly understood, and liberated from  Pelagian or 
oppressive notions o f  immediate and unaided perfection, the w ay o f  perfection is sim ply a w a y  o f  
growth in virtue, centred upon Christ, and sustained by the Spirit.
28 Veritatis Splendor, 15: “Jesus brings G od’s commandments to fulfilment, particularly the 
commandment o f  love o f  neighbour [...]. Jesus shows that the commandments must not be understood 
as a minimum lim it not to be gone beyond, but rather a path involving a m oral and spiritual journey 
towards perfection, at the heart o f  w hich is love (cf. Col 3:14)”  (emphasis in text). C f. AAS 85 (1993),
1145: “ Iesus ad plenitudinem adducit mandata Dei, praesertim mandatum amoris proxim i [...]. Iesus 
ostendit mandata haberi non posse terminum minimum non praetereundum, sed potius semitam quae 
patet ad morale spiritaleque perfectionis iter, cuius anima est amor (cf. Col 3 :14).”
29 W hile acknow ledging its difficulties, the call to perfection is a vocation to be what w e 
already are -  it is a call to truth or authenticity. C f. Melina, “ The Call to H oliness,”  447; K eating and 
M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  H oliness,”  839: “ The beauty o f  the good is known through the particular
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Such a w ay o f  p e rfe c tio n  is  fa r fro m  easy, p a rtic u la rly  w hen  w e rem em ber th a t 
w e are cha lleng ed  b o th  fro m  w ith in  and fro m  w ith o u t. A s  w e ll as h a v in g  to  face  the  
re a lity  o f  o u r o w n  concup iscen t nature, w e liv e  in  a so c ie ty  w h ic h  at tim e s  operates 
a cco rd ing  to  d iffe re n t va lues, and expects us to  accept o r cooperate w ith  these
O A
va lues. T he re fo re , one cannot avo id  the fa c t th a t C h ris tia n  m o ra lity  in v o lv e s  an
Q 1
e lem ent o f  “ s tru g g le ” . Indeed the C atech ism  states tha t:
The w a y  o f  p e rfe c tio n  passes b y  w ay o f  the C ross. T here is  no ho liness  
w ith o u t re n u n c ia tio n  and s p iritu a l ba ttle . S p iritu a l p rogress e n ta ils  the  
ascesis and m o rtific a tio n  tha t g ra d u a lly  lead to  liv in g  in  the  peace and jo y  
o f  the  B ea titudes (C C C , no. 2015).
T h is  passage id e n tifie s  the  e ffo rt in v o lv e d  in  s p iritu a l progress. H o w e ve r, th is
shou ld  be understood in  the  co n te x t o f  seeing s p ir itu a lity  and m o ra lity  as in te rre la te d .
T hus, w e are le d  to  understand th a t ou r s p iritu a l a n d  m o ra l deve lop m e n t is  n o t
ach ieved w ith o u t s trugg le , w ith o u t the cross. T h is  also im p lie s  th a t o u r conscience  is
necessa rily  fo rm e d  and deve loped th rough  the experience o f  the  cross o r th ro u g h  a
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process o f  p u rific a tio n , kn o w n  as ascesis.
2. Ascesis —A Purification of Intent
C hapter F ive  saw  us encoun ter such unpopu la r o r un fash ionab le  te rm s as ‘ v ir tu e ’ and 
‘p rudence ’ . O nce aga in , w e seem to  have a rrive d  at a n o tio n  w h ic h  has la rg e ly  gone 
o u t o f  fa v o u r, ye t s t ill “ aw akens resentm ent”  th ro u g h  a m isunde rs tan d ing  o f  its  
s ig n ifica n ce . A scesis  o r ascetic ism  m ig h t be m isunderstood  as s im p ly  a d e n ia l o f
judgm ent and act, when the simple act is marked by and resonates with the greater truthfulness o f  our 
lives.”
30 Keating and M cCarthy sum this up as the “ public-private dilem m a and the divided self.”  C f. 
K eating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness,”  831.
31 M elina, “ The C all to Holiness,”  447; Keating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  H oliness,”  841.
32 The difference here between ascesis as moral struggle or spiritual com bat in a separate 
ascetical theology and ascesis in the context o f  an integrated morality and spirituality is that in the 
latter case ascesis is no longer supererogatory, but an essential part o f  Christian morality.
33 Guardini, Learning the Virtues, 85.
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sensual p leasure  fo r  s p iritu a l ga in . I t  is  true  th a t ascesis  in v o lv e s  s e lf-c o n tro l o f  ou r 
basic urges (and  hence in v o lv e s  the v irtu e  o f  tem perance), so th a t th e y  do n o t fa ll in to  
h a rm fu l excess o r p e rve rs io n .34 H ow ever, to  lim it  o u r unde rstand ing  o f  ascesis  to  an 
o rd e rin g  o f  p h y s ic a l urges w o u ld  o ve rlo o k  its  re ference to  o u r “ m en ta l and s p iritu a l 
urges,”  such as the desire  fo r  pow er, esteem, know ledge  o r freedom , a ll o f  w h ic h  can 
also ru n  to  an excess th a t is  h a rm fu l to  ourselves and to  o the rs .35 T h e re fo re , ascesis  
touches a ll aspects o f  hum an existence, because i t  is  an approach to  life  th a t concerns 
its  o rd e rin g . Indeed , d ra w in g  fro m  its  G reek o rig in s , the w o rd  m eans “ p ra c tice  and 
exerc ise ,”  and hence “ exercise in  the p roper d ire c tin g  o f  one ’ s life .” 36 H ence, ascesis  
is  n o t som e k in d  o f  “ con tem p t fo r the body” 37 o r se lf-h a tre d .38 H o w e ve r, H e n ri de 
Lubac p o in ts  o u t th a t n e ith e r is  C h ris tia n  ascetic ism  s im p ly  “ som e so rt o f  tra in in g  
im posed on  o u r hum an nature  to  enable i t  to  p e rfo rm  ce rta in  fea ts in  its  o w n  o rd e r.” 39 
R ather, C h ris tia n  ascesis  is  “ the ind ispensable co n d itio n  fo r re a liz a tio n  o f  the  u n io n  o f  
[...] tw o  incom m ensurab les: G od and m an.” 40 A s such, ascesis  fo rm s an essen tia l and
34 Ibid., 85-89.
35 Ibid., 89.
36 Ibid., 88. Pinckaers points out that the term askesis was originally attached to the methodic 
exercises used in the physical training o f  athletes and soldiers. Cf. Pinckaers, La Vie Selon L ’Esprit, 
235.
37 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 83. This contempt has dualist roots. C f. Pinckaers, La Vie 
Selon L 'Esprit, 237.
38 Hugh Connolly, Sin (London and N ew  York: Continuum, 2002), 137-38: “ Seen in this w ay 
[that is, the involvem ent o f  the whole s e lf  in the process o f  conversion], asceticism  is not at all about 
self-hatred, still less is it about personal feats o f  endurance or showing ‘ what one can do for G o d ’ . 
Spiritual ‘m achism o’ can have no genuine point o f  contact with a gospel o f  hum ility and truth.”
39 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 83.
40 Ibid.
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“ unceasing” 41 p a rt o f  the  life  o f  grace, w ith  its  purpose ce n trin g  upon  o u r graced 
tra n s fo rm a tio n  to  enable o u r u n io n  w ith  G od.42
T h is  tra n s fo rm a tio n  re fle c ts  a response to  the  new  s e lf o r n ew  c re a tio n  w e 
becam e in  bap tism , w h ic h  conta ins the o n to lo g ica l im p e ra tive  (o u r c a llin g ) to  liv e  a 
life  in  keep ing  w ith  ou r redeem ed nature, in  keep ing  w ith  o u r res to red  likeness to  
G od.43 I t  is  the  s trip p in g  o f  the o ld  s e lf fo r  the  purposes o f  b e in g  c lo th e d  anew  fo r  
ho liness o f  life  w h ic h  constitu tes the purpose o f  ascesis.44 T he re fo re , ascesis  is  a 
process o f  p u rific a tio n , o r pu rga tion , as i t  has been ca lle d  in  the  h is to ry  o f  
s p ir itu a lity .45 The p a in fu l nature o f  the process o f  p u rific a tio n  re fle c ts  th e  fa c t th a t i t  
deals w ith  the  re a lity  o f  ou r s in fu l live s , ra the r than  d e a lin g  w ith  som e abstract
41 Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, 66. Cf. John Paul II, Post-Synodal A postolic 
Exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1984), 4: “ In this sense, 
penance  means, in the Christian theological and spiritual vocabulary, asceticism, that is to say the 
concrete daily effort o f  a person, supported by G od’ s grace, to lose his or her ow n life for Christ, as the 
only means o f  gaining it”  (emphasis in text); AAS 77 (1985): 191: “ Secundum hunc sensum  paenitentia 
in sermone christiano theologico et spirituali ascesin significat, id est nisum concretum et cotidianum 
hominis, gratia D ei suffulti, eo pertinentem ut is vitam suam propter Christum perdat, qui unicus sit 
modus ut earn in ven iaf ’ (emphasis in text).
42 This transformation is the necessary beginning o f  that which w ill reach its fulfilm ent at the 
Parousia (Phil 3:20-21). See D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 82-83. C f. St John o f  the Cross, The Dark 
Night o f  the Soul, in The Collected Works o f  St. John o f  the Cross, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and O tilio 
R odriguez (W ashington, D C : IC S Publications, 1979), II, 3, 3 (page 333): “ perfection, [...] is the union 
o f  the soul w ith G od.”
43 For exam ple, see Eph 4:22-24: “ Y o u  were taught to put aw ay your form er w ay  o f  life, your 
old self, corrupt and deluded by its lusts, and to be renewed in the spirit o f  your minds, and to clothe 
yourselves w ith the new self, created according to the likeness o f  G od in true righteousness and 
holiness.”  The Orthodox writer Paul Evdokim ov considers asceticism  to be fundamental to the moral- 
spiritual life (a unity which he believes should not be severed) as the foundation for the restoration o f  
the beauty our lives as im ages o f  G od and the transfiguration, or divinisation, o f  our lives (theosis). See 
Christopher P. K lofft, “ Gender and the Process o f  M oral Developm ent in the Thought o f  Paul 
E vdokim ov,”  Theological Studies 66 (2005): 69-95, at 76-77, 87 and 89-92. C f. Dumitru Staniloae, 
“ Image, Likeness, and D eification in the Human Person,”  Communio 13 (1986): 64-83; St John 
Dam ascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12, PG 94, 919-920B. Here John Dam ascene talks o f  our being 
made in G od ’ s im age as referring to our mind and freedom o f  choice, and being made in his likeness as 
relating to “the greatest possible similitude in virtue.”  Translation in Staniloae, “ Image, Likeness, and 
D eification,”  73. See also Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 47, 83.
44 John o f  the Cross, The Dark Night o f  the Soul, II, 3, 3 (page 333). John o f  the C ro ss’ s text 
focuses on G o d ’ s activity. G od strips us o f  our old self. He “ divests the faculties, affections, and 
senses,”  to leave “ the intellect in darkness, the w ill in aridity, the mem ory in emptiness, and the 
affections in supreme affliction,”  to refashion us and draw us into closer union with him. This passage 
is helpful in that it indicates the ascesis is far from a one-sided practice, where w e becom e h oly  purely 
by our own efforts. Rather prim arily we become holier b y  giving G od the occasion to w ork in us.
45 Traditionally the three w ays o f  spiritual progress have been classified as the purgative, 
illum inative and unitive, where w e are purified and enlightened in order to reach union w ith God. Cf. 
Dennis J. B illy  and James K eating, The Way o f  Mystery: The Eucharist and Moral Living (N ew  Y o rk  
and M ahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2006), 85-92.
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c o lle c tio n  o f  fla w s .46 Thus, in  th is  pu rg a tio n  w e re fle c t p ra y e rfu lly  upon  the  state o f  
o u r life  and ask fo r  the  grace to  change, so th a t w e m ay m ore re a d ily  choose G o d ’ s 
w ays. In  the  p ra c tice  o f  ascesis  w e also open ourse lves to  G od ’ s grace so th a t ou r 
though ts  and desires are n o t c louded w ith  lo g is m o i (bad th o u g h ts ).47 W ith o u t the 
p ra c tice  o f  ascesis  th ro u g h  p raye r and action  (such as a lm s g iv in g  o r fa s tin g ), w e leave 
ourse lves open to  se lf-d e ce p tio n  and to  m ora l to rp itu d e , w he reby o u r conscience  is 
d u lle d  o r duped b y  a fa lse  appra isa l o f  o u r actions.48 A s  a re su lt, ce n tra l to  ascesis  is  
the  p u rific a tio n  o f  in te n t and a p u rity  o f  heart: “ p u r ify  y o u r hearts, y o u  doub le - 
m inded ”  (Jam es 4 :8 ).49 Ascesis  g ives us the  c la r ity  to  ju d g e  th e  tru e  va lu e  o f  th in g s  
(c f. 1 C o r 2 :1 5 ), and, in  the  face o f  com peting  cho ices,50 to  surrender o th e r th in g s  in
46 B illy  and Keating, The Way o f  Mystery, 87.
47 The eight logismoi o f  the desert fathers, first codified by Evagrius o f  Pontus, w ere the 
traditional list o f  distracting, tempting thoughts, or states o f  mind, that, i f  entertained, draw us aw ay 
from G od and lead to sinful action. (They also formed the basis o f  Pope St G regory the G reat’ s list o f  
seven deadly sins.) The logismoi are gluttony, fornication, avarice, sadness (self-pity), anger, acedia  
(radical bordedom), vain glory and pride. Cf. Evagrius o f  Pontus, On the Eight Thoughts, in The Greek 
Ascetic Corpus, trans. w ith introduction and commentary b y  Robert E. Sinkew icz (O xford: O xford 
University Press, 2003; paperback ed., 2006), 66-90; Andrew Nugent, The Slow-Release Miracle: A 
Spirituality fo r  a Lifetime (Dublin: Columba Press, 2006), 25-37; Benedict X V I, Address In 
Inauguratione Anni Academici Pontificiorum Athenaeorum in Urbe (23 October 2006), A AS 98 (2006), 
8 17-19 , at 818: “ II pensiero ha sempre bisogno di purificazione per poter entrare nella dim ensione in 
cui D io pronuncia la sua Parola creatrice e redentrice”  [“ Thought alw ays needs purification to be able 
to enter into the dim ension in w hich God pronounces his creative and redemptive W ord” ].
48 C f. Evagrius o f  Pontus, To Eulogios: On the Confession o f  Thoughts and Counsel in their 
Regard, in The Greek Ascetic Corpus, X X , 21 (p. 47): “ Y o u r conscience bears witness for you: do not 
give it up to a thought that treats your fault lightly and coats it w ith honeyed words” ; ibid., X IV , 13 (p. 
40) [on the effects o f  pride over ascetic achievement]: “their soul’ s conscience w as tom  apart, the 
disease o f  fame spread abroad.”  For insightful comments on the effects o f  acedia, or sloth as it cam e to 
be known, see Kenneth R. Himes, “ The Formation o f  Conscience: The Sin o f  Sloth and the Signficance 
o f  Spirituality,”  in Spirituality and Moral Theology: Essays from a Pastoral Perspective, ed. James 
Keating (N ew  Y o rk  and M ahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2000), 59-80, at 65: “ Sloth permits the vo ice  o f  
conscience to be muted so that the moral quest for goodness ceases.”  Far from  sim ply being laziness, 
acedia  or sloth is a ‘“ hardening o f  the heart, a developing indifference to the good.”  Ibid. Aquinas 
called acedia  a disgust or boredom for action, and a sadness concerning the spiritual good, o f  w hich 
charity rejoices. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ha Ilae, q.35, a.2, resp. C f. Jean-Charles Nault, 
“ Accidia: Taedium Operandi e Tristitia de Bono Divino,” in La ‘Sequela Christi’: Dimensione Morale 
e Spirituale dell’Esperienza Cristiana, ed. L ivio  M elina and O livier Bonnew ijn (Rome: Lateran 
U niversity Press, 2003), 161-75 , at 165-69.
49 On ‘purity o f  heart’ in relation to love o f  G od and neighbour, see John Cassian,
Conferences, trans. and preface by Colm  Lubheid (N ew  Y o rk  and M ahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), I, 
5-7 (pages 40-42).
50 Guardini, Learning the Virtues, 92: “ Plainly, w e cannot have everything at the same time; 
w e must choose, must surrender one thing in order that the other can come to pass.”
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orde r to  ga in  w h a t is  desired .51 P u rity  o f  in te n t o r p u rity  o f  hea rt focuses us upon  
fo llo w in g  the  L o rd  and seeking to  do th ings  w h ic h  lead us to  h im . In  th is  w a y , ascesis  
fo rm s an essentia l p a rt o f  ou r graced tra n s fo rm a tio n  so th a t o u r m in d s  are renew ed, 
enab lin g  us to  “ d isce rn  w h a t is the w ill o f  G od”  (R om  12 :2 ).52
3. Conscience and Prayer
F undam enta l to  th is  renew a l o f  ou r m inds, and hence the  renew a l o f  o u r consciences, 
is  the p ra c tice  o f  p raye r. I f  ascesis in  general is  the p ra c tice  o f  o rd e rin g  o u r liv e s  to  
G od ’ s w ill,  p ra ye r is  b o th  the  env ironm en t and source o f  d ire c tio n  o f  th is  re -o rd e rin g . 
W ith  regard  to  m o ra l liv in g , the re fo re , p raye r is  n o t s im p ly  a step in  the  process o f  
m o ra l-s p iritu a l deve lopm ent, o r a p rim a ry  stage in  e th ica l d e lib e ra tio n , b u t ra th e r, i f
• • 53p ro p e rly  undersood, the  e x is te n tia l con tex t o f  ou r m o ra l judgem en ts and cho ices, the 
fire  th a t e n livens o u r m o ra lity  and prevents i t  fro m  be ing  “ tw is te d  in to  p h a risa ism .” 54 
In  th is  co n te x t, each o f  us “ decides as a p ra y e rfu l b e lie ve r in  C h ris t.” 55 P raye r is  ou r 
encoun ter w ith  the  T riu n e  G od th rough  “ lo v in g  fa m ilia r ity ”  w ith  h is  W o rd ,56 th ro u g h
51 See the conclusion to St Ignatius’ s Principle and Foundation: “ I ought to desire and elect 
only the thing w hich is more conducive to the end for which I am created.”  C f. Ignatius o f  L oyola, 
Spiritual Exercises, no. 23 (page 130).
52 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 82.
53 James Keating warns against the reduction o f  the role o f  prayer “ in m oral livin g and 
deliberation” to “ a step in a process,”  or to “ a benediction preceding one’ s independent ethical 
deliberation.” From this point o f  view , prayer w ill have little or no effect on one’ s conscience, as it has 
been compartmentalised. He gives the example o f  saying grace before a political luncheon, where the 
influence o f  prayer on ethical discussion is reduced to a “ nod to religion.” Cf. James Keating, “ The 
Conscience Imperative as Prayer,”  Irish Theological Quarterly 63 (1998): 65-89, at 65.
54 Hans Urs von  Balthasar, Prayer, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1986), 22: “ what is essential is that incandescent center which is the very heart and source o f  m orality, 
and without w hich it w ould  very sw iftly grow cold and become twisted into pharisaism. The vital thing 
is the livin g encounter w ith the G od who speaks to us in his W ord, whose eyes pierce and purify us 
Tike a flam e o f  fire ’ (R ev 1:14 ).”
55 K eating, “ The Conscience Imperative as Prayer,”  66.
56 Benedict X V I, In Inauguratione Anni Academici, AAS 98 (2006), 818: “ Tale ascesi si basa 
sulla fam iliarità am orosa con la Parola di D io e direi prima ancora con quel ‘ silen zio ’ da cui la Parola 
prende origine nel dialogo d ’ amore tra il Padre e il Figlio nello Spirito Santo” , [“ Such ascesis is based 
on loving fam iliarity w ith the W ord o f  God and, I would say even before that, w ith that ‘ silen ce’ from 
w hich the W ord takes its origin in the dialogue o f  love between the Father and the Son in the H oly 
Spirit” ]. C f. Sergio Bastianel, Prayer in Christian Moral Life, trans. Bernard H oose (M iddlegreen, 
Slough and N airobi, Kenya: St Paul Publications: 1988), 80.
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sacram ents, and th ro u g h  the s tillness o f  p riva te  m e d ita tio n . T h o u g h  the re  are 
d iffe re n t fo rm s  and purposes o f  prayer, va ry in g  fro m  p e titio n  to  a d o ra tio n ,58 in  o rde r 
fo r p raye r to  be a tru e  d ia logu e ,59 a ll fo rm s o f  C h ris tia n  p raye r need som e e lem en t o f  
silence  and an a ttitu d e  o f  lis te n in g , so th a t w e are recep tive  to  w h a t G od is  say ing  to  
us: “ O  th a t to d a y  yo u  w o u ld  lis te n  to  h is  vo ice ! H arden n o t y o u r hea rts”  (Ps 94 
[9 5 ]:8 ).60
the communal worship of the Church, particularly in the Eucharist and other
3.1 Conscience and Prayer as Listening
T h is  a ttitu d e  o f  lis te n in g  is  fundam enta l to  the fo rm in g  o f  the  C h ris tia n  conscience . 
Such lis te n in g  to  G od in  p rayer, how ever, is  n o t s im p ly  h e a rin g  w h a t is  sa id , b u t 
lis te n in g  to  h is  W o rd  re ce p tive ly , 1 des iring  to  p u t i t  in to  p ra c tice  (Jam es 1 :22 -25 ), 
d e s irin g  th a t is  m ay to  tra n s fo rm  o u r m inds and actions. C le a rly , such a p ra y e rfu l 
encounter o f  a c tive , “ ra p t lis te n in g ”  can o n ly  be m ade in  h u m ility  and d o c ility  to
— /TO
G od. Loca ted  in  th is  env ironm en t o f  p ra y e rfu l d o c ility , the  fo rm a tio n  o f  C h ris tia n
57 C f. M elina, Sharing Christ’s Virtues, 152-54; B illy  and Keating, The Way o f  Mystery, 60- 
84, at 79: “ Out o f  the silence o f  communion, we hear the call to live the moral life  within culture, and 
w e go forth from  worship to do the truth.”
58 Pinckaers, La vie selon l ’Esprit, 225.
59 Cf. James Keating, “ Prayer and Ethics in the Thought o f  Hans Urs von  Balthasar,”  Irish 
Theological Quarterly 62 (1996/97): 29-37, at 30. V on  Balthasar highlights that the dialogue begins 
with G od speaking to us through his Word; we listen to him and then respond. Therefore, prayer is not 
“ a w eak isolated cry to an unknown God,”  but arises out o f  a “ context o f  trust”  as a “ response to a 
merciful divine presence w ho knows us and invites us into intimacy.”  See ibid., 30, 32-33.
60 C f. B illy  and Keating, Conscience and Prayer, 57. The translation o f  Psalm  94 [95] used 
here is the 1963 G rail version. Its only difference from the N R S V  is a more poetic word-order. I have 
used it here, as it is the version used for prayer in liturgies.
61 C f. B illy  and Keating, Conscience and Prayer, 56-57; CCC, no. 1785: “ In the form ation o f  
conscience the W ord o f  G od is the light for our path; w e must assimilate it in faith and prayer, and put 
it into practice” . Pinckaers says conscience is “ enlightened” by the Word o f  God. See Pinckaers, La vie 
selon l ’Esprit, 224: “ la conscience, éclairée par sa Parole.”
62 For V o n  Balthasar, this attitude o f  rapt listening is related to obedience to G od and to his 
W ord, epitom ised in M ary, the M other o f  God. Cf. Keating, “ Prayer and Ethics in the Thought o f  Hans 
Urs von Balthasar,”  33-35; V on  Balthasar, Prayer, 22, 29-31.
63 B illy  and K eating, Conscience and Prayer, 57; B illy and Keating, The Way o f  Mystery, 70. 
V on  Balthasar considers docility before Christ, the W ord, to be the “ original w ellspring o f  all Christian 
life and prayer.”  See V on  Balthasar, Prayer, 30-31, at 31. Cf. Keating, “ Prayer and Ethics in the 
Thought o f  Hans Urs von Balthasar,”  34.
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conscience th e re fo re  becom es a m atte r o f  re la tio n sh ip  (o u r f i l ia l re la tio n s h ip  as 
adopted sons and daughters o f  G od, as co -he irs w ith  C h ris t),64 ra the r than  s im p ly  the 
g a the ring  o f  ru le s  and com p liance  to  “ ce rta in  a lle g e d ly  C h ris tia n  p rin c ip le s .” 65 Thus, 
V o n  B a lthasa r states th a t, “ in  so fa r as w e are C hris tians , o u r consciences m u st a lw ays 
lis te n  fo r  and rem a in  open to  the H o ly  S p irit o f  C h ris t, w h ich , free  and u n re s tric te d , 
ru les in  and o ve r us.” 66
In  th is  a ttitu d e  o f  d o c ile , receptive  lis te n in g , the person seeks the  v o ic e  o f  G od 
(c f. 1 [3 ] K in g s  19:12 [V u lg a te ]; Ps 3 :4 ; 25 :4 -5 ). L ike w ise , th e re fo re , conscience is  
ca lle d  th ro u g h  p ra ye r to  go beyond its e lf and seek G od ’ s v o ic e .67 The d e s c rip tio n  o f  
‘ vo ice  o f  G o d ’ in  re la tio n  to  conscience is  a p o w e rfu l one, and m ade p o p u la r in  recent 
tim es th ro u g h  the in flu e n ce  o f  the w ritin g  o f  John H e n ry  N ew m an, b u t i t  is  a n o tio n  
th a t a lso  b rin g s  its  o w n  prob lem s, i f  taken too  lite ra lly . W e m ust be c a re fu l th a t the 
idea is  n o t o v e rs im p lifie d  o r m is in te rp re ted , in  such a w ay as i t  is  understood  as som e
64 C f. Réal Trem blay, “Una Antropologia Filiale: Cosa Significa?” , in L ’Antropologia della 
Teologia Morale secondo L'Enciclica “Veritatis Splendor": Atti del Simposio promosso dalla 
Congregazione p er la Dottrina della Fede, Roma, settembre 2003 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 2006), 57-72.
65 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Who is a Christian?, trans. John Cum m ing (W estm inster, M D : 
N ewm an, 1967), 86. C f. Keating, “ Prayer and Ethics in the Thought o f  Hans Urs von Balthasar,”  34.
66 V on  Balthasar, Who is a Christian?, 86. Cf. Keating, “ Prayer and Ethics in the Thought o f  
Hans Urs von Balthasar,”  34.
67 Veritatis Splendor, 58: ‘“ M oral conscience does not close man within an insurmountable 
and impenetrable solitude, but opens him to the call, to the voice o f  G od ’” ; AAS 85 (1993), 1180: 
“ Conscientia m oralis non in solitudine insuperabili et impenetrabili includit hominem, sed vocationi 
aperit vocique D ei.”  Quotation taken from John Paul II, Address La Conscienza Morale è il Luogo del 
Dialogo di Dio con l ’Uomo (General Audience, 17 August 1983) in Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo 
II, voi. 6, part 2: 1983 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983), 2 (page 256).
6 N ew m an clearly uses “ voice” to describe G od ’ s communication and com m and, made 
known particularly through conscience, leading him also to call conscience the “ vo ice  o f  G od .” 
H owever, w hile m aintaining the idea o f  G od ’s presence and guidance, the notion is not to be taken as a 
direct auditory com m unication, otherwise he would not equally call conscience “ His [G od ’ s] 
representative.”  Thus, the image is on a par with St Bonaventure’ s description o f  conscience as G od ’ s 
herald. C f. Veritatis Splendor, 58; AAS 85 (1993), 1179: “ sicut praeco Dei et nuntius” ; John Henry 
Newm an, Parochial and Plain Sermons, new ed., vol. 1 (London and N ew  Y ork: Longm ans, Green 
and C o., 1891), II, page 21: “the presence o f  the great G od in us, and over us, as our G overnor and 
Judge, who dw ells in us b y  our conscience, which is His representative” ; ibid., p. 22: “ obey the secret 
vo ice o f  G od” ; N ew m an, Parochial and Plain Sermons, new ed., vol. 2 (London and N ew  York: 
Longm ans, Green and Co., 1894) X XIII, p. 288: “ conscience [...] the voice o f  G od” ; N ewm an, 
Parochial and Plain Sermons, new ed., vol. 8 (London and N ew  York: Longm ans, G reen and Co.,
1891), IV , p. 59: “ obey G o d ’ s inward voice.”  Cf. also Newman, Words o f  Conscience in Parochial and 
Plain Sermons, ed. Fabio Attard, 89, 117 , 78.
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k in d  o f  d ire c t d iv in e  com m un ica tion , w h ich  a lw ays bypasses o u r re fle c tiv e  hum an 
fa c u ltie s .69 In  fo llo w in g  the  p rom p tings o f  p raye r in  conscience, w e  do n o t “ je ttis o n  
reason and a ffe c tio n  [,] b u t [...] com e to  u tiliz e  those pow ers as ba thed  in  th e  v irtu e s  
o f  fa ith , hope and lo v e .” 70 Indeed, S t John o f  the C ross, one o f  th e  g rea t m ys tics  o f  the 
C hurch , fo rc e fu lly  argues th a t p raye r is  no t to  be understood as som e k in d  o f  d o o r to
• 71
m y s tic a l re ve la tio n s  w h ic h  render (m o ra l) reasoning redundant. T h e re fo re , g ive n  
th a t the  te rm  ‘ vo ice  o f  G od ’ can be m isconstrued as an in d ic a tio n  th a t conscience
• •  . . » • • •  77
operates la rg e ly  o r w h o lly  th ro u g h  “ d iv in e  p o s itiv is m  and o r illu m in is m ,”  o r th ro u g h  
d iv in e  a u d itio n ,73 th is  m etaphor shou ld  be app lied  to  conscience w ith  care and w ith  
c la r ific a tio n .74 N onethe less, w hen used a pp rop ria te ly , the n o tio n  o f  conscience  as 
‘ vo ice  o f  G od ’ o r s im ila r language describ ing  conscience as the  lo cu s  o f  G od ’ s
69 B illy  and Keating also highlight the problem o f  misinterpreting our ow n selfish thoughts, or 
parental or societal expectations as G od ’ s voice in our conscience. See Conscience and Prayer, 70 -71.
70 Ibid., 46. C f. Keating, “ The Conscience Imperative as Prayer,”  66: “ Prayer w ill not make 
ethical decision m aking infallibly correct. Prayer does not usually carry oracles from  G od w hich 
circum vent our human integrity. W hat prayer does add to moral deliberation is the hope that, in prayer, 
the deciding agent w ill be acting as one dependent upon G od for all moral w isdom .”
71 St John o f  the Cross, The Ascent o f  Mount Carmel, in The Collected Works o f  St. John o f  the 
Cross, trans. K ieran  Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington, DC: IC S  Publications, 1979), II, 
2 1 ,4  (page 174): “ W e should make such use o f  reason and the law o f  the G ospel that, even though -  
whether w e desire it or not -  some supernatural truths are told to us, we accept only w hat is in harmony 
w ith reason and the G ospel law. [...] W e ought, in fact, to consider and exam ine the reasonableness o f  
the truth when it is revealed even more than when it is not.”
72 Keating, “ Conscience Imperative as Prayer,”  89.
73 Pinckaers highlights that the nature o f  communication between us and G od is ontological, 
between substances, and w e use sym bolic and metaphorical language in an attempt to describe this 
profound dialogue. C f. Pinckaers, La vie selon TEsprit, 149.
74 In this w ay, the description found in Gaudium et Spes o f  G od ’ s vo ice  echoing or resounding 
in the conscience reduces the chance for misconstruing the notion as plain illum inism , g iven  that an 
echo can be m isunderstood or go  unnoticed through inattention. In this context, the listener is clearly 
involved in seeking to understand. Cf. Gaudium et Spes, 16; AAS 58 (1966), 1037: “ C onscientia est 
nucleus secretissim us atque sacrarium hominis, in quo solus est cum D eo, cuius vo x  resonat in intimo 
eius.”  The passage draws heavily from a speech made b y Pius XII. Cf. Pius X II, Radio M essage De 
Conscientia Christiana in Iuvenibus Recte Efformanda (23 March 1952), AAS 44 (1952), 270-78, at 
2 71: “ L a  coscienza è com e il nucleo più intimo e segreto dell’uomo. L à egli si rifugia con le sue facoltà 
spirituali in assoluta solitudine: solo con se stesso, o m eglio, solo con D io -  della cui vo ce  la coscienza 
risuona -  e con se stesso. [...] L a  coscienza è quindi, per dirla con ima im m agine tanto antica quanto 
degna, una aduton un santuario”  [“The conscience is like the most intimate and secret nucleus o f  man. 
There he takes refuge with his spiritual faculties in absolute solitude: only w ith him self, or better, only 
with G od -  o f  w hose voice conscience resounds/echoes -  and with himself. [...] C onscience is 
therefore, to say it w ith an image that is as old as it is worthy, an aduton, a sanctuary” ].
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co m m u n ica tio n  w ith  us, and ou r d ia logue  w ith  h im , serves as a necessary fo il 
aga inst in te rp re tin g  the in d iv id u a l conscience as to ta lly  c losed in  on  its e lf  and 
abso lu te  in  its  judgem en t, such th a t w e m ake ourse lves o u t to  be gods in  ou r
7A * •
decis ions. In  reco g n is in g  o u r p ra ye rfu l openness o f  to  G od in  o u r conscience , w e 
a lso a v o id  re d u c in g  conscience to  a fa c u lty  th a t s im p ly  obeys e x te rio r la w s .77 In  th is  
w a y  w e  take  in to  account the o n to lo g ica l im pe ra tive  roo ted  in  o u r graced existence  
and graced re la tio n sh ip  w ith  the G od in  w hom  “ w e liv e  and m ove  and have o u r 
b e in g ”  (A c ts  17 :28 ).78
3.2 Conscience and Prayer as Memory
O ur consciences are fo rm e d  the re fo re  th ro u g h  p ra ye rfu l lis te n in g . H o w e ve r, th e y  are 
a lso fo rm e d  th ro u g h  p ra y e rfu l m em ory. A s was m entioned p re v io u s ly , th e  a n am n es is
7Q
o f  fa ith  re ca lls  o u r transfo rm ed  id e n tity , “ rece ived  in  fa ith  and tra n sm itte d  by  
b a p tism ,”  nam e ly , as adopted sons and daughters o f  G od, b ro the rs  and sisters in  
C h ris t, and h e irs  to  the  K in g d o m  (c f. R om  8: 14-17, G a l 3 :2 7 ; 4 :4 -7 ). T h is
re c o lle c tio n  in  fa ith  o f  ou r adop tio n  and o u r “ liv in g  re la tio n s h ip  w ith  the ‘A b b a  ’ o f  the
• « 8 1  
S on ”  th ro u g h  the  a c tio n  o f  the  H o ly  S p irit, draw s the b e lie ve r to  recogn ise  th a t, a t
75 Veritatis Splendor, 58: ‘“ In this, and not in anything else, lies the entire m ystery and the 
dignity o f  the m oral conscience: in being the place, the sacred place where G od speaks to m an’” ; AAS 
85 (1993), 1180: ‘“ In hoc tantum, neque alibi, totum positum est mysterium conscientiae m oralis 
eiusque dignitas: esse scilicet locum  et ambitum, ubi Deus hominem alloquitur’ .”  Quotation taken from 
John Paul II, Address La Conscienza Morale, 2 (page 256).
76 K eating describes the absolute claim  o f  conscience as “ idolatry.”  C f. Keating, “ C onscience 
Imperative as Prayer,”  88-89: “ In order to avoid idolatry in submitting to the absolute claim  o f  
conscience one must simultaneously hear the voice o f  God in this claim .”
77 C f. B illy  and Keating, Conscience and Prayer, 72.
78 K eating, “ Conscience Imperative as Prayer,”  89. Cf. Keating, “ Prayer and Ethics in the 
Thought o f  Hans Urs von Balthasar,”  60: “ Without prayer and worship, ethics becom es im posed, law- 
centred and self-enclosed.”  C f. Pinckaers, La vie selon I'Esprit, 149.
79 Ratzinger, “ I f  Y o u  W ant P eace... Conscience and Truth,”  94-95.
80 Trem blay, “ Una Antropologia Filiale: C osa Significa?” , 65: “ L ’uom o che è oggetto di 
questo dono [di filiazione] (evidentemente accolto nella fede e trasmesso dal battesim o) vede il suo 
statuto d ’ essere metamorfosarsi”  [“ Man, who is the object o f  this gift [o f sonship] (evidently received 
in faith and transmitted by baptism) sees that his status o f  being is transformed” ].
81 Ibid.: “una relazione viva con I' ‘Abba’ del Figlio" (emphasis in text).
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the  le v e l o f  o u r b e in g ,82 he o r she pa rtic ipa tes in  the  m ys te ry  o f  the  T r in ity .83 S uch a 
f i l ia l understand ing  o f  one ’ s be ing , rem em bered and experienced  in  p raye r, has 
im p lic a tio n s  fo r  one ’ s m o ra l understand ing, in  tha t i t  is  n o w  lo v e  th a t m o tiva te s  one ’ s 
conscience to  choose acts th a t g ive  g lo ry  to  G od (c f. M t 5 :1 6 ),84 and th a t re fle c t 
a ttitudes o f  lo ve  and service  w h ic h  are in  keep ing w ith  the lo v e  show n to  us in  C h ris t 
(Jn 15 :12 -17 ; M k  10 :45 ).85 Thus, m o tiva ted  b y  lo ve , ra the r th a n  s im p ly  o b lig a tio n , w e
O/'
are ca lle d  to  go beyond the  m in im um  in  generosity, g o in g  the  e x tra  m ile  fo r  the
87
b e n e fit o f  o u r n e ighb ou r, o r even ou r enem y (M t 5 :41 ; L k  10 :25 -37 ).
Just as conscience operates on d iffe re n t le ve ls , so the  m e m o ry  re la tes to  
conscience in  d iffe re n t w ays. So fa r, w e have been d iscuss ing  the  deeper o n to lo g ic a l 
le v e l, b u t m e m o ry  a lso a ffec ts  the judgem en t o f  actua l conscience . W e use ou r 
m em ory  to  re v ie w  the  m o ra l q u a lity  o f  o u r actions (o r ra th e r, w e  shou ld  use ou r 
m em ory  to  re v ie w  o u r ac tions), to  see w hether the rig h t th in g  was done, o r w he the r 
w e have w ronged  som eone, re q u irin g  us to  m ake am ends. T h is  re v ie w  is  the  ta sk  o f
the  consequent conscience, b u t in  the  con tex t o f  p raye r th is  act o f  re fle c tio n  becom es
88 •
an e xa m in a tio n  o f  conscience, w here “ G od is  [o u r] w itness,”  w here  o u r consciences
82 Ibid.: “ la filiazione del credente, opera del Dio trinitario, concerne l ’ontologia. L ’uom o che 
è oggetto di questo dono [...] vede il suo statuto d ’essere metamorfosarsi”  [“ the sonship o f  the believer, 
w ork o f  the trinitarian God, concerns ontology. Man, who is the object o f  this gift [...] sees that his 
status o f  being is transformed ” ] (emphasis in text).
83 Ibid.: “ si esperimenta l ’ autentica partecipazione al mistero dei Tre”  [“ the authentic 
participation in the mystery o f  the Three is experienced” ].
84 Ibid., 7 1 .
85 Pinckaers says that our “ freedom to love as God loves us in Christ, despite our faults and 
w eaknesses,”  is a “ pure gift o f  the Spirit.”  C f. Pinckaers, La vie selon l ’Esprit, 246: “ L a contestation de 
ce monde par l ’ ascèse chrétienne [...] proclame à sa façon [...] qu’ il existe une autre espèce de liberté, 
qui est un pur don de l ’Esprit: la liberté d ’aimer comme Dieu nous aime en Jésus-Christ, m algré nos 
fautes et nos faiblesses.”
86 Trem blay calls it “una morale del maximum” : a morality o f  the m axim um . C f. Trem blay, 
“U na A ntropologia Filiale: C osa Significa?” , 72.
87 C f. K eating, “ The Conscience Imperative as Prayer,”  65: “ Prayer activates the m em ory o f  
being loved b y  G od  w hich can deepen the reverence which I hold for m y se lf and all other persons. Out 
o f  this reverence for God, se lf and others the agent is better prepared to decide what is the right 
behaviour in any situation.”
88 The Catechism quotes St Augustine in saying “ Return to your conscience, question it... Turn 
inward, brethren, and in everything you do, see God as your witness.”  C f. CCC, no. 1779; St
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are answ erab le  to  G od .89 T h is  re fle c tio n , in  the presence o f  G od, “ b e fo re  the  L o rd ’ s 
C ross,” 90 a llo w s  us to  recognise the u n d e rly in g  m o tiv a tio n s  th a t caused us to  act.91
♦ 09
W e are honest w ith  G od and ourselves, and so g ive  thanks fo r  the  good w e have 
done w ith  h is  h e lp , w e ask fo r  fo rg iveness fo r the sins w e have co m m itte d , and seek 
h is  grace to  g ro w  in  lo ve  and w isdom . A lth o u g h  w e m ay be d iscouraged  fro m
♦ ♦ • QO
e xa m in in g  o u r conscience b y  the d is trac tions  o f  life , o r ou t o f  a fe a r o f  fe e lin g  g u ilty  
w hen fa c in g  ou r sins, w e need to  exam ine our conscience re g u la rly . A  la c k  o f  
re fle c tio n  and exam en, an u n w illin g n e ss  to  lis te n  in  o u r liv e s , can lead  to  a hardness 
o f  heart, o r can be sym p tom a tic  o f  a hardened heart. I t  was th is  hardness o f  hea rt th a t 
Pope John P au l described as a loss o f  a “p ro p e r  sense o f  s in ”  (aeq u u s  sensus p e c c a t i) ,  
roo ted  in  a dam aged “sense o f  G o d ’ (o u r re la tio n sh ip  w ith  h im ) and an “ obscured”  o r
Augustine, In Epistolam Joannis adParthos, VIII, 9: PL 35, 2041: “ Redi ad conscientiam  tuam, ipsam 
interroga. [...] Redite ergo intro, fratres; et in omnibus quaecumque facitis, intuemini testem Deum .”
89 Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 31: “ The sacramental sign o f  this clarity o f  conscience [which 
acknow ledges one’ s sins] is the act traditionally called the examination o f  conscience, an act that must 
never be one o f  anxious psychological introspection but a sincere and calm  com parison w ith the 
interior m oral law, with the evangelical norms proposed by the Church, with Jesus Christ h im self who 
is our Teacher and M odel o f  life, and with the heavenly Father, who calls us to goodness and perfection 
(emphasis in text)” ; AAS 77 (1985), 260: “ Signum sacramentale huius claritatis conscientiae est actus 
ille qui translaticio more nuncupatur examen conscientiae, actus, qui esse non debet sollicita quaedam 
inspectio psychologica, verum sincera serenaque comparatio cum interna lege m orali, cum normis 
evangelicis ab E cclesia  propositis, cum Iesu Christo ipso, qui nobis m agister est et vitae exem plar, 
necnon cum Patre caelesti, qui nos ad bonum vocat atque perfectionem”  (em phasis in text).
90 CCC, no. 1785: “ W e must also examine our conscience before the Lord’ s C ross.”
91 Evagrius, To Eulogios, X X V II, 29: “ For the more you treat your body harshly, penetrate all 
the more your conscience. Learn to know yourself by perceiving the secret plunderings o f  the thoughts 
[the logismoi], lest perhaps, swept aw ay unawares regarding their hidden thieveries, w e find ourselves 
in darkness to reap the virtues by austerity alone.”  Here Evagrius is warning us that w e need to reflect 
even more in the situation o f  a pious or ascetic life, since the intention driving our actions m ay be pride 
or vain glory, rather than love o f  G od and neighbour.
92 C f. Connolly, Sin, 135: “ Honesty and candour are the starting points for the individual’ s 
process o f  turning aw ay from  sin and returning to the loving presence o f  G od” ; Reconciliatio et 
Paenitentia, 22: “ E very individual therefore is invited by the voice o f  divine truth to exam ine 
realistically his or her conscience, and to confess that he or she has been brought forth in iniquity, as 
w e say in the Miserere Psalm” ; AAS 77 (1985), 232: “ Unusquisque ergo vo ce Veritatis divinae monetur 
ut conscientiam  suam ex rerum momentis perscrutetur et confiteatur se in iniquitate generatum esse, 
quemadmodum in psalmo Miserere dicim us.”
93 C f. CCC, no. 1779: “ It is important for every person to be sufficiently present to h im self in 
order to hear and fo llow  the vo ice o f  his conscience. The requirement o f  inferiority is all the more 
necessary as life often distracts us from any reflection, self-examination or introspection.”
341
num bed conscience .94 In  con trast, in  the p ractice  o f  e xa m in a tio n  o f  conscience  w e  
com e to  the  L o rd  w ith  a “ hum bled , co n trite  heart”  (Ps 50 [5 1 ]: 17, G ra il), w illin g  to  
face the  re a lity  o f  o u r s ins,95 and asking  G od fo r  h is  m ercy, in  c h ild - lik e  tru s t.96 Such 
h u m ility  seeks G od ’ s h e a lin g , expressed in  va rious  fo rm s o f  p e n ite n tia l p ra ye r and 
a c tio n , b u t rece ived  m ost e ffe c tiv e ly  th ro u g h  the Sacram ent o f  Penance, o r
0 7
R e c o n c ilia tio n .
F rom  these re fle c tio n s  on the e ffects o f  p raye r in  conscience , w e  can see th a t, 
ju s t as in  the  case ascesis, in  d iffe re n t w ays p rayer draw s us in to  a deeper re la tio n s h ip  
w ith  G od, th ro u g h  a ttitudes o f  h u m ility , d o c ility  and lo ve . These a ttitu d e s  open us to  
h is  h e a lin g , b u t a lso to  a fru it fu l recep tion  and use o f  the  g ifts  o f  the  S p irit.
4. The Gifts o f the Holy Spirit and their Role in Conscience
In  d iscuss ing  the  ro le  o f  the  v irtu e s  in  the w o rk in g s  o f  conscience w e have h ig h lig h te d  
th e ir ro le  o f  o rd e rin g  the  in te lle c t and w ill th rough  prudence and the  m o ra l v irtu e s , so 
th a t reason and w ill cooperate in  ju d g in g  and choosing  r ig h tly . S t Thom as em phasised 
th a t the  fu lln e ss  o f  v irtu e  is  in  the graced d isp o s itio n  and o p e ra tio n  o f  the  in fu se d  
v irtu e s , w h ic h  leads to  a co n n a tu ra lity  w ith  G od ’ s w ays. P inckaers describes 
c o n n a tu ra lity  as a “ s p iritu a l s e n s ib ility ,”  w here reason and w il l  act in  an in s tin c tiv e
94 Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 18 (emphasis in text); AAS 77 (1985), 224-28, at 224: “ accidit 
ut conscientia moralis hominum multorum obscuretur. [...] ‘Habemusne recte cogitam  conscientiam ? 
[...] ne torpescat vel conscientiae quasi “ anaesthesia”  afficiantur?” ’ Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 26 
also talks o f  the effects o f  present-day culture, leaving conscience “ confused and obscured.”  C f. AAS 
11 (1985), 244: “ conturbatur et obscuratur.”
95 For Pinckaers’ discussion o f  the relationship between hum ility and our recognition o f  sin, 
rooted in both a respectful fear o f  the Lord and a trust in him, see La vie selon I'Esprit, 224, 284-85. 
C f. Prov 15:33: “ The fear o f  the Lord is instruction in wisdom , and hum ility goes before honor.”
96 Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 22: “ When w e realize that G od ’ s love for us does not cease in 
the face o f  our sin or recoil before our offences [...], then we exclaim  in gratitude: ‘Y e s , the Lord is 
rich in m ercy ’ , and even: ‘The Lord is m ercy’”  (emphasis in text); AAS 11 (1985), 233: “ Cum  
animadvertimus amorem, quo Deus nos prosequitur, non velut consistere ante peccatum  nostrum, non 
rem overi ab offensionibus nostris [...], haec verba effundimus profitendo: ‘ Ita est; D eus est dives in 
m isericordia’ , quin immo affirmamus: ‘ Dominus estm isericordia’ .”
97 Cf. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, 28; AAS 11 (1985), 251.
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w a y  th ro u g h  a c la r ity  o f  pe rcep tion  made possib le  th ro u g h  lo v e .98 Such c o n n a tu ra lity  
has in te lle c tiv e  and a ffe c tiv e  elem ents. W h ile  no t c o n tra d ic tin g  reason, a d is p o s itio n  
o f  c o n n a tu ra lity  no lo n g e r requ ires the in d iv id u a l to  m ake step b y  step re fle c tio n , 
since the  ca p a c ity  fo r  g rasp ing  and respond ing to  the p ro b le m  has becom e so re fin e d  
o r p ra c tice d .99 M o re o ve r, th ro u g h  connatura l a ffe c tiv ity  w e becom e m ore  a ttuned  to  
G od ’ s w ill,  and to  d e s irin g  G od ’ s w ill th rough  lo v in g  u n io n  w ith  h im .100 I t  is  in  these 
w ays th a t the person acts in s tin c tiv e ly , so m uch has a lo ve  o f  G od and o f  h is  w ays 
becom e p a rt o f  h im  o r he rse lf. H ow ever, A qu inas says th a t the  im p a c t o f  the 
th e o lo g ic a l v irtu e s  is  s t ill im pe rfec t, since o u r know ledg e  and lo v e  o f  G od is 
in c o m p le te ,101 s t ill as though  “ th rough  a glass, d a rk ly ”  (1 C o r 13:12, K J V ),102 and our 
a tte n tio n  tow a rds o u r fin a l end is  n o t so firm  as to  re q u ire  no  fu th e r assistance.103 
U ltim a te ly , the re fo re , i t  is  o u r openness to  G od in  the S p ir it (o u r ca p a c ity  fo r 
re ce iv in g  G od: c a p a x  D e i ) ,104 th a t takes us beyond the  hum an lim its  o f  o u r reason,105
98 Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 26. As we have said before, this connatural, 
instinctive w ay o f  thinking is a developed mode, rather than something that is innate, gained b y  the 
practice o f  virtue and the action o f  the H oly Spirit, whereby we know longer require to think through 
every stage o f  reasoning before w e act. W e therefore act witli solertia.
Bouchard, “ Recovering the Gifts o f  the Holy Spirit,”  549.
100 See ibid. Pinckaers identifies this affective connaturality as a “ connaturality o f  lo ve” (“La 
connaturalité d ’amour”). See Pinckaers, La vie selon l ’Esprit, 149. This affective sense or cognition is 
epitom ised in spiritual discernment, which was discussed in chapter four, as part o f  the reflection on 
the validity o f  the notion o f  a holistic conscience, made up o f  different, supporting capacities, rather 
than sim ply operating b y  deduction alone. As was mentioned earlier, such connatural affectivity  does 
not operate in opposition to reason.
101 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  llae, q.68, a.2, resp.: “ imperfecte enim diligim us, et 
congnoscim us D eum .”
102 C f. N R S V  version o f  1 Cor 13:12: “For now w e see in a mirror, dim ly, but then w e w ill see 
face to face.”
103 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  llae, q.68, a.2, resp: “ Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum 
supematuralem, ad quern ratio movet, secundum quod est alilqualiter, et im perfecte informata per 
virtutes theologicas, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus, et m otio Spiritus 
Sancti, secundum illud Rom an.8: Qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt, et heredes: et Psal. 142. 
dicitur: Spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam (emphasis in text)” ; ibid., q.68, a.2, ad 2: “ per 
virtutes theologicas, et morales non ita perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper 
indigeat moveri quodam superiori instinctu Spiritus Sancti.”  Gardeil sums this up b y saying that the 
theological virtues are effective in pointing the w ay for the person, but cannot absolutely guarantee 
reaching the destination. Thus, w e need the Spirit to aid us in reaching beatitude. C f. A . [Am broise] 
Gardeil, “ Dons du Saint-Esprit,”  in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, voi. 4, part 2, ed. A . Vacant, 
E. M angenot, and É. Am ann (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1939), 1736.
'°*' Pinckaers, “ Ethics and the Image o f  God,”  141; Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics,
453: “ A s  spiritual beings, we are capable o f  receiving God, capax Dei, even though this capacity is
343
tra n s fo rm in g  o u r understand ing  and ou r actions (c f. R om  12 :1 -2 ; M t 16 :23 ). H ence, 
co n n a tu ra lity  d e rive d  th ro u g h  v irtu e  is  no t o n ly  m ade p o ss ib le , b u t a lso  b ro u g h t to  
fu rth e r p e rfe c tio n  th ro u g h  a life  liv e d  accord ing  to  the  H o ly  S p ir it, in  d o c ile  
re c e p tiv ity .106 A s  a re su lt, the  S p irit no t o n ly  in fuses the  v irtu e s  w ith  grace, b u t 
pe rfec ts  th e ir g oa l and fu n c tio n  th rough  h is  g ifts .107
I t  is  fo r  th is  reason th a t A qu inas saw the v irtu e s  as connected to  the  g ifts  o f  the  
S p ir it, as w e ll as to  the  B eatitudes and the fru its  o f  the S p ir it.108 T h is  is  w h y , a fte r h is  
genera l d iscuss ion  on  v irtu e , S t Thom as no t o n ly  trea ts the  g ifts , B ea titude s and S u its  
o f  the  S p ir it in  successive questions ( la  Ila e , qq. 68 -70 ), he a lso p a irs  the  v irtu e s  w ith  
in d iv id u a l g ifts  in  the  S ecu n d a  Secundae. So w h a t are the  g ifts  o f  the  S p ir it, and h o w  
do th e y  assist in  the  fo rm a tio n  o f  conscience?109
w holly  passive and receptive. The grace o f  the H oly Spirit touches us in our ‘ substance,’ in our 
personal being, and acts even at the level o f  our natural inclinations.”
105 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a . l : “ qui moventur per instinctum divinum  
non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanum, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum; quia 
m oventur a m eliori principio, quam sit ratio humana”  [“ (Aristotle says) it is not profitable for those 
m oved b y divine instinct to deliberate according to human reason, but that they should fo llow  the 
interior instinct, because they are m oved by a better principle than human reason” ]. W e shall return to 
the issue o f  instinctus below.
106 Pinckaers points out that w e are active in the development o f  virtues, but passive in their 
perfection since this is the task o f  the gifts o f  the H oly Spirit. Our task in this circum stance is to be 
receptive to the m ovem ent o f  the Spirit. C f. Pinckaers, La vie selon I ’Esprit, 206. A ccord in gly  Aquinas 
sees no contradiction between virtue as a perfection and gift as perfection, since the w ord ‘ g ift ’ 
highlights its cause or origin. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a .l ,  resp. Gardeil says that 
w e have to be open and receptive to the H oly Spirit, the Gift, in order to receive his gifts. Gardeil, 
“ Dons du Saint-Esprit,”  1730: “ [Le Saint Esprit] il est Don. [...] c ’est grace & la reception en nous du 
don de l ’Esprit-Saint, amour substantiel de Dieu, que nous recevons les autres dons” [“ (The H oly 
Spirit) is Gift. [...] it is thanks to the reception in us o f  the gift o f  the H oly Spirit, the substantial love o f  
God, that w e receive the other gifts” ].
107 Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 225: “ They [the virtues] are perfected b y the gifts 
o f  the H oly Spirit, to w hich are added the Beatitudes and the fruits o f  the H oly  Spirit.”  Aquinas says 
that w hile the theological virtues help to perfect the naturally acquired virtues, they do so in an 
im perfect w ay, since in them our love o f  God is still imperfect or incomplete, and our reason is not 
fu lly  directed or focused on our ultimate, supernatural goal. Thus, to assure our attainment o f  beatitude 
w e still require the gift o f  the H oly  Spirit. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a.2, resp.
108 In their connection Aquinas was influenced by the earlier connections made b y  saints such 
as Am brose and Augustine. C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.69, a .l ,  o b j.l and ad 1. St 
Am brose had related the Beatitudes to the cardinal virtues and St Augustine connected the Beatitudes 
with the gifts o f  the H oly Spirit. C f. Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 151-54.
109 CCC, no. 1785.
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In  the  W est, theo log ians and s p iritu a l w rite rs  have o fte n  used the  lis t  o f  the  
seven g ifts  o f  the H o ly  S p ir it to  describe h is  “ sa n c tify in g  a c tiv ity .” 110 The fo rm  o f  the 
seven g ifts  is  based upon the  S eptuag int ve rs ion  o f  Isa iah  11:2 -3 ,n i w h ic h  enum erates 
ce rta in  a ttrib u te s  o f  the  shoot fro m  Jesse’ s s to ck .112 In  id e n tify in g  C h ris t as th is  
righ teous shoot, the  e a rly  G reek and L a tin  Fathers o r ig in a lly  described  these q u a litie s  
as a ttrib u te s  o f  C h ris t.113 H ow eve r, Saint A u gustine  proposed a d iffe re n t v ie w  on  the  
basis o f  lin k in g  the  B eatitudes to  the g ifts , presented in  reversed o rd e r.114 In  d o in g  so, 
he a lso id e n tifie d  the  g ifts  o f  the  H o ly  S p irit as the  a c tio n  o f  the  S p ir it (s e p tifo rm is  
o p e ra tio ) in  the  liv e s  o f  C h ris tians , those to  w hom  the  B eatitudes are addressed.115 
W ith  som e p re fe rrin g  the  sc rip tu ra l o rde r instead o f  A u g u s tin e ’ s ,116 a succession o f  
w rite rs  con tinue d  to  deve lop  the  doctrine  o f  the  g ifts  o f  the  H o ly  S p ir it,117 to  th e  p o in t 
th a t b y  the tim e  o f  e a rly  S cho lastic ism  it  had taken  the  fo rm  w e are fa m ilia r  w ith
n o Y v e s M .J . Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, vol. 1, The Holy Spirit in the ‘Economy’: 
Revelation and Experience o f  the Spirit, trans. David Smith (N ew  York: The Seabury Press; London: 
G eoffrey Chapman, 1983), 122.
111 O nly the Septuagint enumerates seven gifts, as piety (eusebeia) is m issing from  the 
Hebrew text, mentioning fear o f  the Lord twice instead. Cf. Isaiah 1 1 :2-3. This Septuagint version o f  
the gifts then passed into the first Latin Vulgate translation, which has since been revised.
112 C f. Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 151.
113 Ibid. Pinckaers mentions this theology in connection with the G reek Fathers. G ardeil points 
out that this teaching is also present among the Latin Fathers, such as Tertullian. M oreover, the fact 
that the seven powers or gifts o f  Isaiah 11:2-3 were first attributed to Christ should not lead us to think 
that the early Church did not hold that the Spirit acts in our lives, too. Therefore, it should be noted that 
the Isaiah passage offers a form to a pre-existing belief. C f. Gardeil, “ Dons du Saint-Esprit,”  1766.
For a historical summary o f  the Greek and Latin Fathers’ writing on the gifts, see Gardeil, “ D ons du 
Saint-Esprit,”  1754-66. B oth Congar and Bouchard state that G ardeil’ s historical article, w hich sparked 
renewed theological interest in the gifts o f  the H oly Spirit, is still a most valuable tool for current 
research, ow ing to its com prehensive nature. C f. Y v es  M.J. Congar, I  Believe in the Holy Spirit, vol. 2, 
'He is Lord and Giver o f  Life ’, trans. David Smith (N ew  York: The Seabury Press; London: G eo ffrey  
Chapman, 1983), 139, n.3; Bouchard, “ Recovering the Gifts o f  the H oly Spirit,”  540.
114 Cf. Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 151; Gardeil, “ Dons du Saint-Esprit,”  1763-64. 
Augustine changes the order found in Isaiah, since “initium sapientiae timor Domini.” The reversed 
order also fits with the order o f  the Beatitiudes. Hence he states, “primus ibi est timor D ei, secunda 
pietas, tertia scientia, quarta fortitudo, quintum consilium, sextus intellectus, septima sapientia. See St 
Augustine, De Sermone Domini in Monte secundum Matthaeum, 1,4, 11; P L  34, 1234.
113 Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 151; Augustine, De Sermone Domini, I, 4, 11; PL 
34, 1234. The Catechism upholds both the giving o f  the Spirit in fullness to Christ and the action o f  the 
gifts in our lives by stating that the gifts sustain the “moral life o f  Christians,”  but “ belong in their 
fullness to Christ, Son o f  D avid,”  that is, the one who is o f  Jesse’ s line. C f. CCC, nos. 1830, 1831 and 
1831, n.109.
116 For A q uin as’ s discussion on the order o f  gifts, see Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a.7.
117 Cf. Gardeil, “ Dons du Saint-Esprit,”  176 6-1771; Congar, I  Believe in the Holy Spirit, I,
115-18.
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today, nam e ly: w isd o m , u nd ers tan d in g , counsel, fo r t itu d e , k n o w le d g e , p ie ty  and fe a r  
o f the L ord ', seven g ifts  d is tin c t in  fu n c tio n  fro m  the  o the r ac tions  o f  th e  S p ir it, as
• i i o
fo u n d  in  the  v irtu e s  and charism s.
O f a ll the  d is tin c t fu n c tio n s  o f  the  seven g ifts  o f  the H o ly  S p ir it, as o u tlin e d  b y  
S t Thom as, the p rim a ry  purpose o f  the g ifts  concerns o u r s a lv a tio n .119 W e cannot 
reach bea titude  b y  o u r ow n  w eak e ffo rts , as o u r foo lishness w ill d rag  us aw ay. Thus, 
the  S p ir it p ro tec ts  and guides us by  p e rfe c tin g  o u r reason and w il l l  to  act in  accord  
w ith  o u r u ltim a te  goa l, d ire c tin g  i t  aw ay fro m  foo lishness, ignorance , du llness  o r 
harshness,120 and b y  le ad ing  i t  to  respond w e ll to  h is  p ro m p tin g , h is  in s tin c tu s ,121
118 Congar points to Philip the Chancellor, in 1235, as the first writer to create a system atic 
treatise on the gifts o f  the Spirit, discussed as “ specific realities o f  grace as distinct from  the virtues and 
the charisms.”  C f. Congar, I  Believe in the Holy Spirit, I, 118; idem, I  Believe in the Holy Spirit, II, 
134. This distinction is still in evidence in modem Church documents. For exam ple, Lumen Gentium 
talks o f  the Spirit directing the Church through “ varied hierarchic and charismatic gifts.”  C f. Lumen 
Gentium, 4; AAS 57 (1965), 7: “ diversis donis hierarchicis et charismaticis” ; CCC, no. 768. The 
Catechism declares that the Spirit “ works in many w ays different gifts and charisms to build up the 
B ody o f  Christ. CCC, no. 798. Thus, the seven gifts are not to be considered the only form s o f  
intervention b y the H oly  Spirit. Congar also notes that the number seven also becam e m ore important 
at the time o f  early Scholasticism . Previously, Fathers such as Saints Am brose and G regory the Great 
had considered the number seven to mean “ fullness” or “ completeness,”  such as the fullness o f  the 
virtues. H ow ever, b y  the time o f  the early Scholastics the idea had changed to “ discrete gifts o f  grace, 
distinguished in accordance with the subject-matter denoted by their nam e.”  C f. Congar, I  Believe in 
the Holy Spirit, I, 117 ; Gardeil, “ Dons du Saint-Esprit,”  1763, 1765, at 1763: “ Le nombre sept signifie 
la plénitude des vertus.”  For G regory’ s description o f  the sevenfold gift o f  the spirit as seven virtues 
(sancti Spiritus septem in nobis virtutes), whose sister virtues are faith, hope and love, and w hich act 
against seven temptations, see Moralia in Job, I, 27, 38, P L  75, 544; ibid., II, 49, 77, P L  75, 592.
119 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a.2, resp.: “ quia scilicet in haereditatem illius 
terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi movetur, et deducatur a Spiritu Sancto.”  A s  the gifts are 
necessary for salvation, rather than some optional extra, they are not the preserve o f  a spiritual elite. C f. 
Bouchard, “ R ecovering the G ifts o f  the H oly Spirit,”  548.
120 Ibid., la Ilae, q.68, a.2, ad 3: “ sed ille [Deus], [...] sua motione ab omnia stultitia, et 
ignorantia, et hebetudine, et duritia, et ceteris hujusmodi, nos tutos reddit.”  See also ibid., Ia Ilae, q.68, 
a.4, resp.
121 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.68, a.2, ad 3: “ et ideo dona Spiritus Sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes 
instinctum ipsius, dicuntur contra hujusmodi defectus dari”  [“and therefore the gifts o f  the H oly Spirit, 
which make us fo llo w  his instinct well, are said to be given against these defects”  (em phasis mine)]. 
Pinckaers comments that translators and theologians have long been suspicious o f  A quinas’ s use o f  
instinctus, g iven  their concern that ‘ instinct’ at the heart o f  ethics might im ply som e kind or irrational 
core to our m orality. H ow ever, Aquinas’ s use o f  instinctus is quite deliberate and is m ore evident in his 
later works. O f  the 298 appearances in the Thomistic corpus, 50 o f  them relate to moral life, and 51 o f  
the relate directly to the H oly Spirit. The highest concentration o f  the word concerns the gifts o f  the 
H oly Spirit. The problem  for us is that we imagine instinct as a sense or urge that is basic and interior 
in its origin. St Thom as’s use in relation to the Spirit is quite different: “ it refers to an interior impulse, 
whose origin is nevertheless exterior [i.e. from an Other], or rather superior.”  In this w ay, the instinctus 
is neither base nor irrational, but rather supra-rational, helping us beyond the feebleness o f  our own 
reason. C f. Servais Pinckaers, “ M orality and the M ovem ent o f  the H oly Spirit: A quinas’ s D octrine o f
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T he re fo re , the  g ifts  are h ab itu s , la s tin g  d isp o s itio n s , w h ic h  p e rfe c t th e  w h o le
hum an pe rso n ,123 fu rth e r equ ipp ing  us fo r liv in g  a good life ,124 and hence fo r  ou r
jo u rn e y  to  G od.
T he d iffe re n ce  betw een the in fused  v irtu e s  and the g ifts  is  th a t, u n lik e  the 
fo rm e r, the  g ifts , as a h ig h e r m o tiva tin g  fo rce  ( s u p e r io r  in s tin c tu s ) ,125 are n o t o n ly  
g ive n  b y  G od, b u t are g ive n  so th a t w e are re a d ily  open to  b e in g  m oved  b y  d iv in e  
in s p ira tio n . In  th is  w ay the  g ifts  as instinctus, w h ic h  is  in te rio ris e d  in s p ira tio n  and
197 • • . •
illu m in a tio n , lead to  a deeper in c lin a tio n  “ to w a rd  the tru th  and the  d iv in e  goods th a t 
are revea led  to  us,”  and to  obedience to  the O ne w ho is  the source o f  a ll th a t is  good
n o
and true . H o w e ve r, one shou ld  n o t m is in te rp re t the m o v in g  o f  the  S p ir it ’ s in s tin c tu s
■ • « 1 9 0
in  us as som e k in d  o f  “ sporad ic”  in te rve n tio n , o r as som e th ing  th a t renders a ll
1 o A #
hum an e ffo r t as w o rth less . A s w e have noted e a rlie r, S t Thom as cons ide red  the  
g ifts  and v irtu e s  to  be in tim a te ly  connected. T here fo re , o u r m o ra l life  does n o t operate 
acco rd ing  to  v irtu e s  in  som e cases and the g ifts  in  others. R a ther the  tw o  fo rm  “ a v ita l 
and dynam ic  o rg a n ism ,” 131 w ith  the g ifts  o ffe rin g  “ constant”  suppo rt to  the  v irtu e s ,132
Instinctus,”  trans. C raig  Steven Titus, in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, 
ed. John Berkm an and C raig Steven Titus (Washington, D C: Catholic U niversity o f  A m erica  Press, 
2005), 385-95, at 389.
122 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a.3, resp.: “ unde et dona Spiritus Sancti sunt 
quidam habitus.”
123 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.68, a .l ,  resp.: “ dona sunt quaedam hominis perfectiones” ; ibid., Ia Ilae, 
q.68, arg. 2: “ D ona Spiritus Sancti perficiunt hominem.”
124 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.68, a.4, ad 1: “ dona Spiritus Sancti perficiunt hom inem  in his, quae 
pertinent ad bene vivendum .”
125 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q.68, a.2, ad 2.
126 Ibid., Ia Ilae, q. 68, a .l ,  resp.: “ut efficiatur prompte m obilis ab inspiratione divina.”  C f. 
Pinckaers, La vie selon I ’Esprit, 94.
127 Pinckaers, “ M orality and the M ovement o f  the H oly Spirit,”  389-90.
128 Cf. ibid., 389; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae, q.68, a.3, resp.: “ dona Spiritus Sancti 
sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad prompte obediendum Spiritui Sancto” (emphasis mine).
129 Pinckaers, “ M orality and the Movem ent o f  the H oly Spirit,”  391.
130 D e Lubac, A B rief Catechesis, 86: “ [The supernatural] neither disdains nor replaces 
[nature]. It informs it, remolds it; i f  necessary it can exorcise it [...]; it transfigures it in all o f  its 
concepts and activities.”
131 Pinckaers, “ Ethics and the Image o f  G od,”  139.
132 Pinckaers, “ M orality and the Movem ent o f  the H oly Spirit,”  391: “ The coordination 
between gifts and virtues [...] shows that this spiritual instinct formed in us b y  the gifts does not act in a 
sporadic w ay, through sudden inspirations, but in a constant w ay, supporting the enduring patience
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th a t “ enable [s ] the C h ris tia n  to  act w ith  excellence under the  m o tio n  o f  the  S p ir it o f  
G od.”  T he  m o tio n  o f  the  g ifts  m ay go beyond hum an reason, b u t th is  does no t 
m ean th a t th e y  lead us in to  an irra tio n a l fog . Indeed, fo u r o f  the  g ifts  are re la te d  to  the 
reason: w isd o m , understand ing, counsel and kn o w le d g e .134 S t Thom as says th a t the 
g ifts  p e rfe c t th e  apprehension (d isco ve ry ) and judgem en t o f  the  tru th , b o th  in  the 
specu la tive  and p ra c tic a l realm s. In  apprehension, specu la tive  reason is  p e rfe c te d  b y  
understand ing , and p ra c tic a l reason by  counsel. In  rig h t ju d g e m e n t, spe cu la tive  reason
1 T f
is  pe rfec ted  b y  w isd o m , and p ra c tica l reason by  know ledge . T h e re fo re , th e  g ifts  o f  
the S p ir it “ b rin g  us lig h t” ; 136 they he lp  us to  deve lop  an in te lle c tu s  f ld e i ,  th a t 
understands the  fu lle r  m eaning o f  re a lity  and th a t helps us to  ju d g e  w h a t is  tru ly  
p ruden t, in  kee p in g  w ith  the w isdom  o f  G od .137 I t  is  th is  lig h t o f  the  H o ly  S p irit, 
ope ra ting  in  th e  d o c ile  pe rson ,138 tha t guides and supports m o ra l ac tio n . S ince the 
v irtu e s  are a ided  b y  the  S p ir it’ s g ifts , th is  means tha t o u r conscience is  a lso supported  
b y  the  e n lig h te n in g  g ifts  o f  the S p irit, th rough  a deepening o f  o u r p e rce p tio n  o f  the 
tru th  and o f  o u r awareness o f  G od ’ s w ill,  and in  opening us up  to  h is  ju d g m e n t. In  th is
required by the practice and progress o f  virtues.” The efficacy o f  this support, how ever, is clearly 
linked to docility.
133 Pinckaers, “ Ethics and the Image o f  God,” 139. In this w ay w e achieve acts that are “ higher 
than acts o f  virtue.”  C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a .l ,  resp.: “ dona perficiunt 
hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum.”  W hile much o f  Thom as O ’M eara’ s analysis o f  
the gifts agrees w ith Pinckaers (particularly in identifying the gifts as “ special, divinely infused 
dispositions,”  rather than “ transitory actual graces” ), his comments on the role o f  the gifts in exuberant, 
spontaneous action, in contrast to the “ frequent, deliberate, thoughtful”  acts o f  virtues m ight be 
misconstrued as splitting the gifts and virtues into two styles o f  operation, rather than seeing the gifts as 
offering further perfection to virtuous action, making the act higher in quality than that w hich would be 
achieved b y virtue alone. C f. O ’Meara, Thomas Aquinas, Theologian, 125.
134 C f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, la  Ilae, q.68, a.4, resp.
135 See ibid. W hile the other gifts operate in the reason, St Thomas observes that piety, 
fortitude and fear o f  the Lord operate in the w ill. See ibid.
136 Pinckaers, “ M orality and the M ovem ent o f  the H oly Spirit,”  392.
137 Ibid.
138 C f. Pinckers, “ M orality and the Movem ent o f  the H oly Spirit,”  391: “ L ikew ise the spiritual 
instinct, formed in us in our intial yes to a vocation, continues its inspiring w ork in the secret o f  the 
soul, all throughout our life, i f  w e are faithful to it.”
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w ay, the  g ifts  o f  the  S p ir it assist bo th  in  the exam ina tion  o f  conscience  and the 
fo rm a tio n  o f  consc ience .139
M o ra l g ro w th  is  dependent upon a deepening awareness and pe rfo rm ance  o f
tru th . P art o f  th a t tru th  is the  tru th  about ourselves. In  e xa m in in g  o u r conscience  in
p raye r, the  presence o f  the S p irit and the instinctus  o f  h is  g ifts  th ro w  lig h t upon  the
tru th  o f  ourse lves, b o th  in  the re a lity  o f  o u r d iv in e  c a llin g  and in  o u r fa ilu re  to  liv e  up
to  th a t c a ll in  o u r actions. C ongar sums th is  up thus:
T he H o ly  S p ir it acts w ith in  us o r he penetrates in to  us lik e  an a n o in tin g . H e 
m akes us, at a le ve l th a t is  deeper than tha t o f  m ere re g re t fo r  som e fa u lt, 
conscious o f  the sovere ign a ttra c tio n  o f  the A b so lu te , the P ure and the  T rue , 
and o f  a new  life  o ffe re d  to  us by  the L o rd , and he a lso  g ives  us a c le a r 
consciousness o f  o u r ow n  w retchedness and o f  the  u n tru th  and se lfishness 
th a t f i l ls  o u r live s . W e are conscious o f  be ing  ju d g e d , b u t a t the  sam e tim e  
w e  are fo re s ta lle d  b y  fo rg iveness and grace, w ith  the  re s u lt th a t o u r fa lse  
excuses, o u r s e lf- ju s tifiy in g  m echanism s and the s e lfis h  s truc tu re  o f  o u r liv e s  
b reak d o w n .140
E a rlie r i t  w as noted tha t G od is  o u r w itness in  an e xa m in a tio n  o f  
consc ience .141 The H o ly  S p ir it is  th a t w itness, th a t revea le r o f  the  w h o le  tru th  (c f. Jn 
16 :13), th a t c a lls  us b o th  to  recognise ou r sins and to  liv e  the  new  life  w e  have been 
g iven . Pope John Paul w rite s  in  a s im ila r v e in  in  h is  e n c y c lic a l D o m in u m  et 
V iv ific a n te m . H e p o in ts  ou t th a t in  the Paschal M ys te ry  o u r consciences are p u rifie d  
b y  the  b lo o d  o f  C h ris t (c f. H eb 9 :14 ), enab ling  the H o ly  S p irit to  en te r in .142 The H o ly  
S p ir it thus becom es ‘“ the lig h t o f  hearts,” ’ th a t is , “ the lig h t o f  consciences,”  and so 
m akes us aw are o f  o u r sins (c f. Jn 16:8) and d irects us to  the  g o o d .143 H ence, w e
139 CCC, no. 1785.
140 Congar, I  Believe in the Holy Spirit, II, 123.
141 C f. CCC, no. 1779.
142 Donum et Vivificantem, 42; AAS 78 (1986), 858-59: “ Idcirco Epistula adH ebraeos  asserit 
hunc sanguinem ‘ emundare conscientiam’ : qui igitur -  ut ita loquamur -  viam Spiritili Sancto aperit ad 
hominis intima, seu conscientiarum humanarum sacrarium”  (emphasis in text).
143 C f. Donum et Vivificantem, 42: “ B y  becom ing ‘the light o f  hearts,’ that is to say the light o f  
consciences, the H oly Spirit ‘ convinces concerning sin’” ; AAS 78 (1986), 858: “ Cum  fiat ‘ lumen 
cordium ’ , seu conscientiarum, Spiritus Sanctus ‘arguit de peccato’ , id est efficit ut hom o malum suum 
cognoscat, et simul eum ad bonum dirigif' (emphasis in text). The description o f  the Spirit as lumen 
cordium refers to a line in the sequence Veni, Sancte Spiritus. Cf. Bouchard, “ R ecovering the G ifts o f
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recognise o u r need fo r  convers ion  and fo r  the ongo ing he lp  o f  the H o ly  S p ir it. John 
Paul w rite s  tha t “ every  k in d  o f  hum an s in  can be reached b y  G o d ’ s sav ing  p o w e r,”  
thanks to  the g ifts  o f  the H o ly  S p irit, whose “ m u lt ip lic ity ”  o f  g ifts  g ives h im  the name 
the “ seven fo ld  one.” 144 Thus, “ b y  v irtu e  o f  the seven g ifts  o f  the  H o ly  S p ir it  a ll e v ils  
are destroyed and a ll good th ings are produced.” 145
The S p ir it there fore  o ffe rs  h is  g ifts  to  he lp  us in  ou r w eakness,146 and to  a id  us 
in  d o ing  good. I f  w e accept w ho lehearted ly, the S p ir it tru ly  becomes o u r gu ide  (G a l 
5 :25; R o m  8:14), and w e are thus enligh tened and draw n fo rw a rd  in  the know ledg e  
and desire fo r  goodness. I t  is th is  d raw ing  fo rw a rd  in  goodness p ro v id e d  b y  the 
in s tin c tu s  S p ir itu s  S a n c ti tha t fu rthe r shapes o r fo rm s o u r conscience in  a 
“ co n n a tu ra lity  o f  love  and w isdom .” 147 Thus, the acts o f  prudence and d isce rnm ent 
in v o lv e d  in  the judgem en t o f  conscience are heightened b y  the  g ifts  o f  counse l and 
kn o w le d g e ,148 backed b y  understanding and w isdom . A l l  the o the r v irtu o u s  
d ispos itions  tha t in fluence  ou r conscience are like w ise  deve loped b y  the  g ifts  o f  
fo rtitu d e , p ie ty  and fear o f  the Lo rd . In  these ways conscience becom es m ore
the H oly Spirit,”  551 : “ One o f  the most important aspects o f  the gifts, especially the gift o f  
understanding, is that it purifies our vision so that w e can let our illusions die and see our ow n 
sinfulness and need for G od ’ s grace.”  Prades observes that the guidance o f  the Spirit w as often 
described b y  the Fathers as a lux beatissima, “ a new source o f  knowledge, according to an internal 
unity betw een faith and knowing” . Cf. Javier Prades, ‘“ Guidati dallo Spirito’ (Rom  8:14): Itinerari 
Spirituali e M orali della Prospettiva della M issione,”  in La ‘Sequela Christi’: Dimensione Morale e 
Spirituale dell ’Esperienza Cristiana, ed. L ivio M elina and O livier Bonnew ijn  (Rome: Lateran 
University Press, 2003), 55-81, at 79: “una lux beatissima, una nuova fonte di conoscenza, secondo 
un’ unità interna tra fede e sapere.”
144 Donum et Vivifìcantem, 42; AAS 78 (1986), 858: “ V i m ultiplicium  donorum eius, unde 
tamquam ‘ septiform is’ in v o cato , quodlibet hominis peccatum potest potentiae D ei salvificae subici.”
145 C f. Bonaventure, De Septem Donis Spiritus Sancti, coll. II, n. 3: “ Unde per septem dona 
Spiritus Sancti om nia mala destruunto, et omnia bona introducunto” ; Donum et Vivifìcantem, 42; AAS 
78 (1986), 858 (translation o f  Bonaventure taken from English text o f  Donum et Vivifìcantem).
146 Bouchard says that this work o f  the gifts o f  the Holy Spirit progresses in tw o stages: a clear 
vision o f  sinfulness and smoothing the “ rough edges” , leading to consistency and integrity o f  life. C f. 
Bouchard, “ R ecovering the G ifts o f  the H oly Spirit,”  551-53, 555-56.
147 C f. Pinckaers, La Vie Selon L ’Esprit, 149: “ La connaturalité d ’ amour et de sagesse est le 
m eilleur don de l ’Esprit Saint.”
148 On prudence and counsel, see Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ila  Ilae, q.52, aa. 1-2.
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sensitive, serene and courageous, lead ing to  “ the p rope r ju d g m e n t and jo y o u s  
fu lf i lm e n t.” 149
W e shou ld  no t conclude, however, that the w o rk  o f  the  S p ir it  is  l im ite d  to  the 
deve lopm ent o f  v ir tu e .150 Rather, as Pinckaers states, “ the H o ly  S p ir it  com m unicates 
to  C h ris tians  the new  life  issu ing fro m  the resurrection. I t  recreates them , changes 
them  in  the  depths o f  th e ir  being, p roduc ing  in  them  a presence tha t causes them  to  
l iv e  ‘ in  C h r is t’ and fo rm s them  in  the image o f  C hris t.” 151 I t  is  the re fo re  in  the S p ir it 
tha t w e  becom e im ita to rs  o f  C h ris t,152 w h ich  has fu rth e r im p lic a tio n s  fo r  the  shaping 
o f  conscience.
5. Im ita tio  et S eq u e la  C hristi in th e  F orm ation  o f  C on sc ien ce  
I t  is th ro u g h  the g if t  o f  the S p ir it tha t w e are able to  encounter the  rise n  C h ris t, and in  
freedom  deve lop  a “ progressive  se lf- id e n tifica tio n ”  w ith  h is w a y  o f  th in k in g , fe e lin g  
and lo v in g .153 Prades po in ts  out tha t w hen in  the N e w  Testam ent i t  is  said tha t w e 
have the m in d  o f  C h ris t (1 C o r 2:16), o r w e are to  have the same though ts , fee lings  o r 
a ttitudes as C h ris t (P h il 2 :5 ),154 and love  each other as C h ris t has lo v e d  us (Jn  13:34- 
35), “ i t  is  n o t us ing  a m etaphorica l language to  vague ly a llude  to  a co rrec t behaviou r,
149 Haring, Free and Faithful in Christ, I, 255: “ The special gift o f  the H oly Spirit w hich
brings prudence to perfection is counsel. [...] Under the inspiration o f  the g ift o f  counsel, the
conscience rejoices in the divine dispositions and directives and thus becom es more sensitive to all the 
possibilities o f  the here and now. I f  the conscience is solidly guided by the H oly Spirit and trusting in 
the Lord, serenity and courage w ill guarantee the spiritual atmosphere that provides the proper 
judgm ent and jo yo u s fulfilment.”
150 C f. Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 120.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., 121: “ Imitation rooted in faith operates at a deeper level, for it is the w ork o f  the 
H oly Spirit.”  C f. Pinckaers, La vie selon I ’Esprit, 94.
153 Prades, “ ‘ Guidati dallo Spirito’ ,”  77. Prades uses the term “ progressiva im m edesim azione” : 
self-identification, literally, a progressive ‘making the same’ .
154 There are various possible translations o f  phronein, whose m eaning can range from ‘to 
think’ to ‘ entertaining sentiments o f  a specific kind.’ In Phil 2:2 and 2:5 w e are uged to think the same 
w ay as Christ. H owever, the context talks o f  having “ compassion and sym pathy”  (Phil 2 :1). Therefore 
the thought described here involves affectivity. The Vulgate translates this as “ id ipsum sentientes” and 
“ sentite in vobis quod et in Christo Iesu.”  Thus, w e are to think and feel as Christ does.
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tha t w o u ld  tend  to  the good and avo id  the e v il.” 155 Rather, i t  is  t ru ly  a p roposa l o f  
personal c o n fo rm ity  w ith  C hris t, w h ic h  reaches us no t as a th e o ry , b u t is  addressed to  
us as a “ vo ca tio n ,”  156 o f  im ita tio n  and fo llo w in g  (s e q u e la ), and hence as a v o c a tio n  to 
ho liness in  u n io n  w ith  God.
The im ita t io n  o f  C h ris t shou ld  therefore no t be m isconstrued  as s im p ly  an 
exte rna l co p y in g  o f  C h ris t, on the le ve l o f  p raxis, in  w h ic h  w e re la te  to  C h ris t as a ro le  
m o d e l.157 R a ther o u r se lf- id e n tifica tio n  w ith  C hris t, under the gu idance o f  the  S p ir it, 
is a se q u e la  C h r is t i ,158 a l iv in g  re la tionsh ip  w ith  C h ris t.159 The s e q u e la  C h r is t i  is the 
ca ll o f  the  d isc ip le  to  “ learn fro m  [C h ris t]”  (M t 11 :28-29 ),160 to  “ fo l lo w ”  and to  
“ serve”  C h ris t, o ffe r in g  one ’ s l i fe  so com p le te ly  tha t one seems to  lose it ,  o n ly  in  fac t 
to  have t ru ly  ga ined i t  (c f. Jn 12:24-26).161 Such a d isc ip lesh ip  o f  p a rtic ip a tio n  and 
u n io n  is  liv e d  ou t in  o u r p rayer and com m un ion  w ith  h im ,162 b u t also in  o u r lo ve  and
155 Prades, ‘“ Guidati dallo Spirito’ ,”  77: “non sta usando un linguaggio m etaforico per 
alludere vagam ente ad un comportamento corretto, che tenda al bene ed eviti il m ale.”
136 Ibid., 78.
137 C f. Prades, ‘“ Guidati dallo Spirito’ ,”  80; Pinckaers, Sources o f  Christian Ethics, 121; 
Veritatis Splendor, 21: “Following Christ is not an outward imitation, since it touches man at the very 
depths o f  his being” (emphasis in English text); AAS 85 (1993), 1150: “ Sequi Christum  non sim plex est 
exterior imitatio, quia ad imtima hominis pertinet.”
138 C f. Prades, “ ‘ Guidati dallo Spirito’ ,”  80; Veritatis Splendor, 19; AAS 85 (1993), 1148.
139 C f. B illy  and Keating, The Way o f  Mystery, 104: “ Suffice it to say that w e are not called  to 
m im ic Christ in his personal acts [...]. W e are, however, called literally to follow  him to the source o f  
his obedience, [namely, the Father]”  (emphasis in text).
160 C f. Juan Antonio R eig Plà, “ L ’Insegnamento Morale: Un Cam m ino nella Chiesa,”  in 
Camminare nella Luce: Prospettive della Teologia Morale a Partire da ‘Veritatis Splendor’, ed. L iv io  
M elina and José N oriega (Rome: Lateran University Press, 2004), 371-83, at 376.
161 C f. R éal Trem blay, “Sequela e Beatitudine: Riflessioni alla L uce di Gv 12, 25-26,”  in i n  
‘Sequela Christi’: Dimensione Morale e Spirituale dell’Esperienza Cristiana, ed. L iv io  M elina and 
O livier B onnew ijn  (Rome: Lateran University Press, 2003), 41-53, at 46.
162 Babini sees “ participation”  or “ union”  with Christ as the interpretive key  that prevents the 
imitation o f  sequela  being reduced m erely to the moral imitation o f  a role m odel. C f. E llero Babini,
“Sequela: D a ll’ Imitazione alla Partecipazione,”  in La ‘Sequela Christi ': Dimensione Morale e 
Spirituale dell’Esperienza Cristiana, ed. L iv io  M elina and O livier Bonnew ijn (Rome: Lateran 
U niversity Press, 2003), 297-303, at 301.
Our participation in Christ leads to a participation in the life o f  the Trinity, since through 
Christ w e becom e adopted sons and daughters, bearing his likeness. Through the action o f  the H oly 
Spirit w e are conform ed to the image o f  Christ, imperfectly in this life, and com pletely in eternal life. 
Thus, Pinckaers points out this our imitation o f  Christ is a dynamic process, leading to progressive 
resemblance and increasing conform ity to Christ. C f. Prades, “ ‘ Guidati dallo Spirito’ ,”  80; Pinckaers, 
“ Ethics and the Im age o f  G od,” 140. On the two stages o f  resemblance (im perfect and perfect), cf. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q.45, a.4, resp.: “ adoptio filiorum D ei est per quamdam 
conformitatem imaginis ad Filium  D ei naturalem: quod quidem fit dupliciter: primo quidem  fit per
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service o f  h im  in  ou r ne ighbour (c f. M t  25:31-46). Thus, i f  in  im ita t io n  o f  C h ris t w e 
are ca lled  to  fo l lo w  h is  w a y  o f  love  and service, tha t im ita tio n  w i l l  necessarily  in c lu d e  
the cross. C h ris t says, “ w here I  am, there w i l l  m y  servant be a lso”  (Jn  12:26). 
There fo re , w e  are ca lled  to  fo l lo w  h is path com ple te ly , no t sh rin k in g  fro m  accepting  
the se lf-sa c rifice  in vo lve d  in  love  (c f. Jn 15.T2-13).163
T h is  means tha t i t  is  ou r re la tionsh ip  w ith  C h ris t in  im ita t io  and se q u e la , liv e d  
in  the  S p ir it, tha t fo rm s the env ironm ent fo r  the flo u r is h in g  o f  a l i fe  liv e d  in  ho liness 
and v ir tu e .164 Indeed, Pope John Paul saw that a ttitude  o f  fo l lo w in g  C h ris t as “ the 
essentia l and [p a rticu la r] founda tion  o f  C hris tian  m o ra lity .” 165 In  im ita t io  and s e q u e la  
o u r thoughts, fee lings, actions are thus rem oulded accord ing to  C h ris t. P inckaers says 
tha t in  the im ita t io n  o f  C h ris t (and hence in  the resora tion  o f  im age and likeness), 
“ p a rtic ip a tio n  o f  the in te lle c t”  is  “ essential.” 166 H ere he m en tions  its  acts o f  w isd o m  
and prudence as be ing a ffected b y  ou r im ita tio n  o f  C hris t. Indeed, th is  is  to  be 
expected, g ive n  tha t St Paul ca lls  C h ris t our w isdom  (c f. 1 C o r 1:30). H o w e ve r, one
gratiam viae, quae est conformitas imperfecta: secundo per gloriam  patriae, quae erit conform itas 
perfecta”  (emphasis in text); Romanus Cessario, “ Christian Personalism and A doptive Sonship,”  in 
L 'Antropologia della Teologia Morale secondo L ’Enciclica “Veritatis Splendor": Atti del Simposio 
promosso dalla Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, Roma, settembre 2003 (Vatican C ity: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006), 92-101, at 93.
163 C f. Veritatis Splendor, 20-21, at 21: “ Being a follow er o f  Christ means becoming 
conformed to him w ho becam e a servant even to giving him self on the Cross (cf. Phil. 2:5-8)”
(emphasis in text). C f. AAS 85 (1993), 1150: “ Iesu discipulos [discipuli] esse significat Ei conform es 
fieri, qui servus factus est usque ad sui ipsius donationem in cruce.”  A m ong m any possible exam ples in 
spiritual writing, both Thomas a Kem pis and John o f  the Cross clearly recognise that im itating Christ is 
not all “ sweetness and ease,”  but involves the w ay o f  the cross. C f. Thomas a Kem pis, The Imitation o f  
Christ, trans. o f  1441 manuscript by Edgar Daplyn (London: Sheed &  W ard, 1952; paperback ed.,
1978), II, 1 1-12 , at 12 “ W hy therefore fear to bear a cross by which you com e into a kingdom ?” ; John 
o f  the Cross, Ascent o f  Mount Carmel, II, 7, 8 (p. 124): “ A  man makes progress only through imitation 
o f  Christ, W ho is the W ay, the Truth, and the Life. [...] A ccordingly, I should not consider any 
spirituality worthwhile that would w alk in sweetness and ease and run from imitation o f  Christ.”
164 Cessario says that the new form o f  being cultivated in the believer b y  the infused virtues 
“ amounts to a real participation in the imitatio Christi.”  Thus, we should alw ays recognise that the 
starting point o f  imitatio and o f  the virtuous life is given by God, and is not established b y ourselves.
C f. Cessario, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 112.
165 Veritatis Splendor, 19: “Following Christ is thus the essential and primordial foundation o f  
Christian morality” (emphasis in English text); AAS 85 (1993), 1149: “ Qua de re Christum sequi 
fundamentum est essentiale et proprium doctrinae moralis christianae.”  It seem s to me that ‘particular’ 
rather than ‘prim ordial’ as in the English text would have been a better translation o f  proprium.
166 Pinckaers, “ Ethics and the Image o f  God,”  140. Naturally, Pinckaers also observes the 
necessary involvem ent o f  our free will. See ibid.
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o u r conscience also starts to  take on the fo rm  o f  C hris t. B i l ly  and K e a tin g  see the
• 168 —
cross as cen tra l to  th is  trans fo rm ation . I t  is in  liv in g  in  the paschal m ys te ry  o f  C h ris t
tha t w e see the sense in , and ga in  the courage to , take up the cross d a ily  (c f. L k  9 :23;
M k  8 :34), and meet tem p ta tion  o r e v il w ith  goodness and lo v e .169 Thus, the
“ conscience begins [...] to  bear m arks o f  the cross”  in  m ee ting  e v il w ith  good, acting
1
in  obedience to  the Father, as C h ris t d id . Th is  means tha t at the  heart o f  ‘p u tt in g  on 
the m in d  o f  C h r is t’ is the deve lopm ent o f  an a ttitude o f  se lf-sa c rifice , a conscience 
tha t is  m ou lded  in  im ita t io n  o f  the love  o f  C hrist.
The b lu e p rin t o f  o u r im ita tio n  is presented to  us in  h is  com m andm ent to  love  
(Jn 15:12) and in  the B eatitudes,171 w h ich  are “ sort o f  s e lf -p o r tra it  o f  C h r is t .” 172 
There fo re , to  im ita te  h im  w e are to  w a lk  the w a y  o f  the B eatitudes, in  the  lig h t  o f  the 
D eca logue and the aposto lic  teaching, and sustained b y  the grace o f  the H o ly  S p ir it .173 
Y e t, th is  im ita t io n  needs a setting, w h ich , in  fact, is  the re a lity  o f  o u r live s  in  a ll its  
va rie ty . T h is  m eans that the judgem ents o f  our conscience are co n fo rm ed  to  C h ris t in  
the ve ry  c ircum stances o f  ou r liv e s .174
should add conscience to the list, too. In “holding fast to the very person o f  Jesus f 161
167 Veritatis Splendor, 19 (emphasis in text); AAS 85 (1993), 1149: “ adhaerendo ad ipsam 
Christi personam.”
168 B illy  and Keating, The Way o f  Mystery, 108.
169 Ibid.: “ Specifically, the cross entails the disposition to meet evil with love. [...] In the face 
o f  evil, this disposition can place the believer in the throes o f  suffering. This suffering is know n b y  
those w ho wrestle w ith the choice o f  virtue in the context o f  temptation.”
170 Ibid. Sim ilarly, V on Balthasar declared all Christian ethics to be “ cruciform ,”  both in its 
reference to G od and humanity, but also more fundamentally because the paschal m ystery, the 
crucified Christ stands at the centre. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, “N ine Propositions on Christian 
Ethics,”  in H einz Schiirmann, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, and Hans Urs von  Balthasar, Principles o f  
Christian Morality, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), III, 3 (p. 86):
171 See CCC, nos. 1716-172 9.
172 C f. Veritatis Splendor, 16 (emphasis in text); AAS 85 (1993), 114 7: “ quaedam Christi 
im ago ab ipso picta” ; CCC, nos. 17 17 , 459, at 459: “ The W ord became flesh to be our model o f  
holiness. [...] Jesus is the m odel for the Beatitudes and the norm o f  the new  Law : ‘ L o ve  one another as 
I have loved you. This love implies an effective offering o f  oneself, after his exam ple”  (em phasis in 
text).
173 CCC, 1724.
174 Keating and M cCarthy, “ Habits o f  Holiness,”  835: “ The heart o f  spirituality and moral 
living point enduringly to the ordinary location o f  our lives, the parish, the hom e, our w ork or 
profession, our children and their needs.”
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O u r live s  present us w ith  systems and conventions w h ic h  fo l lo w  c o n flic t in g  
values. T h is  can p lace us in  cha lleng ing  situations w here w e are ca lled  upon  to  m ake 
tough  decis ions. I t  w o u ld  be n ice  to  th in k  tha t m o ra lity  cou ld  reso lve  such c o n flic t,  
re lie v in g  us o f  the unpopu la r o r d if f ic u lt  choice. H ow ever, m o ra lity  cannot reso lve  
values tha t are d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposed; an attem pt at re so lu tio n  w o u ld  re la tiv ise  bo th  
tru th  and goodness. There fore , rather than seeking to  com bine  co n tra d ic to ry  practices, 
w e are ca lled  to  ask: “ W h a t k in d  o f  practices can sustain an agent’ s fo rm a tio n  and 
o rie n ta tio n  to  the good? W h a t k in d  o f  practices o rie n t us to  seeing G od  in  the 
w o r ld ? ”  K e a tin g  and M cC a rth y  propose that the practice  o f  goodness and ho liness 
in  o rd in a ry  l i fe  is  he ld  together th rough  a life  live d  in  the C h u rch .176 W e are the re fo re  
led  to  conc lude th is  chapter w ith  a b r ie f re fle c tio n  on the im p a c t o f  the l i fe  o f  the 
C hurch  on  conscience .177
6. C om m u n io  a s  th e  K ey  C ontext f o r  Christian C on sc ien ce
A n  o ft-quo te d  m a x im  sum m aris ing the re la tionsh ip  between o u r p ractice  o f  p raye r as 
C hurch  and the con ten t o f  o u r fa ith  is lex o ra n d i, lex  c re d e n d i,178 H ow eve r, o u r l i fe  o f  
p rayer n o t o n ly  a rticu la tes o u r fa ith : i t  also necessarily expresses the fo u n d a tio n  o f  ou r
175 Ibid., 833.
176 Ibid., 835: “ W hen the ‘exercise’ o f  day-to day living coheres w ith the practices o f  the 
Church [...] spirituality encompasses the task o f  living w ell and uncovers the divine origin o f  the 
everyday, even as it directs one to G od as ultimate end” (emphasis in text)
177 Here I am lim iting m yself to discussion o f  the the formation o f  conscience within the 
Catholic Church. H owever, further research should be made into how this relates to the form ation o f  
conscience in those w ho belong to other churches or ecclesial communities, as w ell as beyond the 
ambit o f  the Christian faith. A s the Spirit blows where he w ills (cf. Jn 3:8), through the w hole o f  
creation and all o f  history, some have proposed the action o f  the Spirit as an interpretive k e y  to such an 
investigation. C f. Dennis J. B illy , “ The Person o f  the H oly Spirit as the Source o f  the Christian M oral 
L ife ,”  Studia Moralia 36 (1998): 325-59; Philip J. Rosato, “ The M ission o f  the Spirit W ithin and 
B eyond the Church,” The Ecumenical Review 41 (1989): 388-97; Yannis Spiteris, “ II D ialogo 
Intercristiano e Interreligioso e Lo Spirito Santo: Segni di Speranza,”  Studia Moralia 36 (1998): 479- 
507.
178 Cf. Y v e s  M.-J. Congar, Tradition and Traditions: An Historical and a Theological Essay, 
trans. M ichael N aseby and Thom as Rainborough (London: Bum s &  Oates, 1966), 354-55. Lex orandi, 
lex credendi is the typical form o f  the maxim drawn from Prosper o f  Aquitaine’ s statement Uut legem 
credendi lex statuat supplicandi." C f. Aidan Kavanagh, On Liturgical Theology: The Hale Memorial 
Lectures o f  Seabury- Western Theological Seminary, 1981 (N ew York: Pueblo, 1984), 9 1, 18 1, n .l .
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action , a fo u n d a tio n  tha t goes to  the depths o f  our be ing  th ro u g h  ou r l iv in g  covenan ta l 
bond  w ith  the Father in  the S p ir it, forged th rough  the saving act o f  the Son (c f. H eb 
9 :14 -15), in  w h ic h  w e  are ca lled  to  liv e  fo r  G od the new  li fe  w e have rece ived  (c f. 
R om  6 :11 , 6 :5 ).179 The re a lity  o f  our fa ith , expressed in  prayer, is  to  be m ade e ffe c tive
i o n  « »  ,  ,  ,
th rough  love , in  im ita tio n  o f  C hris t. Thus, we cou ld  say tha t ou r prayer, fa ith  and 
ac tion  as C hris tians  are in e x tr ica b ly  lin ked  as le x  o ra n d i, le x  c re d e n d i, le x  a g e n d i.m  
T h is  also im p lie s  tha t th is  ru le  o f  action is no t the preserve o f  iso la ted  in d iv id u a ls . 
L iv io  M e lin a  observes tha t the “ new  com m andm ent o f  cha rity , l ik e  the E ucha ris t, is
1 o?
g iven  f ir s t  o f  a ll to  the C hurch and in  the C hurch .”  There fo re , w e can say tha t
—  1 O T
C h ris tia n  m o ra lity  has a cons titu tive  ue c c les ia l fo r m .”  I t  is  in  the  e n v iro n m e n t o f
1 84
the C hurch  tha t w e bo th  liv e  and act as the adopted sons and daughters o f  G od, and 
i t  is there fo re  in  th is  co m m u n io  that we m ost f in d  tha t w h ic h  sustains o u r m o ra l 
action , and tha t w h ic h  is  m ost conducive to  the C hris tian  fo rm a tio n  o f  consc ience .185 
The C hurch , gathered and acting  in  C h ris t’ s name (c f. M t  18:20; John 14:13), is  the 
con tex t in  w h ic h  w e rece ive G o d ’ s grace and m ercy, a u tho rita tive  teach ing  and the 
support o f  m u tua l exam ple and he lp  o f  our fe llo w  C hris tians .186
179 Luis F. Ladaria, “ Chiesa e V ita  M orale,”  in Camminare nella Luce: Prospettive della 
Teologia Morale a  Partire da ‘Veritatis Splendor’, ed. L ivio M elina and José N oriega (Rome: Lateran 
U niversity Press, 2004), 30 1-17, at 301-302.
180 Cf. G al 5:6: “ the only thing that counts is faith working through love.”
181 C f. B illy  and Keating, The Way o f  Mystery, 25; Robson, ‘With the Spirit and Power o f  
Elijah’, 380-81.
182 L iv io  M elina, “ M oral Theology and the Ecclésial Sense: Points for a Theological ‘Re- 
dim ensioning’ o f  M orality,”  trans. Sr M ary Jeremiah, Communio 19 (1992): 67-93, at 81.
183 Ibid. M elina continues, “ Ecclésial communio is the proper form o f  the new  life w hich is 
bom  from  the Eucharist. See ibid.
184 C f. Ladaria, “ Chiesa e V ita M orale,”  305, 309.
185 C f. Veritatis Splendor, 119: “ Christian morality consists, in the sim plicity o f  the G ospel, in 
following Jesus Christ, in abandoning on eself to him, in letting on eself be transformed b y his grace and 
renewed by his m ercy, gifts which com e to us in the living communion o f  his Church”  (em phasis in 
text); AAS 85 (1993), 1226: “ [...], quia ilia [Christiana doctrina moralis], secundum evangelicam  
simplicitatem, consistit in sequendo Iesum Christum et in nobis ipsis Ei tradendis, necnon in sinendo ut 
ipsius gratia transformemur atque eius misericordia renovemur: quae ad nos perveniunt per vitam  
communionis E cclesiae eius.”  Cf. Ladaria, “ Chiesa e V ita  M orale,”  315.
186 CCC, no. 1785: (talking o f  the formation o f  conscience): “ W e are assisted by the gifts o f  
the H oly Spirit, aided by the witness or advice o f  others and guided b y the authoritative teaching o f  the 
Church.”
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O ur v o ca tio n  in  the S p ir it as adopted sons and daughters o f  G od, as a 
co m m u n io  o f  the  B o d y  o f  C h ris t (R om  12 :4-5),187 in  u n io n  w ith  C h ris t and w ith  each 
other, p rov ides  the basis fo r  the sensus f ld e i  w h ic h  “ also inc ludes the sensus
1 RR
m o ru m .”  The  m o ra l sense o f  each in d iv id u a l C h ris tian  is v e ry  m uch  bound  up  w ith
f  i  O Q
his o r her u n io n  w ith  the rest o f  the Church, such tha t o u r search fo r  the  tru th  and 
ou r re co g n itio n  tha t w e  are ca lled  to  liv e  in  lo ve  relate to  o u r id e n tity  as ‘“ w e ” ’ .190 
Thus, the im p lic a tio n s  o f  the ecclesial id e n tity  o f  the C h ris tia n  m eans tha t the 
conscience o f  the in d iv id u a l C hris tian  also contains an essentia l ecc les ia l 
d im e n s io n .191 In  th is  w a y  co n-sc ien tia , k n o w in g -w ith , co inc ides w ith  s e n tire  cum
■ • • 1Q')
e c c les ia , th in k in g  w ith  the Church. The re la tiona l, in te rpersona l e lem ent o f  
conscience, the cum  a l io  s c ie n tia  tha t seeks the tru th  in  one’ s be ing, in  o thers and in  
G od, thus fin d s  a p r iv ile g e d  place in  k n o w in g  w ith  the C hurch , a c o m m u n io  o f  
persons in  u n io n  w ith  each o ther th rough  th e ir  oneness in  the S p ir it .193 F ro m  th is  
understand ing, conscience and M ag is te rium  are no longer pe rce ived  as opposites, bu t 
ra ther “ com p lem enta ry  func tions , w o rk in g  at d is tinc t, bu t n o t separate le ve ls ”  un ite d  
in  th e ir  o r ig in  in  the H o ly  S p ir it and in  th e ir goal, nam ely, to  seek and do  the  tru th ,
187 For Pinckaers’ comments on Paul’ s ecclesial notion o f  conscience inserted into the B o d y  o f  
Christ, see Servais Pinckaers, “ Conscience and Christian Tradition,”  trans. Sr M ary Thom as N ob le, in 
The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkm an and C raig Steven Titus 
(W ashington, D C : Catholic University o f  Am erica Press, 2005), 321-41, at 325-329, 338.
188 C f. Ladaria, “ Chiesa e V ita  M orale,”  305, 309; Lumen Gentium, 12; AAS 57 (1965), 16.
189 C f. Ladaria, “ C hiesa e V ita  M orale,”  315: “ L a vocazione del singolo non si può separare da 
quella dei fratelli, non si può cercare la verità da solo senza il rischio dello smarrimento”  [“ The 
vocation o f  the individual cannot be separated from that o f  his brothers and sisters; one cannot seek the 
truth alone without the risk o f  getting lost” ].
190 See also V on  Balthasar, Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics, II, 3 (p. 84): “ A t  the more- 
than-organic -  that is, the personal -  level o f  the Church, our membership in the ‘one b o d y ’ means that 
w e are given  a personal awareness o f  being a ‘ w e ’ ; implementing it in terms o f  life is the Christian’ s 
ethical task.”
191 C f. Ladaria, “ C hiesa e V ita  M orale,”  314.
192 C f. M elina, “ M oral Theology and the Ecclesial Sense, 92, 90.
193 C f. ibid., 92: “ The reference back to the ecclesial ‘w e ’ becom es the condition o f  truth [,] 
for opening to the Spirit given  by Christ to his Spouse the Church. Starting from  a theological 
rediscovery o f  the conscience-Church-H oly Spirit relationship, an earlier moral theology using an 
autonomous and individualistic conception o f  conscience must be critically exam ined.”
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tha t w e m ig h t bear the im age o f  C h ris t.194 In  th is  con text, th ro u g h  its  “ m a ie u tic  
fu n c tio n ,”  the M a g is te r iu m  serves the conscience to  h e lp in g  i t  to  recogn ise  and 
receive the tru th , a tru th  tha t is already part o f  onese lf,195 and i t  is  to  th is  tru th  tha t w e 
g ive  ou r persona l assent.
C le a rly  th is  v ie w  d iffe rs  ra d ica lly  fro m  a m o ra l p lu ra lis t stance, w h e re b y  the 
le ve l o f  p a rticu la r, ‘ “ ca tegorica l m ora l questions’ ”  is excised fro m  the b o n d  be tw een 
fa ith  and m ora ls , and the conscience is  v iew ed  in  m ore in d iv id u a lis t ic  te rm s, m a k in g  
i t  “ ex te rna l to  eccles ia l ‘ co m m u n io ’ .” 196 H ow ever, to  separate the C hu rch  fro m  the 
in d iv id u a l in  such a w a y  as to  reduce the C hu rch ’ s m o ra l ro le  to  the  general, 
transcendental le ve l is  to  fo rge t tha t fo llo w in g  C h ris t’ s w a y  is  tro d  “ step b y  step, b y
i n 7
everyday acts,”  and n o t at the leve l o f  genera lities, and tha t w e  w a lk  the  w a y  o f  
C h ris t toge ther as C hurch . The conscience o f  the in d iv id u a l has a un ique  and essentia l 
p lace in  m o ra l action . A s  such, i t  cannot be bypassed o r substitu ted  b y  the 
M a g is te riu m  o f  the C hu rch .198 H ow ever, g iven  o u r ecclesia l existence as the B o d y  o f  
C h ris t, the conscience is  no t alone in  its  judgem ents, indeed, n o r need i t  be o r  shou ld  
i t  be. W e  need cha llenge and support in  seeking the tru th  and the g o o d .199 Thus, 
Servais P inckaers says:
194 M elina, “ M oral Theology and the Ecclesial Sense, 92-93.
195 C f. Ratzinger, “ I f  Y o u  W ant P eace... Conscience and Truth,”  94. Since this truth is in our 
very being, (as synderesis or anamnesis), the role o f  the M agisterium  is therefore to help this 
primordial m em ory “ becom e aware o f  its own self.”  See ibid.
196 M elina, “ M oral Conscience and ‘ Com m unio’ ,”  674-75. Elsewhere, M elina calls this 
separation o f  the Church from  the particular level o f  morals a “ de-moralising”  o f  the Church (de­
m oralizzare). C f. L iv io  M elina, “ L a Chiesa e il Dinamismo dell’A gire ,”  in Camminare nella Luce: 
Prospettive della Teologia Morale a Partire da ‘Veritatis Splendor ', ed. L ivio  M elina and José N oriega 
(Rome: Lateran U niversity Press, 2004), 281-99, at 283.
197 CCC, no. 1724.
198 C f. M elina, “ M oral Conscience and ‘ Com m unio’ ,”  686.
199 C f. Servais Pinckaers, “ L a Coscienza e L ’Errore,”  Communio [M ilan ed.] 130 (1993): 40- 
51, at 5 1. W ith regard to challenge, V on  Balthasar says our conscience, as “ G o d ’ s vo ice”  within, needs 
to be challenged b y  the external W ord o f  G od in Scripture and “ the living w ord o f  the Church [...] in 
sermon and teaching” , listened to “ in an attitude o f  worship, in the m ilieu o f  the Church and in 
connection w ith her sacraments.”  See V on  Balthasar, Prayer, 30-31.
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[C onscience ] pushes us to  m ake use o f  a ll the sources o f  tru th  th a t are at 
o u r d isposal: the teaching o f  R eve la tion  and o f  the  C hu rch  in  its  
m ag is te rium , the doctrine  and exam ple o f  the saints, b o th  canonised and 
non, the re fle c tions  o f  theolog ians and the advice  o f  experts o r o f  ou r 
fr iends , because w e need each other in  the search fo r  the  good. B u t above 
a ll, conscience inv ites  us to  app ly  ourselves to  lis te n in g  to  the in te r io r  
Teacher, C h ris t, ou r lig h t, in  assiduous m ed ita tio n  o f  h is  w o rd  and in  the 
conversa tion  o f  prayer. 00
The eccles ia l d im ens ion  o f  C h ris tian  conscience the re fo re  im p lie s  th a t i t  
depends upon  a w h o le  ra ft o f  elements fo r  support in  its  m o ra l d e lib e ra tio n  and 
judgem en t. P inckaers says tha t “ we need each o ther in  the search fo r  the good .”  T h is  
shou ld  n o t be understood  as weakness, no r as an argum ent created s im p ly  to  ju s t i fy  
the p lace o f  m ag is te ria l teaching in  spec ific  m ora l issues. R ather, conscience in  the 
con tex t o f  co m m u n io  in v ite s  us to  pu t C h ris t at the centre o f  th ings , and to  m ake ou r 
judgem ents in  fa ith  and h u m ility , w ith  a w illin g n e ss  to  lis te n  to  and to  accept good 
counsel.
7 . C on clu sion
T h is  chapter has focused m ore d ire c tly  upon  the con text o f  ho liness w ith in  w h ic h  the 
C h ris tia n  conscience operates and flourishes. Here the v irtu o u s  life ,  in fo rm e d  b y  
grace, is  p laced  fu l ly  w ith in  the setting o f  our re la tionsh ip  w ith  G od  in  prayer, a 
re la tionsh ip  w h ic h  nourishes our m ora l understanding and sustains o u r reso lve  to  seek 
the tru th  and to  do the good out o f  love  fo r  h im  and love  fo r  ne ighbou r. T h is  thesis
OA1
has argued fo r  a dynam ic  approach to  conscience, a perspective  w h ic h  recognises
200 Pinckaers, “ L a Coscienza e L ’Errore,”  51 : “ [La coscienza] ci spinge a servirci di tutte le 
fonti della verità che sono a nostra disposizione: gli insegnamenti della R ivelazione e della C hiesa  nel 
suo magistero, la dottrina e gli esempi dei santi, canonizzati e no, le riflessioni dei teologi e i consigli 
degli esperti o dei nostri am ici, poiché noi abbiamo bisogno gli uni degli altri nella ricerca del bene. M a 
soprattutto la coscienza ci invita a porci all’ ascolto del Maestro interiore, Cristo, nostra luce, nella 
meditazione assidua della sua parola e nel colloquio della preghiera.”
201 Pinckaers calls this “ dynamic interiority.”  C f. Pinckaers, “ R ediscovering V irtue,”  364-65.
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tha t conscience needs to  g row , and tha t such g ro w th  is m ost f i t t in g ly  m ade th rough  
v ir tu e  and grace, in  the con text o f  s tr iv in g  to  liv e  in  a l i fe  o f  ho liness (c f. 2 Peter 3 :11 - 
15.18) in  co m m u n io n  w ith  G od and w ith  others. Such a con tex t also fu l ly  recognises 
the struggles peop le  face in  try in g  to  liv e  in  holiness, tem pted and w eak  as w e  are. 
Here w e  tu rn  to  G o d ’ s m ercy  and grace, and to  the support o f  the  C hu rch  to  l i f t  us up 
and c a ll us fo rw a rd  in  hope once more.
U lt im a te ly , then, acknow ledg ing  bo th  its  d ig n ity  and its  weaknesses, 
conscience cannot f r u it fu l ly  operate in  iso la tion . C h ris tian  conscience is  a hum an 
capacity  tha t is  to  be exercised in  un ion  w ith  God. I t  is a ju d g e m e n t roo ted  in  the tru th  
o f  re a lity , tha t is  made bea u tifu l th rough  v irtu e  and grace, so th a t i t  becom es a w o rth y  
m eeting  p lace o f  the soul w ith  C hrist. St A lb e r t the G reat sums th is  up  b y  lik e n in g  
conscience to  a bed strew n w ith  flow e rs ,202 where the soul meets C h ris t h e r Spouse. 
The flo w e rs  are the v irtues, w h ic h  need to  be in  evidence i f  w e  w is h  to  stay close to  
C h ris t.203 Thus, conscience directs ou r m ora l action , bu t u lt im a te ly  i t  d irec ts  us to  
G od, the source o f  a ll goodness, and i t  is in  s tay ing close to  h im  th a t w e  are ab le  to  
“ d iscern  [...] w h a t is  good and acceptable and pe rfec t”  (R om  12:2).
202 St A lbert draws from the Vulgate version o f  the Canticle o f  Canticles, in w hich w e find: 
“Ecce tu pulcher es dilecte mi et decorus lectulus noster floridus”  (Cantic. 1:15).
3 C f. St A lbert the Great, De Natura Boni, in Opera Omnia, vol. 25, part 1, ed. E. Filthaut 
(Aschendorff: M onasterii W estfalorum, 1974), tract. II, pars 3, cap. 2A , q. 2 (page 104): “ Est autem 
lectulus floridus conscientia respersa virtutibus [...]. Si ergo conscientiae lectulus non prius virtutibus 
sit refertus, non requiescet tecum  sponsus in ipso” [“N ow  the flow ery bed is conscience strewn w ith 
virtues (...). If, therefore, the bed o f  conscience is not filled with virtues beforehand, the Spouse w ill 
not rest in it w ith you ” ] ; Pangallo, Legge di Dio, 141-42. The imagery m ay seem  to describe 
conscience more in terms o f  a faculty, but other texts o f  Albert would affirm  it to be an act o f  
judgem ent. Perhaps, therefore, we could use this image to describe the unity o f  the tw o levels, habitus 
and act, that is, synderesis and conscientia.
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C o n c lu s io n
U nders tand ing  conscience in  sub jec tiv is t term s has become com m onp lace  in  m o d e m  
cu ltu re . The  in v io la b il ity  and d ig n ity  o f  conscience is r ig h t ly  p rom oted , b u t in  a 
m a im er w h ic h  is detached fro m  its  proper context. Detached fro m  o ther e lem ents tha t 
bestow  and q u a lify  its  d ig n ity , conscience is therefore seen b y  m any  as the  u ltim a te  
dec is ion -m ake r, one tha t cannot be challenged. C lea rly , seeing conscience in  absolute 
term s, as supported b y  em o tiv ism , w e are le ft  in  a s itua tion  w here  the in d iv id u a l 
conscience is  defended, bu t the question o f  m ora l tru th  is le f t  to  the side, re la tiv ise d  
b y  com pe ting  a rb itra ry  op in ion . Th is  understanding o f  conscience is  o b v io u s ly  fa r 
fro m  the n o tio n  presented in  h is to ry , p a rticu la rly  in  the con tex t o f  C a th o lic  m o ra l 
theo logy . H o w e ve r, ove r the centuries, sh ifts  in  sty le in  m o ra l th e o lo g y  have 
occasioned a p rogressive  em p ty ing  o f  the perce ived content o r fu n c tio n  o f  conscience, 
to  the p o in t th a t i t  has come to  be understood b y  m any as the e ithe r the  locus  o f  b lin d  
obedience o r ju s t if ie d  oppos itio n  to  an im posed external law . In  th is  w a y  elem ents o f  
a fragm ented  (o r  iso la ted), e m o tiv is t understanding o f  conscience have co lou red  the 
th e o lo g ica l n o tio n , e ithe r in  term s o f  a r ig o r is t reaction  against the secu lar n o tio n , o r 
b y  w a y  o f  an in co rp o ra tio n  o f  certa in  aspects o f  the sub jec tiv is t v ie w p o in t.
I t  is  the  prevalence o f  th is  weakened, in d iv id u a lis t n o tio n  o f  conscience tha t 
presented the s ta rting  p o in t fo r  th is  investiga tion  in to  the nature and con tex t o f  
conscience. S tim u la ted  by pastoral experience, p a rticu la rly  w ith  in d iv id u a ls  and th e ir 
m o ra l d ilem m as, I  was draw n to  make fu rth e r enqu iry  in to  h o w  conscience m ig h t 
operate in  re la tio n  to  the o ther elements o f  m o ra lity , such as o b je c tiv ity , tru th , 
a u tho rita tive  teach ing , socia l setting and counsel fro m  others. H o w e ve r, a m a jo r pa rt
1. R e v ie w in g  th e  A im  o f  the  Thesis
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o f  m y  ques tion ing  focused upon the m ora l g ro w th  o f  the in d iv id u a l. I f  the  conscience 
is  n o t absolute, i t  is capable o f  error. T h is  fundam enta l co n c lu s io n  leads us to  
investiga te  tw o  m a jo r issues: the perception o f  e rro r and the desire  fo r  the re d u c tio n  o f  
error.
I t  is  sa id  tha t w e learn b y  o u r m istakes, bu t i f  the errors are no t pe rce ived  as 
m istakes, w e  cannot learn  fro m  them , so perpetuating the w ro n g d o in g , o r lead ing  us 
to  do som eth ing  worse. T h is  s itua tion  o f  ignorance o r s e lf- in flic te d  b lindness draw s us 
to  re fle c t upon  conscience’ s percep tion  o f  tru th  and goodness, and its  capac ity  to  
re fle c t upon  pe rfo rm ed  action. M oreover, i f  an acceptance o f  the  fa l l ib i l i t y  o f  
conscience is  coup led  w ith  a desire to  do the good, o r to  do be tte r m o ra lly , w e  are led  
to  seek some m eans o f  reduc ing  the lik e lih o o d  o f  error. B o th  issues o f  awareness and 
im p rovem en t led  m e to  research in to  v irtue , grace and the c a ll to  ho liness as the 
setting  fo r  th is  reduc tion  o f  error, o r p u t m ore po s itive ly , the se tting  fo r  m o ra l g row th . 
W ith  these basic prem ises we arrive  at the m o tiva tio n  beh ind  the  m a jo r elem ents o f  
th is  thesis. In  h ig h lig h tin g  the question o f  fragm enta tion  in  m o ra l th e o ry , and in  ou r 
understand ing  o f  conscience, the f irs t chapter set the scene fo r  a s tudy  in  chapters tw o  
to  fo u r  o f  the  nature o f  conscience accord ing to  h is to rica l pe riods and sp e c ific  themes, 
w ith  the p a rticu la r in te n tio n  o f  h ig h lig h tin g  bo th  the d ig n ity  and the fa l l ib i l i t y  o f  
conscience, as w e ll as its re la tiona l nature. T h is  provides us w ith  the fo u n d a tio n  fo r  a 
d iscussion on  v ir tu e  and grace, cu lm in a tin g  in  a n o tion  o f  conscience w h ic h  f irm ly  
sets its  purpose and fu n c tio n  in  the con text o f  a liv in g  re la tionsh ip  w ith  G o d  and w ith  
others, p a rtic u la r ly  in  the co m m unio  o f  the Church. H av ing  n o w  sum m arised the a im  
o f  the thesis, le t us b r ie f ly  re v ie w  some o f  its  key find ings , s ta rting  w ith  the h is to r ica l 
study.
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O ur e x p lo ra tio n  o f  the C h ris tian  use o f  conscience f irs t d re w  us back to  its  o rig in s  in  
the G reek te rm  syneidesis , da ting  back to  about 500 B .C . S yneid es is  is  the  n o u n  d raw n 
fro m  the ve rb  s y n o id a  w h ic h  refers to  someone w ho  ‘ has kn o w le d g e  o f  som eth ing  
w ith ’ another person o r oneself, o r know s som ething w e ll. A lth o u g h  the usage o f  the 
te rm  w as rare at f irs t, i t  became m ore frequent and m ore stable in  m ean ing  in  bo th  
secular G reek w r it in g s  and H e lle n is tic  Jew ish w orks  b y  the tim e  o f  the  f ir s t  cen tu ry  
A .D ., as attested to  b y  w rite rs  such as P lutarch, P h ilo  and Josephus. T h is  frequency  o f  
usage con tinued  in  R om an authors, such as C icero and Seneca, th ro u g h  the L a tin  
tra n s la tio n  c o n s c ie n tia , w h ic h  is a con traction  o f  c u m -s c ie n tia . W h ile  in  t im e  the 
m o ra l s ig n ifica n ce  o f  syneidesis  (and co nsc ien tia ) came to  h o ld  sw ay, fro m  e a rly  on, 
the w o rd  was used to  describe tw o  d iffe ren t, though at tim es  re la ted, acts: ph ys ica l 
awareness and m o ra l awareness. P rio r to  C hris tian  usage the  w o rd  syn e id es is  was 
a lm ost a lw ays re la ted to  bad past actions, and m ost o f  the a tten tion  w as g ive n  to  its  
ro le  in  d ra w in g  a tten tion  to  the w rongdo in g  b y  means o f  e lic it in g  p a in fu l o r g u ilty  
fee lings , tho u g h  th is  d id  n o t com p le te ly  exclude some lim ite d  unders tand ing  o f  
syneidesis  as also an act o f  judgem en t concern ing the w ro n g fu l deed.
In  sacred Scrip ture , apart fro m  ve ry  rare appearances in  S ap ien tia l L ite ra tu re , 
the w o rd  syneides is  appears e xc lu s ive ly  in  the N e w  Testam ent, w here  S t P au l is  the 
f ir s t  to  use the  te rm . In  the w ritin g s  o f  St Paul syneidesis  has the characte ris tics  o f  
be ing  an instance o f  c r it ic a l re fle c tio n  about onese lf and about the  actions o f  others, 
tha t is  fo u n d  in  a ll people. Fo r Paul, syneidesis  is a hum an capac ity  w h ic h , though  
re la ted to  G o d ’ s presence, is  n o t w ith o u t the p o s s ib ility  o f  e rro r o r c o n f lic t  w ith  
another person, and so shou ld  no t be considered as the u ltim a te  ju d g e  o f  o u r actions, 
since th is  is, in  fact, G od. I t  is clear tha t Paul develops the m ean ing  o f  the  te rm , in
2. C onsc ience  in  H is to ry
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such a w a y  tha t h is  usage should n o t s im p ly  be equated w ith  the fo rm e r p ro fane  
n o tion , focused on  past bad actions, ep itom ised in  p a in fu l m etaphors. G iv e n  St P a u l’ s 
background, i t  w o u ld  be sensible to  in fe r tha t some o f  the m ean ing  o f  the  Jew ish  use 
o f  ‘ hea rt’ ( l e t )  fo rm s p a rt o f  h is  understanding o r expanded use o f  syneides is .
In  la te r N e w  Testam ent w ritin g s , we note that, b y  and la rge, conscience is  n o w  
characterised b y  its  a ttribu tes, nearly  a ll o f  w h ic h  are p o s itive , such as a ‘ g o o d ’ o r a 
‘ c le a r’ conscience. Thus, in  com parison to  the pro fane G reek n o tio n , the focus has 
sh ifted  co m p le te ly , and the good o r clear conscience ( lin k e d  to  o u r re la tio n sh ip  w ith  
G od), ra the r than  a g u ilty  conscience, is n o w  the no rm  ra the r than  the exception . A  
num ber o f  the  passages express a m uch stronger connection  to  b e lie f  in  the  tenets o f  
the fa ith , and in  some instances continue to  relate the state o f  the  conscience to  the 
state o f  the  heart. These p o s itive  descrip tions therefore ind ica te  a concen tra tio n  on  
f id e lity  to  G od  and in te g r ity  o f  life , rather than on g u ilt  o r p e rp le x ity . A s  a resu lt, 
m any o f  the  post-P au line  texts accentuate the ecclesia l d im ens ion  o f  an in d iv id u a l’ s 
conscience, as w e ll as encourag ing C hris tians to  be good c itizens.
The M id d le  Ages saw the f irs t attempts at a system atic s tudy o f  conscience. 
The e ffo rts  o f  the Scholastics were no t o n ly  b u ilt  upon  S crip tu re  and G reek 
p h ilo so p h y , b u t also P a tris tic  sources. A s  a resu lt, Scholastic ana lys is w as h e a v ily  
in fluence d  b y  an extract fro m  St Jerom e’ s C o m m e n ta ry  on  E z e k ie l presented in  the 
w id e ly -u se d  G lo s s a  O r d in a r ia ,  w h ic h  conta ined a spe lling  erro r, chang ing  syneidesis  
to  synderes is . Thus, m ed ieva l analysis o f  conscience was d iv id e d  in to  tw o  leve ls: 
synderes is  and c o n sc ien tia . A  deta iled survey o f  the Scho lastic  s tudy o f  conscience, 
w ith  p a rtic u la r a tten tion  g iven  to  the w o rks  o f  Saints Bonaven ture , A lb e r t the  G reat 
and Thom as A qu inas , leads us to  conclude tha t th e ir ana lysis o f  syn deres is  and 
c o n s c ie n tia  is  v e ry  r ich , and o ffe rs  us a great deal in  the w a y  o f  c la r if ic a tio n . In  the
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con tex t o f  th e ir  precise analysis w e  realise tha t the in tro d u c tio n  o f  syn deres is  shou ld  
n o t be understood as an aberration o f  h is to ry  o r an unnecessary a d d itio n a l 
c o m p lica tio n  to  the m eaning o f  conscience. Rather, synderes is  assisted th e o lo g y  b y  
o ffe r in g  a te rm  fo r  an a lready-ex is ting  understanding, n am e ly , tha t conscience 
operates on  the basis o f  an innate, non-de libera tive  in c lin a tio n  to  the m o ra l good, an 
in c lin a tio n  tha t p rov ides the fundam enta l im peratives fro m  w h ic h  sp e c ific  m o ra l 
judgem en ts  are made. In  e ffect, synderesis  operates as the anchor fo r  o b je c t iv ity  in  
m ora ls . T hough  num erous descrip tions o f  the nature o f  c o n s c ie n tia  abounded d u rin g  
the Scho lastic  pe riod , b y  the tim e  o f  Aqu inas i t  had come to  be understood  as an act 
o f  ju d g e m e n t o f  p rac tica l reason, w h ich  is the conc lus ion  o f  the  process o f  an 
a p p lica tio n  o f  un ive rsa l m o ra l p rinc ip les  to  the p a rticu la r s itua tion . D ra w in g  upon  
A r is to tle , Saints A lb e r t and Thom as Aqu inas presented th is  in  te rm s o f  a sy llo g ism . In  
d o ing  so, th e y  recognised bo th  ca pab ility  and fla w , since th is  process o f  d educ tio n  is 
sub ject to  e rro r and fa ilu re . Nevertheless, the M ed ieva ls  also saw  c o n s c ie n tia  as the 
he ra ld  o f  G o d ’ s la w , and so deserving o f  the greatest respect. Indeed, fo r  the 
Scholastics, i t  is its  re la tionsh ip  to  G od and to  the search fo r  the  tru th  roo ted  in  G od 
tha t g ives conscience its  ve ry  d ig n ity  and authority .
W ith  the advent o f  m anua lis tic  m ora l theo logy w e  f in d  tha t the  ro le  o f  
conscience has sh ifted  s ig n ifica n tly , re fle c tin g  the revised fo rm  o f  m o ra lity , nam e ly  
lega l o b lig a tio n . Such a s h ift re flects the progressive im pac t o f  n o m in a lism , w here 
m o ra lity  is atom ised and there fore  analysed in  terms o f  d iscrete acts, ju d g e d  s im p ly  in  
term s o f  obey ing  the law . In  th is  con text sp iritua l-m ora l g ro w th  is g ive n  l i t t le  o r no 
a tten tion , lead ing  to  an ossified , vo lu n ta ris t m o ra lity  o f  o b lig a tio n , and the reby lo s in g  
s igh t o f  the  p o s itive  m o tiva tio n s  beh ind  do ing  the good. H ere m o ra lity  is  seen as an 
im p o s it io n  o r a burden, and so conscience steps to the fo re , no t so m uch  as he ra ld  o f
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the tru th , b u t as p ro tec to r o f  one ’ s lib e rty . Thus, conscience operates as the stage upon  
w h ic h  the tens ion  betw een the freedom  o f  the in d iv id u a l and the a u th o r ity  o f  the 
exte rna l la w -g iv e r p lays  out. D epend ing upon the system adopted b y  a person, in  the 
case o f  unce rta in ty , the in d iv id u a l w o u ld  fee l ob liged  to  c o m p ly  m ore  o r less w ith  the 
a u th o rity . There fo re , a m in im u m  m o ra lity  begins to  flo u r is h , fu e lle d  b y  a g ro w in g  
antagon ism  betw een the in d iv id u a l and authority . T h is  antagon ism  sets up  the con tex t 
fo r  m od e m  o p p o s itio n  between conscience and M ag is te rium , w here  C hu rch  teach ing  
is  seen as a burdensom e im p o s itio n , the m erits  o f  w h ic h  b e ing  ju d g e d  u lt im a te ly  b y  
the in d iv id u a l’ s conscience. In  th is  con text conscience is  pe rce ived  in  an in c re a s in g ly  
su b je c tiv is t m anner, w here externa l teaching can at best o ffe r  adv ice  th a t is  e ithe r 
accepted o r re jected.
3. P a rticu la r  Issu es  C on cern in g  th e  N ature a n d  F u n ction  o f  C o n sc ien ce  
In  tu rn in g  to  the de ta il o f  the nature o f  conscience, fu r th e r e xp lo ra tio n  in to  the 
fu n c tio n  o f  m o ra l reasoning leads us to  recognise that the m ed ieva ls  w ere  r ig h t  to  
d is tin g u ish  betw een the tw o  leve ls  o f  conscience, nam ely, syn deres is  and c o n s c ie n tia . 
T h is  a llo w e d  them  to  m a in ta in  the delicate balance between conscience as a capac ity  
o f  m o ra l ju d g e m e n t tha t is rooted in  ob jective  rea lity , w h ile  s t i l l  be ing  fla w e d  o r 
lim ite d  in  its  achievem ents. T h rough  the w rit in g s  o f  Jose f P ieper and Joseph 
R a tz inge r in  p a rticu la r, w e deepen ou r understanding o f  syn deres is  (o r p r im o rd ia l 
conscience o r an am n es is , as they ca ll it) , so tha t w e appreciate i t  as o u r necessary 
access to  the fundam enta l tru th  o f  re a lity  on an on to log ica l le ve l, and the necessary 
d rive  to  seek good and avo id  e v il tha t underpins a ll o u r m o ra l a c tiv ity . I t  is  th is  
o n to lo g ica l g round in g  tha t g ives conscience its  so lid  p o in t o f  reference, thereby 
p reven ting  i t  fro m  be ing  reduced to  an excuse m echanism . C onscience is  thus the
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a p p lica tio n  o f  the basic know ledge  o f  the good to  the p a rtic u la r concrete s itua tion . 
H ow eve r, such a p p lica tio n  can run  in to  d iff ic u lty , e ithe r in v o lu n ta r ily  o r v o lu n ta r ily , 
th ro u g h  fa u lty  reasoning, psycho log ica l problem s o r sin. Research m ade b y  the f ie ld  
o f  m o d e m  co g n itive  psycho log y  supports the m ed ieva l v ie w  that, fo r  a v a r ie ty  o f  
reasons, w e  m ake frequen t errors in  our m ora l deduction , n o t o n ly  because o f  s in  o r 
o ve rpow erin g  em o tion , b u t also because o f  the defects in  o u r deduc tive  a b ilit ie s . O u r 
re v ie w  o f  the e lem ents supporting  ou r m ora l reasoning rem inds us th a t one m ust also 
be ca re fu l n o t to  reduce conscience so le ly  to  some k in d  o f  dispassionate deduction . 
O the r hum an capacities and tra its  are invo lved  in  co rrec ting  o u r pe rcep tion  o f  re a lity  
and s trengthen ing ou r reso lve  to  act, such as va rious fo rm s  o f  non -ded uc tive  o r 
una rticu la te d  reasoning, l ik e  ins igh t, induc tion  o r p ra ye rfu l d iscernm ent, as w e ll as the 
cons truc tive  in fluence  o f  w e ll-o rde red  passions.
B o th  the study o f  co nsc ien tia  and synderesis  h ig h lig h t the fa c t tha t conscience 
does n o t operate in  iso la tion . Synderesis  does no t create the  fundam en ta l m o ra l 
p rin c ip le s  its e lf, b u t recognises them  in  the fab ric  o f  o u r created be ing  and in  the 
w o r ld  around us. T h is  re co g n itio n  is supported th rough  the m a ie u tic  a c t iv ity  o f  the 
C h u rch ’ s M a g is te riu m , w h ic h  assists th rough the a rticu la tio n  and defence o f  these 
p rin c ip le s . O n  the le ve l o f  conscience our pa rticu la r m o ra l reasoning is  fa r  fro m  
perfect, and so cannot operate in  iso la tion . Therefore, i t  is  in  constant need o f  
deve lopm ent and o f  the assistance o f  others, p a rticu la r ly  the C hurch , as w e ll as G o d ’ s 
m ercy. The deve lopm ent o f  ou r conscience there fore  centres upon  ou r g ro w th  in  
v ir tu e  and grace, in  a l i fe  o f  holiness.
4. C on sc ien ce , Virtue, G race  a n d  th e  C all to H olin ess
T h is  con tex tua l deve lopm ent o f  conscience fo rm s the subject o f  the f in a l tw o  chapters 
o f  th is  thesis. In  d iscussing v ir tu e  o r elements o f  a l ife  o f  ho liness, w e  are faced w ith
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the  d if f ic u lty  o f  c lea ring  aw ay the negative connota tions p resen tly  attached to  some o f  
the ke y  term s. Instead o f  be ing understood as concepts re la ted  to  streng th  o r 
excellence, w o rds  lik e  ‘ v ir tu e ’ , ‘ prudence’ , ‘ tem perance’ o r  ‘ asce tic ism ’ p ro b a b ly  
con ju re  up  ideas o f  a repressed, cautious, p u rita n ica l l i fe  tha t lacks  any  jo y  o r 
exc item ent. H ow eve r, such a v ie w  is a d is to rtio n  o f  a m uch  r ich e r re a lity , one tha t 
a llo w s  us to  m ove  aw ay fro m  a m o ra lity  o f  m ere o b lig a tio n  to  a m o ra lity  o f  g ro w th  
tha t p o s it iv e ly  seeks to  choose and do the good and u lt im a te ly  seeks u n io n  w ith  G od  
ou t o f  love .
V ir tu e  assists in  d isposing the person to  a r ig h t understand ing  o f  the  end o f  
action , and in  ac ting  in  accordance w ith  th is  end, b y  ca rry in g  ou t a good  act, the 
person flou rishes  o r develops m o ra lly . Th is  has obv ious im p lic a tio n s  fo r  the  m o ra l 
conscience, in  tha t v ir tu e  p rov ides the environm en t fo r  b o th  the fu n c tio n in g  and the 
re finem en t o f  ou r m o ra l capacity  fo r  re fle c tio n  and judgem en t. C en tra l to  the  shaping 
o f  conscience so tha t i t  is  perfected o r conna tu ra lly  attuned to  the true  and the good, 
and the re fo re  also to  G o d ’ s w i l l ,  is its  re la tionsh ip  to  the ca rd ina l and th e o lo g ica l 
v irtues . Prudence helps conscience b y  ra is ing  the act o f  ju d g e m e n t to  a n e w  le v e l in  
its  q u a lity  o f  reason ing and m o tiva tion , such tha t the person seeks the best poss ib le  
so lu tio n  fo r  the  concrete circum stances o f  the p rob lem , ra ther than  s im p ly  any one o f  
a num ber o f  le g itim a te  poss ib ilities . Justice prom pts conscience to  ju d g e  w ith  
re sp o n s ib ility  and due care fo r  others. Temperance and fo rtitu d e  support conscience 
b y  o rde ring  o u r passions, p a rticu la r ly  those o f  desire o r fear. In  th is  w a y  o u r m o ra l 
jud g e m e n t is uphe ld  in  the con text o f  tem pta tion  o r danger. H o w e ve r conscience is 
n o t o n ly  o ffe re d  the na tu ra l support o f  hum an v irtu e ; w e are o ffe re d  d iv in e  assistance 
th rough  grace.
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C urren t m o ra l theo log y  is once again g iv in g  greater re co g n itio n  to  the ro le  o f  
grace in  the v irtues  and in  the m ora l l ife  in  general. The ac tion  o f  grace shou ld  
there fo re  n o t be considered as some k in d  o f  aw kw ard  a d d itio n  to  m o ra l theo ry , bu t 
ra ther as the p o w e r o f  G od susta in ing and trans fo rm ing  our live s  in  ho liness. In  th is  
w a y  o u r na tu ra l s tr iv in g  fo r  v irtue  is b rought to  new  he ights, w ith o u t d isca rd in g  the 
necessity o f  o u r o w n  e ffo rt. Grace changes our perspective, so tha t w e  desire  to  g ro w  
in  sym pathy w ith  G o d ’ s ways. Thus, the in fused v irtues, p a rtic u la r ly  the  th e o lo g ica l 
v irtu e s  o f  fa ith , hope and cha rity , d irec t our actions so tha t they  are in  accord  w ith  ou r 
supernatural end. F a ith  draw s us to  liv e  a l ife  in  keep ing w ith  o u r recreated natu re  and 
eternal goal. H ope  sustains ou r e ffo rts  fo r  goodness, even in  the face o f  t r ia l o r fa ilu re , 
and th ro u g h  our p a rtic ip a tio n  in  G od ’ s nature, ch a rity  un ites ou r m in d s  to  G o d ’ s, 
fo rm in g  a ll v irtues  so tha t they re fle c t the u ltim a te  goal o f  love . Such a tra n s fo rm a tio n  
o f  v irtu e , and hence o f  conscience, th rough  the ac tion  o f  grace cannot f lo u r is h  w ith o u t 
the necessary setting. Hence w e conclude tha t the m os t f ru it fu l co n te x t fo r  
deve lopm ent o f  conscience th rough  v irtue  and grace is a l i fe  tha t is liv e d  in  response 
to  the c a ll to  ho liness.
A  l i fe  o f  ho liness as the setting fo r  sp iritu a l-m o ra l g ro w th  necessarily  in vo lve s  
p u r if ic a tio n . Thus the practice  o f  ascesis  fo rm s an essential part o f  the l i fe  o f  grace in  
tha t i t  renews ou r m inds  b y  c lea ring  aw ay a fa lse appraisal o f  ou r actions and p u rif ie s  
ou r in te n tio n  to  fo l lo w  the L o rd . Fundam ental to  th is  renew al o f  o u r m in d s  is  the 
practice  o f  prayer. In  p rayer w e lis ten  fo r  the L o rd , w ith  obedience and d o c il ity ,  in  a 
l iv in g  re la tionsh ip  o f  sons and daughters in  the Son. T h is  re la tio n sh ip  ca lls  us to  
exam ine o u r conscience before  the L o rd , so tha t w e m ay rece ive  h is  m e rcy  and 
hea ling , bu t also so tha t w e  m ay make fru it fu l use o f  the g ifts  o f  the H o ly  S p ir it, 
w h ic h  en ligh ten  o u r m inds  and assist in  bo th  the deeper exam ina tion  and fo rm a tio n  o f
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our consciences. O u r l i fe  in  the S p ir it also leads us to  im ita te  C h ris t, le a rn ing  fro m  
h im  and se rv ing  h im  in  seq uela . Th is pa rtic ip a tio n  in  the l i fe  o f  C h ris t m o u ld s  ou r 
consciences so tha t o u r judgem ents are made w ith  the same a ttitude  o f  lo v in g  se lf- 
sacrifice . U lt im a te ly , how ever, such a life  o f  grace cannot be liv e d  alone. W e liv e  in  
co m m u n io  as the  B o d y  o f  C hris t, nourished by  the L o rd  th rough  the C hurch , and so 
ou r desire fo r  a conscience tha t judges accord ing to  G o d ’ s w ays, and acco rd ing  to  ou r 
eternal goa l, fin d s  its  fu lle s t setting in  the l i fe  o f  the C hurch . In  th is  co n te x t the 
conscience o f  the in d iv id u a l receives support and challenge so th a t in  o u r d a ily  lives  
w e m ay fa ith fu lly  liv e  as G o d ’ s adopted sons and daughters.
T h is  thesis has attem pted to  present a m ora l theo ry  o f  conscience w h ic h  sees 
v ir tu e  and grace in  the con tex t o f  a l ife  o f  holiness as bo th  a rem edy fo r  fragm en ta tio n  
in  m ora l th e o ry  and an environm en t where the C h ris tian  conscience can flo u r is h . 
H ow eve r, such f lo u r is h in g  does no t preclude a ll error. W e w i l l  never reach pe rfe c tio n  
in  th is  life ,  and so o u r m o ra l judgem ents w i l l  s t i l l  be subject to  some ex ten t to  the 
dram a o f  tem p ta tio n  and hum an fra ilty . Nonetheless, th is  does n o t d im in is h  the 
honesty o f  o u r desire to  l iv e  h o ly  lives. In  answering the ca ll to  ho liness every  day we 
are expressing o u r desire to  fo l lo w  the L o rd , and to  a llo w  h im  to  m o u ld  us, so th a t w e 
m ay t ru ly  l iv e  in  lo ve , a “ lo ve  tha t comes fro m  a pure heart, a good conscience, and 
sincere fa ith ”  (1 T im  1:5).
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